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ABSTRACT 
From the international criminal law perspective, unlike the national law perspective, the 
principle of corporate criminal responsibility is not defined neither does the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 1998 provide for it. Therefore, currently, the ICC 
has no jurisdiction over legal persons. It is the argument of this dissertation that legal 
persons can commit atrocities. The exclusion of corporate criminal responsibility from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC undermines the preventative measures that are aimed at putting an 
end to impunity for atrocity crimes under international criminal law. Further that the exclusion 
of corporate criminal liability has potential to create unnecessary dissonance between the 
jurisprudence of the ICC and that of domestic courts. 
The premise for advancing the corporate criminal responsibility, among others, includes: 
first, that prosecuting and punishing corporations for international crimes (attributing criminal 
liability to corporations) would enhance the deterrence theory anticipated by the Rome 
Statute, thereby supplementing the principle of individual criminal responsibility. Second, it 
is trite law that corporations are at law construed as juristic persons vested with rights and 
obligations. Therefore, these legal realities, outweighs the corporations’ perceived lack of 
capacity to commit international crimes. Finally, evidenced by a series of human rights 
violations by corporations, there is a watertight case to argue that corporations are capable 
of being more complicit in the commission of core crimes than is currently assumed. 
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ABSTRAK 
Vanuit die perspektief van die internasionale strafreg, anders as die nasionale 
regsperspektief, word die beginsel van korporatiewe strafregtelike verantwoordelikheid nie 
algemeen erken nie, en die Rome Statuut van die Internasionale Strafhof (ISH) van 1998 
maak ook nie daarvoor voorsiening nie. Daarom het die ISH tans geen jurisdiksie oor 
regspersone nie. Hierdie verhandeling argumenteer dat regspersone gruweldade kan pleeg. 
Die uitsluiting van korporatiewe strafregtelike verantwoordelikheid van die jurisdiksie van die 
ISH ondermyn die voorkomende maatreëls wat ten doel het om straffeloosheid vir 
gruwelmisdade onder internasional reg te beëindig. Verder het die uitsluiting van 
korporatiewe strafregtelike verantwoordelikheid die potensiaal om onnodige onenigheid 
tussen die regspraak van die ISH en dié van nasionale howe te skep. 
Die uitgangspunt vir die bevordering van korporatiewe strafregtelike verantwoordelikheid 
sluit in, onder andere: eerstens, dat die vervolging en strafoplegging van korporasies vir 
internasionale misdade (die toeskryf van strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid aan korporasies) 
die vooropgestelde afskrikkingsteorie van die Rome Statuut sal versterk, en sodoende die 
beginsel van individuele stragregtelike verantwoordelikheid sal aanvul. Tweedens, dit is ‘n 
gevestigde regsbeginsel dat korporasies as regspersone met regte en verpligtinge beskou 
word. Hierdie regsrealiteite weeg dus swaarder as die vooropstelling dat korporasies nie die 
vermoeë het om internasionale misdade te pleeg nie. Ten slotte, soos bewys deur ‘n reeks 
menseregteskendings deur korporasies, kan ‘n waterdigte argument uitgemaak word dat 
korporasies in staat is om meer aandadig aan die pleeg van kernmisdade te wees as wat 
tans aanvaar word. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and the legal framework of the study 
1 1 Orientation of the study 
There is a plethora of academic literature on corporate atrocity crimes.1 The conceptual 
meaning of atrocity refers to extreme cruelty, barbaric acts that committed on large scale or 
in a systematic manner, i.e. mass killing and extermination to mention a few. In this 
dissertation, atrocity crimes2 refer to the following categories of crimes: genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.3  
Notwithstanding corporate complicit in atrocity crimes, a coherent, systematic and 
feasible criminalisation and enforcement regime at the international level is still lacking. This 
is the starting point and basic assumption underlying this study. To introduce the basic 
problem, let us take as an example of the recent reports on the Canadian company SNC-
Lavalin’s crucial role in bankrolling the Gadhafi-regime in Libya;4 a regime alleged to have 
committed atrocity crimes, inter alia, “crime against humanity and war crimes.”5 The situation 
in Libya was bad enough for the UN Security Council to refer6 it to the ICC.7 
 
1 Bush JA “The Prehistory of corporations and conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg 
Really Said” (2009) 109 Colombia Law Review 1094-1262; Catargiu M “The origin of criminal liability of legal 
persons – A comparative perspective” (2013) 3 International Journal of Judicial Sciences 26-30; Cavanaugh 
N “Corporate Criminal Liability: An Assessment of Models of Fault – UK” 75(5) Journal of Criminal Law (2011) 
414-440. 
2 It is important from the outset to explain that the dissertation is not concerned with defining what atrocity 
crimes are, nor the elements of atrocity crimes – but on disjoint caused by exclusion of corporate criminal 
liability from the purview of the ICC and the international criminal law imperative of putting an end to impunity 
for atrocity crimes – particularly: the impunity which is de facto and or de jure enjoyed by corporations. 
3 Art 5(a)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
4 Mark Kersten “Companies helped sustain the Gaddafi regime: They should be held to account” Justice in 
Conflict, (8 April 2019) <https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/04/08/companies-helped-sustain-the-gaddafi-
regime-they-should-be-held-to-account/> (accessed 9 April 2019). 
5 See, Kersten (2019) Justice in Conflict. 
6 S/RES/1970 (2011) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/081a9013-b03d-4859-9d61-
5d0b0f2f5efa/0/1970eng.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2019).  
7 For an overview, see <https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya> (accessed 9 April 2019). 
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Several individuals were subsequently indicted for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The arrest warrant against Muammar Gadhafi, the former leader of Libya, was 
withdrawn due to his death, and the other cases also largely collapsed due to legal and 
factual reasons that will not be explored here. Suffice to note that while the ICC has 
jurisdiction to try individuals (natural persons) for the most serious crimes under international 
law, it does not have jurisdiction over juristic persons (corporations and companies). The 
ICC also does not have jurisdiction over states (only over individual leaders). The ICC’s 
inability to try corporate entities for the commission of or complicity to atrocity crimes is the 
topic of this dissertation. 
1 2 Research question 
Does the exclusion of corporate criminal responsibility from the jurisdiction of the ICC 
cause a counterproductive disconnect between international criminal law, primarily via the 
Rome Statute, and domestic criminal law – a disconnect which, in turn, could exacerbate 
the perceived culture of impunity associated with the commission of atrocity crimes? 
1 3 Research rationale, relevance and objectives 
This dissertation contributes to international criminal law studies by defining and 
delimiting the legal requirements and elements of an envisaged corporate criminal 
responsibility regime under the ICC. The working assumption is therefore that there should 
be a legal regime at the international level to hold corporations responsible for their 
contribution to atrocity crimes. It further provides a substantive and procedural criminal law 
framework for corporate criminal responsibility for the purposes of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC. This is because as a primary objective, the dissertation identifies and discusses the 
elements that are needed and the requirements that should be met for purposes of holding 
corporations criminally responsible under the Rome Statute and at the ICC. 
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The secondary objective of the dissertation is to propose less dissonance and more 
positive complementarity8 between the ICC and domestic legal systems with regard to the 
issue of corporate criminal liability for atrocity crimes under international law. It is important 
to state that the efforts related to the proposal of less dissonance and more positive 
complementarity between domestic legal systems and the ICC is not done in isolation or by 
strictly analysing the binary of domestic law, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. Rather, it includes a broader and more diversified view of a 
possible corporate criminal responsibility regime for atrocity crimes. 
It further includes analyses of the possible disruption or fragmentation created by regional 
mechanisms such the Malabo Protocol of the African Union (which is not in operation yet) 
and relevant perspectives from the European Union. Therefore, in order to attain the two 
core objective, the following components of the research project are identified: Firstly, the 
dissertation demonstrates that prosecuting and punishing corporations for international 
crimes (attributing criminal liability to corporations) enhances the deterrence theory 
considered by the Rome Statute, thereby supplementing the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility. Conversely, the dissertation demonstrates that in terms of the Rome Statute, 
the failure of the ICC to expressly hold corporations criminally responsible has the potential 
to exacerbate the perpetration of atrocities by corporations. It is therefore argued that 
subjecting corporations to a criminal regime under international criminal law, particularly 
through the instrumentality of the Rome Statute, would help to put an end to impunity for 
crimes perpetrated by corporations and other organised structures. 
 
8 Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which provides that “(…) International Criminal 
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” See also Art 1 
of the Rome Statute, which provides for the following: “An International Criminal Court (‘the Court’) is hereby 
established. (...) and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”; X Philippe “The Principles of 
Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How do the Two Principle Intermesh?” (2006) 88 IRRC 375 380, 
explains that “the principle of complementarity is a functional principle that is aimed at granting jurisdiction to 
a subsidiary body when the main body fails to exercise its primacy jurisdiction.” In a nutshell, this principle is 
largely function as a middle ground between state sovereignty and the universal jurisdiction principle of the 
ICC. It also functions as a concrete means of implementing the Rome Statute by domestic courts. 
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The assumption is clear: Upholding the theory that corporations cannot commit criminal 
activities amounts to turning a blind eye to reality9 and negates an effective mechanism for 
suppressing any criminal activities perpetrated by corporations.10 In essence, the 
dissertation advocates for the Rome Statute to be amended in order to accommodate 
corporate criminal responsibility alongside the principle of individual criminal liability and to 
allow the ICC to be entrusted with jurisdiction over legal persons. The benefits of such 
inclusion include the following: (i) it effectuates the legitimisation of the domestic prosecution 
of corporations which, in turn, improves the complementarity principle; (ii) it ensures 
predictability in international criminal law; (iii) it has great potential for creating uniformity in 
the attribution of criminal accountability to companies; and (iv) it effectively closes the 
loopholes caused by the failure to prosecute corporations.11 
Secondly, the dissertation demonstrates that upon incorporation, corporations acquire 
rights and obligations,12 which include the right to sue and be sued, the right to acquire 
property in the corporation’s name and to dispose of the same, and the right to conduct 
business for the benefit of the corporation. It is settled law that upon incorporation a company 
(corporation) acquires a separate legal personality from its members;13 therefore, given 
 
9 DM Amann “Capital punishment: Corporate criminal liability for gross violations of human rights (Holding 
multinational corporations responsible under international law)” (2001) 24(3) HICLR 327 331. 
10 See, New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v U.S. 212 U.S. 481 (1909) 495 in which the court held that 
“the law cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern times are 
conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands, 
and giving them immunity from all punishment because of the old principle that corporations cannot commit a 
crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the 
abuses aimed at”. 
11 PH Bucy “Corporate criminal liability: When does it make sense?” (2009) 46(4) ACLR 1437 1437. 
12 Lee v Lee’s Air Farming [1961] AC 12; S Goulding Principles of Company Law (1996) 40 argues that “[o]nce 
registered in a manner required by law, a company forms a new legal entity separate from the shareholders, 
even where there is only a bare compliance with the provisions of the Act and where the overwhelming majority 
of the issued shares are held by one person.” 
13 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619. 
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these legal realities, it is submitted that corporations’ perceived lack of capacity14 to commit 
international crimes should be challenged.15 
Thirdly, the dissertation demonstrates that there is substance to the argument that 
corporations are capable of being more complicit in the commission of core crimes than is 
currently assumed. Core crimes may be committed in different ways, including commission 
by omission. Goodin posits that “[t]he actors’ failure to discharge responsibility for different 
tasks and their ex ante duties to ensure that certain harms do not happen”16 may indeed 
qualify as a mechanism that has merit in attributing criminal liability to corporations. 
Therefore, it is inevitable that corporations’ complicity should be scrutinised. 
Fourthly, the dissertation illustrates that in order to effectively deter corporations from 
committing gross human rights abuses, and core crimes in particular; the ICC must introduce 
criminal sanctions against corporations. It is worth to note that at present, criminal sanctions 
against corporations are the subject of much debate. Scholars argue that the use of civil 
sanctions and administrative fines is not very effective, especially “where the cost of harm 
exceeds the damages that are likely to be imposed on the corporation”.17 In contrast, the 
stigma associated with the imposition of criminal sanctions may very well help to bridge the 
 
14 PL Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 8 ed (2008) 153 posits that the concept 
of capacity when applied in the context of companies can be traced back to the 19th century when the concept 
of a ‘company’s legal capacity’ was developed by the courts; more specifically, the company’s capacity to act 
was limited by its objects. The practice was that a company was required by legislation to include a statement 
of its objects in its memorandum of association; hence, companies were not allowed to act outside their objects. 
15 JW Ehrlich Ehrlich’s Blackstone (1959) 106 – the Blackstone theory states that “a corporation cannot commit 
treason or felony or other crime in its corporate capacity, though its members may in their distinct individual 
capacities”. The approach that corporations cannot commit crimes should be challenged. Among the reasons 
for challenging this approach are obvious, including that the characteristics of present-day corporations no 
longer resemble those of the guilds whose functions were to control the rights to engage in business and that 
corporations could not engage in any business activities except through their members. Modern corporations 
have rights and duties, the capacity to acquire and dispose of property, and the right to sue and be sued in the 
corporation’s name; TJ Bernard “The historical development of corporate criminal liability” (1984) 22(1) 
Criminology 3 4; J Kyriakakis “Prosecuting Corporations for International Crimes: The Role for Domestic 
Criminal Law” in L May & Z Hoskins International Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) 118. 
16 RE Goodin “Apportioning Responsibility” (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 181 183; SL Seck “Collective 
Responsibility and transnational corporate conduct” in T Isaacs & R Vernon (eds) Accountability for collective 
wrongdoing (2011) 148. 
17 VS Khanna “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?” (1996) 109(7) Harvard Law Review 
1477 1479. 
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gap between expectations of justice, on the one hand, and the reality of what is perhaps 
perceived to be a “slap on the wrist” if there are not serious reputational consequences for 
the corporate entity involved in the relevant atrocity, on the other hand. Hence, it is argued 
and indeed, recommended, that the ICC should introduce appropriate criminal sanctions (in 
conjunction with criminal liability) against corporations for atrocity crimes committed by them. 
Fifthly, the dissertation demonstrates and recommend that apart from the strict liability 
and vicarious liability modes, there are other feasible modes that may be applied in the 
process of attributing criminal liability to corporations, including “co-perpetration, joint 
criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting.”18 The latter mode of responsibility contemplates 
bringing justice to remote participants or offenders who may not be present physically at the 
crime scene but whose role may be crucial to the successful commission of the crime. 
Finally, the dissertation demonstrates that the primacy jurisdiction and the 
complementarity principle contemplated in the Rome Statute mandate state parties to 
implement the Rome Statute.19 Domestic courts, pursuant to bringing an end to the impunity 
enjoyed by corporations, may try and punish such corporations for international crimes. 
However, there must be national laws in place that proscribe corporate criminal activities. 
Relevant reform of the Rome Statute legal regime may contribute to domestic law reform, 
which, in turn, will help to close the impunity gap with respect to corporations in the context 
of atrocity crimes.20 
1 4 Research methodology 
The dissertation adopted a qualitative study approach – with object to obtain in-depth 
data on the exclusion of corporate criminal responsibility from the purview of the ICC. For 
 
18 These are some of the principles that may perfectly apply to corporations. 
19 Art 1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
20 Kyriakakis “Prosecuting Corporations” in Law and Philosophy 117; Bernard (1984) Criminology 3; G Mueller 
“Mens Rea and Corporation” (1957) 19 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 21 21. 
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this reason, the conclusions made in the dissertation were not arrived at by means of 
quantification or any mathematical computation. 
A desktop data collection method was used which included a review of secondary legal 
data and literature without undertaking field work. The desktop research activities included, 
search for materials related to the topic in libraries and electronic libraries databases; 
conducted searches through internet sources, specifically, google scholar search engine; 
blogs as well as print and web-based media handles. 
The secondary data mainly included information obtained from published physical books 
and electronic books, electronic peer viewed journals, media reports and reports from the 
United Nations website. The information obtained was subsequently synthesised by drawing 
parallels or comparison (comparative study) between national jurisprudence, regional 
perspectives, and the jurisprudence of the ICC, thereby providing conclusions and 
theoretical results. The secondary sources, which help to inform the theoretical framework 
of the dissertation, were supplemented by an in-depth scrutiny of relevant secondary data 
sources (treaties, constitutions, legislations, common law, and customary international law) 
and the jurisprudence from national and international courts and tribunals.  
The study did not involve any form of fieldwork or field surveys. Thus, it was purely a 
desktop-based research and was construed as a low risk form of study and was as such 
cleared in terms of the institutional rules that governs research ethical clearance.  
1 5 Limitation of study and demarcation of the issues 
The dissertation is constructed and premised on theoretical underpinning, in contrast to 
empirical observations or experiments that may lead to conclusions that can be verified 
through empirical testing. The choice of “core crimes” which form part of the focus of this 
study needs to be briefly explained and justified. There is an elegant Latin maxim that 
encapsulates the problem: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Essentially, it means to 
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include is to exclude. The inclusion/exclusion here refers to the list of crimes that would 
qualify as international/atrocity/core crimes. There is some debate about terminology in 
academic circles. Terms like “international crimes”, “crimes under international law”, “atrocity 
crimes” and “core crimes” refer to different things.  
There are also important overlaps. The approach adopted in this dissertation is the one 
followed by Werle and Jessberger. They recognise that certain crimes, like piracy, terrorism 
and drug trafficking, are “crimes of international concern (and are as such criminalised under 
treaty law and/or customary international law).”21 The proposition that these “international 
crimes” attract direct criminal accountability at international law level, is contested. A smaller 
group of “[c]rimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of 
aggression, involve direct individual responsibility under international law.”22 These are also 
known as the “core crimes” and “are the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community”.23 From the potential list of “international crimes” (which would include treaty 
crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking) it is only the core crimes 
that are provided for in the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
The ICC – the “first permanent international criminal court” ˗ is an imperfect institution (to 
say the least) but the working assumption underlying this dissertation is that the ICC is still 
the best available international (and potentially global) vehicle to end impunity for the atrocity 
crimes. Hence, the choice to use the Rome Statute as a basic framework of analysis for 
purposes of this dissertation. This choice would imply that the topic of corporate criminal 
responsibility should then be considered with reference to all the crimes under the Rome 
Statute, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. 
For purposes of possible corporate criminal responsibility as a mode of liability for atrocity 
crimes a further distinction and demarcation is necessary. Three of the crimes (or, to be 
 
21 G Werle & F Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law 3ed (2014) 31. 
22 Werle & Jessberger International Criminal Law 31. 
23 Werle & Jessberger International Criminal Law 32. 
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more precise, groups of crimes) namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, 
have one element in common:  they all involve severe violations of human rights. Kai Ambos 
puts it as follows: 
“[These] can be regarded as the decision norms (Sanktionsnormen) concerning severe violations 
of human rights as their conduct norms (Verhaltensnormen).’24 
The fourth core crime – the crime of aggression – has one very prominent feature that 
sets it apart, namely its characterisation as a leadership crime par excellence. Moreover, 
this leadership feature refers by definition to a person “in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”25 The crime of aggression 
therefore falls in a class of its own, even though it also forms part of the class of “core crimes” 
included in the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute of the ICC. This dissertation’s focus is not 
on the elements of crimes. The focus is on of models of responsibility – with specific 
emphasis on corporate criminal responsibility. The title of this dissertation therefore contains 
the demarcating reference to “atrocity crimes” in order to limit the focus to the three core 
crimes that are not per definition political and military leadership crimes, but that could also 
(theoretically) be committed by actors other than natural persons (of whatever rank or 
position). 
1 6 Contextualisation of the problem statement  
There is currently no harmonisation between the practice of domestic courts and that of 
the ICC regarding criminal accountability of corporations. The technical reason is obvious: 
The Rome Statute excludes corporate criminal responsibility from the jurisdiction of the ICC 
– by not making a provision for corporate criminal responsibility in the text of the Rome 
Statute. In contradistinction, domestic legislations (laws) in several states makes provision 
 
24 K Ambos “International economic criminal law” (2018) Criminal Law Forum 499 501.  
25 Art 8bis(1) Rome Statute of the ICC; G Kemp Individual Criminal Liability for the International Crime of 
Aggression 2ed (2016) 180.  
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for corporate criminal responsibility,26but the ICC does not recognise this concept. The lack 
of recognition of this concept by the ICC is problematic in the sense that it creates a 
disjointed legal regime on responsibility for atrocity crimes – between the domestic and 
international law. 
The debate on criminal responsibility of body corporates under the ICC has a history.27 
In 1998, the Rome Conference had an opportunity to deliberate on a request or proposal of 
whether to include corporate criminal responsibility in the purview of the ICC. Accordingly, 
Draft Article 23(5) of the Rome Statute sought to provide for corporate criminal responsibility 
scheme. However, this proposal did not succeed because some states objected to its 
inclusion. The grounds for this objection included concerns that the principle of corporate 
criminal responsibility was not practiced in some states, which raised “[q]uestions of how 
various national penal systems would accommodate it”.28 The Rome Conference did not 
exhaust this comparative law challenge; as a result, the principle of corporate criminal 
liability was not included in the final text of the Rome Statute. 
The inception of the ICC in 2002 was without doubt a historic achievement in international 
criminal law and in the sphere of public international law. Among others, the object of the 
ICC is to put an end to impunity for those responsible for committing international core 
crimes. More than a decade has passed since the ICC has commenced its operations, yet 
juristic persons are still excluded from its jurisdiction, even though there was a Review 
Conference in 2010 where states party to the Rome Statute had the opportunity to amend 
the Rome Statute. 
 
26 See, for instance, sect 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 South Africa. See also sect 332 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 Namibia; Arts 121-122 of the French Penal Code; Art 5 of the Belgian Penal 
Code as amended by the Belgium Law of May 4, 1999; Art 51 of the Dutch Penal Code (Netherlands); the 
United States of America; Canada; Denmark (amended its Penal Code in 2002 to accommodate corporate 
criminal liability); CN Nana “Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: A need to look beyond vicarious liability” 
(2011) 55(1) JAL 86 89; EB Diskant “Comparative corporate criminal liability: Exploring the uniquely American 
doctrine through comparative criminal procedure” (2008) 118(1) YLJ 127 128. 
27 A Voiculescu “Human rights and the new corporate accountability: Learning from recent developments in 
corporate criminal liability” (2009) 87(2) JBE 419 420. 
28 A Clapham Human Rights Obligations of non-state actors (2006) 246. 
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It is worth noting that there is a plethora of literature citing concrete examples of 
corporations having been thought to be involved in or having been implicated in grave 
violations of human rights,29some of which are sometimes “considered criminally 
wrongful.”30 For instance, among others, the participation (complicit) of Kangura radio in the 
crime of genocide in Rwanda.31 Kangura radio was active in making announcements which 
directed the Tutsi who were in hiding to go to certain alleged designated rescue points 
(places where they could be rescued by police officials). The Tutsi, who were in hiding, 
followed the directions as per the announcements with hope to be rescued. Upon their arrival 
at the said designated points they found themselves surrounded, captured and killed by the 
Hutus. In this case the Kangura radio played an essential role of deceiving the Tutsi by 
promising them rescue. This, case is discussed in detail in chapter 4 below. 
However, suffices to argue that despite the implication of corporations in serious human 
rights abuses (constituting crimes such as torture, forced labour, rape and so forth),32there 
is still no forum at international criminal law, including the ICC, that has the jurisdiction to 
bring these corporations to justice. In other words, it would seem that for the last decade, 
despite advances made in terms of bringing an end to impunity for individuals, including 
heads of state, accused of crimes under international law, corporations have enjoyed both 
de facto and de jure impunity for these crimes, at least in terms of the first permanent ICC.33 
Situations that demonstrate corporations’ complicity in international crimes include 
incidents such as Unocal, Talisman Energy, Anvil Mining (DRC) and Lundin Oil AB, to 
mention but a few. These concrete situations are fully analysed in chapter 3 below. 
 
29 JW Harlow “Corporate criminal liability for homicide: A statutory framework” (2011) 61(1) DLR 123; MJ Kelly 
“Grafting the command responsibility doctrine onto corporate criminal liability for atrocities (A worldwide 
response: An examination of international law frameworks in the aftermath of national disasters)” (2010) EILR 
24(2) 671 672.  
30 Seck “Collective Responsibility” in Accountability 5; Kyriakakis “Prosecuting Corporations” in Law and 
Philosophy 108. 
31 See, detailed discussion in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
32 Clapham Human Rights Obligations 252. 
33 WC Wanless “Corporate liability for international crimes under Canada’s crime against humanity and war 
crime” (2009) 7 JICJ 201 202. 
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1 7 Theorising about the problem associated with corporate criminal liability 
The exclusion of the principle of corporate criminal responsibility from the text of the Rome 
Statute and from the jurisdiction of the ICC presents two major challenges. In the first place, 
the exclusion undermines the object of the ICC of thwarting impunity for those responsible 
for atrocities, in the sense that atrocities committed by corporations at international level go 
without punishment. Contrast to atrocities committed by natural persons. Of course, other 
collectives and abstract entities, inter alia, states are also not included within the ICC’s, but 
the “[c]onduct of states can be adjudicated before other international fora, notably the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).”34 
Secondly, the exclusion creates discord between the jurisprudence of the ICC and that of 
domestic courts. Among the root causes for the exclusion of corporate criminal liability from 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is the objection by civil law states based on the principle of societas 
delinquere non potest. Apart from this objection, the other cause is partly rooted in the fact 
that the drafters of the Rome Statute failed to appreciate the consequences of organisation 
theory and the dynamics of corporations in attributing criminal liability. 
Max Weber describes a corporation as an institution that is systematically organised and 
whose functions are linked in a hierarchical order.35Thus, Weber’s description of an ideal 
corporation entails a firm that has goals, a hierarchy of offices (structure), policies and rules. 
The legal implications of corporate rules and policies include that the behaviour of an 
individual employee is limited. McGuire states that “an individual employed by a corporation 
is conceived as a means to an end”.36 In a nutshell, the crux of organisation theory entails 
that a corporation is a functional unit or institution that musters its human and capital 
resources towards the full realisation of its corporate objectives and goals. These corporate 
 
34 Croatia v Serbia ICJ para 140 Judgment delivered on 3 February 2015 on the application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
35 M Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation Translated by AM Henderson & T Parsons, 
edited by T Parsons (1946) 71; H H Gerth & C Wright Mills From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) 20. 
36 JW McGuire Theories of Business Behaviour (1964) 31. 
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objectives are often not identical to the interests of the individual employees who are 
employed by such a corporation.37 
Larry May extends Max Weber’s organisation theory and describes a corporation as “[a] 
conglomerate that has internal decision-making procedures”.38 In this manner, corporations 
function according to established procedures and not according to the whims and caprices 
of the employees; hence, these sets of corporate procedures, policies and practices may be 
evidence of corporate intention.39In HL Bolton (Engineering) Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd,40 
Denning held that: 
“A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which 
controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions 
from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are 
nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others 
are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control 
what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is 
treated by law as such.”41 
It is therefore submitted that although corporations are abstract entities without a mind of 
their own or a tangible physical body, as Haldane in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic 
Petroleum Co Ltd42 held, “their directing mind and will must consequently be sought in the 
person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the 
corporation.”43 
 
37 McGuire Theories 29. 
38 L May “Collective Punishment and Mass Confinement” in T Isaacs & R Parson Accountability for Collective 
Wrongdoing (2011) 169 170. 
39 May “Collective Punishment” in Accountability 171. 
40 [1957] 1 QB 159. 
41 Para 172. 
42 [1915] AC 705 713. 
43 Para 713. 
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The development of business corporations and their recognition as legal persons mean 
that corporations are not regarded merely as an aggregate of persons; rather, they are 
conglomerates with internal control measures and mechanisms. These internal mechanisms 
include, among others, corporations’ capacity to make and implement decisions.44 It is 
commonplace that these corporate decisions and practices are in many jurisdictions 
construed as constituting a true reflection of the “corporate knowledge, aims, objects or 
intentions”,45 unless the contrary is proven. These decisions are often made for the benefit 
of the corporations as opposed to that of the individual members (including directors). 
Resolutions passed or decisions taken and implemented by corporations may have 
adverse effects on human rights that may reach the threshold of atrocity crimes. Under these 
circumstances, it is worth noting that it is unfair and unreasonable to reduce or attribute such 
decisions to an individual member(s) to the exclusion of the corporation itself without 
prejudicing the individual (natural person).46 This is because, but for the business benefit 
that accrued to the corporation(s), the individual member(s) could not by his/her own volition 
have participated in the decision-making process. Therefore, this indicates the corporate 
mind in contrast to the individual member(s)’ intentions and without doubt requires, as Wells 
puts it, “a special kind of intentionality, namely ‘corporate policy’”.47 
It is submitted that the complexity of corporations and the technicalities related to 
corporate decision-making make it difficult for the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility to be sufficiently appreciated. Now, it is relevant to note a number of decision-
making models that may help us to understand corporate organisational behaviour. Such an 
understanding can help to shape arguments when debating whether to hold corporations 
criminally liable or not. 
 
44 Goulding Principles 47. 
45 Seck “Collective Responsibility” in Accountability 146. 
46 H van der Wilt “Corporate criminal responsibility for international crimes: Exploring the possibilities” (2013) 
12(1) CJIL 43 48. 
47 C Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility 2 ed (2001) 79-80. 
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There are three business decision-making models that have been identified as being 
relevant to the question of whether to hold corporations criminally responsibility or not. The 
first is the rational actor model. This model holds that “corporations are unitary rational 
decision makers”48with the effect that the decisions taken within the corporation are solely 
for and in the interests of the corporation (maximising corporate value) in contrast to the 
interests of the individual member(s).49The proponents of this model argue that to impose 
criminal sanctions for wrongful conduct flowing from this model on an individual member is 
unfair and prejudicial to the individual member because no pleasure or benefits accrued to 
or were enjoyed by the individual member. Therefore, to effectively deter criminal activities 
committed under this model, sanctions should be imposed against corporations. 
The second model is the organisational process model, which considers corporations to 
be akin to a “[c]onstellation of loosely allied independent decision making bodies or units”50 
that are regulated by a set of standardised procedures. The assumption under this model is 
that liability should be assumed with regard to individuals who are in a position to enact (in 
a managerial position) the criminogenic set of procedures, to the exclusion of members of 
lower ranking. 
The third model is the bureaucratic politics model. This model presupposes that 
individuals use the legal personality of corporations for their own private interests, which are 
distinct from those of the corporations.51 In essence, in such cases corporations may be 
used as an instrument for committing crimes, for example to finance terrorism and aid and 
abet atrocities. The proponents of this model argue that when corporations commit crimes, 
such corporations may be declared as criminal organisations. Moreover, despite this 
 
48 B Fisse & J Braithwaite Corporations Crime and Accountability (1993) 102. 
49 N Cavanaugh “Corporate criminal liability: An assessment of models of fault in UK” (2011) 75(5) JCL 
414 415. 
50 Fisse & Braithwaite Corporations 102. 
51 Fisse & Braithwaite Corporations 103. 
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declaration the courts should proceed in “piercing the corporate veil”52 to ensure that the 
authors of these atrocities who are hiding behind the corporate veil are held individually 
criminal liable. 
In Foss v Harbottle53, the famous English precedent, the court found that a company may 
institute a suit against any person – here, a body corporate has locus standi to sue in its 
capacity as plaintiff in the proceedings, in contrast to its members. It is on this premise, as 
it is argued in this dissertation, that where a body corporate commits an offence – the 
corporation itself should be liable.  In essence, the view here, is that corporate criminal 
responsibility and individual criminal liability both strongly advance the object of putting an 
end to impunity. Therefore, they stand in a complementary position to each other in the 
process of social control and should not be construed as a mutually exclusive means of 
social control. 
1 8 An overview of the substantive chapters 
The dissertation consists of seven substantive chapters. Chapter 1: The foundational 
chapter contains the research question, the rationale and the methodology that inform the 
research and presentation thereof in the various chapters of the dissertation. Chapter1 also 
contains some definitional and foundational discussions, including an elucidation and 
discussion of the concepts of corporation and corporate criminal responsibility. It explains 
the rationale, the relevance of undertaking the study and state the contribution that the study 
will make to the legal literature. The chapter places the problem statement informing the 
research in its proper context. In addition, the chapter also explores the contours of the 
challenges associated with the criminal responsibility for body corporates for atrocity crimes 
 
52 Declaring an organisation a criminal organisation has far-reaching consequences because all those 
associated or affiliated with such an organisation may be deemed to have had knowledge that such an 
organisation is indeed a criminal organisation. This may adversely affect those who are/were innocently 
associated with that organisation. Hence, piercing the corporate veil helps to identify the real culprits and to 
exonerate innocent members. 
53 (1843) 67 ER 189. 
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under both the jurisdiction of the ICC and domestic jurisdictions. The object, being to lay the 
foundation for the in-depth analyses of the various doctrinal and policy issues addressed in 
the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2: The origins and historical development of the principle of corporate criminal 
liability: An analysis from selected domestic jurisprudence. The chapter firstly analyses the 
origin and historical evolution of the principle of corporate criminal liability. Secondly, it 
expound on the principle of legal personality (concept of juristic person) and how legal 
personality influences corporate capacity. Further, it demonstrates that corporations have, 
among others, the capacity to act, to sue and to be sued for wrongful conduct, to acquire 
property and to dispose of such property, and further that these rights impose corresponding 
obligations. Thirdly, it includes a discussion on the inclusion and exclusion of the principle 
of corporate criminal liability at domestic level. For this purpose, selected jurisdictions are 
analysed, notably South Africa (SA), Namibia, the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden and the 
United States of America (USA), that recognise criminal responsibility of body corporates; 
and civil law states, such as Germany, Italy and France, which recognise varying forms of 
corporate criminal and/or administrative liability. 
Chapter 3: The principle of corporate criminal liability and the international criminal 
tribunals: The unfinished business from Nuremberg to The Hague and beyond. This chapter 
analyses the practice and the legacy of the Nuremberg trials, including the trials under the 
Control Council Law, and other international criminal tribunals, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTR), The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the 
jurisprudence of the Special Courts for Sierra Leone. Further, it discusses the theories 
behind the withdrawal of Draft Article 23(5) from the Rome Statute. There is profound 
dissonance between the ICC and domestic courts concerning corporate criminal liability. 
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Chapter 4: Corporations and human rights violations. The chapter analyses illustrative 
incidences of body corporates and human rights infringement. The analysis is narrowed 
down to then focus specifically on systemic violations that would amount to crimes under 
international law (the atrocity crimes). It is shown that there are various ways in which 
corporations may commit, conspire, or to “aid and abet the commission of atrocity crimes.”54 
The discussion in this chapter include the analysis of important cases such as the Unocal 
case, the Talisman Energy case, the Anvil Mining (DRC) case, the Shell Nigeria case and 
the Lundin Oil AB case. The essence of the chapter is to provide evidence and to 
demonstrate that body corporates can commit crimes at the systemic or atrocity level. 
Chapter 5: Forms of criminal responsibility: Attribution to corporations of actus reus and 
mens rea for international crimes. Firstly, this chapter analyses two important approaches 
that are relevant in the process of imputing actus reus and attribution of mens rea on the 
corporation, inter alia: the nominalist approach on one end, and on the other end, the realist 
approach. The nominalist (derivative) approach encompasses principles such as command 
responsibility, senior management test, aggregation, and vicarious liability as modes 
through which criminal responsibility may attach on body corporates. In contrast to the 
nominalist approach is the realist approach that contemplates to hold body corporates 
criminally responsible for atrocities by means of invoking “corporate culture and structural 
negligence.”55 Secondly, the chapter contrasts rules of corporate criminal responsibility with 
the modes of liability currently available at the ICC, which excludes the modes of 
responsibility of body corporates explored in this chapter. 
Chapter 6: Prosecution and punishment: Exploring how corporations may be criminally 
sanctioned under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for international crimes. 
To unpack the contents of this chapter, firstly it discusses the theories of punishment, 
 
54 See, detailed discussion on how corporation may be complicity in the commission of atrocity crimes in 
chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
55 These are new principles that anticipate holding body corporates responsible. 
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including retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence. These are analysed within the framework 
of criminal responsibility of body corporates. It further acknowledges the fact that 
corporations are excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC and therefore corporations cannot 
be prosecuted and punished by the ICC for international crimes. Given this proposition, this 
chapter surveys the possibilities of prosecuting corporations for atrocity crimes and analyse 
the nature of punishment that may be appropriate for corporations, including, among others, 
criminal fines, declaring corporations as criminal organisations, adverse publication and 
compulsory deregistration of corporations. Chapter 7: Submissions and conclusions. This 
chapter contains the main conclusions and submissions. 
1 9 A brief primer on a key concept: What is a corporation? 
The definitions of the entities known as “corporations” and “companies” are contentious 
and is far from being settled as it is demonstrated below. The purpose of providing a 
discussion on these concepts is multifaceted. It is important to illustrate the conceptual 
nexus between the corporation and corporate criminal responsibility. Further, to show to that 
body corporates possess features (legal personality, company as a system, corporate 
culture) from which their capacity to act may be inferred from – including the capacity to 
commit crimes. 
In literature, (referencing mostly the broad corporate tradition influenced by English and 
US law) there seems to be a theoretical distinction between “companies” and “corporations.” 
The terminological distinction includes the proposition that ownership of a company is vested 
in its members. By contrast, shareholders own corporations.56 Further, members manages 
the company, whereas, executives and officers of the corporation are responsible for its 
management subject to the board of directors’ oversight. Thus, the effect of this distinction 
is that a corporation may possess the characteristics of a company; in contrast, a company 
 
56 S J Skripak “Forms of business ownership” (2016) 120 <http://hdl.handle.net/10919/70961> accessed 
(2019/02/28). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
is not capable of possessing characteristics which are unique to a corporation.57 Implicitly, 
the concept of corporation has a wider scope than the word company. It is submitted that 
for purposes of this dissertation, the distinction between the two concepts is recognized, but 
the dissertation will use both terms. The reasons being that practically, both companies and 
corporations are creatures of the law (statutes, for the most part, but historically also under 
common law58). Both are conferred with legal personality distinct from their founders and 
that they may be formed for gain or not for gain. It should also be noted here that these 
observations are fairly generalising and with reference to the main national jurisdictions that 
feature in this dissertation. It follows that reference to the word company, unless otherwise 
specifically stated, means corporation and vice versa.59 
The origins of the entities that later became “companies” and “corporations” under English 
law can be traced back to the English borough and gild merchant. Although corporations 
existed in some form in the ancient world (Greece and Rome),60 it is doubtful that modern 
English law found inspiration in these ancient constructs. The true foundations of the modern 
English corporation and company are the abovementioned borough and gild, and by 
extension, the foreign trading companies which extended their operations from the craft 
guilds in the early 1500’s.61 A detailed discussion on guilds is undertaken in Chapter 2 below. 
For purposes of this chapter, it suffices to state that at domestic level modern companies 
may be classified as private or public companies.62 Despite this classification, the definition 
 
57 Skripak “Forms of business ownership” (2016) 120. 
58 J Grant The Law of Corporations (1854) 18 (cited in L W Hein “The British business company: Its origins 
and its control” 15 U Toronto LJ 134 (1963) 134.  
59 Y Zhang “Corporate criminal responsibility in China: Legislations and its deficiency” (2012) 3 Beijing Law 
Review, 103 -108 at 103 defines corporations interchangeably with organisations as “meaning any kind of 
entities, groups especially those in private sectors which are organised loosely, whereas the term of unit 
includes not only any companies, enterprises, institutions and organisations, but also some entities in public 
sector, such as the state organ which is the organ of state authorities or administrations. 
60 S Williston “History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800” 2 Harvard Law Rev 117 (1888) 108. 
61 L W Hein “The British business company: Its origins and its control” (1963) 135-136. 
62 Chapter 3 Part 1 of the Namibian Companies Act 28 of 2004. 
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of the term company caters for both the private and public companies. The (South African) 
Companies Act63, defines a company with reference to: 
“a juristic person incorporated in terms of this Act, a domesticated company, or a juristic person 
that immediately before the effective date- 
(a) was registered in terms of the  
(i) Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973), other than as an external company as defined 
in that Act; or  
(ii) Close Corporation Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984) if it has subsequently been converted 
in terms of schedule 2;  
(b) was in existence and recognized as an existing company in terms of the Companies Act, 
1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973); or 
(c) was deregistered in terms of the Companies Act 1973 (Act No. 61 0f 1973) and has 
subsequently been re-registered in terms of this Act.”64 
From the definition above, it is apparent that for an association of people or conduct of 
business to be construed as a company, it must be incorporated or registered in the country 
of origin. Further that upon registration, the company becomes a juristic person. Finally, 
organisations that are recognized as companies may either be of domestic or external 
(international) origins. The statutory connotation of company as provided above does not 
depict all the features of what a company is, as it only identifies certain features such as 
incorporation and legal personality of companies. On the face of the statutory definition, key 
features such as association of people, contributions, and intangibility, are not readily 
provided. 
Thus, to bring to the fore a definition that depicts salient features of what a company is, 
resort may be had to jurisprudence and scholarly works. Davies describes a company as 
“an association of a number of people for some common object or objects.”65 It follows from 
 
63 Act 71 of 2008 of South Africa. 
64 Section 1 of Namibian Companies Act 28 of 2004 provides that “a company incorporated under Chapter 4 
of this Act and includes any body which, immediately before the commencement of this Act, was a company 
in terms of the repealed Act.” This definition includes companies registered or incorporated outside the 
Namibian territory. 
65 Davies Company law 4. 
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Davies’ description of company that the meaning of common object(s) may include forming 
a company for purpose of carrying out business to gain profit or not for profit.66 Wardell 
defines a corporation in an extended manner to include not only the association of persons 
for a common goal as defined by Davies, but rather “as an association of individual people 
created by law, and it exist independent of the existence of its members, and powers and 
liability distinct from those of its members.”67 Zinnecker describes a corporation as an 
“[i]maginary being without a mind but the mind of its servants, it has no voice but the voice 
of its servants, and it has no hands with which to act but the hands of its servants”.68 
There is agreement, at least in theory, by scholars that the definitions of corporation 
provided above might well extend with necessary amendments to include multinational 
corporations or transnational corporations (TNCs).69 This suggestion is premised, among 
others, on the following elements: first, both domestic corporations and TNCs have countries 
of origin or countries where they were founded and registered and are juristic persons. 
Second, TNCs, just like domestic corporations, are associations of persons for a common 
goal and they exist independently of their founders or owners. The necessary amendments 
to the definition of corporation above are required to fully cover the TNCs. These 
amendments are found in the operational characteristics of the TNCs. On this score, Hobson 
posits that TNCs “are business entities that have operations critical to their prosperity in two 
or more countries.”70 The enhanced mobility of TNCs over countries’ borders has been 
 
66 Section 21 of the Namibian Companies Act 28 of 2004 provides for creation of companies formed for 
promotion of religion, arts, recreation, and charity. 
67 N N Wardell “The Corporation” (1978) 107(1) Daedalus 97 97. 
68 T R. Zinnecker “Corporate vicarious liability for punitive damages” Brigham Young University Law Review 
(1985) 317 320. 
69 M Kordos & S Vojtovic “Transnational corporations in the global world economic environment” (2016) 230 
Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 150-158 at 151 who posits that “even if these companies are 
developing the international activities, by their nature they are a national company.” 
70 I R Hobson “The unseen world of transnational corporations’ powers” (2006) 1 Neumann Business Review, 
23 23. 
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accredited to free market systems and internationalisation of business – which are hallmarks 
of 21st century globalisation.71 
The other aspect identifiable from the operations and governance of TNCs is that they 
command strong influence on states, especially (but not exclusively) states with poor 
democracies and governance systems. Hobson argues that this influence is a reality “[d]ue 
to the concentration of market power – for instance, TNCs have achieved and demonstrated 
the ability to influence the direction of political and economic policies both on a national and 
international level.”72 With this enormous power and influence, TNCs, as Rondinelli argues, 
are capable of operating beyond or in contravention of national laws and in the manner that 
may negatively affect the rights of citizens, including commission of crimes.73 
Derived from these definitions and analyses, the following corporate features which are 
relevant to the discussion on corporate criminal responsibility are identified, namely: 
incorporation, legal entity, capacity to prosecute or defend a legal suit in corporate name, 
and corporate culture. These identified features are briefly discussed below. It should be 
noted that these features are contextualised with reference to some of the domestic legal 
systems that feature in this dissertation. These are mostly from the Anglo-American legal 
culture, and South African and Namibian law feature prominently for illustrative purposes. 
1 9 1 Incorporation 
Incorporation refers to the registration of a company in the register of companies and 
“upon registration a certificate of registration or incorporation is issued.”74 The issuance of 
the certificate of registration signifies the birth of the company. Important to note that prior 
to the registration of a company there are rigorous processes that take place, among others, 
 
71 Kordos et al (2016) PSBS 150 151. 
72 Hobson (2016) 1 NBR 23 23. 
73 D A Rondenelli “Transnational corporations: International citizens or new sovereigns?” (2003) 107(4) BSR 
391-413 at 395. 
74 D French, S Mayson & C Ryan Company law 24th Ed (2008) New York: Oxford University Press, 3; Section 
70 of the Namibian Companies Act 20 of 2004. 
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there is a duty on the registrar of companies to ensure that the business (object) of the 
company to be registered is lawful. If the object of the company is illegal – such a company 
may not be registered.75 
Incorporation is significant to the discussion on corporate criminal responsibility, because 
of its undertone, that is, it implies that a company is registered for a lawful purpose. This fact 
obviates and pre-empts any critical inquiry on criminal responsibility of juristic persons 
(corporates). The reason is technical – that is, it can create a perception within the broader 
public that corporations are incapable of committing crimes because their objects of 
incorporation are to conduct lawful business. Therefore, if a wrongful conduct was 
committed, it ought to be construed as unintended.  Further analysis, on this subject, is 
made in chapter 5 below. 
1 9 2 Legal personality 
It is common knowledge that upon incorporation a corporation becomes a juristic person 
(artificial person) with its own legal personality separate from its founders, promoters and 
shareholders.76 Lord MacNaghten in Salamon v Salamon and Co Ltd77 stated that “the 
company is at law a different person from its subscribers.”78 Legal personality refers to the 
recognition or status afforded to the corporation by the law. The legal nature of legal 
personality, among others, is that a company is conferred with requisite rights and 
corresponding obligations.79 A company exist separately from its owners. The legal entity 
status of the company impacts the principle of corporate criminal responsibility. The 
corporate legal personality, particularly the separate existence of companies, is not immune 
from abuse and as such, it may be used as a shield by criminals to evade justice by invoking 
 
75 French et al Company law 44.  
76 Davies Company law 33. 
77 1897 AC 22. 
78 Salamon at 51. 
79 M Kremnitzer “A possible case for imposing criminal liability on corporation in international criminal law” 
(2010) 8 JICJ 909 911. 
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the protection provided by the corporate veil. Of course, the corporate veil may, under 
certain special circumstances, be pierced by courts.80 
However, piercing the corporate veil is not an ordinary relief and, as such, courts are often 
reluctant to invoke it.81 In Adams v Cape Industries plc82 it was found that the right to use a 
corporate structure was inherent in corporate law, as such courts are not entitled to readily 
pierce the veil of incorporation – this was stated as follows: 
“We do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the corporate veil (…) merely 
because the corporate structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability in respect 
of a particular future activities of a group will fall on another member of the group rather than the 
defendant company.”83 
By explication, it is apparent that because of the corporate legal personality and strict 
rules that govern piercing the veil of incorporation – individuals who abuse the corporate veil 
may enjoy impunity for crimes committed. 
1 9 3 Capacity to sue and be sued in corporate name 
There is a dominant view within the Anglo-American tradition that corporations have the 
right to bring and/ or defend a legal suit in their names.84 This right may be exercised both 
in civil and criminal proceedings. States afford corporations the right to sue and obligation 
to be sued because they are recognized as juristic persons and as such are construed as 
subjects of domestic laws. Domestic courts, in an innovative manner, have begun 
adjudicating over issues to determine whether body corporates can be held to account for 
contravening the principles of international law. However, at international level, corporations 
 
80 Smith v Hancock [1894] 2 Ch 377; Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd v Lewellin [1957] 1 WLR 464. 
81 Nedco Ltd v Clark (1973) 43 DLR (3d) 714 at 721 the court emphasised that the separate personality of a 
corporation may be lifted if there are compelling reasons to do so. 
82 [1990] Ch 433. 
83 Adams at 544. 
84 Davies Company Law 41. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
are not recognized as subjects for purposes of legal actions – this is despite the fact that 
they enjoy certain limited rights.85 The non-recognition of corporations as subjects at 
international level negatively affects the application of the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility, an issue which is at the heart of this dissertation. 
1 9 4 Corporate culture 
The concept of corporate culture refers to how the corporation hold itself in the society 
and it is not limited to corporate policies, management dynamics, and practices. Burchell 
posits that corporate culture is “founded in the outward manifestation of the policy and 
practices of the corporation.”86 In order to invoke corporate culture scheme in the context of 
criminal law, the inquirer should examine whether the conduct of a corporate agent is 
dictated by a corporate policy. If it is established that such conduct was in compliance with 
a particular corporate policy – then the corporation ought to be held criminally responsible. 
1 9 5 Complex nature of corporations 
Corporations can be structured in a less complicated or more complex manner. Pickering 
observes that the complexity of corporations renders it difficult to exactly pinpoint who must 
carry the blame for corporate wrongful conduct87 ˗ for instance where a corporation has 
subsidiaries and where a sublet of a subsidiary committed the wrongful conduct. The 
challenge, from the perspective of the victim and, by extension the prosecutor, is whether to 
proceed against the sublet-subsidiary or the subsidiary or the parent corporation.88 
The issue of establishing who ought to take the blame under the principle of corporate 
criminal responsibility has led to a comparative law challenge. The challenge is evidenced 
 
85 J E Alvarez “Are corporations subject of International Law?” (2011) 1 Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law 1 – 36. 
86 J Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 4th Ed. (2011) 474. 
87 M A Pickering “The company as a separate legal entity” (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review, 481 -511 at 481. 
88 French et al Company Law 126. 
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by the inconsistencies observed in states when applying the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility. As is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, some states apply 
theories such as vicarious liability, piercing of corporate veil, identification, aggregation or 
corporate culture theory to establish the guilt of offenders. The lack of a unified applicable 
theory adds to and deepens dissonance between domestic and international legal 
development towards holding corporate entities responsible for atrocity crimes. 
1 10 A brief primer on the notion of corporate criminal responsibility 
To regulate the conduct of corporations, a state may opt to impose civil, criminal or 
administrative sanctions or a combination of these sanctions. Therefore, the principle of 
corporate criminal liability forms part of the broader scheme of corporate responsibility. The 
definition of corporate criminal responsibility is contentious and as such is far from being 
settled. 
Farisani defines corporate criminal responsibility with reference to “finding a corporation 
criminally liable for crimes it has committed or for crimes that have been committed in 
endeavouring to pursue the interests of the corporation.”89 It is common knowledge that a 
body corporate does not have hands and mind of its own to actually commit a crime – thus, 
when Farisani in her definition makes reference to crimes it has committed, implicitly it 
means the offences committed by the agents of the company. This suggestion is supported 
by Burchell who argues that “[t]he principle of corporate criminal liability purports to impute 
onto a corporation, crimes – conduct and fault of individuals – committed by the director, 
employee or agent of a corporation.”90 
On the issue of imputation of conduct, as is discussed in detail in chapter 2, 5 and 6 
respectively below, there are jurisdictional facts that must be satisfied before a director or 
 
89 D M Farisani “Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: What does history tell us about the reverse onus 
provision?” (2017) 23 (1) Fundamina, 1 3. 
90 Burchell Criminal Law 473. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
 
employee’s conduct may be imputed on the corporation. These factors include, among 
others, the determination whether the agent, employee or director committed the crime 
whilst in the performance or furtherance of the corporation’s interests. 
Gruner describes corporate criminal liability as “a device that encourages corporate 
managers to ensure that the corporate activities they initiate and oversee are conducted 
within lawful bounds and with due regard for public interest.”91 According to Fisse and 
Braithwaite, corporate criminal liability presupposes that companies can commit offences – 
thus, they ought to account. Further that accountability here should be through criminal 
responsibility.92 
In a nutshell, the principle of corporate criminal responsibility is construed as a principle 
that is parallel to corporate civil liability and it complements the principle of individual criminal 
liability.93 It is important to note that several theories underpins the principle of corporate 
criminal liability scheme, namely: vicarious liability, identification and aggregation, and 
corporate culture or organisational model theory. In practice, as it is demonstrated in 
chapters 2 and 6 respectively below, corporate criminal liability may encompass three 
modes, namely, direct, indirect and administrative sanctions. 
1 10 1 Direct form of corporate criminal responsibility 
Under the direct model, the object is to punish the offending corporation directly for the 
crimes committed – without first finding a director or agent or representative of such 
offending corporation guilty. The basis for this direct mode of corporate scheme may be 
found on assumption and utility of corporate culture and policy theories. Corporate culture 
 
91 R Gruner Corporate Criminal Liability and Prevention (2005) 1-4. 
92 Fisse et al Corporations 19. Fisse et al contend that “[m]any features of corporations are observable, such 
as assets, factories and decision-making procedures while many features of individuals are not, such as 
personality, intention, and unconscious mind.” 
93 Kemp G, Walker S, Palmer R, Baqwa D, Gevers C, Leslie B & Steynberg A Criminal Law in South Africa 
(2012) 215 proffer that unlike corporate criminal liability, “individual criminal liability is the cornerstone of 
criminal law and it presupposes that a person who commits a crime is generally, and with a number of 
exceptions, held criminally responsible for his or her deeds.” 
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theory presupposes that a corporation’s criminal liability should be construed from its 
policies, rather than from the fault of its employees, agents or directors.94 
This model is relatively new, and it has not received wide acceptance. Much of the 
discussion on this model is provided in chapters 2, 5 and 6 below. However, suffice to state 
that there are compelling suggestions on the relevance and application of this model, among 
others: firstly, corporations, unlike natural persons are recognized as juristic persons with 
limited capacities. Thus, there is a suggestion that corporations should not be equated with 
individuals. Rather – when corporate criminal conduct is considered a suitable – an analogy 
between corporate and human activity must be searched.95 
In relation to the search of an analogy, Burchell posits that corporate policies may be 
comparable to mens rea of a natural person. Further, the failure on the part of the corporation 
to devise and use or apply strategies to avert harmful conduct may be “seen as reactive fault 
on the part of the corporation.”96 Therefore, the corporation’s guilt may be established 
referencing its failure, if such failure does not satisfy the standard required of reasonable 
behaviour in terms of the settled negligent test.97 
1 10 2 Indirect (derivative) form of corporate criminal responsibility 
The indirect model seeks to punish corporations by means of first obtaining a guilty 
finding against a director and or representative of such corporation. The indirect mode is 
theoretically premised on vicarious liability, aggregation and identification theory – a full 
discussion on these principles is provided in chapter 2 below. The choice for the state to 
reject or adopt both or either of the two models of corporate criminal liability may be informed 
by such state’s legal history, political aspirations, social and economic developments.  
 
94 L Jordaan “New perspectives on the criminal liability of corporate bodies” (2003) 1 Acta Juridica 48 51. 
95 Burchell Criminal Law 472. 
96 Burchell Criminal Law 472. 
97 Jordaan (2003) Act Juridica 48 71. 
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1 10 3 Administrative sanctions 
Administrative sanction is a form of punishment that is imposed when conduct regarded 
as an administrative offence is committed. For instance, in Russia the Code of 
Administrative Offences of 2001 defines an administrative offence with reference to a 
“wrongful, guilty action of a natural person or legal entity which is administratively 
punishable.”98 Since that definition sounds somewhat circular and self-referential, a more 
generic approach may be more useful. Thus, for administrative penalties to be levied, it 
ought to be proved that a corporation had an opportunity to observe the violation of the rules 
and norms. Further that notwithstanding such observation, the corporation did not take 
necessary steps to avert the contravention of the said rules and norms.99 
It follows that administrative offences are generally committed through negligence – that 
is, a corporation must have foreseen the harm and opted to tolerate or treat such harm in 
an unreasonable manner. Despite the existence of negligence in this scenario, scholars tend 
to classify administrative offences as non-criminal. This suggestion is premised on the 
assumption that corporations are “incapable of taking autonomous decisions”100 and are 
therefore morally blameless and their conduct (albeit “negligent”) should not attract criminal 
sanctions that would be appropriate in the case of moral blameworthy human beings.101 
It is not the aim here to make general statements about whether there is a movement 
away from criminal liability and towards administrative liability for corporate misconduct. 
Such a statement would require careful and nuanced national surveys. But anecdotally one 
can point to national examples where the application of criminal law in administrative 
proceedings favours a different classification from the present non-criminal classification. A 
 
98 Article 2.1.1 of The Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation 195-FZ of December 2001 
adopted on 21 December 2001 and endorsed by the Council of Federation on 26 December 2001. 
99 Article 2.1.2. 
100 S Kuhn “Corporate criminal liability in Germany?” (2014) Simmons & Simmons elexica, 1 1. 
101 M Bose “Corporate criminal liability in Germany” (2011) in M Pieth & R Ivory (eds) Corporate Criminal 
Liability. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, Vol 9, 227-254. 
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notable example is Germany, a jurisdiction often associated with an aversion for corporate 
criminal liability. However, even the German system, with its apparent preference for 
administrative rather than criminal sanctions for corporate wrongdoing, provides in the 
Criminal Code102 (sections 73 and 74) for forfeiture and confiscation of proceeds of unlawful 
activities acquired by companies, the kind of sanction that is more punitive than it is purely 
administrative in nature. 
Reliance on criminal law principles as noted above, support a suggestion that the 
administrative sanctions are quasi civil and criminal103, and certainly not devoid of the 
rationales and nomenclature associated with criminal liability. In sum, suffice to state that 
the primary object of administrative liability as well as both the direct and indirect model of 
corporate criminal liability is to thwart impunity for the violations committed by corporations. 
And, it is the quest to end impunity for harmful corporate behaviour that is the golden thread 
running through this dissertation. 
1 11 Corporate criminal liability and the Rome Statute of the ICC: An overview 
The overview on corporate criminal liability is provided here, notwithstanding an elaborate 
analysis thereof in chapters 2 and 3 below. The object is to enhance and provide a 
contextualised perspective of the statement of the problem provided below. Therefore, in a 
concise manner, suffice to state that the principle of corporate criminal liability is not defined 
nor is it provided for in the Rome Statute of the ICC of 1998.104 The rationale for its exclusion 
from the ICC’s jurisdiction, as is discussed and analysed in detail in chapter 3 below, is a 
subject of much debate. As noted elsewhere in this dissertation, currently the ICC has no 
 
102 The German Criminal Code promulgated on 13 November 1998, Federal Law Gazette p3322. 
103 R Kriksciunas & S Matuliene “Practice of Establishment of Evidence in Cases of Administrative offences” 
(2011) 1(22) Socialiniai tyrimai / Social Research, 25 26. 
104 The text of the Rome Statute was circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by 
procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 
16 January 2002; the Rome Statute came into force on 1 July 2002. 
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jurisdiction to prosecute and punish juristic persons.105There are arguments that the 
“application of the definition of many crimes, is restricted through having evil intent as an 
element thereof.”106 Because of this limitation, individual criminal liability is treated and 
ordained as the backbone of criminal responsibility, to the exclusion of others forms 
responsibility.107 
With this foundation, the dissertation advances argument, as demonstrated in 
subsequent chapters below, that the exclusion of corporate criminal liability from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC undermines the preventative measures that are aimed at “putting an 
end to impunity for the most serious crimes under international law.”108 Further, it is 
submitted that the exclusion of corporate criminal liability also creates unnecessary 
dissonance between the jurisprudence of the ICC and that of domestic courts. The non-
recognition of corporate criminal liability is critically analysed from a distinct international 
criminal law perspective that is informed by the imperative to bring an end to impunity for 
atrocity crimes under international law, namely genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
  
 
105 Art 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides for individual criminal liability as opposed to corporate 
criminal liability; N Farrell “Attributing criminal liability to corporate actors: Some lessons from the International 
Tribunal” (2010) 8(3) JICJ 873 875. 
106 E J Chesney “Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law” (1939) 29(5) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 627 -630. 
107 F P Lee “Corporate criminal liability” (1928) Vol 28(1) Colombia Law Review 1 2.; Kemp et al Criminal Law 
215. 
108 Putting an end to impunity for atrocity crimes is one of the foundational basis for this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
The origins and historical development of the principle of corporate criminal 
liability: an analysis from selected domestic jurisprudence 
2 1 Introduction 
The concepts of corporation and corporate criminal responsibility were briefly explored in 
chapter 1 of this dissertation. In this chapter, focus is not on a redefinition of the notion of 
corporate criminal responsibility; rather, it is on the doctrinal origins and development 
thereof. To attain this object, firstly: the chapter explores the principle of legal personality; 
how legal personality influences corporate capacity and its relation to criminal responsibility 
of body corporates. 
Secondly the chapter analyses the origins and historical evolution of the principle of 
corporate criminal liability at domestic level. For this purpose, selected jurisdictions are 
analysed, including common law (or mixed) jurisdictions, such as SA, Namibia, the UK, the 
USA and Sweden and civil law states,109 such as Germany, Italy and France. Finally, a 
summary of the discussion is made. 
2 2 The correlation between corporate separate legal personality and corporate 
criminal liability 
The argument in favour of prosecuting and punishing corporations for their conduct that 
are deemed to be criminal including “crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide” 
may be explained by the distinct legal nature and the effects of the principle of legal 
personality of corporations. As we know, the concept of legal personality when applied in 
the context of law of corporations (company law) refers to a legal status that is conferred on 
 
109 M Mohamed “Corporate criminal liability: Article 10 of the Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime” (2012) 66(1) JIA 107 109. 
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a corporation by law.110 It is therefore important to elucidate the salient characteristics of the 
concept of separate legal personality, its relevance and legal consequences thereof in the 
setting of corporate criminal responsibility. It is common knowledge that corporations, unlike 
human beings, lack any physical mass which can be confined or a soul that can be subjected 
to condemnation, however, a corporation is at law recognized to subsist as a separate 
person from its founders or promoters.111  
At the onset, it is important to set the legal history that underpins legal personality of body 
corporates. In the present, the Roman Dutch law with the influence of the English common 
law constitutes the SA and the Namibian common law.112 The precepts of the classic Roman 
 
110 Goulding Company Law 39. 
111 Bernard (1984) Criminology 4 argue that “[f]or practical reasons, the legal fiction developed, in Europe that 
various nonhuman entities would also be considered persons before the law. Further that among the early 
examples of this legal fiction concerned the question of who owned the church property. In addressing this 
question, the courts accepted that the property of the church was not necessarily owned by landowner or the 
clergy but by the church itself or the on-going group of people who constituted the congregation and who, for 
legal purposes, were to be treated as a single person.” Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 
530 at 550; Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL(Ir)); Gutman v Standard General 
Insurance Co Ltd 1981 (4) SA 114 (C); Dhlomo v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1989 (1) SA 945 (A) at 952 
Rabie ACJ stated “ (…) the recognition of the right of a trading corporation to sue for defamation involves an 
extension of the principles of Roman and Roman Dutch Law which dealt with the right of action only in relation 
to natural person (…)”; Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A). 
112 J Dugard International Law 4th ed (2011) 15; Nana (2011) 55 (1) JAL 86 posit that “the Roman Law of 
corporations formed the basis of Roman Dutch law, given that Dutch institutional legal commenters and 
practitioners of the 16th, 17th,and 18th centuries used Roman law as the foundation of their private law. It was 
this system that was initially exported to South Africa by Dutch settlers who had come to colonize this part of 
Africa. Thus, the law of Holland as it was in the year 1652 became the bedrock of the modern South African 
law when it was instituted in the Cape of Good Hope”. According to PH Masake “A critical analysis of the 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Namibian perspective” (2014) LLM 
Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 15 stated that “[N]amibia as it is known today was formerly called South West 
Africa. It was annexed as a German colony in 1884. Later South West Africa came to be a Protectorate of 
South Africa under the precepts of the Treaty of Versailles and the South West Africa Mandate, Act 49 of 1919 
which was signed on 28 June 1919, reprinted in Government Notice 72 of June 1921. This Act ensured that 
the administration of the territory of South West Africa was delegated to the Governor General of South Africa. 
Subsequently, the Administration of Justice Proclamation 21 of 1919 was promulgated which transferred all 
laws, including criminal laws which were applicable in South Africa, to be applied in the territory of South West 
Africa”.; S K Amoo & S L Harring “Namibian Land: Law, Land Reform, and the Restructuring of Post-apartheid 
Namibia” (2009) Vol 9 University of Botswana Law Journal 87 89 states that there is “[a] plethora of literature 
which confirms that the common law which was brought by Jan van Riebeeck when he settled at the Cape of 
Good Hope traces its origin to Roman Dutch law, which is currently perceived as the common law of Holland. 
This common law was developed in South African courts and was also made applicable in the territory of South 
West Africa”. In Binga v Administrator General, South West Africa and Others 1984(3) SA 949 at 972 C-E the 
court confirmed that: “The common law in this territory is still the Roman-Dutch law which is the common law 
of the Republic of South Africa. (…) a great part of our statute law originated in the Republic or was South 
African statute law which was made applicable to the territory. It further follows that our statute law is to be 
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law, two categories of artificial entities were recognized as legal persons, albeit, with limited 
capacity and these included the “universitas personarum” and the “universitas bonorum.”113 
In essence, “these artificial entities were comprised of natural persons who could 
nominate one of their members or any natural person to act on their behalf”.114 Despite the 
limited capacity of these artificial entities and the fact that their existence and functions were 
strictly dependent on the permission from the state, “their right to sue in their corporate 
capacity and obligation to pay compensation when requested by courts were recognized”.115 
The recognition of corporations’ separate legal personality status by the law entails that 
corporations “have the capacity to acquire legal rights and incur corresponding legal 
duties.”116 
In contradistinction, a human being has distinctive characteristics including physical 
existence and a mind that may be capable of appreciating an act and acting in accordance 
with own free will and the ability to contrast right and wrong or good and evil.117The essence 
or consequences of conferring a corporation with the legal personality status is multifaceted 
including but not limited to benefits or rights such as limited liability, perpetual succession, 
acquisition and disposal of properties, profit making, capacity to sue and be sued in the 
corporation’s name and capacity to conclude legally binding contracts.118 These economic 
benefits are not limited to domestic companies; rather they equally apply to multinational 
and or transnationally operating corporations. 
 
interpreted against the background of our common law which is, as stated above, the same as that of the 
Republic of South Africa.” 
113 See, Nana (2011) 55(1) JAL 87 who defines universitas personarum  as “[a]n association of persons and 
included municipalities, various religious bodies, certain trade unions and associations of financers whereas 
the universitas bonorum refers to a complex set of assets and liabilities, including charitable foundations such 
as hospitals alms-houses”. 
114 Nana (2011) JAL 104. 
115 Nana (2011) JAL 87. 
116 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeats Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 
31. 
117 Burchell Criminal Law 332. 
118 Cassim et al Contemporary Company law 35 – 40. 
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Therefore, upon incorporation a corporation is legally accepted or deemed to be person 
who can be distinguished from the founders and as such became a bearer of rights and 
obligations. The instructive matter on this legal position is the Salomon v Salomon and Co 
Ltd119 in which the court held that: 
“It seems to me impossible to dispute that once the company is legally incorporated it must be 
treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and 
that the motives of those who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant 
in discussing what those rights and liabilities are.”120 
Further that the actions or decisions made in the furtherance of a corporation’s business 
interests by an agent or employee of the juristic person (corporation) are at law recognized 
as the acts or decisions of such a juristic person.121 The recognition of corporations as juristic 
persons and bearer of rights and corresponding obligations are entrenched in domestic 
legislation and even in foundational and constitutional law. The 1996 South African 
Constitution recognizes this position and provides that: “a juristic person is entitled to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of 
that juristic person.”122Recognition of corporations to have full capacity to act, including to 
sue and be sued, to be bearer of rights and obligation can further be construed in terms of 
the Namibian Companies Act which provides that: 
 
119 [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
120 Salomon at para 30. 
121 See, Vane v Yiannopoullos [1965] AC 486 at 504 “(…) that in the absence of proof of actual knowledge, 
nevertheless the licencee or proprietor may be liable if he be shown (…) effectively to have delegated his 
proprietary or managerial functions.” 
122 Section 8(4) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; Article 5 of the Namibian Constitution 
provides that “the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be respected and upheld 
by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all organs of the Government and its agencies and, where 
applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in Namibia, and shall be enforceable by the Courts in the 
manner hereinafter prescribed”.; Section 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 of South Africa; 
Dadoo at 550 “[a] registered company is a legal persona distinct from the members who compose it (…). This 
conception of the existence of a company as a separate entity distinct from its shareholders is no merely 
artificial and technical thing. It is a matter of substance, property vested in the company is not, and cannot be 
regarded as vested in all or any of its members.” 
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“Subject to this section a company has the capacity and powers of a natural person of full capacity 
in so far as a juristic person is capable of having that capacity or of exercising those powers.”123 
In terms of the principle of separate legal personality Kemp et el observed that:  “flowing 
from this is the practical reality that juristic persons can act, and their actions have 
consequences in real life. Unfortunately, these consequences are sometimes criminal in 
nature”.124 These practical realities need to be recognized not only by domestic legal 
systems or courts as is the practice at present but should in the same vein be recognized at 
the international level, as is argued in this dissertation. 
As expounded above, the principle of separate legal personality plays a vital role in 
imputing criminal liability on corporations. For instance, there are high prospects of 
succeeding with a charge against a corporation based on vicarious liability principle if such 
“[a] body corporate is recognized at law as a legal person (juristic person).”125 In contrast, 
there are low prospects for a charge against a corporation to succeed based on vicarious 
liability in circumstances where such a corporation is not incorporated as such.126 This is 
because of the difficult in proving master-agent relationship, without which the requirements 
of in “course of employment” may not be established. The failure by the prosecution to prove 
this requirement may render a charge not successful. The relationship between the principle 
of separate legal personality and corporate criminal liability is of great importance when 
contemplating to hold corporations liable for the perpetration of crimes, and, as will be 
shown, the core international crimes. 
 
123 Section 38 (1) of the Namibian Companies Act, Act 28 of 2004. 
124 Kemp et el Criminal Law, 215. 
125 This is because body corporate are the captains of economies, unlike individual human beings. 
126 The reasons for lesser prospect of succeeding against unregistered corporation include among other things 
the challenge of establishing the legal existence of the master (corporation) for purposes of proving the master-
agent relationship and the determination of the scope of employment element. 
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2 3 Historical development of corporate criminal liability 
There is a plethora of academic literature and court decisions that support a contention 
that prior to the inception and recognition of the principle of corporate criminal liability, 
corporations were deemed incapable of committing any offence.127 The early criminal law 
theories of punishment were premised on individual criminal liability, thus, criminal 
responsibility was limited to offences that were committed by natural persons.128 The origins 
and development of the principle of corporate criminal liability is a subject of much debate 
and was strongly influenced by the type of a legal system. For instance, in common law legal 
systems, the origins can be traced to the common law doctrine of vicarious liability.129This 
can be contrasted with civil law legal system in which it developed at a slower pace because 
they upheld the societas delinquere non potest principle. Thus, the conception, contours 
and expansion of the principle of corporate criminal liability can be distinguished (different) 
from one legal system to another. The notable contradistinction is apparent, inter alia, amid 
the civil law130 legal system on one hand, and on the other hand, the common law legal 
systems.131 In the discussion that follows, a comparative analysis in regards to the origins 
and doctrinal development of corporate criminal responsibility is made with specific 
reference to common and civil law legal systems. 
 
127 R v Oudtshoorn Municipality (1908) 25 SC 257 at 261; Bernard “The historical development of corporate 
criminal liability” 4; E Burchell, P Hunt, J Milton and J Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure 
General Principles of Criminal Law vol 1 (1983) 395. 
128 This legal position is still practiced at present by some of the states that adopted the civil law legal system. 
129 Bernard (1984) Criminology 3; Seck “Collective Responsibility” in Accountability 143.The vicarious liability 
doctrine entails that a principal (corporation) may be held liable based on the transactions of an agent or 
employee if such agent or employee acted within the actual scope of authority, including if such transactions 
were ratified. 
130 Civil law legal systems require that all the laws must be ‘completely written and codified’ and the judges are 
expected to interpret and apply it without reference to decided cases. 
131 The common law legal system is often known as the Anglo-American tradition of common law. Under this 
legal system, according to Bernard (1984) Criminology 13 “Common law, through most of its history, was not 
written or codified, and judges were expected to make substantive interpretations and advances from 
established common law positions.” 
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2 3 1 Development and inclusion of corporate criminal liability in common law/ mixed 
jurisdiction legal systems 
Literature suggests that the corporate criminal liability scheme developed in common law 
jurisdictions. However, there are observations, inter alia, that, its inception is tainted with 
obscurity132 and it was not conceived by legislative will, rather it was developed by courts. 
Interestingly, the development was premised on yet another obscurely founded principle of 
derivative scheme, namely: vicarious liability. Bernard summarises the early development 
of the corporate criminal liability principle stating that: 
“The application of criminal liability to corporations grew out of a minor common law doctrine that 
masters were criminally liable if their servants who created a public nuisance by throwing 
something out of the house onto the street. The expansion of that doctrine to full corporate 
criminal liability was primarily the result of judicial interpretation of common law and existing 
statutory laws, rather than the result of any deliberate legislative action.”133 
Deduced from the summary above, it is apparent that vicarious liability as practiced in 
common law states influenced, to a great extent, the development of the principle of 
corporate criminal liability.134In brief, the principle of vicarious liability refers to the “liability 
of one legal person, be it natural or juristic person, for the acts of another.”135The conception 
of the principle of vicarious liability is obscure and lies directly in opposition or sharp contrast 
to the principle of individual criminal liability136and it was not conceived by any legislative 
 
132  Mueller (1957) Uni Pitts Law Rev 21 argues that “[n]obody bred the principle of corporate criminal liability, 
nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it, rather it just grew”; Bernard (1984) Criminology 3 opined that “[t]he 
concept of corporate criminal liability developed in the Anglo-American tradition of common law from small and 
obscure beginnings in the process of accretion that lacked any conscious or overall directions.” 
133 Bernard (1984) Criminology 4. 
134 Bernard (1984) Criminology 5; S Park & J Song “Corporate Criminal Liability” (2013) Vol 50 American 
Criminal Law Review, 729 731. 
135 C Elliott & F Quinn Criminal Law Sixth edition (2006) 303. 
136 Elliott et el Criminal Law 9 asserts that it is generally accepted at law that for “[a]n accused to be found 
guilty of an offence, such an accused must not only have behaved in a particular way, but must also have had 
a particular mental attitude to that behaviour.” See, Rex v Huggins 92 Eng. Rep. 518 (1730) “it is a point not 
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authority; rather it was developed by courts.137 According to Elliott et al there are several 
reasons that may be advanced to justify the application of the vicarious liability principle.138 
These reasons include: control139, compensation,140 deterrence,141 loss spreading, 
enterprise liability, mixed policy and indemnity.142 
It is trite law that for the actus reus to be imputed and the mens rea of an employee to be 
attributed on the corporation, there are certain requirements that must be satisfied. These 
requirements include: a) there must be a crime committed by the employee, b) at the time 
when the employee committed the crime, the employee must have been employed by the 
employer, and c) the crime must have been committed whilst the employee was performing 
 
to be disputed, but that in criminal cases the principal is not answerable for the act of the deputy as he is in 
civil cases: they must each answer for their own acts, and stand or fall by their own behaviour.” 
137 C Okpaluba & P Osode Government Liability: South Africa and the Commonwealth (2010) 293 describe 
the principle of vicarious liability as “it is not, in the context of English common law, a distinct tort; rather it is a 
judge-made concept that holds one person responsible for the misconduct of another because of the 
relationship between them. Nor is it an aspect of wrongfulness or fault in South African law of delict. Indeed, 
the principle of vicarious liability is at odds with the general approach of common law.” 
138 Elliott et el Criminal Law 303. 
139 P S Atiyah Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 172; J W Neyers “A theory of vicarious liability” 
(2005) 43(2) Alberta Law Review 1 6; The control rationale entails that it “is justifiable for an employer to be 
held vicariously liable for the acts of the servant,” if such a servant acted pursuant to the command of the 
master. Thus, by virtue of the power of control which the employer wields over the servant (employee) it is only 
correct to impute the conduct of an employee on the employer. 
140 Limpus v London General Omnibus Company (1862) 158 ER 993 at 998 the court held that it is necessary 
for “[i]njuries that occasion as a result of an act committed by an employee in the course of his or her master’s 
service to be compensated by the master.” 
141 See, Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534 paragraph 30 the court reasoned that “(…) beyond the narrow band 
of employer conduct that attracts direct liability in negligence lies a vast area where imaginative and efficient 
administration and supervision can reduce the risk that the employer has introduced (...). Holding the employer 
vicariously liable for the wrongs of its employee may encourage the employee to take such steps, and hence 
reduce the risk of future harm”. 
142 Neyers (2005) Albert Law Review 15 argues that the justification of vicarious liability principle is apparent 
“in the relationship between employer and employee – namely, in the employer’s implied promise contained 
in the contract of employment that indemnify the employee for  harms, including legal liability, suffered by the 
employee in the conduct of the employer’s business.” 
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his duties in the course of employment.143 These elements are the anchors of vicarious 
liability.144 
In sum, the lack of legislative will that manifested at the early developmental stages of 
corporate criminal liability tied with the then legal position in which corporations were 
deemed incapable of committing any offence accounts for the reluctance to fully apply 
“corporate criminal liability in civil law legal systems.”145 Another important point to note is 
that, even in common law states – the advancement of the principle of corporate criminal 
liability followed a dissimilar path from one country to another. In some states it developed 
by the instrumentality of theories such as vicarious liability, identification, aggregation and 
corporate culture. The discussion that follows analyses the origins and developmental 
stages of corporate criminal responsibility scheme from the common law and mixed legal 
system states, namely: USA, UK, Sweden, South Africa and Namibia. 
2 3 1 1 The USA perspective 
Already during the 18th century the notion of corporate criminal liability was known and 
applied in USA. The mode of liability was based on vicarious liability and included offences 
related to public nuisance. In order for a body corporate to be found criminally responsible, 
it was required to prove that there was a failure on the part of the corporation to perform a 
certain function (nonfeasance) or there was a positive or improper conduct that violated a 
statute (misfeasance).146 Moreover, local government units and private businesses were 
held criminally liable for public nuisance in circumstances where local government officials 
 
143 Zinnecker (1985) Brigham Young University Law Review 322 posits that “[t]he proponents of the course of 
employment rule have been concerned primarily with its deterrent effect (…) and have said that if holding a 
corporation liable will encourage it to exercise closer control over its employees for the prevention of 
outrageous torts, that is sufficient ground to hold corporation liable. Thus, a corporation facing the threat of 
punitive damages will exercise greater care over its employees and recurrence of similar tortious conduct will 
thereby be avoided.” 
144 J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict Fifth Edition (2006) 341. 
145 Bernard (1984) Criminology 3 argues that “the concept of corporate criminal liability did not develop at all 
in civil law countries, where all criminal liability is laid to individuals, and none to corporation itself”. 
146 State v Morris and Essex Railroad Co. (1852) 23 NJL 360. 
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and or employees of private businesses “failed to adequately maintain roads and waterways 
that ran through their jurisdictions.”147 
According to Bernard, it was relatively easy for courts to hold private corporations 
criminally liable because “[p]rivate corporations were chartered with specific public functions 
– thus, the failure to perform these chartered public functions, for example failure to maintain 
roads, the corporation itself could be prosecuted for public nuisance”.148 The early 19th 
century accounted for increased formation and registration of corporations wrought by 
industrialisation, construction of infrastructures and development. These developments led 
to increased corporate activities, including negative activities such as corporate bodies’ 
involvement in committing offences. 
To regulate corporate conduct and to avoid punishing employees whose conduct 
benefited the corporation, the principle of corporate criminal liability became entrenched in 
American statutory law. In this regard, the Elkins Act 1903 was promulgated and it provided 
that: 
“In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section, the act, omission or failure of any 
officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any common carrier, acting within the 
scope of his employment, shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omission or failure 
of such carrier, as well as of that person.”149 
The effects of the Elkins Act 1903 included that courts, by virtue of statute, could attribute 
criminal intent on corporations as opposite to mere judicial interpretation as was the practice 
prior to promulgation of the Elkins Act 1903. In the landmark case of New York Central and 
 
147 Queen v Great North of England Railway (1846) 114 Eng Rap 492 at 1298 the blurring nature and the 
challenge of distinguishing between nonfeasance and misfeasance was recognized by the court when it 
considered whether “If A is authorised to make a bridge with parapets, but makes it without them, does the 
offence consists in the construction of unsecured bridge or in the neglect to secure it?”. This expression entails 
that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between nonfeasance and misfeasance, thus the distinction is merely 
philosophical as the unlawful conduct could easily be classified as both nonfeasance or misfeasance. 
148 Bernard (1984) Criminology 6. 
149 Elkins Act 1903, c708, (32 stat 847). 
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Hudson River Railroad Co v United States150 it was found that attributing criminal intent on 
the corporation is one of the effective ways of enforcing the law.151 
Further, in the USA, concerted efforts to criminally punish the offending corporation 
increased owing to corporate scandals. The analysis on the current USA laws on corporate 
criminal responsibility indicates a steady shift from corporate fault based on vicarious liability 
to a corporate culture model. As stated in chapter 1, the underpinning rationale of corporate 
culture is to hold corporations directly criminally liable. This differs from the approach of 
predicating a guilty finding against a servant of a company. This assumption is apparent 
from different statutes, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977 (FCPA 1977). The 
object of the FCPA is to criminalise, prevent and combat corporate bribery. 
The FCPA 1977 was amended in 1988 by the Trade Act 1988.152 The effect of the 
amendment was to amend the Security Exchange Act 1934 by introducing three 
fundamental provisions related to obligations of issuers (corporations),153 namely (a) the 
obligation to adopt appropriate accounting standards and maintenance of internal 
accounting control system; (b) the obligation to keep records, books and corporate accounts 
accurately; 154 and (c) the anti-bribery provision proscribing corporate corruption.155 Further 
indication of the shift in approach, can be identified from the promulgation of the Sarbanes-
 
150 (1909) 212 U.S. 481. 
151 New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co at 495 the court stated “we see no valid objection in law, 
and every reason in public policy, why the corporation which profits by the transaction and can only act through 
its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to 
whom it has intrusted authority to act in subject matter (…) and whose knowledge and purpose may well be 
attributed to the corporation for which the agents act. (…) to give them (corporation) immunity from all 
punishment because of the (…) doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away 
the only means of effectually controlling the subject matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.” 
152 Title V, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 
153 Title 15 U.S.C Section 78dd-1(g). 
154 M V Sietzinger “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Congressional Interest and Executive Enforcement” (2010) 
CRS Report for Congress available <http://www.crs.gov> (accessed 2014/09/01). 
155 Sietzinger (2010) Report for Congress. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
44 
 
Oxley Act of 2002,156 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010157 and the adoption of the Model Penal Code.158 
Apart from providing for direct corporate criminal liability, these statutory frameworks 
place a duty on corporations to put in place appropriate control and managerial measures 
such as corporate policies and effective compliance programmes that are aimed at 
preventing corporations from committing crimes. Park and Song noted that these 
criminalisation-cum-preventive efforts “[a]llows a corporation to avoid criminal liability from 
attaching where a corporation demonstrates that a supervisor acted with due diligence to 
prevent the commission of a crime.”159 
Vicarious liability alone as a premise for finding corporations liable may no longer be 
sufficient. That is, to effectively bring an end or thwart impunity for the perpetration of crimes 
by corporations, another model, for instance the rational actor (corporate culture) model 
must be adopted. In USA background, it appears that the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility, which originated from court interpretation of the “master’s liability for the acts 
of his or her servant”, has developed into the aggregation theory and the corporate culture 
theory, and these approaches are currently provided for in several legislative schemes. 
The liability of corporations (including, transnational corporations) in the USA, extends 
beyond the sphere of criminal law. Example in point is the Alien Torts Claim Act of 1789 
which have significantly made inroads in corporate liability. This legislation empowers the 
Federal Courts with the extraterritorial jurisdiction to adjudicate over civil matters involving 
corporations. Its impact cannot not be overstated, in that several cases have been brought 
before the US courts for gross human rights violations which were committed outside the 
borders of the USA. Some of the cases which were brought before the federal courts are: 
 
156 Publication No. 107-204, §§ 802 -807, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
157 Publication No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
158 USA Model Penal Code (1985). 
159 Park et al (2013) American Criminal Law Review 731. 
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Talisman Energy Inc, Ester Kiobel and Others (Nigeria Shell case) and Unocal case. These 
cases are discussed in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
2 3 1 2 The UK perspective 
The early corporations (association of persons) in the United Kingdom (UK) were treated 
and had characteristics that were comparable to those of the Guilds. Thus, corporations had 
limited capacity. During the 17th century, the numbers of unincorporated joint stock 
companies increased and their involvement in commission of offences became prevalent to 
such an extent that the Bubble Act of 1720 was promulgated to regulate the creation of 
corporations. Notably, the Bubble Act 1720 placed a limitation on the establishment of 
corporations – thereby requiring that corporations were to be “[e]stablished by virtue of an 
Act of Parliament and that corporations could only act within the remit of their 
constitutions.”160 
The Bubble Act 1720 was repealed and subsequent to its repeal corporate activities 
increased enormously. In UK, body corporates were recognized as juristic persons and 
consequently the acts of employees could be imputed onto the corporation by means of 
either the identification or the vicarious liability theory. However, the application of vicarious 
liability had certain limitations, namely: it was only applied to regulatory offences or offences 
requiring no intent. Consequently, the advancement of corporate scheme – appears – to 
have been more influenced by the identification theory. 
In essence, the identification theory provides that for a servant’s conduct to be construed 
as that of the campany, such an employee must occupy a position in a corporation with 
necessary authority to direct and control the activities of a corporation.161 Thus, the conduct 
of the employees who occupy low level positions in a corporation may be excluded or may 
 
160 See, W Laufer Corporate bodies and guild minds: The failure of corporate criminal liability (2008) 11. 
161 The application of this principle in this form has a history. See, in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd 713 the court 
held that “[a] corporation is an abstraction, therefore, its active mind and directing will should be sought in its 
employees who are really the very ego and centre of its personality.” 
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not be imputed onto the corporation. The acts that could be attributed to corporations were 
limited to acts of employees who controlled and directed the affairs of a corporation. Denning 
LJ applied the identification theory in HL Boulton (engineering) Co. Ltd v TJ Graham and 
Sons Ltd162, in which he stated that: 
“(…) others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company 
and control what it does – the state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company 
and is treated by law as such.”163 
In the UK, a company may attract liability for conduct that constitutes a crime, if and when 
such conduct was committed by its employee, and provided that such employee is 
“sufficiently senior or occupies a senior position within the rank and file of the corporation in 
order for his or her conduct to constitute the corporation’s directing mind and will.”164 It is 
important to state that, notwithstanding, the scope and nature of the identification theory and 
vicarious liability which are delimited and formulated by courts as a result of judicial 
interpretation, these theories were transformed and became entrenched into UK statutory 
law. 
The promulgation of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007165 is 
perceived as a much better step in the right direction. This is because it has increased focus 
on the role of corporations in everyday life. It represents an important development in the 
English law on liability of body corporates, even though, the corporate scheme is limited to 
certain type of offences. Despite the identified limitation, the principle is clear: body 
corporates do not enjoy impunity – because, companies stand to criminally account if the 
 
162 [1957] 1 QB 159. 
163 HL Boulton (Engineering) Co Ltd 172. 
164 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153; Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Security 
Commission [1995] 2 AC 500. 
165 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Chapter 19, Royal assent 26 July 2007 (entry 
into force 6 April 2008 – United Kingdom). 
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manner in which it is “managed or organised cause the death of a person”166or where 
corporate activities “amount to gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed to the 
deceased.”167 The risk-creating activities of corporations can now form the basis for criminal 
liability under English law, akin to the reckless individual who caused the death of another. 
2 3 1 3 The Namibian and South African perspectives 
South Africa and Namibia share a significant historical and legal background. It is worth 
noting that laws that regulate corporate conduct in South Africa are similar to the laws that 
are applicable in Namibia. The similarity is so obvious that discussing these two jurisdictions 
separately on this particular topic, may amount to a substantive repetition. Therefore, on this 
premise, these two jurisdictions are discussed together. In these jurisdictions, the 
development of corporate scheme is attributed to the innovative judicial interpretation 
vicarious liability. 
The legal position on corporate liability before the promulgation of the Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act168 in 1917 was constructed on the delictual principle of “vicarious liability”. 
Nana observes that courts used to “[i]mpose liability on corporations in their capacity as 
employers”.169 Notably, liability was attributed on the corporation if it was established that a 
servant, while “in the course of employment”, committed a wrongful act. As a general rule, 
these wrongful acts were imputed on the corporation. The other example where liability was 
 
166 Section 1(1)(a) of Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
167 Section 2(1) of Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 defines a “relevant duty of care” 
as “(a) a duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the organisation or performing services 
for it; (b) a duty owed as occupier of premises; (c) a duty owed in connection with(i) the supply by the 
organisation of goods or services (whether for consideration or not), (ii) the carrying on by the organisation of 
any construction or maintenance operations; Further defined in section 2(7), (iii) the carrying on by the 
organisation of any other activity on a commercial basis, or (iv) the use or keeping by the organisation of any 
plant, vehicle or other thing.” 
168 Act 31 of 1917 South Africa. 
169 Nana (2011) JAL 89 posits that as “[a] general rule, the liability imposed upon these companies was 
vicarious in scope and nature, given that they were held liable for the wrongful acts of employees committed 
in the course of employment.” 
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assigned to the corporation included circumstances where a corporation as an employer 
failed to provide a conducive and safe working environment for its employees. 
The vicarious liability principle was without modification applied to hold corporations 
criminally liable. It is submitted that substantively, the requirements that were applied to hold 
corporations delictually liable were the very same requirements that were retained by courts 
to hold corporations criminally liable. The common law principle of vicarious liability was in 
1917 supplanted by section 384 of the South African Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
31 of 1917. The effect of this provision was to “[r]ender corporations criminally liable for 
offences committed by directors and servants in their course of employment.”170 The South 
African Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917 was repealed by the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1955 and subsequently by the current Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977.171 This legislation is applicable in Namibia, as the principal legislation that governs 
criminal proceedings. Thus, currently the principal legislation that governs the principle of 
corporate criminal liability is the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977172 and it provides that: 
“For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any offence, whether 
under any law or at common law- 
 (a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or with permission, 
express or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; and 
 (b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have been but was 
not performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of that corporate body, 
 
170 Nana (2011) JAL 90. 
171 Act 51 of 1977 South Africa. 
172 The Act mainly governs and regulates procedures in criminal proceedings. It is important to note, as Amoo 
et al (2009) University of Botswana Law Journal 89 posit that “[t]he administration of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, Act 51 of 1977 (CPA 1977) to South West Africa (now Namibia) was transferred from South Africa in terms 
of the Executive Powers (Justice) Transfer Proclamation AG 33 of 1979 dated 12 November 1979. More 
particularly, the application of CPA 1977 to Namibia is made in terms of section 1 which defines ‘Republic’ to 
include the territory. Territory in this context refers to South West Africa (Namibia). Further that section 343 
entails that the CPA 1977 apply also in the Territory, including Eastern Caprivi Zipfel (now Zambezi region).” 
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in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant or in 
furthering or endeavoring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed to have 
been performed (and with the same intent, if any) by that corporate body or, as the case may be, 
to have been an omission (and with the same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body.”173 
The provision entails that corporations may be held criminally liable for offences that 
require intent or for strict liability offences. Liability attaches, “[r]egardless of whether the 
offence was committed by lower level employees or directors of the company.”174 Of course, 
there are issues that beg more questions, for instance, are corporations (or other abstract 
entities) capable of committing offences such as rape? In NK v Minister of Safety and 
Security175 the South African Constitutional Court applied the vicarious liability principle to 
hold the state (as the responsible abstract entity) liable for the conduct of three police officers 
who committed rape whilst they were performing duties or course of employment.176 
It appears that the legal nature of vicarious liability, inter alia, includes that a director may 
be cited on behalf of the accused company.177 However, such citation does not lead to the 
director to personally account – unless where it can be shown that the individual director 
committed a crime independent from the company. If it can be shown that both the director 
and the company fulfil the required elements of criminal liability then both can, of course, be 
criminally charged. The position is that responsibility cannot automatically be attributed to 
any of the natural persons that are either members or employees of the corporate entity, 
thus confirming the legal fact that corporations are regarded as independent actors for 
 
173 Section 332(1) Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 South Africa. 
174 Nana (2011) JAL 103 posits that “[l]iability is not only imposed for acts of directors but also for acts of lower 
level employees of the company.” 
175 [2005] JOL 14864 (CC). 
176 ABSA Bank Ltd v Born Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 378; Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom 2003(3) 
SA 83 (SCA).  
177 Section 332(2) of Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 provides that “In any prosecution against a 
corporate body, a director or servant of that corporate body shall be cited, as representative of that corporate 
body, as the offender, and thereupon the person so cited may, as such representative, be dealt with as if he 
were the person accused of having committed the offence in question (…).” 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
 
purposes of criminal liability. Since the corporate entity is still an abstract entity, the legal 
fiction at work is that the organs of that entity – primarily the directors – will do the thinking 
and acting and these will be attributed to the corporate entity. This is a one-way street: The 
converse is not true, so that criminal conduct of the corporate entity is not simply transferred 
to the individual directors. Their liability, as a matter of principle, ought to be independently 
proved “beyond reasonable doubt” and based on the usual mens rea and actus reus 
requirements.178 This legal proposition was approved in S v Coetzee179 in which the 
Constitutional Court declared section 332(5) of South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 to be unconstitutional. The provision purported to place the onus on “directors or 
servants” of an accused corporation to prove that they were not parties to the crime and that 
they could not avert the commission of the offence in question. 
Safe, to submit here that the growth of the corporate scheme in common law jurisdiction, 
as was discussed above, is accredited to or was wrought by judicial interpretation and the 
application of the principles including vicarious liability, identification theory and the theory 
of aggregation. There is much debate at domestic level towards adopting corporate culture 
(rational actor) model “as the basis for holding corporations criminally liable.180 These 
aspects will be explored below with reference to other comparative jurisdictions.” 
2 3 1 4 Swedish perspective 
Sweden subscribe to the general rule that corporations are not capable, on their own, to 
commit crimes. However, this legal position does not exonerate corporate directors or 
employees from being criminally sanctioned. On this point, Hedwall elucidates that 
“[c]orporate directors or employees may be held criminally liable, if crimes are committed 
 
178 Kemp et el Criminal Law 215. 
179 1997 (4) BCLR 437 (CC). 
180 Nana (2011) JAL104; J Kyriakakis “Corporate criminal liability and the ICC Statute: The comparative law 
challenge” (2009) 56(3) Netherlands International Law Review 333 337. 
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during the corporation’s operations, either in Sweden or abroad by the employees.”181 In the 
same vein, jointly with the offending employees, the corporations may be liable to 
administrative penalties or corporate fines. The development of liability of body corporates, 
particularly in Sweden, is accredited to several legal instruments. Notably, the Swedish 
Penal Code Chapter 22 section 6 provides that: 
“A person guilty of a serious violation of a treaty or agreement with a foreign power or an infraction 
of a generally recognized principle or tenet relating to international humanitarian law concerning 
armed conflict is liable for crime against international law (…).”182 
This above quoted provision read in conjunction with section 3(6) of Chapter 2 of the 
Swedish Penal Code which anticipates for a world-wide jurisdiction presupposes that 
corporate employees’ conduct that violate international law, whether committed in the 
territory of Sweden or abroad may be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Swedish courts. 
The Swedish corporate scheme was not free from critiques. Such critiques lay, inter alia, in 
terms of section 6 Chapter 22 of the Swedish Penal Code which have been criticised for 
limiting its scope as it mainly regulates “violations of international humanitarian law,”183 to 
the exclusion of other violations under international criminal law.184To respond to the 
criticism on limited scope stated above, Sweden – with effect from 1 July 2014 - adopted 
the Swedish Code of Statutes.185 This legislation provides for the substantive law on 
international criminal law in Sweden and it covers all the violations of international criminal 
law that were committed after 1 July 2014. The significance of the Swedish Code of Statute 
 
181 M Hedwall “Corporate liability in Sweden” (n.d) Available at <https://globalcompliancenews.com> (accessed 
on 31 January 2019). 
182 Section 6 of Chapter 22 of the Swedish Penal Code of 1962. 
183 M Klamberg “International Criminal Law in Swedish Courts: The principle of legality in Arklov Case” (2009) 
9 International Criminal Law Review 395 398. 
184 M Ingeson & A L Kather “The road less travelled: How corporate directors could be held individually liable 
in Sweden for corporate atrocity crime abroad” (2018) Available <https://www.ejiltalk.org> (accessed on 12 
December 2019). 
185 Swedish Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes issued on 
28 May 2014 published 11 June 2014 and became effective on 1 July 2014. 
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cannot be overemphasised. The Swedish corporate criminal responsibility scheme has been 
praised by many as a trend setter and that it helps to align the Swedish domestic law with 
that of international criminal law. In this manner, the Swedish Code of Statutes, read in 
conjunction with the Swedish Penal Code particularly sections 6 of Chapter 22 as well as 
section 3(6) of Chapter 2 thereof, stretches further and provide that corporate directors or 
employees who commit international crimes during the corporation’s operations may be 
prosecuted and punished. 
The veracity and application of these provisions are evident in the Lundin Petroleum case 
in which directors in the employment of Lundin Petroleum were in 2018 indicted for 
international crimes which emanated from the Lundin Petroleum operations in Sudan during 
the late 1990s to early 2000.186 The allegations against the directors in this matter, include 
that the oil extraction operations of Lundin Petroleum ignited a war in Sudan which led to 
displacements, murders, torture, and rape.187 Sweden does not recognise direct liability 
premised on corporate culture – but rather, a corporation may be accountable jointly with 
the individual offending director or employee of such a corporation. 
2 3 2 Development and the exclusion of corporate criminal liability in civil law legal 
systems 
The anti-corporate criminal liability school of thought, including the legal writings of 
scholars such as Blackstone, opines that corporations cannot commit crimes.188Hence, only 
the corporation’s members (natural persons) ought to be criminally responsible.189 The 
rationale underpinning this perception includes that criminal conviction and punishment is 
 
186 Ingeson & Kather “The road less travelled: How corporate directors could be held individually liable in 
Sweden for corporate atrocity crime abroad.” 
187 R Milne “Swedish oil bosses set to be charged over South Sudan deaths” (2018) Available at 
<https://www.ft.com> (accessed on 31/03/2019). 
188 J Hasnas “The discordance of New York central jazz: It is time to abandon the notion of corporate criminal 
liability” (2010) 33(1) Regulation 46 46. 
189 Ehrlich Ehrlich’s Blackstone 106. 
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bound up with an enquiry of whether the act of a person presents an independent decision 
to commit a crime. Thus, this school of thought advocates for the societas delinquere non 
potest principle which presumes that a body corporate is merely a legal fiction – as such it 
lacks a “body and soul:” hence, a corporation is not capable of taking independent decisions, 
nor is it capable of committing the necessary actus reus and forming the required mens rea 
in propria persona.190 
This presumption entails that corporations by their nature, as abstract entities, cannot act 
and, further, that imposing criminal sanctions on corporations is inappropriate because, 
unlike human beings, corporations are not capable of making any moral determination.191 
Despite these philosophical objections of corporate criminal liability within some of the civil 
law states, since the 1970s some civil law states started to recognise and introduced the 
corporate criminal liability principle in their penal codes.192 
The predominance of the rational actor model as a preferred type of business making 
decision over other types of business management and decision is noted in this regard. 
Because of this type of business decision making model there has been “[a] shift from liability 
based on imputing individual behaviour to the corporation to the original liability based on 
organisational deficiencies.”193 In the discussion that follows the focus is on selected civil 
law jurisdictions that are relevant to the discussion at hand – these jurisdictions are 
Germany, France and Italy. 
2 3 2 1 The German perspective 
In Germany and the Germanic laws do not recognize the principle of corporate criminal 
liability. This legal position exists, notwithstanding the fact that corporations are recognized 
 
190 AI Pop “Criminal Liability of Corporations: Comparative Jurisprudence” (2006) available at 
<http://digitalcommons.lawmsu.edu/king/81>  6-9 (accessed 12/01/2015). 
191 T Weigend “Societas Delinquere non Potest? A German Perspective” (2008) 6(5) JICJ 927 929. 
192 See, article 121-2 French Penal Code of 1992. 
193 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 342. 
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as real subjects of law.194 The theoretical objections that under lie the exclusion of corporate 
criminal liability in Germany include that only human beings are capable of committing 
crimes. Therefore, it is perceived that any criminal sanctions imposed on legal fictions such 
as companies – departs from the basic and settled criminal law rules, which proffers that for 
a person to be criminally liable – such person must be capable of committing an act and 
possesses the necessary guilty mind. Kyriakakis posits that among the decisive factors that 
led Germany to opt for administrative penalty include that “[a]dministrative sanctions are 
considered morally neutral and they lack the stigma associated with criminal sanctions.”195 
Penalties in this context do not require punishment by imprisonment, rather the effect 
thereof is mainly the restoration of the harm caused and not retribution. It is argued that 
these theoretical and penological objections undermine the object of putting an end to the 
current de facto and de jure impunity enjoyed by corporations. It is demonstrated in chapter 
4 of this dissertation that modern corporations are capable of committing crimes in a myriad 
of ways. 
The German position can be juxtaposed with the rational actor or corporate culture theory 
that entails that a corporation is a functional unit or institution that musters its human and 
capital resources towards the full realisation of its corporate objectives and goals. Hence, 
corporations are capable of developing policies and take decisions necessary to advance 
their interests including profiting from such decisions. Despite the exclusion of corporate 
criminal responsibility proper in the German legal scheme, alternative mechanisms are put 
in place to sanction the offending corporations and representatives of such offending 
corporations. These alternative mechanisms include liability for administrators of 
corporations and the administrative fines imposed on corporations or association of persons. 
The German Criminal Code provides in para 14 that: 
 
194 M Catargiu “The origin of criminal liability of legal persons – A comparative perspective” (2013) Vol 3 
International Journal of Judicial Sciences 26 30. 
195 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 342 344. 
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“(1) If a person acts: 
1. in his capacity as an organ authorised to represent a legal entity or as a member of such an 
organ;  
2. as a partner authorised to represent a partnership with independent legal capacity; or  
3. as a statutory representative of another,  
any law according to which special personal attributes, relationships or circumstances (special 
personal characteristics) form the basis of criminal liability, shall apply to the representative, if 
these characteristics do not exist in his person but in the entity, partnership or person 
represented.”196 
By virtue of the above quoted provision, and further taking into account the German Code 
of Administrative Offences,197 it can be deduced that although corporate criminal 
responsibility is excluded from the German’s penal code: certain officers – especially 
administrative officers in senior positions may be subjected to criminal sanctions for the 
conduct of the body corporate which they are appointed to manage. For administrative 
sanctions to attach, it must be proved that a corporation failed in its stated organisational 
aims and functions.198 
It is worth stating that recently, the principle of corporate criminal responsibility has been 
subjected to rigorous debate in Germany. These debates came after the tabling of the Draft 
 
196 German Criminal Code promulgated on 13 November 1998 published in the Federal Law Gazette I p. 3322 
as Amended by Art 1 of the Law of 24 September 2013 published in the Federal Law Gazette I p. 3671 and 
as Amended by Art 6(18) of the Law of 10 October 2013 published in the Federal Law Gazette I p. 3799. 
197 Section 30 of the German Code of Administrative Offences provides for fines that may be issued against a 
juristic person “(1) Where someone acting: (a) as an entity authorized to represent a legal person or as a 
member of such an entity; (b) as chairman of the executive committee of an association without legal capacity 
or as a member of such committee; (c) as a partner authorized to represent a partnership with legal capacity; 
or (d) as the authorized representative with full power of attorney or in a managerial position as procura-holder 
or the authorized representative with a commercial power of attorney of a legal person or of an association of 
persons referred to in numbers b or c; (e) as another person responsible on behalf of the management of the 
operation or enterprise forming part of a legal person, or of an association of persons referred to in numbers 
(b) or (c), also covering supervision of the conduct of business or other exercise of controlling powers in a 
managerial position – has committed a criminal offence or a regulatory offence as a result of which duties 
incumbent on the legal person or on the association of persons have been violated, or where the legal person 
or the association of persons has been enriched or was intended to be enriched, a regulatory fine may be 
imposed on such person or association.” 
198 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 345. 
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Bill on Corporate Penal Code (Draft Bill) in November 2013. Section 2 of the Draft Bill, 
creates two corporate offences, namely: (a) infringement by decision makers; and (b) failure 
to prevent the infringement. Kuhn argues that “for these criminal offences to be committed, 
it does not require the guilt of an individual perpetrator to be established.”199 Rather, what is 
required is proof that the corporation’s decision making structures were sufficiently seized 
with knowledge related to the infringement. Further that, despite this knowledge, the 
structure of the body corporate did not endeavour to avert the alleged infringement. 
An analysis of the arguments, on which the Draft Bill is anchored includes, firstly, 
employees and agents often assume the blame where in actual fact the corporations ought 
to have assumed such blame collectively. In this manner, employees are construed as 
sacrificial lambs for the crimes committed by the corporations. Secondly, it has increasingly 
became apparent that administrative fines are ineffective in the face of globalisation, 
industrialisation and internationalisation (free movement of labour, services and powers of 
transnational corporations). Indeed, Rubenstahl and Brauns identify that what exacerbates 
the ineffectiveness of administrative fines is that administrative fines can be exploited by 
corporations “since the asset recovery can be calculated and weighted against the 
infringement.”200  
It follows that, as far as doctrinal development is concerned, the Draft Bill seems set the 
stage for further deliberations on criminal liability of body corporates. This is so because, the 
Draft Bill seeks the introduction and recognition, for the first time, the corporate criminal 
liability proper and it is referred to as the first of its kind in the long history of corporate 
responsibility laws in Germany.201 
 
199 Kuhn (2014) Simons & Simons Elexia 2. 
200 M Rubenstahl & C Brauns “Trial and Error – A critique of the New German Draft Code for a Genuine 
Corporate Criminal Liability” (2015) 16(4) German Law Journal 871 874. 
201 Rubenstahl & Brauns (2015) German Law Journal 871. 
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2 3 2 2 The French perspective 
In France, the concept of legal person is known as moral person. Thus, in this context the 
concept of legal person is used interchangeably with the concept of moral person. 
Historically – before the revolution in France, companies were recognized as legal persons 
which could be subjected to criminal prosecution and sanctions. Consequently, the principle 
of corporate criminal liability was applied. This principle was provided for in terms of the 
French Criminal Ordinance of 1670. However, because of the French Revolution certain 
limitations were imposed, including the suppression or prohibition of freedom of 
association.202 
Limitation on freedom of association which was the predominant factor that led the French 
to abandon the criminal liability of body corporates. Another attack that was directed at 
disbanding the criminal liability of body corporates was premised on the insistence and rigid 
interpretation of ultra vires principle. Catargiu pointed out that the ultra vires principle 
provides that a juristic person is limited to act within a given mandate.203 The given mandate 
in this context included the object of the corporation, and the object ought to have been 
allowed or approved according to the precepts of the law.204 
Therefore, at law and in terms of public policy, no corporation could be formed with an 
object of committing crimes. These policy considerations influenced France to adopt the 
principle of individual criminal liability in its criminal code. In France, the general criminal 
liability rule was that “no one is criminally liable except for his own conduct”.205 The 
underpinning theory of punishment entails that criminal liability attaches to an individual 
person as contrasted to juristic persons or collective entities. 
 
202 See, Catargiu (2013) International Journal of Judicial Sciences 27 posits that “the French Code of 1810 
repealed the criminal liability of moral persons, consequently after the French Revolution legal persons under 
private law vanished due to the prohibition of freedom of association.” 
203 Catargiu International Journal of Judicial Sciences 27. 
204 See, for instance in the Namibian context – Section 59(1) of the Companies Act, Act 28 of 2004. 
205 Article 121-1 of the 1994 French Criminal Code. 
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However, the effects of industrialisation, globalisation and increased business activities 
including increased negative activities such as commission of crimes by corporations, 
influenced France to re-introduce the principle of corporate criminal liability.206 In terms of 
the French Criminal Code of 1994 it is provided that: 
“Legal persons, with the exception of the State, are criminally liable for the offences committed 
on their account by their organs or representatives, according to the distinctions set out in articles 
121-4 and 121-7.”207 
It is apparent that the acts that may be imputed on the corporation must be the acts of an 
employee who is in a senior position or an employee who form part of the governing body 
of such a corporation. The acts, as a requirement, should be committed on the behalf of or 
in body corporate’s name. The quoted provision discloses that the provision is wide enough 
to cover the crimes committed by subsidiary entities. This proposition is premised on the 
French Criminal Code that makes reference to “their organs” in paragraph 1 of article 121-
2. The inference made in the article above supports a submission that “their organs” may 
include subsidiary entities when they represent the parent corporation.208  
2 3 2 3 The Italian perspective 
In Italy, the criminal responsibility of corporations is not recognized, nor is it construed to 
be a genuine model through which liability may attach. The Italian Constitution provides that 
“criminal responsibility is personal.”209 Kyriakakis noted that the Italian Constitution’s criminal 
responsibility provision “[i]s the most significant obstacle to the adoption of corporate 
criminal liability in Italy.”210The other factor that influenced Italy to adopt administrative or 
 
206 Amann (2001) Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 332. 
207 Article 121-2 of the French Criminal Code. 
208 Catargiu (2013) International Journal of Judicial Sciences 28. 
209 Article 27 (1) of the Italian Constitution. 
210 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 345. 
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civil sanctions against offending corporations, includes “[I]taly’s desire to harmonise its 
national laws with the European Conventions.”211 The European conventions places positive 
obligations on its members to adopt, inter alia, legislations or legal schemes which 
contemplates to hold offending corporations liable.212 
Thus, the desire to implement these European Conventions and taking into consideration 
the constitutional criminal liability clause that limits criminal liability to natural persons led 
Italy to adopt administrative liability for corporations as a compromise.213 
The other instrument that may be invoked when discussing the concept of corporate 
criminal liability is the Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001. This decree provides that the 
conduct of the employee of a company “can be imputed” onto the company if the offending 
conduct in question was committed in the corporation’s interest or for its benefit.214It is worth 
to note that the offending conduct in question is not limited to the conduct of employees in 
senior positions or positions of authority.215 Rather, conduct that may be imputed on the 
corporation, includes offending conduct of subordinate staff.216 On this score, the Italian law 
on corporate liability (albeit administrative in nature) is comparable to the corporate culture 
theory, in the sense that to avoid liability from attaching, a body corporate should show that 
“it has established certain effective system of control and supervision over the behaviour of 
corporate employees.”217 Even though the Italian model is not per se a genuine form of 
corporate criminal liability – it cannot be over emphasized that there exisist some doctrinal 
support to construct a model of responsibility based on corporate culture theory. 
 
211 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 347. 
212 Article 9(1) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal 
Law of 1998; Article 18 of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999 came into 
force 1 July 2002. 
213 Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001 issued on 2001 June 8. 
214 Art 5(2) of the Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001. 
215 Art 5(1)(a). 
216 Art 5(1)(b). 
217 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 346. 
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2 4 Analysis on doctrinal development 
The origins of the criminal responsibility of companies in common law states is attributed 
to judicial interpretation (case law), which in turn became entrenched into domestic 
legislations. The development of this principle appears to grow from strength to strength – 
that is, the principle which was once almost universally unrecognized, is now recognized in 
most states. For instance, France following the French Revolution, abandoned the principle 
of corporate criminal liability, only to later re-introduce it – chief reason for this re-introduction 
is much owed to industrial development and increased corporate activities, of which some 
of these corporate activities without doubt constitute criminal conduct that are proscribed 
and sanctioned as criminal. 
From the civil law states, there are measures put in place, other than criminal liability, that 
contemplates to hold corporations liable for conduct that constitute an offence. Suffice to 
state that the adopted mechanisms of holding corporations liable within the civil law states 
are significantly different from one jurisdiction to another. States such as France provide for 
corporate criminal liability which can be contrasted from the practice in Germany and Italy 
which do not sanction offending corporations with criminal sanctions. 
One important distinguishing factor underpinning these measures (administrative 
penalties) is that they are accepted to be “morally neutral and without stigma because they 
relate to offences that cannot be punished by imprisonment if committed by natural 
persons”.218It is argued that the impact of an administrative penalty which is primarily aimed 
at restoration of the harm caused may not be an effective measure to deter corporations 
from committing crimes. 
In fact, it is submitted that at present, criminal sanctions against corporations are the 
subject of much debate and some scholars argue that the use of civil sanctions and 
 
218 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 345. 
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administrative fines is not very effective, especially “where the cost of harm exceeds the 
damages that are likely to be imposed on the corporation”.219 In contrast, the stigma 
associated with criminal sanctions appears to be more effective in situations where the fine 
imposed is less than the harm caused. 
It is worth noting that the principle of corporate criminal liability is not only recognized in 
common law legal systems, but that it is also recognized in some of the civil law states. 
However, the main concern is not necessarily in its recognition per se but in its application. 
This concern lies in the fact that there is no uniform manner in which the principle of 
corporate criminal liability may be applied at international level for purposes of providing 
guidelines for domestic jurisdictions. For instance, in SA and Namibia, companies are not 
directly accountable, instead, an indirect liability scheme is applied – that is companies may 
be criminally responsible by the instrumentality of vicarious liability principle. 
The practice of holding corporations liable based on vicarious liability can as well be 
identified with the practice in the USA, notwithstanding the current USA’s shift to direct 
liability schemes based on corporate culture. The indication of this shift lies in several 
legislation that require intention of the offending corporations to be derived or inferred from 
the corporations’ policies, management and organisational behaviour. 
The holistic approach to corporate liability that is practiced in some of the common law 
states, that is, holding corporations criminally liable based on the rational actor model or 
corporate culture model. This is commendable as a good milestone achieved – considering 
the complex nature of corporations. It is was submitted above that “even in common law 
states where” the principle of corporate criminal responsibility was received suffer from lack 
of a unified theory on which the corporate criminal liability may be founded. For instance, 
the analysis of the UK legal mechanism indicates that offending companies may attract 
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criminally responsibility by means of the identification theory. By contrast, and from a SA 
perspective, guilt is founded on the utilisation of vicarious liability. 
The factor that differentiates the identification theory from vicarious liability, among 
others, include: the former requires that the employee or agent of the corporations must be 
in a position of authority (senior position) and that such employee’s conduct should be 
identified with the company (“as the directing mind and will”). The UK, just like USA, appears 
to be shifting at least in principle to the practice of responsibility based on the culture of the 
entity, for instance, the (UK) Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007 
provides that company intent can be “inferred from the manner in which the corporation is 
managed.”220 These innovations, without doubt represent or are good indicators that the 
corporate scheme is not static – rather, it is gaining new heights and commands to be 
recognized as a competent form of criminal responsibility. 
2 5 Conclusion  
A comparative and selective overview reveals that the application of corporate criminal 
responsibility, sharply differs. These differences in the application of the principle exacerbate 
the dissonance at domestic levels. From this baseline proposition we work our way towards 
the central argument in this dissertation, namely that this domestic dissonance in the 
application and enforcement of corporate criminal scheme can, to a significant extent, be 
remedied by a coherent international approach to corporate liability for systemic crimes, 
including the core crimes. The dogmatic confusion and fragmentation can, over time, 
disappear if there is a strong international institutional through which corporate criminal 
responsibility can be developed. Further, that such a platform may be used to ratchet 
corporate liability scheme to the level where it may be universally accepted as a mode of 
liability for atrocity crimes. This will require a top-down approach, and not an organic bottom-
 
220 See, a discussion on the UK perspective in section 2 3 1 2 if this chapter. 
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up approach, given the varying modalities and principles underpinning corporate liability at 
the domestic level. The submission here is that the Rome Statute of the ICC, despite all its 
flaws, may yet be the best vehicle for such a unifying project. First, we need to go back in 
history to see how this topic of corporate criminal liability was treated at the other 
international criminal tribunals. That is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The principle of corporate criminal liability and the international criminal 
tribunals: the unfinished business from Nuremberg to The Hague and beyond 
3 1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter briefly analysed the origins and development of the principle of 
corporate criminal responsibility at domestic level. In this chapter the analysis focusses: 
firstly, on the practice and the legacy of the Nuremberg trials. Secondly, a discussion on the 
trials which were held in terms of the Control Council Law 10221 will be provided. Thirdly, the 
chapter provide an analysis from selected international criminal tribunals that followed in the 
historical footsteps of Nuremberg, such as: the ICTR; the ICTY; the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL); and the jurisprudence from the ICC. The chapter further discusses the 
motivations and rationales behind the withdrawal of Draft Article 23(5) from the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. Fourthly, the chapter identifies relevant developments at the regional and 
domestic levels that may be useful in terms of developing proposals for the inclusion of 
corporate criminal liability at the international level, specifically the ICC. 
3 2 Legacy of Nuremberg trials 
The Nuremberg trials present an invaluable and rich foundation of international criminal 
law. The Nuremberg trials had a profound impact on the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility. This is because they served as the first international adjudications on 
corporate involvement in systematic criminal behaviour constituting crimes under 
international law. 
 
221 Control Council Law No. 10 Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity of 20 December 1945, Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946). 
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3 2 1 Corporate criminal liability and the Nuremberg trials 
True to the intention of punishing the perpetrators of the atrocities committed in occupied 
Europe by the Nazi regime, the Allied Powers222 concluded several agreements – notably, 
the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis223 and the constitutive instrument of the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT).224 Premised on these instruments, the IMT had jurisdiction over three international 
crimes, namely: “crimes against peace”225, “war crimes,”226 and “crimes against 
humanity.”227 Further, the IMT had jurisdiction “[t]o try and punish persons responsible for 
the perpetration of the atrocities as individuals or as members of organizations.”228 
For present purposes reference is made to the Nuremberg trials, meaning a “[nu]mber of 
trials that were held in Nuremberg, Germany.”229 These trials can be broadly clustered into 
 
222 Allied Powers in terms of paragraph 4 of the Preamble of the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis of 8 December 1945 and article 1 of the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 refers to states such USA, France, UK, and Soviet Union 
(Russia). 
223 08 August 1945; Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 pertaining to the prosecution and punishment of 
German War Criminals in the countries in which atrocities were committed; Control Council Law 10 of 20 
December 1945. 
224 Charter (Constitution) of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) of 08 August 1945 in London. It is also 
known as the Nuremberg Charter. 
225 Art 6(a) provides that Crimes against peace includes “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.” 
226 Art 6(b) provides that War crimes includes “violations of the law and customs of wars. Such violations shall 
include, but not to be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoner of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity.” 
227 Art 6(c) provides Crimes against humanity includes “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” 
228 Art 6. 
229 D Bloxham “From the International Military Tribunal to the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings: The 
American Confrontation with Nazi Criminality Revisited” (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 567 
567 posits that “Nuremberg refers to both the event and process or the prosecution , in the German city of that 
name, of twenty-two senior German figures and six organisations before the IMT in 1945-6 (…) or may connote 
not just the IMT trial but also the twelve subsequent trials before the NMTs conducted in 1946-9 by the 
American occupation authorities against major war criminals of the second rank.” 
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two groups: The first group consisting of the criminal proceedings that were heard by the 
IMT, in which high ranking German officials and six organisations were brought before the 
IMT.230 The corporations were brought before the IMT not necessarily for prosecuting and 
punishing them, but for determination as to whether such corporations were criminal 
organisations or not.231 The effect of the declaration of a corporation as criminal organisation 
will be dealt with below. The individuals who were brought before the IMT were suspected 
to be the major war criminals.232 The second group refers to the criminal proceedings that 
were brought before national courts of the Allied Powers as constituted in the demarcated 
zones, hereinafter referred to as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs). The trials under 
the NMTs include the trials233 which mainly dealt with war criminals that may arguably be 
referred to, in the words of Bloxham  – as “the major war criminals of the second rank”234 
and lesser, including leaders of certain corporations.235 These NMTs were constituted under 
the “[a]uspices of the Allied Powers as provided for by the Control Council Law 10.”236 
The conception of the IMT and its jurisprudence can be distinguished from the 
subsequent ad hoc international criminal tribunals (ICT) including the ICC. The Nuremberg 
trials are generally construed as the birth or inception of international criminal law and these 
 
230 Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 567. 
231 See, Article 9 of the Charter of the IMT. 
232 See, Paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis. 
233 US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, (United States of America v Carl Krauch et al.) (“Carl Krauch”) judgment 
of 30 July 1948, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Vol. VIII; US Military 
Tribunal Nuremberg (United States of America v Flick et al) (“Flick et al”), judgment of 22 December 1947, in 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Vol. VI. 
234 Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 567. 
235 See, T Taylor The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (1993) 269 noted that “the Moscow 
Declaration of November 1943 had distinguished between major war criminals who would be punished by the 
joint decision of the Allied Powers and those miscreants of lesser stature who would be dealt with by national 
courts”. Further see, Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis which provides that “and whereas the Moscow Declaration of 
30 October 1943, on German atrocities in occupied Europe stated that those German officers and men and 
members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and 
crimes will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they be 
judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free Governments that will 
be created therein”. 
236 See, G Werle & F Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law 3ed (2014) 11-12.  
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trials provided the contours of “substantive body of law” at international level and “procedural 
aspects” of the subsequent development of the body of law that we know today as 
international criminal law.237 The constitutive instrument of the IMT provided for substantive 
law on liability of body corporates, ranking it as the first international instrument which 
contemplated to advance the principle of corporate criminal responsibility. 
Furthermore, the IMT was the first international tribunal that successfully adjudicated over 
corporations, even though the effect of such adjudication was merely to declare the 
corporations as criminal organisations as opposed to punishing such offending corporations. 
The reason as to why the IMT opted not to punish corporations for their complicity in the 
commission of the atrocities was not because there was no evidence that implicated the 
corporations, but that the IMT adopted the position that criminal responsibility, ultimately, is 
personal (meaning natural persons, not abstract entities). Consequently, it was assumed 
that abstract entities were incapable of committing crimes. In Trial of the Major War Criminals 
(Göring and Others)238, the Tribunal famously stated: 
“Many other authorities could be cited, but enough has been said to show that individuals can be 
punished for violations of international law. Crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”239 
Prior to the above quoted judgment, individuals had no locus standi under international 
law. That is, natural persons were not “recognized as subjects of international law.”240 The 
 
237 F Jessberger “On the origins and individual criminal responsibility under international law for business 
activity” (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 783 798. 
238 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, (“Goring and Others”) 1946, IMT 
Volume XXII, Judgment and Sentencing of the Afternoon Session of the Two Hundred and Seventeenth Day, 
Monday 30 September 1946. 
239 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Volume XXII, (1948) 466. 
240 J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3ed (2005), 1 - 2 posits that “Individuals benefit 
from the protection of international law and participate in its process, but they cannot be described as full 
subjects of international law.” 
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general rule under international law then was that international law was concerned with 
regulating state conduct and not individual conduct. In this context, it was perceived that 
when an individual act in the interests (behalf) of the state – such actions could not attract 
individual liability under international law. Rather, such acts were attributed to the state. For 
this reason, an individual person’s conduct was “protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty 
of the state.”241 Understood from this position, it can be concluded that the principle of 
individual liability appeared to be more of an exception, rather than a general rule. However, 
by virtue of the IMT’s judgment quoted above, the exception was elevated and made to be 
the mainstay principle of international criminal law. 
3 2 1 1 Aspects of the substantive law on corporate criminal liability 
A literal reading of the text of the constitutive instrument of the IMT may be construed so 
as to provide and recognize liability of companies. This submission resonates in terms of 
the Charter of the IMT which conferred onto the IMT the jurisdiction to hear matters that 
were concerned with the determination (declaration) of whether the corporations that 
participated in the commission of atrocities were criminal organisations or not. The principal 
provision in this regard provided that: 
“At the trial of any individual member of any group or organisation the Tribunal may declare (in 
connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organisation 
of which the individual was a member was a criminal organisation.”242 
Moreover, in terms of article 10243 of the constitutive instrument of the IMT, the legal 
nature of the declaration contemplated in article 9 entails that once an organisation is 
 
241 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Volume XXII, (1948) 465. 
242 Para 1 of art 9 of the Charter of the IMT. 
243 Article 10 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal provides that “In cases where a group or 
organisation is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have 
right to bring individual to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any 
such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.” 
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declared as a criminal organisation – such declaration is final. That is, the criminal nature of 
such organisation is deemed proved and no questions may be raised in that regard. The 
consequences that ensued as a result of the declaration includes that national authorities 
were vested with powers to prosecute and punish “individuals for membership” in such 
criminally declared corporations. In this context, membership into a criminally declared 
organisation was an offence that attracted personal liability. 
Hopeful to these provisions, coupled with sweeping prosecutorial powers to charge 
conspiracy to commit atrocities, Robert H. Jackson at the realm of the prosecution team 
elucidated that the prosecution’s task was twofold: first, it was to “[e]stablish the existence 
of a general conspiracy to which the Nazi Party and other organizations were parties. The 
second phase was concerned with the identification of individuals who were parties to the 
general conspiracy”.244 The impression in relation to these phases included that upon 
establishing that organisations were party to conspiracy to commit atrocities, it were to follow 
that “the evidence against individuals could be held against organizations and vice versa”.245 
In the event that an organisation was declared as a criminal organisation – the following 
implications were probable, namely: first, it implied that members of such an organisation 
were by virtue of such declaration guilty and punishable for the offence of membership of a 
criminally declared organisation. Second, such members could be held liable for offences 
that were committed by such an organisation.246 In this regard, Article 9 further provided 
that: 
“After receipt of the indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that the 
prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the 
organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon 
 
244 Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 572. 
245 Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 573. 
246 See, G Ginsburgs & V N Kudriavtsev The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990) 215 posits that 
“once the conspiracy is established, each act of every member thereof during its continuance and in 
furtherance of its purposes would be imputable to all other members.” 
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the question of the criminal character of the organisation. The Tribunal shall have power to allow 
or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the 
applicants shall be represented and heard.”247 
The text of this provision entails that, the constitutive instrument of the IMT provided for 
the rights and procedures that were available to a member of a group or organisation. For 
instance, “[a] member of a group was entitled to bring an application before the Tribunal for 
leave to be heard in relation to the question of the criminal character of the organisation.”248 
The provisions that contemplated to provide for corporate criminal liability presented 
challenges. These challenges, among others included that, apart from the interpretation that 
“[i]ndividual members of organizations declared criminal could themselves be convicted on 
the basis of membership therein; the penalty for crime of membership was to be made in 
terms of the Control Council Law 10, which authorized capital punishment.”249 The problem 
here was that a person who may have joined the group without having knowledge that the 
group’s object was to commit atrocities would have been subjected to injustice. Equally so, 
members who were conscripted into the organisation were without protection. In other 
words, the provisions had far-reaching consequences without safeguards for purposes of 
ensuring that innocent members (i.e. morally blameless) were not prejudiced. 
The other concern was that the provisions reversed the onus in relation to proving that 
such members may have joined the organisation involuntarily (claim of conscription). 
Resulting from these limitations the corporate liability scheme was vigorously challenged by 
the defence counsel. Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev summarised the defense counsel’s main 
objections to include that - “collective criminal responsibility is a denial of justice and violates 
 
247 Para 2 of art 9 of the Charter of the IMT. 
248 See, Bloxham (2013) Journal of Historical Association 574. 
249 Taylor Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 283; Ginsburgs et al Nuremberg Trial 242; R K Woetzel The 
Nuremberg Trials in International Law (1960) 191 posits that “the court thereby showed that the declaration of 
criminality could have serious consequences and could result in the imposition of death penalty for the crime 
of membership in such organization. Further that the procedure was novel and its application unless properly 
safeguarded may produce great injustice.” 
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international law; the Charter imposes punishment retrospectively upon membership in 
groups that were not prohibited by law; and the fact that individual members were labelled 
criminals without a hearing”.250In response to these objections, the IMT held that:  
“(…) if satisfied of the criminal guilt of any organization or group, this Tribunal should not hesitate 
to declare it to be criminal because the theory of group criminality is new, or because it might be 
unjustly applied by some subsequent tribunals. (…) the Tribunal should make such declaration of 
criminality as far as is possible.”251 
The tribunal made comparison between a criminal organisation and criminal conspiracy. 
The tribunal stated that they are both concerned mainly with cooperation for criminal 
purposes. Despite the tribunal taking the above stated position, it however observed that to 
avoid the irreparable injustice against innocent members of the organisations that are 
declared criminal, there must be safeguards or mechanisms that must be put in place to 
separate the innocent from the guilty members. In this regard, the Tribunal continued with 
caution and held that: 
“[S]ince the declaration with respect to the organization and groups will, as has been pointed out, 
fix the criminality of its members, that definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge 
of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the State for 
membership, unless such members were personally implicated in the commission of the acts 
declared criminal by article 6 of the Charter as members of the organization. Membership alone 
is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations.”252 
To this effect the tribunal laid down certain requirements which must be satisfied before 
declaring organisations as criminal organisations. In the similar manner, the requirements 
which ought to be proved before a member of the group could be held accountable for the 
 
250 Ginsburgs et al Nuremberg Trial 240. 
251 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, IMT Vol XXII 500. 
252 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, IMT Vol XXII 500. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
offence of membership of a criminally declared organisation were prescribed. These 
requirements included: first, the group or organisation must be formed or used in connection 
with any act proscribed by “article 6 of the Charter of the IMT” of which the individual may 
be convicted. The measuring yard stick for this requirement was that in order for an 
organisation to be declared criminal it must have been proven beyond reasonable doubt that 
the group or organisation “really acted as a group or organization towards the common plan 
(commission of atrocities).”253 
Second, was the voluntary aspect of membership. Here, it was stated that a person could 
only be held to account, if or when such person’s membership in a group was voluntary, 
namely: if the said person joined the group at his or her own accord. The essence of this 
requirement was to exclude membership that may have been resulted from conscription or 
involuntary mechanisms.254 This conforms to the finding that membership alone is 
insufficient for purposes of prosecuting and punishing a member of a group for the crime of 
membership. That is, the tribunal held that criminal liability for the offence of membership 
may not attach, unless where the member” was personally implicated in the commission of 
the atrocities.”255 
Third, it was required to be proved that the design and the object of the organisation were 
to commit the criminal activities that were proscribed in terms of article 6 of the Charter of 
the IMT. Fourth, the object of the organisation must have been commonly known to its 
members. Woetzel posits that this requirement entails that “[t]he criminal purpose and 
activities of the organization must be widespread to an extent that they are known to all 
members”.256 The essence here is that any reasonable person must be able to draw an 
 
253 Para 519. 
254 Taylor Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 282. 
255 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, IMT Vol. XXII 500. 
256 Woetzel Nuremberg Trials 192. 
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inference in all fairness that the members of the group or organisation had knowledge of 
such criminal purpose. 
3 2 1 2 Declaration of organisation as criminal 
Despite the limited scope of the corporate scheme under the constitutive instrument of 
the IMT, the IMT adjudicated over organisations that were alleged by the prosecution to 
have been criminal in nature. Six organisations or groups were brought before the IMT to be 
declared criminal for their alleged complicity in the commission of atrocities. These 
organisations were the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Geheime Staatspolizei 
(Gestapo), the Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (SS), the 
Reich Cabinet, the Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei 
(SA) and the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. 
The IMT declared three of these organisations as criminal organisations, namely the 
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS and the Gestapo. These organisations were 
declared criminal because of their complicity in the commission of atrocities. For instance, 
in the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party case, the tribunal found this group was, inter alia, 
instrumental and fundamental in the assisting the Nazi regime to commit atrocities in the 
conquered territories; the formulation of policies with the object of extermination of the 
German Jews; the design, formulation and implementation of slave programmes; and so 
forth. 
The Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer (SD) were treated together and 
the reasons for declaring them as criminal included their participation in the annihilation of 
the Jews, slaughters in the “concentration camps” and implementation of the slave 
programmes. The tribunal held that the Gestapo and SD organisations were “[i]nvolved in 
the persecution and extermination of the Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration 
camps, excesses in the administration of the occupied territories, the administration of the 
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slave labour programmes and the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war.”257 In the 
same sense the SS was declared as a criminal organisation for similar reasons as those 
advanced with regard to the Gestapo and SD. 
As was stated above that the reason for declaring groups as criminal organisations was 
to afford Allied Powers a legal and factual foundation to prosecute and punish individuals 
for membership in organisations that were declared criminal. Of course, as was already 
mentioned above, membership alone was found to be insufficient for purposes of finding an 
individual criminally liable for the offence of membership.258 In order for liability in regard to 
the crime of membership to attach, the individual must have had personally acted or had 
knowledge that the organisations’ object was to commit crimes that were proscribed in terms 
of article 6 of the Charter of IMT. It is worth noting that faced with these stringent 
requirements, the Tribunal, even though it declared some of the above named organisations 
as criminal – criminal liability only attached to the members of these organisations who were 
in high raking position to the exclusion of lower ranking members of same organisations. 
For instance among those who were excluded were cleaners, ordinary clerical personnel, 
stenographers and employees who performed unofficial routine works.259 
The IMT did not declare three of the six organisations as criminal organisations for various 
reasons. The Reich Cabinet was essentially exonerated because there was not enough 
evidence to show that from the cut-off date (since 1939)260 it had acted as a group. Further 
that the size of the Reich Cabinet was too small, thus, it was easier to identify the members 
and to institute criminal charges against the individual members, rather than declaring the 
 
257 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, IMT Vol. XXII 511. 
258 Para 500. 
259 Woetzel Nuremberg Trials 197. 
260 See, Woetzel Nuremberg Trials 193 stated that “[t]he IMT also limited the period of membership to which 
the declarations of criminality should apply. Since the jurisdiction of the court was limited by the Charter to 
crimes committed during the period from 1939 to 1945. (…) thus, the declaration should not apply to persons 
who had ceased to be members of a criminal organization before 1939.” 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
75 
 
organisation to be criminal. Equally so, the General Staff and High Command as well the 
SA survived the reach of the declaration. 
Concerning the General Staff and High Command the tribunal found that it was composed 
of “[m]ilitary officers whose relationships were in general like those in other services 
throughout the world”.261 For this reason, it could not be said that their object was for 
purposes of committing offences which were proscribed by article 6 of the Charter of the 
IMT, nor could they qualify as a group or organisation as contemplated in terms of article 9 
of the Charter of the IMT. 
3 2 1 3 Observations and deductions from the IMT: The Juristic person’s case 
The IMT assumedly, was unique in as far as the history of international criminal law is 
concerned. The reason, inter alia, is that it was seized with a rare opportunity to lay the 
foundation of whether to subject body corporates to criminal responsibility for perpetration 
of offences. It is submitted that the drafters of the IMT constitutive instrument instead of 
limiting the liability to mere declaration, should rather have expanded the mode of liability to 
include effective punishment of corporations for their complicity in atrocities. The IMT should 
also have exploited articles 9, 10 and 11 (corporate scheme) to the fullest to provide for 
corporate criminal liability in the true sense, rather than literally interpreting the corporate 
scheme provision by limiting such possibility to mere declaration of the organisation as 
criminal. It is without doubt that there was sufficient evidence implicating organisations to 
have participated in the commission of atrocities.262 However, their responsibility were 
immunized and reduced to mere declaration. 
 
261 Woetzel Nuremberg Trials 199. 
262 See, Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 573 stated that “In many cases the 
documentary evidence was clear cut, and that was particularly true of the direct participation in war crimes and 
crimes against humanity of SS and army leaders (Kaltenbrunner, Keitel, Jold), slave labour exploiters and 
plunderers.” 
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Scholars contend that there were various explanations which were instrumental or 
strongly influenced the Allied powers to be reluctant or to avoid pressing for corporate 
punishment – notwithstanding such body corporate’s participation in crimes. These factors 
include, notably, the lack of prescribed defences. Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev argued that 
the “[t]he omission from the IMT Charter of any provision as to the defences which would be 
available in trials under article 10 was an excruciating blow on the prosecution.”263 Thus, it 
followed that there was no legal basis both under the IMT constitutive instrument or 
international criminal law from which the defences such as lack of knowledge pertaining to 
the criminal object of the corporation or involuntary membership (conscription) could be 
derived from. For this reason, some of the IMT judges appeared to exasperated with the 
notion of corporate or group criminal responsibility. During the deliberations on corporate 
involvement in atrocities it was stated by one judge that “[t]his group crime is a shocking 
thing and that all charges against organizations must be dropped.”264 
Apart from the legal considerations, there were other contributing factors such as the 
desire and advocacy from the Allied Powers for the restoration of Germany’s economy. This 
was despite the fact that the moral obligation of the Allied Powers was total denazification 
and deindustrialization as was contemplated in terms of the Control Council Law 9. The 
effect thereof was to devastate or de-industrialize German corporations that benefited from 
atrocities such as spoliations and plunder. Bloxham observed that this Morgenthau plan was 
considered by other members of the Allied Powers as “impractical and immoral”. And, “the 
plan perceived to sow the seeds of the Third World War.”265 
Further, historians argue that the fear of Soviet expansionism influenced some of the 
Allied Powers such as Britain to begin analysing possible avenues for the restoration of the 
 
263  Ginsburgs et al Nuremberg Trial 240.  
264 Ginsburgs et al Nuremberg Trial 241 makes a summary of Judge Biddle’s view on corporate scheme stating 
that “by September 1946, he Biddle had concluded that the original recommendations of January 1945 that 
allowed corporate scheme was wrong and that the whole approach had to be repudiated by the Court.” 
265 Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 571. 
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German industries. The object was that Germany would serve as the backbone of central 
Europe – thus, if it were to be economically resurrected, it would essentially counter the 
developments of the Soviet communism. For this reason, from Britain’s perspective, the 
proceedings against industrialists and corporations were perceived to be strategically 
unwise.266 Although I mention this “non-legal” reason for the non-criminalisation of corporate 
conduct in passing, it should not be underestimated as an overt or covert rationale for the 
apparent reluctance (globally) to hold companies criminally liable for atrocity offences. It is 
simply regarded as too costly from a geo-economic or even geo-political perspective. For 
now, back to the infancy of efforts to hold corporations or organisations liable for their 
contributions to atrocity crimes. 
3 2 2 Corporate liability under the NMTs 
Control Council Law 10 formed the legal source for the proceedings which were initiated 
against the second rank and lesser offenders including the industrialists under the 
jurisdictions of the NMTs. Unlike the IMT constitutive instrument, the text of Control Council 
Law 10 did not include corporate responsibility. However, the Control Council Law 10 
provided for the offence of membership in a criminally declared organisation. It stipulated 
that acts that are recognized as criminal include “membership in categories of a criminal 
group or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.”267 
There was incontrovertible evidence pertaining to organisations’ contributions or 
participation in crimes which were committed. These contributions included the provision of 
 
266 Bloxham (2013) The Journal of the Historical Association 576 -7 posit that “British foreign political thinking 
as a whole was ahead of its American counterpart, in perceiving before the end of the war the threat that Soviet 
expansionism was held to pose to Europe. Likewise, Whitehall was first to see that Germany would have to 
be resurrected in some form, as the mainstay of a central European power bloc designed to check the advance 
of communism. By mid-1946 this impulse had grown stronger than fears of a revival of German nationalism. 
Hence trials of Germany’s former leaders came to be seen as detrimental to Britain’s interests and particularly 
so if these trials concerned industrialists whose complicity in Nazi criminality could be used for anti-capitalist 
propaganda purposes.” 
267 Art II (1)(d) of the Control Council Law 10. 
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vital war materials, armaments, illegally benefiting from plunder and spoliation, 
administration of slave programmes, deployment of inmates in factories (forced labour), and 
manufacturing and production of chemical “Zyklon B gas” and its delivery to various 
encampments. 
The factual contribution of corporate entities in the atrocity offences and serious violations 
of “international humanitarian law” was recognized by the NMT’s via the prosecution of 
individuals who were instrumental in these activities. For instance, in United States v Alfried 
Krupp et al268 it was found that the commercial interests of the well-known German industrial 
firm Krupp were unlawfully and criminally served by individuals associated with this firm. The 
unlawful and criminal activities in question were acts of pillaging in violation of international 
humanitarian law, notably The Hague Regulations articles 28 and 47. In essence, these 
regulations provide for the protection of property rights and commercial interests in occupied 
territories.269 Property in occupied territory can be seized by the occupying forces for 
emergencies, with the consent of the owner, or under circumstances where the defence of 
necessity would apply. These defences, as well as the defence’s excuse of duress, were 
not available for the defendants in Krupp et al. The NMT rejected the defences and 
confirmed the applicable principle of individual criminal responsibility: 
“[T]he Krupp firm, through defendants Krupp, Loeser, Houdremont, Mueller, Janssen and 
Eberhardt, voluntarily and without duress participated in these violations by purchasing and 
removing the machinery and leasing the property of the Austin plan and in leasing the Paris 
property: and that there was no justification for such action, either in the interest of public order 
and safety or the needs of the army of occupation.”270 
 
268 US v Alfried Krupp et al, (“Alfried Krupp et al”) Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol X (1949) 130-
159 available at <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-states-military-tribunal-nuremberg-united-
states-v-alfried-krupp-et-al> (accessed 2019/04/20). 
269 Apart from the Hague Rules, at present, the prohibition of pillage is also prohibited in Geneva Convention 
IV (1949) art 32(2) (for international armed conflicts) and (for non-international armed conflicts) in Additional 
Protocol II (1977) art 4(2)(g). See, also, M Sassòli International Humanitarian Law (2019) 293-294.  
270 Alfried Krupp et al, 130. 
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Significantly, for purposes of this dissertation, is the NMT’s treatment of the notion of 
individual criminal liability. Safe to say that considering the factual matrix of the case like 
Krupp et al that the relevant crimes were “committed for the commercial benefit of the 
corporation.”271 Yet, the NMT adopted a liability model that excluded direct criminal 
responsibility for the corporation. Instead, the focus was on individuals who controlled, 
managed and directed these commercial entities. The NMT in Krupp et al took guidance 
from a leading American academic commentary at the time: 
“Officers, directors, or agents of a corporation participating in a violation of law in the conduct of 
the company’s business may be held criminally liable individually therefore. [...] He is liable where 
his [...] authority is established, or where he is the actual present and efficient actor. When the 
corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors and to 
each director, separately and individually.”272 
Van Der Wilt opined that these corporate contributions present a “[s]ymbiotic relationship 
between corporate activities and the criminal regime, in which relationship the latter could 
not survive without the corporations’ unfaltering support.”273 The non-incorporation of direct 
corporate scheme in the text of the Control Council Law 10 and the jurisdiction of the NMTs 
prompted the NMTs to place its reliance on the principle of individual criminal liability even 
though the criminal conduct clearly benefitted the corporate entity. Nevertheless, this step 
towards holding corporations responsible for atrocity crimes, albeit indirectly via the 
application of individual criminal responsibility of the directors, managers and senior 
members, constituted an important moral victory. 
 
271 There was evidence which suggested that Krupp firm benefited from the sale of various war materials that 
supported the Nazi regime. 
272 The NMT quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol 19 (1940) 363. 
273 Van Der Wilt (2013) Chinese Journal of International Law 52. 
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3 3 Jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR 
The discussion in the preceding section analysed the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility from the IMT and NMTs perspectives. In this section, the object is to analyse 
the criminal liability of body corporates – with specific focus on the ad hoc UN tribunals; the 
ICTY, and ICTR. 
3 3 1 Overview on establishment of ICTY and ICTR 
Needless to state that the ICTY274 and the ICTR,275even though they are distinct from 
each other, are creatures of their constitutive instruments and were created with the object 
to put an end to impunity for atrocity crimes which were committed in the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda respectively. From the onset, it must be explained that these tribunals are 
discussed together under this section because their respective founding statutes are 
substantively identical. 
3 3 1 1 Establishment of ICTY 
The aftermath of the Cold War witnessed the fall and disbanding of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Behind this disbandment was the quest for the 
constituent states of SFRY which sought independence and self-determination. This 
endeavour led to the conflict that were characterised as having both “international and 
 
274 See, Statute of ICTY adopted on 25 May 1993 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
827 as Amended on 13 May 1998 by UNSC Resolution 1166 and Amended on 30 November 2000 by UNSC 
Resolution 1329, the Preamble provides that “ Having been established by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (…).” 
275 See, Preamble of the Statute of the ICTR which provides that “ Having been established by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of persons for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 
(…).” 
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internal conflict dimensions.”276 A Commission of Experts was setup at the instance of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with the object to determine the veracity of the 
atrocities that were committed in the territory of SFRY.277 The investigation revealed that 
there were “[w]idespread violations of grave breaches and other violations of international 
humanitarian law, among others, these violations included mass wilful killing, ethnic 
cleansing, and pillage, torture and destruction of cultural and religious property.”278 
Culminating from this investigation the recommendation was that a tribunal must be created 
either based on treaty or resolution of the UNSC.279 Consequently, by virtue of the UNSC 
Resolution 827 of 1993, the ICTY was established to prosecute and punish persons who 
participated in the commission of atrocities offences in SFRY.280 
3 3 1 2 Overview on the establishment of ICTR 
Distinguished from the conflicts that occasioned in SFRY, the creation of the ICTR 
culminated not because of the quest of independence and self-determination for the Hutus 
neither for the Tutsi. The conflict in the territory and neighbouring states of Rwanda by 
Rwandans was not per se classified as containing international elements (to justify UNSC’s 
intervention) but it was classified as an internal conflict which nevertheless posed a “threat 
to international peace and security”281, thus justifying UN action.282 
 
276 S Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional Issues (2012) 31. 
277 Para 2 of the UNSC Resolution 780 of 1993 UN Document S/RES/780.  
278 See, UNSC Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established in terms of UNSC Resolution 780 of 
1992 UN Document S/25274; See further, UNSC, Final Report of the Commission of Experts established in 
terms of UNSC Resolution 780 UN Document S/1994/674; Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal 
Tribunals 31. 
279 See, UN Document S/25704; Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 32 “The Secretary 
General had recommended that the tribunal be established by a resolution rather than by treaty, as the treaty 
process would be too lengthy and would not guarantee that the state affected would become parties thereto.” 
280 See, UNSC Resolution 808 (1993) establishing the Statute of the ICTY and 827 (1993) UN Document 
S/RES/827.  
281 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 34. 
282 For this reason the UNSC had basis to intervene. The UNSC intervention included the establishment of a 
Commission of Expert in terms of the UNSC Resolution 935 (1994) UN Document S/RES/935 with powers 
and authority to investigate and obtain evidence of these atrocities; Williams Hybrid and Internationalized 
Criminal Tribunals 33 expound that “by the time the killing ended in July 1994, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
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An investigation team was constituted, comprised of experts, with the mandate of 
obtaining evidence of the atrocities that were “[c]ommitted in the territory of Rwanda and 
neighbouring states by Rwandans.”283 The report of the Commission of Expert revealed that 
there was “evidence that genocide had occurred and other widespread, systematic 
violations of international humanitarian law.”284 This, in a nutshell, was the legal and factual 
foundation establishing the ICTR.285 
3 3 2 Competence and jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR 
The ICTY and the ICTR were both conferred with the competence to hold accountable 
persons who participated in the atrocity offences as was proscribed by the establishing 
instruments (statutes).286 The competence of the tribunals as to the temporal, material, 
geographical and personal jurisdiction was determined within the four corners of the 
foundational statutes. With reference to competence, the ICTY, in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić 
and Goran Borovnica287 (“Dusko & Goran”) declared that: 
“The competence of this International Tribunal and hence of this Trial Chamber is determined by 
the terms of the Statute.”288 
 
Tutsis had been massacred and between 10,000 and 100,000 Hutus had been killed in the Rwandan Patriotic 
Force (RPF) counter-offensive.” 
283 The indictment stretched to include acts that were committed outside Rwanda but which had impact on 
Rwanda. 
284 See, the Special Rapporteur Report on Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of Rwanda transmitted 
to the United Nation Commission on Human Rights (Res S-3/1) and the Economic and Social Council Decision 
223 (1994) UN Document A/49/508-S/19941157. 
285 The establishment of the ICTR was executed in terms of the UNSC Resolution 955 of 1994 dated 8 
November 1994. 
286 Statute of the ICTY provides for – art 2 Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949, art 3 Violations 
of laws or customs of war, art 4 Genocide, and art 5 Crimes against Humanity; Statute of the ICTR provides 
for – art 2 Genocide, art 3 Crimes against Humanity, and art 4 Violations of article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. 
287 IT-94-1-T Opinion and Judgment of the Trial Chamber II by Judges McDonald, Stephen and Vohrah dated 
7 May 1997. 
288 Para 558. 
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In this breath, the ICTY’s competence scheme was limited to the prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators of atrocity offences which occurred effective from 1991 in 
SFRY.289 In contradistinction, the ICTR was conferred with competence to prosecute not 
only the authors of atrocity crimes in Rwanda, rather it included criminal conduct that were 
perpetrated outside Rwanda and which acts had detrimental impact on Rwanda.290 
Deducing from the text of these statutes, it is apparent that these statutes in their 
competence provisions refer to the concept of “persons”, without qualifying or limiting it to 
natural or juristic persons. Without first disqualifying either of the forms of persons (juristic 
or natural person), the impression on the face of the competence provisions may imply 
inclusivity of all forms of persons. However, an holistic reading of the foundational statutes 
demonstrates that these tribunals lack competence or jurisdiction over juristic persons. 
The tribunals lacked competence to prosecute and punish corporations for corporate acts 
that may be deemed or qualify as atrocity crimes. Firstly, the exclusion of corporate criminal 
liability is expressly provided for in article 6 of the ICTY Statute, and similar provision exists 
as per article 5 of the ICTR Statute which specifically proffer that the respective tribunals 
“have jurisdiction over natural persons.”291 Secondly, and in further support of the explicit 
provision concerning the exclusion of liability of body corporates, both these Statutes provide 
as follows: 
“[A] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in article (ICTY – article 2 to 5 and ICTR 
– article 2 to 4 respectively) of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.”292 
 
289 Art 1 of the Statute of the ICTY. 
290 See, article 1 of the Statute of the ICTR. 
291 Art 6 of Statute of ICTY; Art 5 of the Statute of the ICTR – The contents of these provisions are identical 
save for the mention of ‘Rwanda’ in article 5 of the Statute of ICTR. Above all they provide that “The 
International Tribunal (for Rwanda) shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of 
the present Statute.” 
292 Art 5 (1) of the Statute of the ICTY; Art 6 (1) of the Statute of the ICTR. 
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It is notable that throughout the deliberations and drafting process of the ICTY’s founding 
statute, the French Government mooted, without garnering enough support, the inclusion of 
the offence of membership in a group or organisation. The French proposal provided that 
“membership in a de jure or de facto group whose primary or subordinate goal is to commit 
crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would constitute a specific offence.”293 
The effect, at least in theory, would be to make allowance for corporate liability in the text of 
the Statute of the ICTY – akin to the corporate liability that was constructed via the 
constitutive instrument of the IMT Nuremberg.294 
The French corporate liability proposal did not receive the necessary support for its 
inclusion in the final text of the ICTY’s founding statute. Among the reasons that caused the 
refusal of the (in)famous French proposal was that the earlier criminal tribunals, for instance 
the Nuremberg tribunals, were not solid historical precedents for corporate criminal liability 
in the proper sense (despite the IMT’s jurisprudence regarding criminal organisations, as 
discussed earlier). The French proposal would also be at odds with the sentencing scheme 
that contemplated imprisonment without option of payment of a fine as the appropriate 
sentence for atrocity crimes.295 
In its application of the statute, the ICTY certainly viewed personal liability for atrocity 
crimes to be, first and foremost, the responsibility of natural persons. In Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadić and Goran Borovnica296 (“Tadic and Borovnica”) the Tribunal cited with approval the 
IMT phrasing that “criminal liability for international crimes” is individual liability. ICTY held 
that “the Nuremberg Tribunal considered a number of factors relevant to its conclusion that 
 
293 United Nations Document S/25266, French Proposal (from the Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations) – letter dated 10 February 1993.  
294 J R W D Jones The practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(1998) 61. 
295 Article 24 of the Statute of the ICTY; Article 23 of the Statute of the ICTR. 
296 IT-94-1-T Appeals Chamber Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction dated 2 
October 1995. 
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the authors of particular prohibitions (international crimes) incur individual responsibility.”297 
The language observed in the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals’, when interpreted against 
the background of the historical Nuremberg legacy, led to the predictable outcome that 
institutional international criminal law was not yet ready for holding corporations responsible 
for atrocities. 
On the face of it, the emphatic rejection of corporate criminal liability as a model of 
attributing liability by both the drafters and the interpreters of the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes 
may very well signal the end of the debate. However, beyond the positive law and drafting 
history, what were the factual situation on the ground in terms of corporate involvement in 
the atrocity crimes that were committed in Rwanda and in the Balkans? Is there enough of 
a factual matrix to at least debate the issue beyond the positive law and with an eye on the 
potential trajectory which could, one day, lead to institutional and legal support for the notion 
of corporate criminal liability for atrocity crimes at the international level? In the discussion 
below, an attempt is made to establish whether there were avenues, other than the 
constitutive statutes, which were open to the ICTY and ICTR to apply and develop the 
principle of corporate criminal responsibility. The points of departure is to briefly ponder 
around issues to whether body corporate had a stink (involvement) in the atrocity crimes (or, 
at least prima facie indication of corporate involvement that would warrant further debate of 
this issue). 
3 3 3 Corporate complicity in atrocities: the Balkans and Rwanda standpoints 
A more detailed survey of corporate complicity in atrocities is provided in chapter 4 below. 
For now, it is worth to survey possible the companies’ involvement in atrocity offences 
committed in Rwanda and in the Balkans. Observed from the standpoint of the ICTY and 
ICTR it appears that the body corporate’s hands in atrocity crimes cannot be denied. The 
 
297 Tadić and Borovnica at 128. 
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tribunals acknowledged these body corporates’ involvement in atrocity offences. However, 
because of the rigid application of the individual criminal liability principle, corporations and 
other collectives went unpunished. The principle of corporate/group criminal liability was 
excluded in cases such as the participation of Kangura newspaper, Arkan’s Tigers 
consortium, the Interahamwe of Rwanda, and the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM). These collectives-qua-collectives essentially went unpunished. 
In relation to the Arkan’s Tiger in the Former Yugoslavia, the group was formed by Željko 
Ražnatović alias Arkan and it consisted of Serbian volunteers who became to be known as 
Arkan’s Tigers. The object of the group was to protect and defend the interests of Serbians 
who lived outside Serbia and within Yugoslavia. It operated under the shadows of the Serb 
Military. By this association with the Serb Military, the Arkan’s Tigers committed atrocities 
among others including torture, looting of property, rape, and murder in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Kosovo.298 However, the Arkan’s Tigers as a group was not declared criminal. None of the 
members of the Arkan’s Tigers were prosecuted for these atrocities, except for Željko 
Ražnatović who was indicted for atrocities that he personally committed.299 Equally, and 
despite the proven active participation in the commission of genocide and other international 
crimes, the Interahamwe group,300 Kangura Newspaper (print media)301 and the RTLM302 in 
Rwanda enjoyed impunity for the perpetration of international crimes. 
 
298 E Pond “Kosovo and Serbia after the French Non” (2005) Washington Quarterly 19 20. 
299 Prosecutor v Željko Ražnatović (“Željko”) IT-97-27. Arkan was indicted, however, he was killed in 2000 in 
Belgrade and did not stand trial. 
300 Prosecutor v Juvěnal Kajelijeli (“Juvěnal”) Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T Judgment and Sentence of 1 
December 2003, paragraph 83 “the Chamber is aware that based on the notoriety of the word Interahamwe a 
witness when testifying in court may use the word with reference to either the particular group that existed in 
Mukingo Commune and neighboring areas or the general term used by the populace which means 
genocidaires or killers.” 
301 Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze (“Nahimana et al”) Case 
No. ICTR-99-52-T Judgment and Sentence of Trial Chamber I on 3 December 2003, paragraph 11 the 
indictment read “Hassan Ngeze stand charged mainly in relation to newspaper Kangura.” At paragraph 1038 
the Trial Chamber held that “(…) it is evident that Kangura (Newspapaer) played a significant role, and was 
seen to have placed a significant role, in creating the conditions that led to acts of Genocide.” 
302 Para 8 reflects that Ferdinand Nahimana was indicted to stand trial mainly in relation to the participation in 
the commission of atrocities by the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). At paragraph 486 the 
Chamber found that “[R]TLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping in a manner that promoted contempt 
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The role played by these groups or corporations in the build-up and eventual commission 
of genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was found to be significant, for example on the role 
played by the RTLM, the Tribunal found that: 
“(…) RTLM also broadcast messages encouraging Tutsi civilians to come out of hiding and return 
home or go to the roadblocks, where they were subsequently killed in accordance with the 
direction of the subsequent RTLM broadcasts tracking their movements.”303 
In this instance, because of the broadcasts calling on Tutsis to come out of hiding, those 
in hiding would possibly not have been killed. This was a clear strategy deployed by the 
RTLM to ensure the extermination of the Tutsis, which strategy was approved by the 
management of RTLM. Therefore, in this context, the principle of individual criminal liability 
unlike corporate criminal liability appears to be insufficient for purposes of deterring 
corporate conduct that may be deemed criminal. 
It is argued that taking into consideration the evolution of corporations, their power and 
influence in social sphere and the rights conferred on them, not only do they require 
corresponding obligations, but that they also require appropriate sanctions to ward-off the 
conduct that may be deemed criminal. Atrocity crimes don’t occur in a vacuum, or without 
considerable organisational support. Individuals alone did not out of their own volition 
decided to commit these atrocities in the Balkans and in Rwanda. A certain context and 
atmosphere were created by a complex of role-players, not least of all institutions (often in 
the private or semi-private sphere) that propagated hateful ideas and atrocious intentions. 
A mix of individual and corporate actors304 contributed substantially in the build-up to the 
genocide in Rwanda. However, the veracity of these contributions is not reflected in the body 
 
and hatred for the Tutsi population. (…) the virulence and the intensity of RTLM broadcasts propagating ethnic 
hatred and calling for violence increased. The broadcasts called explicitily for the extermination of the Tutsi 
ethnic group.” 
303 Para 487. 
304 For an overview, see the Human Rights Watch report, available at: 
<https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-03.htm> (accessed on 2019/03/18). 
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of cases that were heard by the ICTR. Chief reasons for this was due to the jurisdictional 
limitation regarding individual criminal liability. 
3 4 Jurisprudence from SCSL 
In this section, the discussion focusses on the jurisprudence from the SCSL. The SCSL, 
by far can be contrasted from other ad hoc ICTs discussed above. Notably, because the 
SCSL was not limited to apply its constitutive instrument – rather, it was allowed or permitted 
to apply domestic laws. This placed the SCSL, theoretically, in a better position to apply 
corporate criminal liability because Sierra Leonean Criminal Procedure Act of 1965, as is 
demonstrated below, provides for a corporate scheme to criminally sanction body corporates 
for offences. 
3 4 1 Overview on the establishment of SCSL 
The establishment of the SCSL culminated after the conflict that was contested by the 
government forces of Sierra Leone which went barrel for barrel with the rebel militia, namely: 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF was under the leadership of Foday Sankoh. 
The conflict was characterized as a civil war through which RUF intended to overthrow the 
government. The civil war led among others to killings, murders, displacements, recruitment 
of children as soldiers, looting of civilian properties, raping of women and girls, sex slaves 
and amputations.305 The RUF attacks were repelled by the “international pressure and 
military interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).”306 
Following the atrocities that were committed and with the object to bring an end or thwart 
impunity for the perpetration of core offences, President Kabbah forwarded the request for 
intervention to the UNSC for assistance in establishing an independent tribunal sought to 
bring to justice persons who participated in the atrocity offences that occasioned in Sierra 
 
305 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 67. 
306 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 66. 
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Leone. In support of his request, President Kabbah indicated that a number of 
considerations was required to be taken into account, inter alia, “[the nature and extent of 
the atrocities committed; Sierra Leone’s lack of resources to mount and sustain the 
anticipated trial; as well as lack of expertise to bring to justice those who were responsible 
for committing the atrocities.”307 
After the negotiations between the Sierra Leone government and the UN, an agreement 
to establish the SCSL with object to bring to justice those responsible for atrocities was 
concluded.308 To this effect the SCSL had an intermingling of “international and domestic” 
legal flavour. That is, as Williams puts it “the SCSL exists as a distinct institution, separate 
from both the United Nations and the National legal system.”309 The SCSL had the mandate, 
without limitation, to consider the referencing the international rules and in addition the rules 
culminating from Sierra Leone. It cannot be overstated that the domestic law of Sierra Leone 
included the Criminal Procedure Act 1965. The import of this legislation will be showcased 
in the analysis below. 
3 4 2 Competence and personal jurisdiction of SCSL 
The competency of the SCSL is embedded in terms of the SCSL constitutive Statute. 
Article 1 confers SCSL with the powers to adjudicate over offenders and it provides that the 
court “have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leone law committed in the territory 
of Sierra Leone (…).”310 The competency provision makes reference to the word ‘person’ 
 
307 Sierra Leone Presidential Letter to UNSC President dated 12 June 2000 UN Document S/2000/786. 
308 UNSC Resolution 1315 of 2000 UN Document S/RES/1315; See, article 6 of the Agreement Between the 
UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone dated 16 
January 2002; Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 69 posits that “unlike the ICTY and the 
ICTR, the SCSL was to be funded by voluntary contributions from member states of the United Nations, and 
not from the normal United Nations budget.” 
309 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 70. 
310 The Statute of the SCSL – Article 1(1) the court’s competency includes atrocities committed “since 30 
November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment 
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone; and in terms of article 1(2) the court have 
competency for any transgressions by peacekeepers and related personnel present in Sierra Leone pursuant 
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without distinction between natural and juristic persons. In the entire Statute of the SCSL, 
the word ‘person’ is not qualified, when compared with other statutes.311 In the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes, there is express reference from which reasonable inferences may be drawn 
that the word ‘person’ in the context of ICTR and ICTY means ‘natural person’ – which 
qualification may from the onset exclude the possibility of including the liability of a body 
corporate in the jurisdictions of the ICTR and ICTY. 
The non-qualification of the word person in the Statute of the SCSL was described by 
Schabas as an indication of the willingness to bring to justice corporate bodies. In this regard 
Schabas observed that: 
“[T]he Report of the Secretary-General on the draft statute of the SCSL provides no explanation 
as to why this provision (jurisdiction over natural persons) was not included. This rather surprising 
given that the SCSL Statute is undoubtedly modelled on the other two statutes (ICTY and ICTR). 
Perhaps it reflects a specific interest in corporate liability within the Sierra Leone Conflict or 
alternatively, a more general growing concern with financial actors in armed conflicts.”312 
Emphasis added in brackets. 
However, despite this opportunity, the SCSL exercised jurisdiction over offenders who 
were natural persons to the exclusion of companies. In this manner, the SCSL, like other 
tribunals which existed before it, adopted the “individual criminal liability” as its functional 
liability model.313 For this reason the jurisprudence of the SCSL followed those of the IMT, 
ICTY and ICTR. 
 
to the Status of Mission Agreement in force between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone 
or agreements between Sierra Leone and other Governments or regional organizations, or in the absence of 
such agreement, provided that the peacekeeping operations were undertaken with the consent of the 
Government of Sierra Leone, shall be within the primary jurisdiction of the sending State.” 
311 Art 5 Statute of ICTR; Art 6 Statute of ICTY which provides that “(…) Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over 
natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute.” 
312 W A Schabas The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
(2006) 139.  
313 Art 6 (1) of Statute of SCSL provides for individual criminal liability and that “a person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abated in the planning, preparation or execution of a 
crime referred to in article 2 to 4of the Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime”; article 1(5) of the 
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It is argued that the SCSL was not only presented with the competency provision that did 
not distinguish between natural persons and juristic persons, but that there were other 
opportunities which were supposed to be explored that would have led to the trial of 
corporations for their complicity in atrocity offences. In this context, the applicable law under 
SCSL was not only limited to the SCSL Statute, jurisprudence of the ICTR314 and 
international law, but rather, the SCSL Statute made allowance for the court to apply the 
domestic laws. Thus, the judges of the SCSL would have been “guided, as appropriate, by 
the Criminal Procedure Act315 of Sierra Leone.”316 The Sierra Leonean Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1965 does not define the term ‘person’, however, it provides a definition of ‘accused’ 
which means “a ‘person’ charged with a crime but does not include defendant.”317 The 
importance of this definition of ‘accused’ is that it is inclusive of both natural and juristic 
persons.318 
This proposition resonates in the fact that the Sierra Leonean Criminal Procedure Act of 
1965 under Part V section 206 to 209 provides for corporate prosecution and punishment. 
Moreover, it proffers that “[a] corporation may be charged either alone or jointly with another 
person with an offence triable on indictment or triable summarily before a Magistrate’s 
Court”.319 Therefore, national laws allowed corporate criminal liability, however, there were 
no corporations or organised groups that were brought before the SCSL to be arraigned for 
 
Statute of SCSL provides that “Individual criminal responsibility for the crimes referred to in article 5 shall be 
determined in accordance with the respective laws of Sierra Leone.” 
314 Art 14(1) of the Statute of the SCSL provides that “The Rule of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda obtaining at the time of the establishment of the Special Court shall be applicable 
mutatis mutandis to the conduct of the legal proceedings before the Special Court.” 
315 Act No. 32 of 1965 Assented to in Her Majesty’s name on the 6th day of October 1965 and interred into 
force being an Act to Consolidate and Amend the Law Relating to Criminal Procedure on 7th October 1965. 
316 Art 14(2) of the Statute of the SCSL provides that “the judges of the Special Court as a whole may amend 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or adopt additional rules where the applicable Rules do not, or do not 
adequately, provide for a specific situation. In so doing, they may be guided, as appropriate, by the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1965, of Sierra Leone.” 
317 Sect 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 32 of 1965 of Sierra Leone. 
318 Corporation is defined under Sect 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 to include “a statutory corporation 
as defined in subsect (9) of sect 32 of the Constitution, a company formed and registered under the Companies 
Act or the Companies Act, 1924, and any Company to which Part IX of the Companies Act applies.” 
319 Sect 207(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 32 of 1965 of Sierra Leone. 
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their complicity in the commission of atrocity crimes. Chief reason for not prosecuting 
corporations was not because corporations did not participate in the commission of 
atrocities, rather it was because of the adopted jurisprudence from the earlier international 
criminal tribunals which favoured the principle that criminal liability for atrocity crimes should, 
in principle, rests with individual (natural) persons. 
It is pointed out here, that the SCSL had a better opportunity, because of existing legal 
avenues, to advance the course of corporate criminal liability, if attempts were made to indict 
corporations or organised groups, including the Executive Outcomes Security Company, the 
RUF, and others for their complicity in atrocities that were committed in Sierra Leone.320 To 
buttress this submission a discussion that follows highlights the involvement of corporations 
in the Sierra Leone conflict. 
3 4 3 Corporate complicity in Sierra Leone – a brief overview 
The RUF (an organisation under the leadership of Foday Sankoh) announced its 
intention to overthrow the Sierra Leone government that was led by the All People’s 
Congress Party (APC) by means other than the precepts acceptable in normal democracies. 
The RUF opted to use other means than by taking over governance through elections.321 
The RUF merged with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and their strategies 
and policies promoted the use of violence against the government of Sierra Leone and the 
civilian population. In Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor322 the SCSL found that: 
“Throughout the indictment period the operational strategy of the RUF and AFRC was 
characterised by a campaign of crimes against the Sierra Leonean civilian population, including 
murders, rapes, sexual slavery, looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription of child soldiers, 
 
320 For a discussion of the involvement of companies like Executive Outcomes in conflicts and atrocities in 
Africa and elsewhere, see J Harding “The mercenary business: Executive outcomes’’ (1997) Review of African 
Political Economy 87-97.  
321 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 65. 
322 SCSL-03-1-T Judgment Summary of 26 April 2011. 
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amputations and other forms of physical violence and acts of terror. These crimes were 
inextricably linked to how the RUF and AFRC achieved their political and military objectives.”323 
The policies of RUF and AFRC were drafted in different forms, for instance the court 
established that these organizations held operations that were titled “Operation No Living 
Thing”, “Operation Spare No Soul” and “Operation Pay Yourself”. These operational 
strategies were a form of direct orders to militia members, as a result the members of RUF 
and AFRC committed atrocities against civilian and the government. The intention of these 
RUF and AFRC as the court found, was explicitly made and it included to permeate a 
crusade of dread disdain against non-combatants. This was the explicit strategy which 
formed part of RUF and AFRC’s war strategy. 
Apart from the rebellious group discussed above (the RUF), there were also private 
security companies that were contracted by the Sierra Leonean government for purposes of 
subduing the conflict. The contribution to the conflict by the instrumentality of private security 
companies, notably, the Executive Outcomes Protection Services and Sandline Security 
made possible many of the reported atrocities in Sierra Leone.324 
At this juncture a distinction between two classes of corporate complicity is made. The 
first class refers to corporations that act or commit atrocities without having been contracted 
by government. The second class refers to corporations that are contracted by government 
but whose conduct are nevertheless deemed criminal. Regarding the first category of 
corporate actors, it should be clear that, in principle, the corporate actor should be liable for 
its own actions. The second category of corporate actors requires more explanation, in the 
sense that, the second category of corporate actors may be treated as instruments, subjects 
or organs of the contracting state. As such, their conduct (commission of atrocities) may be 
 
323 Para 150. 
324 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 65 -70; I Douglas “Fighting for diamonds – Private 
military companies in Sierra Leone” in J Cilliers & P Mason (eds) Peace, Profit, or Plunder: Privatization of 
Security in War-torn African Societies (1999) 175 – 200 at 179 -192. 
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attributed to the contracting State. For instance, in this context, the acts of Executive 
Outcomes Protection Services that ensued by virtue of their contracts for security services 
with the Sierra Leonean government may be deemed as authored by the government of 
Sierra Leone. Therefore, any liability which those acts attract may equally be attributed to 
the Sierra Leone Government. 
This bring to the fore the principle of “state responsibility”, which is squarely found outside 
the purview of this dissertation but may well be noted here to delimit genuine corporate 
responsibility from state responsibility or quasi-state responsibility. The test for responsibility 
under this circumstance as was stated in Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro325 (“Bosnia and Herzegovina”) entails the determination of whether: 
“[F]irst (…) the acts committed were perpetrated by organs of the Respondent (State), i.e., by 
persons or entities whose conduct is necessarily attributable to it, because they are in fact the 
instruments of its action. Next, if the preceding question is answered in the negative, then the 
second question is, it should be ascertained whether the acts in question were committed by 
persons who, while not organs of the State, did nevertheless act on the instructions of the 
direction or control of, the State.”326 (Emphasis added in italics) 
The first leg of the state responsibility test may be answered in the negative when applied 
to the situation in Sierra Leone. The reasons, being, inter alia, that the Executive Outcomes 
Protection Services or the Sandline Security Company did not form part of the organs of the 
government of Sierra Leone.327 In contradistinction, the second leg of the test, may be 
answered positively. The basis being that, though these security companies were 
independent entities and as such could not be construed as part of the organs of government 
 
325 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Report Case No. 91 Judgment of 26 
February 2007. 
326 Bosnia and Herzegovina paras 384 – 385; H Strydom “The Srebrenica genocide and the responsibility of 
states and international organizations” (2008) 3 TSAR 499 503. 
327 The Constitution of Sierra Leone Act 6 of 1991, organ of state refers to the Executive as provided in Chapter 
V, Legislature as provided in Chapter VI and the Judiciary as provided in Chapter VII. 
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– they however “acted under the instructions, direction or control”328 of the Sierra Leonean 
government. This is consistent with the requirements laid down in the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts which provide that: 
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”329 
It is worth to note the control test in this context. For liability to be attributed, the 
requirement that should be met, include proving that there was “effective control.” The 
effective control test was applied in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (“Nicaragua v United States of America”)330in which it was found that: 
“[T]he United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, 
training, supplying and equipping of the contras, (…) planning of the whole of its operation, is still 
insufficient in itself, (…) for purposes of attributing liability to the United States for the acts 
committed by contras. (…) for this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility (…), it would in 
principle have to be proved that the United States had effective control of the contras or military 
or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”331 
 
328 They were hired by the government to provide a service. 
329 Article 8 of the Articles on the Responsibility of the States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 (UN Res 
56/83 of 2001). 
330 ICJ Report No. 14 Judgment dated 21 June 1986. 
331 Nicaragua v United States of America para 115 and at para 277 the ICJ held that “it is Nicaragua's claim 
that the treatment of Nicaraguan citizens complained of was inflicted by the United States or by forces 
controlled by the United States. The Court is however not satisfied that the evidence available demonstrates 
that the contras were (controlled) by the United States when committing such acts. As the Court has indicated 
(paragraph 110 above), the exact extent of the control resulting from the financial dependence of the contras 
on the United States authorities cannot be established: and it has not been able to conclude that the contras 
are subject to the United States to such an extent that any acts they have committed are imputable to that 
State (paragraph 115 above). Even if the provision for (equitable treatment) in the Treaty is read as involving 
an obligation not to kill, wound or kidnap Nicaraguan citizens in Nicaragua - as to which the Court expresses 
no opinion - those acts of the contras performed in the course of their military or paramilitary activities in 
Nicaragua are not conduct attributable to the United States.” 
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The measuring scale of “effective control test” is higher compared to the requirement of 
‘mere control’ as was applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina332 as quoted above or when 
compared to ‘overall control test’ as was applied in Prosecutor v Tadić333 (Tadić  and 
Borovnica) in which the Tribunal held that: 
“In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that 
the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but 
also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. Only then can the 
State be held internationally accountable for any misconduct of the group.”334 
The Tribunal recognized that corporations or organised institutions possess different 
characteristics when compared to individual natural persons. These distinctive 
characteristics, including that associates of organised institutions may act in accord with the 
hierarchy and the interests of the group or policy of such a group. In contrast, an individual 
person may act according to his or her whims and caprices. Therefore, “for the attribution to 
a State of acts of these groups, it is sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under 
the overall control of the State.”335 
Derived from the exposition above, it is apparent that under circumstances where a 
government concludes a contract with private security to subdue a conflict, that corporation 
 
332 ICJ Report Case No. 91. 
333 Case No. IT-94-1-A Judgment of the Appeals Chamber dated 15 July 1999. 
334 Tadić and Borovnica para 131. 
335  Tadić and Borovnica para 120. In the same case at para 119 the Appeals Chamber explained that “(…) 
when a State entrusts a private individual (or group of individuals) with the specific task of performing lawful 
actions on its behalf, but then the individuals, in discharging that task, breach an international obligation of the 
State (for instance, a private detective is requested by State authorities to protect a senior foreign diplomat but 
he instead seriously mistreats him while performing that task). In this case, by analogy with the rules 
concerning State responsibility for acts of State officials acting ultra vires, it can be held that the State incurs 
responsibility on account of its specific request to the private individual or individuals to discharge a task on its 
behalf.” Further at para 117 the Appeals Chamber, juxtaposed the rationale for holding state liable and proffers 
that “The rationale behind this rule is to prevent States from escaping international responsibility by having 
private individuals carry out tasks that may not or should not be performed by State officials, or by claiming 
that individuals actually participating in governmental authority are not classified as State organs under national 
legislation and therefore do not engage State responsibility. In other words, States are not allowed on the one 
hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other to disassociate themselves from such conduct when 
these individuals breach international law (…).” 
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may not be liable for prosecution and punishment as the plea of lack of jurisdiction may 
suffice. However, this is not to say that the conduct of these government contracted 
corporations may go unnoticed, but that their adjudication may be brought in other platforms 
such as the ICJ, albeit as conduct of the state which may result in a conclusion of state 
responsibility. Therefore, under the second class of corporate actors stated above in this 
section, the SCSL would have had no jurisdiction to prosecute and punish Executive 
Outcomes Protection Services as a collective entity because its conduct could easily be 
attributed or subsumed by the government. Of course, the SCSL had no jurisdiction to try 
the state of Sierra Leone (only individuals). 
3 4 4 Tentative thoughts on corporate liability for atrocity crimes – lessons from the ad 
hoc tribunals 
Regarding corporate/group criminal liability, the ad hoc tribunals (including specialist and 
internationalised chambers like the SCSL) have jurisdictional limitations, but that should not 
be the end of the road in terms of holding corporations responsible for atrocity crimes. 
Indeed, there is nothing in international law that precludes the trial of corporations for atrocity 
offences. Considering the prevention and prosecution of a crime like genocide constitutes a 
jus cogens norm,336 one could argue that, insofar as international tribunals lack the 
necessary jurisdiction, states can (some may even say should) step in to allowance for 
corporate criminal responsibility for atrocity offences at domestic criminal law. 
The proposition sounds good, in theory, but as we have seen with the comparative survey 
of domestic systems to liability of companies: the lack of a universal approach to corporate 
criminal liability under national law, and some systems, like Germany, which continue to be 
resistant to the acceptance of genuine scheme that anticipate to criminally sanction 
companies. This brings us to the ICC, as a valuable vehicle for the advancement of 
 
336 MJ Kelly “Prosecuting corporations for genocide under international law” (2012) 6 Harvard Law & Policy 
Review 339 at 365. 
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corporate criminal scheme. As noted, the ICC, like its ad hoc counterparts, also lack 
jurisdiction over corporate entities. Features of the ICC can be contrasted with the other ad 
hoc tribunals – in that the ICC enjoys the status of permanence and further that it is dynamic. 
The Rome Statute provides for “review of the statute” (for example, the first Review 
Conference in 2010 in Kampala). The criticisms, lessons, and observations identified in this 
dissertation can therefore be utilised to build an argument for the amendment of the Rome 
Statute to expand its jurisdiction to include corporate entities. 
3 5 Corporate criminal liability and the ICC  
The discussions in the sections above analysed how the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility was treated at Nuremberg, the ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL. Notably, the nature 
of all these stated tribunals was ad hoc. In this section the discussion focusses on the ICC. 
It includes the needs and rationale that led to setting up the ICC; the international 
community’s debates on whether to include or exclude liability of companies from the 
purview of the Rome Statute of the ICC; and the dynamics at the Kampala Review 
Conference. 
3 5 1 The need to establish a permanent International Criminal Court 
The notion of establishing an international criminal tribunal came about as the result of 
the international community’s desire to put a stop to impunity for those responsible for “the 
most serious crimes under international law.”337 The early conflicts that ignited the idea of 
creating an ICT included the atrocity committed during “First World War,” the “Second World 
War”, and decades later the conflict in the Balkans.338 The after mass of the brutal “First 
World War,” (WWI) culminated in the international community to conclude the Treaty of 
 
337 Schabas International Criminal Tribunals 9. 
338 A Cassese “From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunal to International Criminal Court” in A 
Cassese, P Gaeta & J R W D Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
Volume 1 (2002) New York: Oxford University Press, 4-9. 
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Versailles. This treaty sought to provide for the launch of an ad hoc ICT to bring to justice 
the authors of the mayhems that were committed during the WWI.339 However, the 
envisaged ICT was not established.340 In contrast, an ICT with the object to prosecute those 
responsible for the atrocities that were committed throughout the Second World War (WWII) 
materialised, which turn out to be famously known as the Nuremberg and Tokyo military 
tribunals.341 
Several other ad hoc ICTs and hybrid tribunals were established thereafter.342 These ad 
hoc ICTs shared a communal characteristic, namely, they had limited jurisdiction, in the 
sense that, their competences were limited and lacked universal jurisdiction.343 Some of the 
factors that led to the successful creation of the ICC can briefly be summarised as follows: 
the aspiration to side-step the victor’s justice syndrome; the desire to enhance respect for 
“human rights and international humanitarian law;” and to put an end to impunity for those 
responsible for “atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”344 The concerted 
effort on the idea of creating a perpetual ICT that began with the League of Nations and 
continued during the UN era and which subsequently saw the joinder of Non-Governmental 
Organisations345, finally resulted in the founding and lunch of the first permanent ICC with 
its constitutive instrument, the Rome Statute, 1998.346 
 
339 Art 277 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of 
Versailles) of 18 June 1919. 
340  Cassese “From Nuremberg to Rome” in Cassese et al (eds) Rome Statute 4. 
341 Charter of the IMT; International Military Tribunal for the Far East Special Proclamation by the Supreme 
Commander tor the Allied Powers at Tokyo, entered into force on 19 January 1946 and as Amended on 26 
April 1946. 
342 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 28-29. 
343 Williams Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 300. 
344 The atrocity crimes were branded as such, to show their grave nature, during the Nuremberg trials. 
345 K Haigh “Extending the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction to corporates: Overcoming 
complementarity concerns” (2008) 14(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights, 199 200; A Clapham “MNC’s 
under international criminal law” in M T Kamminga & S Zia-Zarifi (eds) Liability of Multinational Corporations 
Under International Law (2000)139 -195 at 157. 
346 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, text circulated as United Nations Document 
A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and as corrected by process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 
November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002 and it entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
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3 5 2 Corporate criminal liability at the Rome Conference 
The principle of corporate criminal liability, despite its exclusion from the jurisdictions of 
the earlier ad hoc ICTs and the hybrid tribunals, was nevertheless put on the drafting agenda 
at the instance of “French delegation at the Rome Conference in 1998.”347 However, as is 
demonstrated below, it became a bone of contention throughout the deliberations and 
negotiations at the Rome Conference. The debate on the inclusion or exclusion thereof 
brought to the fore different theories in support or negating its adoption and subsequent 
inclusion in the manuscript of the Rome Statute. In this regard, the Rome Conference noted 
that: 
“There is a deep divergence of views as to the advisability of including criminal responsibility of 
legal persons in the Statute. Many delegations are strongly opposed, whereas some strongly 
favour its inclusion (…).”348 
The member states of the ICC that were among the debaters included states that 
recognize the criminal liability of corporations and those that adhere to the principle of 
“societas delinquere non potest.”349 However, even though there was an element among 
states of aligning the debate on corporate liability models as practiced in their own national 
courts (in their domestic law) – it is remarkable that states that recognized the principle of 
corporate criminal accountability in their domestic legal systems generally argued in favour 
of its adoption for purposes of the Rome Statute’s modes of liability. However, one should 
note, states such as Australia recognize the principle of corporate criminal liability in its 
domestic law, but during the Rome Conference its “[o]bjection against the inclusion of 
 
347 An analysis on this point is made below at section 3 5 3 of this dissertation. 
348 UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
“Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court” (1998) UN 
Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 3, 31. 
349 See, a discussion on this viewpoint in chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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corporate criminal liability as a mode of liability at the ICC”350 was based not on dogmatic 
grounds, but rather on the challenges associated with the enforcement thereof.351 And then 
there was the delegation from the USA, a national system that also recognizes the criminal 
accountability of body corporate – however, the USA, even though they were noted to have 
endorsed the Swedish concerns on the subject, further raised concerns regarding the lack 
of sufficient definition and the nature of the burden of proof that was essentially relative to 
corporations.352 
The proposal that contemplated to include civil or administrative liability of corporations 
in the text of the Rome Statute was mooted – chief reason for this attempt was noted as for 
purposes of “providing a middle ground”.353 The authors of the middle ground argument 
were some of the states from the civil law legal systems. The practice in civil law legal 
systems, for instance in Germany – is that the German Criminal Code attaches 
administrative penalties to certain administrators and officers of corporations354to the 
exclusion of corporate criminal liability.355 States which, for one reason or another, do not 
consider the principle of corporate criminal charge presume that corporations are incapable 
of committing crimes (they are not moral agents), hence, criminal liability is perceived to only 
attach to natural persons’ conduct. Thus, the ascription to liability of individuals became the 
 
350 UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
“Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document A/CONF.183/13 
Vol 2, 133. 
351 Page 133. 
352 Page 135. 
353UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
“Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court” (1998) UN 
Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 3, 31 – at Footnote 71 it is noted that “(…) Some delegations hold the view that 
providing for only the civil or administrative responsibility/liability of legal persons could provide a middle 
ground.”  
354 Kemp et al Criminal Law 214. 
355 Sect 14 of the German Criminal Code; G Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative 
Perspective” (1994) 43 ICLQ 493 495; F van Oosten “Theoretical Basis for Criminal Liability of Legal Person 
in South Africa” in A Aser, G Heine & B Huber (eds) Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities 
(1999) 195 197; Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 333 343 – Kyriakakis posits that 
“German law has never recognized corporate criminal liability reflecting the view that such a principle departs 
from the fundamental tenets of criminal law as understood from the framework of influential 19 th century 
philosophical traditions.” 
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mainstay of the debate.356 As a result it militated against the acceptance and inclusion of 
body corporate criminal scheme from the purview of the ICC. 
3 5 3 Analysis on the French proposal on corporate criminal responsibility 
The Preparatory Committee on the creation of the ICC prepared and presented a draft 
text of the Rome Statute to the meeting of the Committee of the Whole.357 Notably, the draft 
text contemplated to include the corporate liability scheme under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The draft text intended to place the corporate scheme as a model of liability to operate 
alongside the principle of individual criminal liability. For this reason, the corporate scheme 
was provided for in terms of draft text article 23 (5) and (6) of the Rome Statute and read as 
follows: 
“[5. The Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States, when 
the crimes committed were on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or 
representatives. 
6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal responsibility of 
natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same crime].”358 
Immediately after these provisions, what followed was a text that referred or directed the 
attention of the Rome Conference to two further provisions of the Draft Rome Statute, firstly, 
to article 76 that contemplated to deal with penalties applicable to corporations. Secondly, 
to article 99 that contemplated to provide for “enforcement of fines and forfeiture 
 
356 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document 
A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 134 “the delegation opposed the inclusion in the Statute of the criminal responsibility 
of legal persons, because the underlying idea of the court was individual responsibility for criminal acts.” 
357 On the drafting history, see, MC Bassiouni The Legislative History of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (2005) Vol II.  
358 UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
“Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court” (1998) UN 
Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 3, 31. The bold text read “NB: In the context of paragraphs 5 and 6, see also 
article 76 (penalties applicable to legal persons) and article 99 (enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures).” 
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measures.359 The analysis of the text of the draft article 23(5) entails that firstly, it places the 
principle of corporate scheme on the same footing with individual scheme.360 Secondly, it 
expressly excluded States from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thirdly, it provides for a 
requirement that for a corporation to be prosecuted and punished, the alleged offences 
should be committed on the company’s behalf. On the face of this requirement, it appears 
that it is not limited to the theory of benefit or profiting from the crime that is been committed 
on its behalf. Fourthly, it contemplated to create an agency theory – that is, for the crime to 
be deemed to have been committed on its behalf, such a crime must have been committed 
by its agent or representative. However, it is silent to whether it refers to all the rank and file 
of the agents or representatives regardless of their authority or position of responsibility. For 
instance, could a cleaner’s or low-level clerk’s conduct be attributable to the corporation or 
only the conduct of employees in a position of control, direction, or decision-making?  
In terms of the draft article 23(6), it firstly contemplated to create a possibility that the 
company and the servant may be charged for the same offence. This implies that, finding 
the corporation guilty does not bar an individual from being prosecuted for the same crime. 
Secondly, this provision does not appear to predicate the guilty finding of the corporation on 
the guilty finding of an individual natural person. The absence of clear guidelines on the 
determination of mens rea of the accused corporation was a contentious and problematic 
issue. The absence of clear guidelines on mens rea of corporations could have been cured 
by predicating the guilty finding against an individual natural person. This entails that if the 
natural person (a servant) who actually performed an act on the behalf of the corporation is 
found guilty, his or her mens rea could be construed to be the mens rea of the accused 
 
359 The bold text read “NB: In the context of paras 5 and 6, see also art 76 (penalties applicable to legal 
persons) and art 99 (enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures.”  
360 L Van Der Herik “Subjecting corporations to the ICC regime: Analyzing the legal counterarguments” (2012) 
5 available at <http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228151086> (accessed 2019/02/28); Haigh (2008) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 202. 
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company. Regrettably, this was not the case under this corporate scheme as it did not 
predicate a guilty finding against a natural person. 
The above discussed corporate liability scheme was devised and introduced by France. 
It transpired that the comparative law challenges were too much for the French proposal at 
the Rome Conference.361 Recognising this comparative law challenge as an impediment, 
Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, a delegate from France, stated that: 
“(…) the inclusion of such a concept in the draft Statute had met with resistance on the part of 
many delegations on the grounds that either the legal systems of their countries did not provide 
for such a concept or that the concept was difficult to apply in the context of an international 
criminal court.”362 
The French delegation mooted the replacement of the draft sub-article 5 and 6 of article 
23 quoted above with the organisation scheme that was enumerated in the Charter of the 
IMT. The French delegation stated that “the Statute should go at least as far as the 
Nuremberg Charter which had provided for the criminal responsibility of criminal 
organizations.”363 It is worth noting that the suggested corporate liability scheme which was 
modelled on the Nuremberg Charter included requirements such as predicating a guilty 
finding of natural person; a guilty finding against an organisation was espoused not to 
release the natural person from incurring personal liability on the same charge; a court can 
declare an organisation to be criminal and the declaration is final and is binding on States; 
corporations declared criminal were to be punished by payment of fines, forfeiture of 
proceeds of crimes or disgorgement.364 
 
361 A Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in A Cassese, P Gaeta & J R W D Jones (eds) The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume 1 (2002) 778-779. 
362 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document 
A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 133. 
363 Page 133. 
364 Page 133. 
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Modelling the corporate scheme for the Rome Statute based on the Nuremberg’ 
organisation responsibility scheme was met with resistance, including the familiar objection 
that the Nuremberg prosecutions were perceived as a victor’s justice, in contrast to the ICC 
that was to be established based on a complex international political situation where 
effective state cooperation and diplomacy would be paramount. Further, the purpose of the 
corporate scheme under the Nuremberg Charter was to prosecute and punish natural 
persons qua members of criminal organisations, and not corporations themselves. 
The objections against the French delegation’s main and alternative proposals were then 
referred to the Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law for further 
consideration. The outcome and recommendations from the Working Group on the proposal 
is discussed below. 
3 5 4 Analysis of the revised French proposal – elements reviewed 
The much-revised French proposal was reflected in the following language, which would 
form part of the provisions contained in Part 3 (General Principles) of the eventual Rome 
Statute: 
“5. Without prejudice to any individual criminal responsibility of natural persons under this 
Statute, the Court may also have jurisdiction over a juridical person under this Statute. Charges 
may be filed by the Prosecutor against a juridical person, and the Court may render a judgment 
over a juridical person for the crime charged, if: 
(a) The charges filed by the Prosecutor against the natural person and the juridical person 
allege the matters referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); and 
(b) The natural person charged was in position of control within the juridical person under 
the national law of the State where the juridical person was registered at the time the 
crime was committed; and 
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(c) The crime was committed by the natural person acting on behalf of and with the explicit 
consent of that juridical person and in the course of its activities; and 
(d) The natural person has been convicted of the crime charged. 
For purpose of this Statute, juridical person means a corporation whose concrete, real or 
dominant objective is seeking private profit or benefit, and not a State or other public body in 
the exercise of State authority, a public international body or organization registered, and 
acting under the national law of a State as a non-profit organization. 
6. The proceedings with respect to juridical person under this article shall be in accordance with 
this Statute and relevant Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Prosecutor may file charges 
against the natural and juridical persons jointly or separately. The natural and juridical person 
may be jointly tried.”365 
The French proposal, in the eyes of the pro corporate scheme was perceived as yet 
another golden opportunity to lay the corporate scheme foundation. The elements or 
requirements that are enumerated in the French proposal appear to be restrictive and may 
be distinguished from the main and alternative French proposal. Firstly, the concept of 
juridical person was defined and it disqualifies States or public bodies when exercising state 
authority, non-profit seeking organisation and public international bodies from being brought 
in the purview of the ICC. In this definition the exclusion of non-profit incorporated 
corporations read with the requirement of registration of juridical person, may by implication 
exclude the conduct of extra-legal organised groups, rebel groups, contras, and political 
parties.366 
Although the element of making profit or obtaining benefit may be sound theory that helps 
to demarcate corporations from other collectives and spontaneous groups – it raises 
 
365 UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court’s Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law “Working Paper on Article 23, Paragraph 5 and 
6: Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court,” (1998) UN Document A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2. 
366 Compare, for instance, the characterisation of the rebel groups instigated and financed by the defendant in 
Charles Ghankay Taylor para 150. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
concerns because it has the potential to create a limitation on the jurisdiction of the ICC. For 
instance, the ICC’s jurisdiction may be limited to corporations that may commit atrocity 
offences for purposes of gaining profit or benefit. It contemplates the commodification and 
price tagging of atrocity crimes, which seems counterintuitive if not outright wrong, at least 
from a moral argument perspective. The ideal situation should be as Van Der Wilt noted that 
"[t]he question is not whether the core crimes themselves display an economic value, but 
whether the supporting activities bear relation to core business of the corporations.”367 This 
may bring corporations such as Talisman Energy Incorporated within the purview of a 
morally and doctrinally defensible construction of corporate criminal liability for atrocity 
crimes. Talisman Energy Incorporated financed and supported military operations that 
causally contributed to the displacement of residents of Khartoum in quest for Talisman 
Energy Incorporated obtaining a concession in an oil rich part in the capital region of 
Sudan.368 The point is that payment of royalties to Sudan government may form part of the 
core business of Talisman Energy Incorporated, rather than committing core crimes. The 
causal link to the atrocity was that without the payment and financing of military operations 
by the corporation, Talisman Energy Incorporated could not have obtained the business 
concession. 
Paragraph 5(d) of Draft article 23 predicates a conviction of a natural person. This 
requirement read with paragraph 5(b) appears to be less harmful on the basis that once an 
individual, seized with the requisite level of authority in the firm is found guilty, then his or 
her mens rea may be ascribed to the corporation. However, difficulties may arise if paras 
5(b) and (d) of Draft article 23 are read together or in tandem with paragraph 6 of draft article 
23 which provides that charges may be brought against natural or juridical persons jointly or 
separately. The concern here is that the revised corporate liability scheme fails to provide 
 
367 Van Der Wilt (2013) CJIL 44-48. 
368 The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc, Case No. 07-0016-CV, Judgment 2 October 
2009. 
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as to how such joint or separate proceedings against a corporation may be conducted. To 
this effect, Ms Bergman (Sweden Delegation) noted that “[t]he proposal raised practical 
problems in ascertaining who would represent the legal person when it is prosecuted 
separate from natural person on one hand, and on the other hand what would happen if the 
representative of the legal person was a natural person who was also indicted for the same 
act?.”369 
The proposal can also be faulted for its failure to recognise the generally accepted 
practice that duly incorporated corporations are at law regarded as equal to natural persons. 
That is, after all, the logic of legal personality. But rather than recognising the full 
consequences of legal personality proper, the revised draft text contemplated to uphold the 
agency theory by virtue of paragraph 5(c) of draft article 23 which requires that a charge 
may be put to the corporation if it is alleged that the crime was committed by a “natural 
person acting on behalf of or with explicit consent” of the corporation. The positive 
suggestion to cure the dependence on agency theory lies in the recognition by the 
international community that corporations are capable of formulating policies, making 
decisions and implement these policies in advancing corporate interests. Thus, these 
policies should be construed as corporate knowledge, objective or intention.370 Suffice at 
this juncture to state that because of the reasons and observations made above on the main, 
the alternative and revised French proposals, the majority of the delegations could not 
support the inclusion of corporate criminal liability in the final text of the Rome Statute. 
Consequently, the French proposal was withdrawn.371 
 
369 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document 
A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 134. 
370 Seck “Collective Responsibility” in Accountability 146; Van Der Wilt (2013) CJIL 49. 
371 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole,” (1998) UN Document 
A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 275. 
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3 5 5 Rationale for rejecting the French proposal 
It is important to reflect on the main factors that predisposed the inclusion of a corporate 
charge, namely, the insistence on individual criminal liability as the primary mode of liability, 
the impact on the complementarity principle, and time constraints. 
3 5 5 1 Individual criminal liability as default factor 
The principle of individual criminal liability appears to have been entrenched and 
construed as the mainstay for establishing liability in the field of international criminal law. In 
contrast, corporate scheme, despite the recognition of separate legal personality of 
corporations in most national laws, is not widely recognized. States in which it is recognized, 
apply it differently and based on different notions of corporate responsibility (as pointed out 
in Chapter 2). By explication, it is uncontested – at least at present – that the individual 
criminal responsibility had been generally regarded as the backbone of criminal law at 
international and national level.372 Further, while virtually all states tend to recognize 
individual criminal liability, in contrast, the corporate criminal scheme does not enjoy the 
same token of recognition or is not widely recognized. Therefore, because of this reason 
coupled with the proposition that international crimes cannot be committed by abstract 
entities (the “legacy of Nuremberg”) – the principle of corporate criminal responsibility was 
ultimately not favourably received at Rome. 
It was with ease – too simple for an answer, or too convenient – that the delegations 
adopted the principle of individual criminal liability. Notwithstanding the fact that the principle 
of corporate criminal liability was debated, even extensively, it appears that any innovative 
initiative that advanced any form of liability373 other than individual criminal liability was met 
 
372 Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 770. 
373 UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
“Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court” (1998) UN 
Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 3, 31 – see footnote 71 “(…) Others have an open mind. Some delegations 
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with strong resistance because most of the delegations had a perception that “the underlying 
idea of the Court was nothing else but individual responsibility for criminal acts.”374 It is 
argued in sustenance of the notion of corporate liability that ideally the object is to place 
corporate criminal liability on the same footing with individual criminal liability, because both 
natural and juristic persons are capable of committing crimes. Therefore, these two 
principles should not be perceived as mutually exclusive in processes of social control. 
3 5 5 2 Complementarity principle as underlying factor 
Complementarity can be inferred or be located in various provisions of the Rome Statute. 
This includes, the Preamble, article 1, article 17 and article 19 of the Rome Statute. The 
effect thereof is to vest states with the right of primacy over international crimes. The 
assumption is that the ICC may only assume jurisdiction over a matter where a state that 
have jurisdiction over crimes committed is “unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or 
prosecute”.375 This principle was used as militating factor that led to the refusal of the 
corporate scheme.376 
The perception was that to embrace corporate scheme would inappropriately disrupt the 
primacy right of the states that exclude criminal corporate scheme.377 Some commentators 
 
hold the view that providing for only the civil or administrative responsibility of legal persons could provide a 
middle ground. This avenue, however, has not been thoroughly discussed.” 
374 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document 
A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 133 -136. 
375 Art 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
376 Haigh (2008) Australian Journal of Human Rights 204; J Kyriakakis “Corporations and the International 
Criminal Court: The Complementarity objection stripped bare” (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum, 115 -151 at 116; 
Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 779; UN 
Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
“Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document A/CONF.183/13 
Vol 2, 133 – see concern from Mr Krokhmal of Ukraine “(…) the implementation of the Court’s decision in 
countries in which the responsibility of criminal organizations was not covered by domestic law, and also about 
the implications for the fundamental principle of complementarity on which the draft Statute was built. If 
paragraph 5 and 6 were maintained, in whatever form, did that mean that the procedures of countries which 
could not comply with paragraph 5 and 6 because of their domestic law did not provide for the criminal 
responsibility of organization would be considered ineffective or non-existent within the meaning of the 
complementarity principle?” 
377 Kyriakakis (2008) Criminal Law Forum 116. 
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on the subject argue that the inclusion of corporate criminal liability would render the 
implementation of complementary principle unworkable.378 Further, that it undermines the 
basic principle of primacy; it is practically difficult and it presents insurmountable 
challenges.379 Corporate criminal scheme lacks universal recognition, moreover, and as it 
was observed in chapter 2 above, even in states where it is recognized there exists no 
common approach.380 Consequently, it has the potential to negatively affect states’ 
“[o]bligation to implement the Rome Statute and it may create international disparity which 
could not be brought in concord with the principle of complementarity.”381 
In contrast, these arguments lose much of their force when considered in light of the 
argument advanced by Kyriakakis, that is, with or without including corporate criminal 
liability, the complementarity principle will still operate effectively. This is because “whenever 
no action has been taken in relation to a case by a state that has jurisdiction over it, the case 
will automatically be admissible under the ICC provided it is of sufficient gravity”.382Further 
that even where inaction on part of the state wrought by lack of national law, the matter may 
still be admissible before the ICC. It then follows that the exclusion of corporate scheme 
from the purview of the ICC, is a matter of preference rather than the protection of the 
complementarity principle per se. In support of this argument, Kyriakakis noted that the age 
required for criminal liability and the disdain of immunity provided under the Rome Statute 
are not consistent with national practices – but the delegations adopted them into the Rome 
Statute without raising objections on the intricacies thereof.383 An analysis of the age of 
criminal responsibility (eighteen for the ICC) reveals conflicting standards that are provided 
 
378 K Ambos “General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute,” (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum, 1 at 7. 
379 W A Schabas “General Principles of Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute,” (1998) 6(4) 
Eur. J. Crime, Crim. L & Crim. Just. 84 94. 
380 M Frulli “Jurisdiction Ratione Personae” in A Cassese, P Gaeta & J R W D Jones (eds) The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume 1 (2002) New York: Oxford University Press, 527 
– 542 at 532 - 533. 
381 Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 779. 
382 Kyriakakis “Corporations and the International Criminal Court: The Complementarity objection stripped 
bare” (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 115 125. 
383 Kyriakakis (2008) Criminal Law Forum 124. 
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in domestic and international criminal penal codes. For example, just to reflect on a select 
few states: South Africa sets the age of liability at 10 years and older;384 Namibia sets it at 
07 years and older; England and Wales sets it at 10 years whereas Scotland sets at 08 
years.385 For Germany the age of capacity is 14 years386 and for Belgium the effective age 
for criminal liability is 18 years.387 
Despite these remarkable differences in approach regarding the age of criminal liability, 
the drafters of the Rome Statute went on and adopted the provision that prescribe the 
minimum age of criminal accountability at 18 years old and above.388 Thus, if vast national 
differences regarding the age of criminal accountability proved not to be fatal for the notion 
of differentiating views of individual criminal liability – why should diverging national views 
on corporate scheme be treated as an insurmountable obstacle that stands in the door for 
averting its inclusion. The beauty of complementarity is supposed to be the elegant 
compromise: to make room for different national legal cultures and practices while working 
towards the same goal: bringing an end to impunity for atrocity crimes.  
3 5 5 3 Observation on time constraints 
Time proved to be a scarce resource during the Rome Conference, in particular, the time 
that was devoted to the discussions on corporate scheme. This was one of the concerns 
that were raised by the delegations. Due to the time that was limited, delegations could not 
exhaust or fully explore the intricacies associated with the principle of corporate criminal 
liability and its inclusion in the Rome Statute. Even though the French proposal was 
 
384 Section 7(1) of the South African Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
385 C Dwyer & S McAlister “Raising the age of criminal responsibility: endless debate, limited progress” (2017) 
3 ARK Feature 1-3. 
386 M Bohlander Principles of German Criminal Law (2009) 22.  
387 C van den Wyngaert & S Vandromme Strafrecht en Strafprocesrecht in Hoofdlijnen 9 ed (2014) 293.  
388 Art 26 of the Rome Statute of the ICC; M Happold “The age of criminal responsibility in International Law” 
in K Arts & V Popovski (eds) International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children (2006) 69 74. 
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subjected to rigorous review, much time was still required in order to iron out the ambiguities 
and textual challenges that it presented. 
In this regard Mr Penko of Slovenia alluded that “in view of the time constraints, the only 
rational solution would be to delete any reference to the criminal responsibility of legal 
persons and leave the question to future legislators to decide”.389 Therefore, it follows that if 
there was sufficient time, possibly the Rome Conference would had exhausted the debate 
on inclusion or otherwise of the principle of corporate criminal liability in the text of the Rome 
Statute. Unfortunately, the limited time was undeniably one of the factors that contributed to 
the retraction of the French proposal. 
3 5 6 The absence of Corporate criminal liability in the Rome Statute of the ICC 
Regarding the ICC’s aspiration, namely: “to put an end to impunity for those who commit 
international crimes”,390 in its current form, the ICC is only competent to adjudicate on 
international crimes391 that are committed by natural persons to the exclusion of the same 
international crimes when committed by juridical persons.392 In this regard it clearly provides 
that “the Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”393 The 
Rome Statute of the ICC expressly makes provision in terms of article 25(2) that an offender 
who commits international crimes should be individually accountable. 
Ambos observed that “there can be no doubt that by limiting criminal responsibility to 
individual natural persons, the Rome Statute implicitly negates – at least for its own 
jurisdiction – the punishability of corporations.”394In Prosecutor v Germain Katanga395 
 
389 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN Document 
A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 136. 
390 Para 5 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute. 
391  Art 5 of the Rome Statute. 
392 Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 778. 
393 Art 25(1) of the Rome Statute. 
394 Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 778. 
395 Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, decision of Trial Chamber II, dated 7 March 2014. 
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(“Katanga”) the ICC interpreted article 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in which the 
Chamber stated that article 25 recognizes individual criminal accountability as the mainstay 
of international criminal law. – that is, only natural persons can be found accountable for 
international crimes.396 This may be construed to entail without doubt that the ICC adheres 
to the principle of individual criminal responsibility and excludes any form of corporate 
scheme. Further, in Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo397 (“Bemba”) the court 
convicted the accused based on the conduct of the contras who committed atrocities while 
under his leadership. In this case the court emphasised that criminal liability was individual. 
Bemba’s conviction was later set aside by the Appeals Chamber398, but that was because 
the Appeals Chamber found that one of the elements of command responsibility under 
Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute was not properly established. The effect of the Appeal 
Chamber’s decision is to confirm, rather than deny, the centrality of individual criminal 
liability as the mainstay of ICC jurisdiction over persons. 
Secondly, the Rome Statute of the ICC does not even contemplate to entertain issues 
pertaining to the declaration of offending corporations as criminal (analogous to what was 
possible at the IMT Nuremberg). This entails that even when seized with incontrovertible 
evidence proving corporate involvement in committing atrocity crimes, such an offending 
corporation cannot be declared as a criminal corporation by the ICC. 
The Rome Statute of the ICC makes provision for a hierarchy of laws which may be 
resorted to by the ICC. These laws may be construed as the sources of laws applicable 
under the ICC and includes, in their order of priority, in the first category, it is the Statute 
itself, the Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence399; the second 
 
396 Para 1386. 
397 Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Para 59, decision of Trial Chamber II dated 21 March 2016. 
398 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”’, Case No ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 
June 2018). 
399 Art 21(1)(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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category of laws include “treaties, principles and rules of international law”;400 and the third 
category includes principles obtained from domestic courts and national laws. The Fourth 
category refers to principles derived from previous interpreted decisions.401 Taken together, 
all of this means that there is simply no textual or interpretative or jurisprudential avenue for 
the ICC to apply the doctrine of corporate criminal liability. 
3 5 7 National Courts may prosecute juridical persons for core crimes 
Despite the exclusion of corporate scheme from the jurisdiction of the ICC as implicitly 
provided for in terms of article 25 of the Rome Statute402 some scholars argue that the Rome 
Statute does not entirely exclude holding corporations liable for atrocity crimes. The vehicle 
is not the ICC, of course, but rather the logic of complementarity. That means that companies 
could still be indicted for atrocity crimes in national courts. There is nothing in the Rome 
Statute, or, indeed international law that would prohibit this.403 
The Rome Statute is relatively flexible regarding domestic implementation and the 
emphasis is on minimum expectations regarding cooperation between state parties and the 
ICC, not so much in terms of domestic laws’ treatment of the general or specific part of 
international criminal law.404 But this is not an entirely satisfactory conclusion. This 
dissertation argues that the exclusion of corporate scheme from the jurisdiction of the ICC 
is basically wrong. The solution is not to rely solely on national legal systems to deal with 
corporations who are responsible for atrocities as these systems see fit. I have noted the 
diverse and even contradictory approaches to corporate liability in various national legal 
systems. The result is that corporations – who are often enormous transnational actors – 
 
400 Art 21(1)(b). 
401 Art 21(2). 
402 Art 25(1) and (2) of Rome Statute of the ICC state “the Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons 
pursuant to this Statute. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.” 
403 Kelly (2012) Harvard Law & Policy Review 365. 
404 Art 1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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can still escape responsibility entirely because of the limitations of domestic legal systems. 
For this reason, the ICC was precisely created to plug the impunity gap regarding 
international atrocity crimes. This is the reason why immunities are (still) inapplicable at the 
ICC,405 even though they are applied and respected at the domestic level because of the 
applicable international and national (constitutional) law. By the same token, if the ICC and 
its legislative community, via the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) are serious about the 
quest to end impunity for atrocity crimes, they must also be serious about the provision of 
corporate scheme for ICC jurisdictional purposes – particularly, corporate criminal 
responsibility. 
The Rome Diplomatic Conference, as was noted above, could not find agreement on the 
question of corporate criminal liability for atrocity crimes. One of the excuses for the lack of 
agreement was that the conference ran out of time. This was, at best, a lame excuse, but at 
least the Rome Statute itself provides for the possibilities to amend (article 121) and review 
(article 123) the Statute. These two options will be explored in the next section. The first 
opportunity to review the Rome Statute was in 2010, at the First Review Conference in 
Kampala. Yet again the issue of corporate criminal lability was left by the wayside, no doubt 
also because of the dominance of the (at that time) unresolved issues related to the definition 
of the crime of aggression, which sucked up almost all the time and resources of the review 
process. Nevertheless, it needs to be asked whether the Rome Diplomatic Conference of 
1998 was really the last word on the inclusion/exclusion of corporate criminal liability or is 
there still a possibility to include corporate criminal liability via either the amendment or the 
review route. 
 
405 O Triffterer & C Burchard “Article 27 Irrelevance of official capacity” in O Triffterer and K Ambos (eds), 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2016) at 1048. 
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3 5 8 Did the buck stop at the 1998 Rome Conference?: Possibilities presented by the 
amendment and review procedures provided for in the Rome Statute 
In the preceding discussions, it was made clear that the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility was on the agenda of the Rome Conference in 1998 when the international 
community was drafting the Rome Statute of the ICC. Because of several challenges 
identified above, the principle of corporate liability was not included in the text of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. As noted, the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute, which was 
hoisted in Kampala, presented an opportunity to further deal with the matter of corporate 
criminal liability, for which there apparently was not enough time at Rome in 1998. 
There are two avenues for an eventual amendment of the Rome Statute. Article 121 (3) 
which provides that an amendment of the Rome Statute can be adopted at a summit of the 
ASP presents the first possibility, and the second possibility for the adoption of an 
amendment is through a review procedure (as provided for in Article 123). The ASP meets 
annually, but before a proposed amendment can be put on the agenda, the relevant state 
party needs to submit the text of the proposed amendment to the UN’s Secretary-General, 
for purposes of causing the proposal to be circulated all member states. Then, “no sooner 
than three months from the date of notification, the ASP at its next meeting, shall, by a 
majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal.”406 
When the ASP is seized with the proposal, depending on the complexity thereof, it may 
opt to deliberate and form its position on the proposal. Alternatively, the ASP refer the 
proposal to the Review Conference. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the ASP 
“requires a two-third majority.”407 Similarly, the adoption of an item deliberated through a 
review procedure where consensus is not reached may “[r]equire a two-third majority to 
sanction such adoption.”408 Unlike ASP meetings, which are held annually, Review 
 
406 See, art 123 of Rome Statute of the ICC. 
407 Art 121(1). 
408 Art 123(1) to (3). 
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Conferences are held less frequently. The First Review Conference was held pursuant to 
Article 123 (1) of the Rome Statute, which makes provision for a period of seven years 
“[a]fter the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
must convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to the Rome Statute.”409 
The First Review Conference was duly convened in 2009, and the Conference took place 
in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda. Article 123 (2) of the Rome Statute provides for any 
subsequent Review Conferences. A state party may request a Review Conference for the 
purpose of any amendments to the Rome Statute. This could include the crimes listed in the 
Rome Statute.410 A state party have an option to request a Review Conference to be 
convened – which request is subject to the approval of the other member states. This 
approval requires a two-third majority. 
The period immediately after the Rome Statute came operational and before the First 
Review Conference in 2010, witnessed much legal discourse. It was anticipated that the 
First Review Conference would possibly prioritise and shed light on the principle of corporate 
criminal liability.411 However, the First Review Conference focused primarily on the crime of 
aggression, the complementarity principle, and the amendments of article 8 concerning war 
crimes (“prohibition of certain weapons in non-international armed conflicts”).412 The 
principle of corporate criminal liability was ultimately not included on the agenda as a matter 
for discussion. This is a striking concern because the expectation was that since the Rome 
Conference failed to exhaust corporate criminal responsibility issues such issues ought to 
have been deferred to and considered by the Kampala Review Conference. 
 
409 Art 123(1). 
410 Art 5 of Rome Statute. 
411 N Gotzmann “Legal personality of the corporation and International Criminal Law: Globalisation, Corporate 
Human Rights Abuses and the Rome Statute” (2008) 1(1) Queensland Law Student Review 36 52; Kyriakakis 
(2008) Criminal Law Forum151; Haigh (2008) Australian Journal of Human Rights 204. 
412 M Wierda “The Rome Statute Review Conference: Thematic Case Study” (2010) International Centre for 
Transitional Justice 1- 8 available at <http://www.ictj.org> (accessed on 2016/05/09). 
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The Kampala Review Conference was unsuccessful in addressing (did not address) the 
principle of corporate criminal liability and as such corporations continue to be excluded from 
the text of the Rome Statute and subsequently from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Despite the 
setback evidenced by the Rome Conference and the Review Conference in Kampala, it is 
argued that the debate on whether to prosecute legal persons for atrocity crimes is far from 
over for as long as corporations are suspected to be involved in the commission of such 
atrocities.413 To support this argument, a detailed discussion on corporations and human 
rights violations is provided in chapter 4 below. 
3 6 Development of corporate criminal liability at International level 
The section above discussed the principle of corporate criminal liability in the context of 
the ICC, the institutional manifestation of international criminal law’s moral imperative – “the 
fight against impunity for the most serious crimes under international law.”414 It was 
demonstrated that the Rome Statute expressly adopted the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility and implicitly excluded corporate criminal liability. This section strives to 
identify other international instruments (beyond the Rome Statute) that may be construed to 
incorporate corporate criminal responsibility, if not explicitly, then at least as a theoretical 
possibility. This is done to illustrate that (a) corporate criminal liability should be seen as a 
moral imperative informing the international criminal justice project, and (b) international 
criminal law is more than its most prominent institutional and legal exponent, the ICC. 
Conclusions will be drawn in terms of these instruments’ utility as norm creators, norm 
confirmers, norm prompters or neutral/permissive norm enablers.  
There are several international instruments that may be construed to contain provisions 
that contemplate to proscribe illegal corporate conduct by means of requiring states to 
criminalise certain corporate conduct. These international instruments mandate the state 
 
413Kyriakakis (2008) Criminal Law Forum 150. 
414 Which the bedrock of this dissertation. 
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parties to provide for corporate criminal liability415 or other appropriate corporate liability 
models at national level.416 Some of these international instruments obligate state parties to 
not only hold the corporations criminally liable but that they stretch further and request the 
state parties to declare offending corporations as criminal entities. 
These international instruments include: First, the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (ICSPCA) of 1974.417 The object of 
this instrument was to “put an end to impunity” for those who were accountable for the crime 
of apartheid – namely: juristic, and natural persons. The ICSPCA instrument is relevant to 
the current discussion on corporate criminal responsibility, because it reflects the approach 
that was adopted by the UN when the crime of apartheid was rife in Southern African states. 
The crime of apartheid falls under the class of crime against humanity as such also 
incorporated in the Rome Statute.418 The UN desired to put an end to impunity by adopting 
a convention that contemplated to hold responsible both individuals and organisations who 
were authors of the crime of apartheid. This is apparent form the language of the ICSPCA 
when it provides that state parties must put in place legislation that proscribe the crime of 
apartheid committed by individuals. Further that “[s]tate parties to the convention may 
declare criminal those organisations, and institutions committing the crime of apartheid”.419 
The puzzling question as to why the Rome Statute, which was authored by the same 
 
415 See, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating of 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction 1997 entered into force on 15 February 
1999, art 3(1) provides that “the bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive criminal penalties (…).” 
416 Art 3(2) of the OECD Convention on Combating of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transaction provides that “[I]n event that criminal responsibility is not applicable to a legal person 
that state party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-
criminal sanctions for bribery of foreign public officials.”; Art 9(1) of the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law of 1998; Art 5 of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002; Art 26 of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, entered into force 14 December 2005; Art 10 of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes, entered into force 29 September 2003. 
417 General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII), 28 UN GOAR Supp. (No.30) at 75 U.N. Document A/9030 of 
1974, 1015 U.N.T.S 243 entered into force on 18 July 1976. 
418 Rome Statute of the ICC, art 7(1)(j).  
419 Art 1(2) of ICSPCA. 
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international community, who were the authors of the ICSPCA, opted to exclude corporate 
liability, was partly addressed in the sections above and partly in chapter 7 below. The point 
of interest here is to demonstrate that the context of adopting international instruments may 
be different – however, the object which is the overriding factor (to end impunity) may still 
have resonance in the quest to expand the reach of the ICC to include jurisdiction over 
organisations and corporations responsible for atrocity crimes. 
In as much as the context under which the ICSPCA instrument was adopted is different 
from the context in which the Rome Statute was adopted – the object in both these 
instruments is similar, that is “putting an end to impunity” for those responsible for the gross 
violation of human rights – apartheid. The difference is, as noted in this chapter, that the 
Rome Statute limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to punishment of natural persons. 
The observation here is that under the ICSPCA, the UN demonstrated a willingness to 
prompt states to put in place legislation that contemplated the criminal liability of entities 
other than natural persons – organisations, by name, and possibly corporations, by 
implication. 
Second, is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCTOC)420and the Protocols thereto. The aim of the UNCTOC (as is provided for in its 
object clause) is to wage a fight against transnational organised crime at global level. Lewis 
argues that the most significant catalysts for transnational organised crimes are 
opportunities presented by globalisation and that the actors, who are responsible for these 
transnational crimes include corporations.421 
 
420 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
55/25 of 15 November 2000. 
421  MK Lewis “China’s Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crimes” (2007) 2(2) Asian Journal of Criminology, 179 180. 
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The UNTOC has been implemented in several countries and this signifies a global 
acceptance or recognition thereof.422 The operational provisions of the UNTOC require state 
parties to criminalise, subject to domestic laws, conduct of legal persons that may be 
construed as criminal. This in itself demonstrates that the conduct of corporations, from the 
standpoint of the international community, is not purely economic or morally neutral.423 
Further, the international community recognizes, as is indicated by signatories to the 
UNCTOC, the principle of corporate criminal accountability. It should also be stated that, as 
is the case with many aspirational international instruments, the text of the UNCTOC does 
not go so far as to impose a particular form of corporate criminal liability on states parties. 
Rather, parties to the UNCTOC are persuaded to make provision for the liability of corporate 
entities. The provision regarding corporate liability is not mandatory, instead, it depends to 
the extent that it is compatible with domestic legal doctrine. 
The UNCTOC therefore foresees a spectrum of possible modalities in terms of corporate 
liability, including “pure” criminal liability, administrative liability and even civil liability.424 
Thus, a country like Germany, for instance, is not obliged to abandon its national criminal 
law principles on criminal liability and is allowed to construct anti-trafficking laws that fit its 
approach to corporate liability. The minimum standard required by UNCTOC is that states 
must ensure that corporations which are responsible for human trafficking “are subject to 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether they are criminal or not.”425 While 
the pragmatism and flexibility in the UNCTOC is understandable from a political point of view 
(one can understand the need not to upset national systems that do not yet recognize full 
 
422 A Standing “Transnational organized crime and the Palermo Convention: A reality check” (2010) available 
at <www.ipinst.org> (accessed on 2018/04/23). 
423 P Williams & R Godson “Anticipating organized and transnational crime” (2002) 4 Crime Law and Social 
Change 311 355. 
424 UN, Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (2004), available at 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf>.  
425 S Rodriguez-López “Criminal liability of legal persons for human trafficking offences in international and 
European law” (2017) Journal of Trafficking and Human Exploitation 95 102.  
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corporate criminal liability). In this vein, it stand to be pointed out that the UN itself, in its 
Legislative Guides for the implementation of the UNCTOC, believes that corporate criminal 
liability in the proper sense of the term is regarded as the best modality.426 This is because 
of the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction, which carries stigmatisation, and can 
“encourage companies to adopt more effective management and supervisory structures.”427 
In terms of substantive law, the UNCTOC proscribe the commission of serious crimes 
that occasion transnationally, which crimes are committed by organised criminal groups428 
and from which, such organised criminal group may derive benefits. The principal provision 
that enumerates liability of corporations is article 10 of the UNCTOC which places an 
responsibility on state parties to employ in their domestic legal systems the necessary 
measures to “ensure that legal persons are held civilly, criminally or administratively 
liable”429 for their complicity in the commission of crimes.430 Important to this discussion is 
the issue of implementation of the UNCTOC. This is because the implantation of UNTOC at 
domestic level, without doubt, signifies the predisposition of the international community in 
developing the principle of corporate responsibility. 
Indeed, some forms of organised criminality, for instance the crime of human trafficking, 
are dependent on corporate structures and the transnational connections that modern 
corporations facilitate. With reference to human trafficking, the drafters were of the view that 
the “trafficking industry is consistently growing due to its prevalence in the corporate 
 
426 UN, Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (2004) at para 240.  
427 Rodriguez-López (2017) JTHE 102.  
428 Art 2(a) UNCTOC, defines an Organized Criminal Group to “mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit.” 
429 Art 5 UNCTOC. 
430 Art 11(3) United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, the Protocol was open for signature 
on 12 -15 December 2000 in Palemo, Italy, and thereafter at the United Nations Headquarters in New York 
until 12 December 2002 and came into force on 25 December 2003. 
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world”.431 The corporate actus reus in the context of a transnational crime like human 
trafficking is by no means restricted to the direct recruitment and exploitation of modern day 
human slaves, but include secondary forms of trafficking as well, for instance where 
corporations knowingly or carelessly hire trafficked workers supplied by third parties.432 
While the UNTOC does not create mandatory corporate criminal liability at the domestic 
level, there are strong pointers in this instrument and in the Protocols and legislative guides 
thereto that the international community’s preferred modality to sanction corporations for 
their conduct in the context of transnational crime, is criminal liability. 
Third, is the Organization for Economic Co-operations and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions433, 
(OECD Anti-bribery convention) which recognizes and provides for criminal accountability 
for corporations. This instrument recognizes that corporations are global actors and that 
their conduct may potentially violate human rights. The violation of human rights may be 
construed as criminal, if the violation is serious and/or systematic. On this score, the 
instrument seeks to regulate corporate conduct by requiring “state parties to establish 
liability of legal persons.”434 The effort includes criminalising the offence of bribery in 
international business. It follows that punishment may include criminal and civil sanctions.435 
As with the UNTOC, it is apparent that the model of corporate criminal liability is preferred, 
although not mandatory. The emphasis is on liability in some form, coupled with an effective 
sanctioning regime. 
It is therefore submitted that derived from the discussion on some of the identified 
international instruments above, there are inroads that has been made at international level 
 
431 TM Parente “Human trafficking: identifying forced labour in multinational corporations and the implications 
of liability” (2014) Brazilian Journal of International Law 148.  
432 Rodriguez-López (2017) JTHE 98.  
433 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 
434 Art 2. 
435 Art 3. 
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with object to put an end to impunity by holding corporations responsible for the commission 
of crimes, including crimes that may be construed as transnational or international crimes. 
An observation on the international instruments discussed above is that these 
instruments do not contemplate to create an international forum for the prosecution of 
corporations. Rather, they delegate such functions to domestic institutions. The failure to 
create an international forum has the potential to lead to divergent views on the question of 
whether these international instruments were intended to develop the corporate liability 
scheme at international level proper. 
Some scholars are of the opinion that to address this question requires appreciation of 
international conventions. For example: the accepted norm that international conventions 
are sources of international law. On this score, it is general knowledge that international 
conventions “are the primary sources of international law.”436 If an instrument qualifies as an 
international convention then what follows is to determine whether such international 
convention falls under the category of law making conventions or not.437 To identify if an 
international convention is a law making convention the following characteristics must be 
established: first, the convention must embody “abstract legal rules which the parties 
explicitly agree to recognise as common norms for their future conduct.” Second, it must be 
open and available to the ascent of all interested state parties.438 
Other scholars extend their arguments beyond the normative classification of law making 
or non-law making conventions. These scholars hold the view that all international 
conventions that contemplate to provide rules which state parties observe (implement) as 
law, are law making conventions per se.439 A convention may function as an indicator of the 
 
436 Dugard International Law 25. 
437 A Holcombe “Improvement of international law making process” (1961) 37(1) Notre Dame Law Review 16 
16. 
438 B Kishoiyain “The Utility of Bilateral investment treaties in the formulation of customary international law” 
(1994) 14(2) Northwest Journal of International Law and Business 327 334. 
439 Kishoiyain (1994) NJILB 335. 
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state parties’ consent. Thus, the higher the number of signatories to a universal convention 
the lesser the uncertainty to whether the principles contained in the convention are practiced 
at domestic level. This proposition follows that if a state party ascent to an international 
convention, the ascent may be construed as proof that the principle in question existed at 
domestic level prior to the conclusion of a convention. In this manner, a convention may be 
a useful tool that indicates the existence of a rule of international customary law or the 
creation of new rules of international law.440 
To place the above discussion on the nature of international convention in its proper 
context, it is important to recognise, firstly that the international conventions discussed under 
this section were open for ascent by all state parties of the UN. Secondly, they contain 
abstract principles which state parties commonly accept to observe and implement,441 
including the obligation on state parties to put in place legislation that seeks to hold 
corporation responsible. In this manner, these conventions may fit within the ambit of the 
law making category of international conventions. Culminating from the discussion above, 
one may argue that despite the different contexts that led to the formulation and adoption of 
these conventions, they may be instructive in the quest for the advancement and recognition 
corporate scheme at international level. This is so, especially when understood from a 
distinct international criminal law perspective where the focus is an end to impunity for all 
actors/ participant (natural and corporate) in atrocity crimes. 
3 7 Corporate criminal liability in regional perspective 
In this Chapter, the analyses centre on the development of the principle of corporate 
criminal responsibility from an international law perspective. The focus now shifts to 
developments at the regional level – notably the African and European regions. Both regions 
 
440 E Nys “The development and formation of international law” (1912) 6(1) The American Journal of 
International Law 1 21. 
441 H Kelsen General theory of law and state (1946) 328. 
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are characterised by institutional arrangements for political and economic integration and 
integrative state cooperation, which include supranational structures for legal and normative 
integration. 
3 7 1 The development of corporate criminal liability at African Union level 
The criminal liability of body corporates under the instruments of the African Union is not 
foreign. There are instruments that provide for measures against corporate offences.442 
However, the challenges which they present are similar to the challenges identified in the 
previous section, inter alia, whether the regional instruments in question were intended to 
develop the principle of corporate criminal responsibility. In addition, it is also questionable 
whether the regional instruments provide for effective enforcement mechanisms. 
Regional instruments regulate the conduct of states within a specified region. In contrast, 
and as it was demonstrated in sections above, international instruments are intended for 
universal application. One may therefore ask what the relevance of some of these regional 
instruments is. Does an understanding of regional instruments that makes provision for 
corporate criminal liability contribute in a meaningful way to the main thesis of this study, 
namely that there should be effective international and institutional provision for corporate 
criminal liability for atrocity crimes? The short answer is yes, it is relevant and potentially 
useful to look at the way in which regional instruments deal with corporate criminal liability. 
Regional instruments help us to understand tendencies and normative developments 
beyond individual states. In a sense, regional developments could also be viewed as 
microcosms of larger international trends. 
Indeed, if one looks at the African region with its 55 states443 it is not a negligible cohort 
when compared to the total number of states in the world, not to mention the one billion 
 
442 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted on 14 July 1999; African Union 
Convention on Protecting and Combating Corruption, adopted on 1 July 2003 (entry into force 5 August 2006). 
443 The AU recognizes 55 states as members. See, <https://au.int/memberstates> (accessed on 2019/07/28).  
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inhabitants of the African continent. The African region also represents a mix of legal 
systems, including the Anglosphere’s common law and the Francophonie’s civil law 
traditions. If a region as diverse and complex as Africa can reach consensus on regional 
instruments to deal with social and criminal phenomena in a certain way, it is submitted that 
that in itself can help us to understand the usefulness of that approach in a broader, universal 
context. First, it is necessary to identify relevant instruments for purposes of this analysis. 
The Bamako Convention444 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption445 are two relevant instruments to start this analysis with. The former convention 
provides for the ban on cross border carriage and storage of perilous waste. This convention 
is important to the discussion on corporate criminal responsibility because, among others, it 
recognizes that corporate conduct may violate protected social interests and human 
wellbeing. Further, the context in terms of which it was adopted underscores the AU’s 
reaction and condemnation levelled against corporate unlawful conduct. 
The issues of corporations and human rights violations internationally and comparatively 
are discussed at great length in chapter 4 below. However, for purposes of placing the 
African conventions in their proper context it is necessary to provide the background and 
events that preceded their adoption. The Bamako Convention was preceded by outrageous 
acts committed by transnational corporations such as Ecomar and Jelly Wax. These 
corporations were registered in Italy and they knowingly exported toxic waste into Nigeria. 
This exportation violated the rights of people who resided in the vicinity of Koko port in 
Nigeria where the toxic waste were stored. With these corporate unlawful conduct in mind, 
the AU through the text of the Bamako Convention, placed an obligation on state parties 
and generators of the hazardous waste. 
 
444 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa of 1991 adopted on 30 January 1991 and opened for 
signature 30 January 1991 to 31 July 1991 (entered into force 22 April 1998). 
445 Union Convention on Protecting and Combating Corruption, adopted on 1 July 2003 (entry into force 5 
August 2006). 
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The obligation is to ensure that the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste is 
done in a way that does not infringe the rights of the people and their environments.446 In 
essence, to import hazardous waste into Africa is prohibited and such importation “is 
deemed to be illegal and a criminal act”.447 The concept of ‘generator’ means any person,448 
whereas the concept of ‘person’ is defined to include any natural or legal person.449 Thus, it 
is clear from these definitions that the proscribed conduct is not only limited to wrongful 
conduct committed by natural persons but rather includes that of the legal persons or 
corporations. State parties are obliged to “[i]ntroduce national legislation for imposing 
criminal penalties and these contemplated criminal penalties are required to effectively 
punish and deter”450 any illegal importation of hazardous waste. 
A purposive reading of the Bamako Convention suggests that the drafters intended 
corporate criminal liability to be part of the strategies to fight the dumping of hazardous waste 
in Africa. This reading of the Bamako Convention is echoed in Africa’s first regional criminal 
justice instrument, the Malabo Protocol, which is discussed further below. Suffice to point 
out that the Malabo Protocol provides for both the criminalisation of trafficking in hazardous 
wastes (Article 28L) and corporate criminal liability as a mode of responsibility (Article 46C). 
Indeed, there is an explicit reference to the Bamako Convention in Article 28L of the Malabo 
Protocol.451 
The other relevant instrument that serves as an example of a growing regional 
recognition of corporate criminal liability is the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (AU Anti-corruption Convention).452 This instrument was preceded by 
 
446 Para 4 of the Preamble of the Bamako Convention. In terms of the Bamako Convention art 4(3) furthermore 
(a) requires state parties to undertake to enforce the obligations of the convention against offenders according 
to relevant laws including international law. 
447 Art 4 (1). 
448 Art 1 (20). 
449 Art 1 (16). 
450 Art 9 (2) of the Bamako Convention. 
451 Art 28L (1) Malabo Protocol.  
452 Union Convention on Protecting and Combating Corruption, adopted on 1 July 2003 (entry into force 5 
August 2006). 
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several corporate scandals. This Convention proscribes corrupt practices committed by both 
the “public and private sector.”453 It obligates state parties to put in place measures aimed 
at “preventing companies from paying bribes.”454 It is necessary to state that the Convention 
recognizes the power and influence of transnational corporations over poor and under-
developed countries.455 This power and influence has the potential cause human rights 
abuses. In this manner, the Convention seeks to encourage state parties to put in place 
preventative measures, among others, the promulgation of national legislation that deals 
with corporate corruption as well as prosecution of offending corporations.456 
The AU Anti-corruption Convention also provides for an enforcement regime which is 
based on the incorporation of regional frameworks for criminalisation and cooperation at the 
domestic level.457 Some scholars argue that the inclusion of substantive and procedural 
criminal law principles in the AU Anti-corruption Convention may signify that this instrument 
contemplates to advance the principle of corporate criminal responsibility at regional level.458 
This may be a moot point in light of the Malabo Protocol, which explicitly provides for the 
criminalisation of transnational economic crimes, inter alia: corruption459 and laundering of 
money.460 And, as was pointed out above, these criminalization provisions in the Malabo 
Protocol are structurally linked to the modes of responsibility, which include corporate 
criminal liability. 
There is a substantive difference between the crime of corruption under the Malabo 
Protocol and corruption as defined in the AU Anti-corruption Convention. The crime of 
corruption under the Malabo Protocol refers to forms of corruption that are “of a serious 
 
453 This is a unique approach – because usually, anti-corruption laws target the public sector to the exclusion 
of private sectors. 
454 Art 11(3). 
455 T R Sinder & W Kidane “Combating corruption through international law in Africa: A comparative analysis” 
(2007) 40(3) Cornell International Law Journal, 691 711. 
456 Art 13 (2) of the AU Anti-corruption Convention. 
457 Sinder & Kidane (2007) Cornell International Law Journal 714. 
458 Sinder & Kidane (2007) Cornell International Law Journal 747. 
459 Art 28I of Malabo Protocol. 
460 Art 28I bis. 
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nature affecting the stability of a state, region, or the [African] Union.”461 Ordinary forms of 
bribery and ‘petty corruption’ (for instance where a company would bribe a local government 
official to obtain a favourable contract) would thus be excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
envisaged African Criminal Chamber, since these forms of corruption presumably do not 
affect the stability of the state, region or the AU. On the other hand, this provision in the 
Malabo Protocol is clearly designed to criminalise systemic forms of corruption (‘grand 
corruption’), and in this regard one could imagine corrupt corporate behaviour on a large 
enough scale to fall within the purview of the Malabo Protocol.  
With reference to the examples of regional instruments discussed above, it is clear that 
these and other regional instruments in Africa were adopted to address a variety of protected 
regional human, economic, political, environmental and security interests. However, none 
of these instruments provided for a comprehensive enforcement regime that included 
criminalisation, a regional criminal court, and state cooperation. With this major lacunae in 
mind, and possibly also because of the AU’s disenchantment with the ICC as an 
international criminal law enforcement regime, the Malabo Protocol462 was adopted to 
provide for an African regional criminal justice instrument. I refer here to the “Malabo 
Protocol”, but technically the instrument of interest is the Annex to the Malabo Protocol that 
provides for an amendment to the “Statute of the African Court of Justice and Peoples’ 
Rights.” In terms of this amendment, the African Court that is established is a merger of the 
“African Court of Justice” and the “African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights”. This new 
African Court is anticipated to operate with three section, including the: “international 
criminal law section.”463 The latter is often in literature and commentaries referred to as the 
“African Criminal Chamber” or “African Criminal Court.”464 
 
461 Art 28I (1). 
462 Malabo Protocol, AU, 2014, available at <https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-
african-court-justice-and-human-rights> (accessed 2019/03/12). 
463 Annex to the Malabo Protocol art 16. 
464 See, for instance the first academic commentary on the Malabo Protocol, G Werle and M Vormbaum (eds) 
The African Criminal Court (2017) 3-9. 
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The Malabo Protocol not only does it provides for the establishment of an African 
Criminal Court, but also for the criminalisation of a number of international and transnational 
crimes, including the core atrocity crimes (genocide,465 war crimes,466 crimes against 
humanity467), the crime of aggression468, and several other transnational crimes of regional 
interest, such as the above mentioned crimes of trafficking in hazardous wastes and the 
crime of corruption, as well as others, including crimes like piracy,469 terrorism,470 
unconstitutional change of government,471 and mercenarism472. Crucially, as mentioned 
above, the Malabo Protocol makes provivison for corporate criminal liability as a mode of 
responsibility, which distinguishes this envisaged regional criminal court from the ICC. 
Article 46C of the Annex to the Malabo Protocol provides as follows:473 
“1. For the purpose of this Statute the Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the 
exception of States. 
2. Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof that it was the policy of 
the corporation to do the act which constituted the offence. 
3. A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation 
of the conduct of that corporation. 
4. Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be established by proof that the 
actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the 
corporation. 
5. Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though the relevant information is 
divided between corporate personnel. 
 
465 Art 28B Malabo Protocol 
466 Art 28D. 
467 Art 28C. 
468 Art 28M. 
469 Art 28F. 
470 Art 28G. 
471 Art 28E Malabo Protocol. 
472 Art 28H. 
473 For a brief comment on Art 46C, see, Werle & Vormbaum African Criminal Court 151-153. 
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6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal responsibility of 
natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes.”474 
When viewed holistically, article 46C makes provision for direct corporate criminal 
liability, in the sense that it does not predicate a guilty finding against a company on the guilt 
of a natural person. The provision on corporate mens rea in Article 46C (2) is an indication 
that the drafters of the Malabo Protocol had in mind to create genuine and independent 
corporate criminal liability as a mode of responsibility independent from individual criminal 
liability. Indeed, it provides that “[c]orporate intention to commit an offence may be 
established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted 
the offence”.475 By implication, this provision may be construed to have adopted the 
corporate culture model of liability, which take into consideration the structure, control, 
policies, organisational and management aspects of a corporation. 
Taking into consideration the general rule at law that a corporation may not be 
established for illegal purposes or contrary to the law, it seems odd, on the face of it, that a 
corporation would have as its policy the commission of acts that are criminal in nature. It is, 
however, more probable that the drafters constructed subparagraph 2 to create corporate 
mens rea for purposes of direct corporate liability by incorporating the relevant company’s 
general objectives and business purpose. Even a company with a perfect legitimate aim and 
policies can commit crimes. In addition, the drafters of the Malabo Protocol opted not to rely 
on vicarious liability as a mode of corporate liability (ie the mens rea of a natural person is 
not assigned to the corporation; rather, the corporation’s own, independent intention is 
established with reference to the tool created in Article 46C (2)). Any acts that align with the 
stated policy of the company will therefore be proof of corporate intent to commit the relevant 
 
474 Art 46C of Malabo Protocol. 
475 Art 46C(2). 
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acts. This is not a presumption of guilt (the other elements of criminal liability must be 
established as well), but rather a tool for the prosecution to prove corporate mens rea.  
Article 46C assumes that in order for a policy referred to in article 46C (2) to be attributed 
on a corporation, such a policy must “[p]rovide a reasonable explanation of the conduct of 
the corporation in question”.476 Furthermore, Article 46C, unlike the identification theory or 
the vicarious liability principle, does not distinguish between the levels of authority 
possessed by employees of a corporation. In this regard, it provides that “corporate 
knowledge of the commission of crime by corporation” may be assessed and ascertained, 
arguably, even at the lower ranked employees of a corporation.477 For this reason it is 
distinguishable from the identification theory which requires that for an employee’s conduct 
to be imputed on the company, such an employee must be identified with the corporation, 
in particular such employee must be in higher position of authority that is necessary to direct 
the will and affairs of a corporation. 
The inclusion of corporate criminal liability as a mode of responsibility in the Annex to 
the Malabo Protocol is a progressive and potentially paradigm-shifting development in 
international criminal law. It creates direct criminal responsibility for corporations who are 
guilty of committing or contributing to atrocity crimes and serious transnational crimes. This 
is, in theory at least, a welcome development. The problem is that few African states are 
signatories to the Malabo Protocol, and there were, “at the time of writing of this dissertation,” 
no ratifications.478 The operationalisation of the envisaged African Criminal Court is thus still 
a long way off. But, the establishment of the principle of corporate criminal liability at the 
regional level is a groundbreaking development regardless. 
 
476 Art 46C (3) Malabo Protocol. 
477 Art 46C (4)(5). 
478 At the time of writing (updated 8 July 2019): 15 signatories and 0 ratifications. For the updated AU Malabo 
Protocol status list, see <https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36398-sl-
PROTOCOL%20ON%20AMENDMENTS%20TO%20THE%20PROTOCOL%20ON%20THE%20STATUTE%
20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20OF%20JUSTICE%20AND%20HUMAN%20RIGHTS.pdf.> 
(accessed on 2019/07/28). 
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3 7 2 The Council of Europe 
In the preceding subsection, the analysis focused on the development of corporate 
criminal responsibility from the AU perspective. It was demonstrated that indeed there are 
AU instruments that may be construed to advance the principle of corporate criminal liability. 
Shortfalls were identified and recognized as such. I will now turn to Europe for a comparative 
regional perspective. The Council of Europe (CoE) was founded in 1949,479 among its 
objects is to uphold human rights, enhance cooperation and the rule of law. It consists of 
two organs namely, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly.480 The 
Parliamentary Assembly performs legislative functions and makes recommendations481 to 
the Committee of Ministers for final action on such recommended items.482 The CoE have 
concluded several Conventions, and it is apparent that some of the Conventions recognized 
and incorporated the principle of corporate criminal liability. Among the conventions that 
recognise and enumerate the principle of corporate criminal liability include, Council of 
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,483 Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings,484 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism,485 and Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law.486 
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (European Treaty 191) 
proscribes corrupt practices without distinction to whether it is “committed by natural and 
 
479 Statute of the Council of Europe (European Treaty Series No. 1) conclude at London on 5th May 1949. 
480 Art 10 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 1949. 
481 Art 22 provides that “the Parliamentary Assembly is the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe. It shall 
debate matters within its competence under this Statute and present its conclusions, in the form of 
recommendations, to the Committee of Ministers.” 
482 Art15 (a) of the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
483 (European Treaty Series No. 173) Done at Strasbourg on the 27th January 1999. 
484 (European Treaty Series No. 37) Done at Warsaw on 16 May 2005, was previously published as 
Miscellaneous  No. 7 (2008) Cm 7465, it entered into force in the UK on 1 April 2009. 
485 (European Treaty Series No. 196) Done at Warsaw on the 16th May 2005. 
486 (European Treaty Series No. 172) Done at Strasbourg on the 4th November 1998. 
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legal persons.”487 It recognize corporate scheme, and this is provided for in terms of article 
18. The consequence, in terms of enforcement, is that it obligates member states to “[a]dopt 
legislative measures to ensure that offending corporations can be held liable for the criminal 
offence of active bribery, trading in influence and money laundering”.488It further lays the 
requirements that should be fulfilled for the corporation to be held criminally liable. These 
requirements include: first, the crime should have been committed by a human being 
(servant) – and by extension, the human being could be acting alone or in corroboration with 
the corporation. Second, the act that constitutes a crime, as a requirement, should be for 
the benefit of the company. 
Third, the natural person must occupy a leading position within the corporation. In order 
to determine whether this requirement is fulfilled – due consideration is paid to the “[p]ower 
of representation of legal person or to such a natural person’s authority to take decisions on 
behalf of the corporation or to such natural person’s authority of control within the 
corporations.”489 Fourth, a corporation may be held criminally liable if the natural person, 
assessed objectively, did not consider reasonable measures to avert the harm or crime. In 
contrast, the inclusion or adoption of effective measures within the corporation’s policies 
aimed at preventing corruption may suffice as mitigating factor but not as defence. The other 
observation is that in terms of article 18(3) the criminal liability attributed to the corporation 
by no means immunises or bar the institution of criminal proceedings against the natural 
person for the same act for which the corporation was held criminally liable. 
The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (European Treaty 
Series 196) proscribe acts of terror committed by legal persons, and it creates several 
offences including: staffing with the object to supply such staff to terrorism schemes; making 
 
487 Art 1(d) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 defines a ‘legal person’ to “mean 
any entity having such status under the applicable national law, except for States or other public bodies in the 
exercise of State authority and for public international organizations.” 
488 Article 18(1) of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 
489 Art 18(1) of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 1999. 
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provisions for training (tactical or otherwise) to enhance terror activities, and so forth. It 
makes provision and recognize corporate scheme as it is anticipated article 10 which 
provides that “State parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, in accordance 
with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal entities for the participation in the 
offences set forth in article 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention”.490 The type of corporate liability 
contemplated in terms of article 10 above includes “criminal liability, civil or 
administrative”.491 The inclusion of other form of liability such as civil and administrative is 
to ensure that the wrongful conducts of corporations are punished in countries that do not 
recognize corporate criminal scheme. 
The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal 
Law (European Treaty Series 172), in its preamble expressly recognizes that the captainship 
character revealed businesses in industrial development is not infallible,492 – thus, implicitly, 
this entails that companies can commit the proscribed conduct. Therefore, corporate 
conduct requires appropriate regulations that are effectively responsive. The European 
Treaty Series 172 is distinguishable from the two Conventions discussed above (European 
Treaty Series 191 and 196) because it advances a perception that to effectively deter 
corporations from committing environmental crimes, criminal sanctions should be part of the 
equation. In this regard it provides that “whilst the prevention of the impairment of the 
environment must be achieved primarily through other measures, criminal law has an 
important part to play in protecting the environment”.493 
 
490 Art 10 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (European Treaty Series No. 
196) Done at Warsaw on the 16th May 2005. 
491 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (European Treaty Series No. 196) Done at 
Warsaw on the 16th May 2005. 
492 Paras 4 and 6 of the Preamble of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law 1998. 
493 Para 7 of the Preamble of Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law. 
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This perception buttresses an argument that the stigma attached to a criminal sanction 
is greater than that which is attached to civil or administrative sanctions. The principal 
provision that enumerates corporate liability under the European Treaty Series 172 is article 
9 which encourages state parties to make provisions, in their domestic laws, legal 
mechanism to ensure the liability of companies for the violations perpetrated as 
contemplated in terms of its article 2 if the offence was committed intentionally, or article 3, 
if the offence was committed negligently. 
The Council of Europe Convention on Acting against Trafficking in Human Beings 
(European Treaty Series 37 of 2012) recognizes and includes corporate liability in its text in 
which it obliges state parties to adopt legislative and other measures to ensure that 
companies can be held to criminally account for the crime of “trafficking in human beings.”494 
Notably, the requirements that must be satisfied for purposes of holding corporations 
criminal liable are identical to the requirements contained in European Treaty Series 191 
which proscribes acts of corruption. Apart from obliging state parties to adopt legislative 
measures for purposes of establishing trafficking in human beings as an offence,495 it further 
and specifically obliges state parties to develop legislation that obliges commercial carriers 
and transportation companies to put in place corporate measures to combat trafficking in 
human beings.496Moreover, this Convention provides factors or conditions that may be 
applied by the prosecution as aggravating circumstances, including circumstances “where 
an offence was committed within the framework of a criminal organization.”497 
In sum, all these conventions oblige state parties to put in place effective laws or other 
measures to ensure that companies are held to, preferably, criminally account for their 
involvement in the offences enumerated in these conventions. The manner of sanctioning a 
 
494 Art 22 the Council of Europe Convention on Acting against Trafficking in Human Beings of 2005. 
495 Arts 5(2) and 18. 
496 Art 7(3). 
497 Art 24(d). 
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legal person is required to be consistent with punishment that is effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. 498 
3 8 Conclusion 
The genesis of the principle of corporate criminal accountability from the Nuremberg 
trials, through the Rome Conference, the Kampala Review Conference and beyond appears 
not to end any time soon. The Nuremberg trials as initiator of group liability under 
international criminal law, only managed to achieve sanctioning corporations indirectly, 
namely by declaring corporations as criminal organisations as opposed to finding such 
corporations guilty for complicity in the commission of atrocities. The reason for providing 
corporate liability under the Nuremberg Charter was to allow national courts of the Allied 
Powers to prosecute individuals for membership in organisations that were declared 
criminal. The legal-historical value of this effort cannot be overstated. 
The principle of corporate criminal liability was rejected at the Rome Conference 
debates. The subsequent Kampala Review Conference focused primarily on the crime of 
aggression to the exclusion of discussions on the principle of corporate criminal liability. 
Consequently, the ICC lacks the jurisdiction over companies who commit international 
crimes. However, despite the exclusion of corporate criminal liability under the purview of 
the ICC, it was demonstrated in this chapter that the examination of corporate criminal 
liability continues. 
Considering the international and regional developments it can be concluded that there 
is significant support, in principle, to hold corporations liable, and liability in this context 
includes criminal liability. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the picture is 
somewhat muddied by (a) the international tendency to not make corporate criminal liability 
and criminal sanctions mandatory, but rather optional together with other forms of liability 
 
498 Art 23(2). 
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(civil and administrative), (b) the diverse and sometimes contradictory way in which states 
incorporate into domestic law their international obligations to hold corporations liable for 
criminal conduct, and (c) the lack of international institutions and fora where companies can 
be tried for atrocity crimes. As for the last point (c), it should be mentioned that the Malabo 
Protocol of the AU represents a potential milestone in the advancement of corporate criminal 
scheme. However, there is still only very limited political and financial support for the 
envisaged “African Criminal Court” that would have jurisdiction over corporations accused 
of international and transnational crimes, including the atrocity crimes.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
141 
 
Chapter 4 
Corporations and human rights violations 
4 1 Introduction 
The picture that has emerged thus far is mixed. There seems to be a clear international 
recognition that corporations should be accountable for international and transnational 
criminal conduct. It is acknowledged in international instruments that corporate criminal 
liability should at least be one of the modes of keeping corporations responsible (the other 
modes being administrative and civil liability). This acknowledgement is, however, diluted 
because of a lack of clear and mandatory international legal frameworks on the 
implementation of corporate criminal liability at the domestic level. Furthermore, the lack of 
domestic implementation is not remedied by strong international institutions with criminal 
jurisdiction over corporations and legal persons. 
The post WWII efforts at the IMT Nuremberg and under the auspices of Control Council 
10 in Germany were off to a promising start (with their pronouncements on criminal 
organisations and individual responsibility for prominent corporate leaders and 
industrialists), but none of the “Nuremberg legacies” (the ad hoc ICTs and the ICC) followed 
through with genuine corporate criminal liability as part of their jurisdictional regimes and 
modes of responsibility. The chequered state of affairs regarding corporate criminal 
accountability for atrocity crimes is further compounded by the legal-cultural divides in terms 
of how corporate criminal accountability is perceived and applied at the national level (if at 
all). There is a potential positive development in the form of the Malabo Protocol that 
envisages an African regional criminal court with comprehensive substantive jurisdiction and 
modes of responsibility that will include corporate criminal liability. But this court will not be 
a reality any time soon. 
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The question, then, is if there is a realistic way forward in terms of an international effort 
to hold companies accountable for atrocity crimes. The sobering conclusions from the 
previous three chapters should not be seen as a forgone conclusion about corporate criminal 
scheme for atrocity offences – at both the international and domestic levels. It is essential 
to go back in time and to view the issue from a normative vantage point. This is to look at 
the way in which human rights as normative driver has informed and is still informing a 
growing movement that seeks to hold companies to account for human rights abuses. At a 
certain level of seriousness human rights violations become atrocity crimes. Even though 
the tentative conclusion from the preceding chapters seems to be that legal and institutional 
efforts to hold businesses to be criminally liable for atrocity crimes (at both the international 
and national levels) has stalled. This Chapter will argues that the human rights imperative 
serves as a driving force for the eventual inclusion of corporate criminal charge as a mode 
of responsibility in the Rome Statute. 
This chapter analyses the phenomenon of corporate participation in human rights 
violations. This is done to illustrate why it is necessary to elevate corporate responsibility to 
the criminal sphere, especially when “human rights violations are of a serious or systematic 
nature.”499 In the first place, the chapter discusses, briefly, the concept of human rights, its 
development and recognition under international and domestic law. The chapter will also 
illustrate the normative nexus between international human rights law and international 
criminal law. Secondly, the analysis of the chapter departs from the long held traditional 
approach that corporations are not obliged to respect human rights – that is, limiting it to 
states. The chapter includes a discussion on businesses’ obligations to promote, respect 
and protect human rights. 
 
499 It must be pointed out that undeniably, when correctly understood from the context of gross human rights 
violations – the would be drafter of Rome Statute (amendment) may be persuaded to strive for the inclusion 
of a corporate charge under the ICC. 
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It is demonstrated that there are various ways in which corporations may commit 
atrocities. Finally, to place the discussion of corporate and human rights abuses in its proper 
context, the chapter include the analysis of case studies such as the Unocal, the Talisman 
Energy Inc and the Shell Nigeria matters. 
4 2 Human rights and its development 
The primary object of this dissertation is to determine whether corporations should be 
punished for international crimes. With this object in mind, and in order to place the 
discussion into context, this section includes a discussion on human rights. The discussion 
on human rights attempts to demonstrate the interrelation amongst “international human 
rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law.”500 Further, 
demonstrates how corporations may violate the principles enshrined in these branches of 
international law. 
From the onset, it is acknowledged that the concept of what we would today recognize 
as human rights stretches back in memory and chequered history.501 The focus in this 
 
500 In this section, it is recognized that these branches of international law are distinct from each other yet are 
so close enough that they are used as triggers or their violations may be construed as criminal. 
501 C Devine, C R Hansen & R Wilde Human Rights: The Essential Reference (1999) 4. Explains that the 
origin, formalisation and the inception of the concept of human rights at domestic level date back to the 19th 
century. However, notwithstanding the formalisation and inception period, the idea of human rights can be 
traced as far back in human history as 700 years Before Christ (700 BC). Arguably, since 700 BC the 
philosophy of human rights, although with less significance, continued to exist at domestic level and was 
perfected by the stages of civilization. The Greek philosophers recognized the role and rights of an individual 
within the society and they advocated for a universal standard of ethical conduct. Plato 472 – 348 BC devised 
the concept of common good which advocated for equal rights of man during war and peace time. Some of 
the scholars such as D Acemoglu & A Wolitzky “The Economics of Labor Coercion” (2011) 79 Econometrica 
555 600; D Acemoglu, C Garcia-Jimeno & J A Robinson “Finding Eldorado: Slavery and Long-Run 
Development in Colombia” (2012) 40 Journal of Comparative Economics 534 – 564; G Bertocchi “Growth, 
Colonization, and Institutional Development: In and Out of Africa” in O de La Grandville (ed) Economic Growth 
and Development, Frontiers of Economics and Globalization Vol 11 25 – 41; S L Engerman “The Extent of 
Slavery and Freedom Throughout the Ages, in the World as a Whole and in Major Subareas” in J S Simon 
(1996) The State of Humanity 171 – 171, are in agreement that the issues related to human rights abuses by 
rulers and political institutions of the ancient including business firms ignited the advocacy for equal rights and 
the human rights activism movement. For instance, one such human rights abuse was the use of slaves. Many 
institutions including family businesses of the ancient relied on slave trade and slavery for purposes of 
commercial farming, agricultural production and constructions. See, for example: B J Ciulla “Why is Business 
Talking about Ethics? Reflections on Foreign Conversations” (1991) 34(1) California Management Review 67  
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Chapter is, however, on the modern conception and inception of human rights and the 
involvement of companies in the violation thereof. 
By way of explaining, the concept of ‘human rights’ refers to the rights which human 
beings are entitled to by virtue of been human beings. Forsythe posits that human rights 
refer to the fundamental values “of a person that are necessary for a life with human 
dignity.”502 Thus, the characteristics of human rights includes they are not capable of being 
divided (“indivisible”), they rely on each other (“interdependent”) and are acknowledge as 
human rights everywhere (“universal”). It is trite that corporations do not possess human 
rights in the full sense. However, corporations are juristic persons and for that reason they 
possess rights applicable to them under national and international law503 as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 above. 
4 2 1 Synopsis on human rights at domestic level 
From the English tradition’s perspective, the idea of human rights manifested in Magna 
Carta in 1215 and the Petition of Rights of 1628, which provided for certain limited 
rights.504These early examples of (limited) human rights posed no impediment on corporate 
behaviour that would today be viewed as human rights violations. This allowed the 
 
67; N M Bin Ahmad “The Economic Globalization and its Threat to Human Rights”, (2011) 2(19) International 
Journal of Business and Social Science 273 280 at 277 they posit that “calls for corporate responsibility and 
accountability have apparently been known throughout the development of TNCs as far back as Cicero in 44 
BC.” Despite the fact that slavery in ancient history was a vital tool or engine of development, it shortly became 
subject of condemnation by many ancient human rights activists including Plato’s work. The natural law school 
of thought including Stoics held a view that slavery was not natural and that a slave could be “free in his own 
mind”, consequently slavery was considered to be against the tenets of natural law. For further literature on 
this argument, see, Devine et al Human Rights 6. Suffice to state that influenced by the Greek philosophers, 
the Roman philosophers developed natural law further and advocated for universal rights for all. The Romans 
in attempt to treat everyone equal, among others, adopted laws which provided that freed slaves were entitled 
to citizenship and were eligible to occupy “[h]igh positions of authority”. 
502 D P Forsythe Human rights in International relations (2000) 3. M Goodale “Locating rights, envisioning law 
between the global and local” in M Goodale & S E Merry The practice of human rights: Tracking law between 
the global and the local (2007) 7 postulates that “[h]uman rights are a set of universal claims to safeguard 
human dignity from illegitimate coercion. Further that human rights are equal, inalienable and universal.” 
503 Bernard (1984) Criminology 4. 
504 For example, “[n]o freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison or deprived of his freehold except by 
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of his land.” 
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corporations, including the world’s first real multinationals such as the British and Dutch East 
India Companies505 to enjoy impunity for crimes such as forced labour.506 
Under the influence of Enlightenment thinkers, more comprehensive declarations and 
statements followed the early examples of rights declarations, such as Magna Carta. The 
USA to adopt the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It inspired France to adopt the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. These instruments were the first notable 
instruments that met the contemporary definition of the concept of human rights at domestic 
level. They formed the bedrock “for the respect, protection and promotion of human 
rights”507, albeit incrementally. For example, the USA’s Thirteenth Constitutional 
Amendment of 1865 abolished enslavement. The effect of the abolishment of enslavement 
was not only limited to the elite of the time who owned slaves, but it included the banishment 
of slavery in commercial farms and the use of slaves in any business institutions. The 
abolishment of slavery at the domestic level and the slave trade at the international level are 
early examples of the normative effect of human rights on commercial and corporate 
practices. 
The protection of human rights is now a key feature of democratic systems all over the 
world. In the post- WWII and post-colonial world, Bills of Rights were introduced for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. Human rights also impacted on the development 
of all areas of law, including international law. The nexus amid human rights, and 
international criminal law is unmistakable.508 
 
505 It was formed in 1602 and historically, it is considered the first major multinational company which 
possessed territorial powers and influence on negotiation of treaties, wagging of war, enslavement, 
imprisonment and execution of prisoners. 
506 J Lucassen “A Multinational and its Labour Force: The Dutch East India Company, 1595 -1795” (2004) 66 
International Labour and Working – Class History 12 14 posits that “the unfree workers from Asia and Africa 
were acquired through purchase or lease of slaves and forced employment of the local population.”; for a 
general discussion on the Dutch slave trade, see, P C Emmer The Dutch Slave Trade 1500 – 1850 (2006); J 
L Price “Review of the Dutch Slave Trade 1500 – 1850” 545 Reviews in History 1-4, Available at 
<http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/545#comment-0> (accessed 2017/01/ 26). 
507 The protect, respect and promote are the current common nomenclatures in the field of human rights. 
508 Y Kocar “The relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law in 
situations of armed conflict” (2015) 5(10) Human Rights Review, 109 112. 
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4 2 2 Synopsis on human rights at international level 
As noted, the post-Second World War and post-colonial international order is to large 
extent structured around conflict prevention and the advancement of human rights and 
security. The international community, through the international institutions such as the UN 
and associated bodies like the ICJ, developed various systems and mechanisms that 
condemned the violation of human rights. From a legal point of view one can note the 
adoption of numerous international human rights instruments, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR)509, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)510, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (UNCNSLWH)511, International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid512, the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,513 and several others covering issues such as racial discrimination, torture, 
women’s rights, and refugees.514 
The UNUDHR became the first enabling instrument that contained the modern definition 
of human rights under international law and it refuted the totalitarian regimes’ disrespect for 
human rights. Following the inception of the UDHR, numerous other international 
instruments that purported to promote human rights were adopted.515 Inferences may be 
drawn from these instruments that the obligation to respect human rights contemplated 
 
509 GA Res 217 A(III) of 10 Dec 1948. 
510 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368 (1967). 
511 GA Res 2391 (XXIII) 1968. 
512 GA Res 3068 (XXVIII) 1974, 13 ILM 50 (1974).  
513 GA Res 25/44 1989, 28 ILM 1448 (1989).  
514 For a comprehensive discussion of the legal frameworks and current case studies on international human 
rights, see J Donnelly & D Whelan International Human Rights (2018).  
515 UNICCPR – with its Optional Protocol Available at <http://www.un.org.tr/human-rights-instruments> 
(accessed on 2017/01/22); UNICERD, Available at <http://www.un.org.tr/human-rights-instruments> 
(accessed on 2017/01/22; UNCAT available at <http://www.un.org.tr/human-rights-instruments> (accessed on 
2017/01/22); United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
adopted by United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992; United Nations 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 20 December 2006 and it came into force on 23 December 2010, Available at 
<http://www.un.org.tr/human-rights-instruments> (accessed on 2017/01/22). 
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therein may implicitly include corporations’ obligations to respect human rights. For instance, 
the UNUDHR preamble makes reference to every organ of society,516 which, as it is 
demonstrated below, may be construed positively that organ of society may encompass 
corporations. 
Although international human rights law may be construed to apply to natural and 
corporate persons alike, it is the case that human rights for corporations are still largely 
viewed as soft law and aspirational. Relevant (non-binding) instruments in this regard are 
the OECD Guidelines on Multinationals,517 and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (2011).518 Other initiatives are even softer (“super-soft”, in the words of 
Professor Mark Pieth519). These include initiatives like the UN Global Compact, which is “a 
non-binding United Nations pact to encourage businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable 
and socially responsible policies, and to report on their implementation.”520 One should, 
however, not be cynical about these efforts. They point to a recognition that human rights 
are increasingly important in policy and legal terms. From a business perspective, 
“compliance” may mean many things, including quality control, ethics, worker rights, 
customer satisfaction – without losing sight of the bottom line – profitability. For purposes of 
this dissertation, “compliance” (should) mean compliance with a normative and legal 
framework subject to effective enforcement mechanism. In other words, compliance must 
ultimately move from the voluntary, “soft law” paradigm to a paradigm of enforcement 
 
516 UNUDHR Preamble provide that “the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual 
and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education 
to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to 
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.” 
517 The non-binding guidelines cover a wide range of due diligence aspects, for instance the elimination of 
child labour and other potential human rights violations. Available at 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines/> (accessed 2019/07/15). 
518 Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf.> 
(accessed 2019/07/15).  
519 M Pieth “Corporate compliance and human rights” Criminal Law Forum (2018) 595-601, at 597.  
520 Available at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/> (accessed 2019/04/12). 
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premised on responsibility for wrongdoers and consequences for the guilty, i.e. the paradigm 
of criminal law.  
Without losing sight of the argument at hand, another important point here, when 
discussing human rights violation and international criminal law, is to briefly determine 
whether, there is a possible link between human rights violations and atrocity crimes (crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes)? At what point does the violation of human 
rights constitute an atrocity crime, if any? In Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber considered the link between human rights violations and international crimes. In 
this case, international crimes could not be divorced from human rights violations and it is 
evident that the link lays on the seriousness of the violation, the Chamber stated that 
international crimes are: 
“considered as a serious violation of (…) basic rights pertaining to human beings, drawn from the 
norms of international human rights law (…).521 
Further link between human rights violation and international criminal law can be 
observed522 in terms of the Rome Statute – which defines the proscribed conduct (crime of 
persecution) with reference to human rights violation and it provides as follows: 
"Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”523 
It is not every violation of human rights that amount to international crimes – rather the 
degree of the violation may render (qualify) it to be construed as an international crime. For 
instance, there should be a serious or grave breach of human rights to an extent that the 
said violations can shock the foundational values or conscious of the international 
 
521 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-717 decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
30/09/2008 at par 431. 
522 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Human Kind of 1984 – in its 1991 version the 
crimes against humanity was replaced with ‘systematic or mass violation of human rights’. The fact that the 
international community interchangeably used the concept of mass violation of human rights with crimes 
against humanity – it is an indication that these concepts are to some extent inseparable. 
523 Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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community. This could entail “destruction in whole or in part” or “widespread or systematic 
attacks” aimed at a civilian population.524 From this brief overview – it resonates that there 
is strong argument that can be raised in favour of the link between human rights violation 
and atrocity crimes. Further that the degree (seriousness) of human rights violation may 
render such human rights violation to be considered as an atrocity crime.  
Since it was already established in prior chapters that corporate criminal liability is 
recognized at the national level, but not yet at the international (institutional and 
enforcement) level, the task at hand is to see whether the “soft law” human rights imperative 
can drive the argument for effective “hard law” corporate criminal liability at the international 
level. The points of departure for this discussion is to establish the extent to which 
corporations are bound by human rights obligations (if at all). 
4 3 Corporate obligations to respect human rights 
It is trite to state that gross human rights violations can amount to offences under 
international law, on condition that all the elements of the offence are satisfied (threshold of 
seriousness, contextual elements, actus reus, and mens rea).525This dissertation is not 
concerned with the elements of any of the specific atrocity crimes, but rather with the issue 
of liability in principle, and corporate liability specifically. So the angle in this section is not 
so much the contents of human rights norms, but the question as to whether companies are, 
in principle bound by (international) human rights. An answer in the affirmative can then help 
to construct a stronger case for direct and effective international criminal liability for atrocity 
crimes committed or abetted by corporations. 
 
524 Prosecutor v Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 Trial Chamber 1 Judgment concerning Article 74 dated 14 
March 2012 at Par 911 the Chamber referred to “widespread serious human rights violation” as constituting 
an international crime. 
525 For a discussion, see JP Pérez-León Acevedo “The close relationship between serious human rights 
violations and crimes against humanity: International criminalization of serious abuses” (2017) Anuario 
Mexicano de Derecho Internacional Vol XVII 145-186. 
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Historically, states bore the obligation to protect and respect human rights. There were 
no legal instruments that expressly placed a duty on companies to respect human rights. 
This was because the early formed companies had no legal personality independent from 
their founders.526 The change in corporations’ legal personality as was discussed in Chapter 
2 above, brought with it benefits (expanded rights) and corresponding obligations. The 
obligations, among others, include corporations’ respect for human rights, upright 
governance, socially responsible and decent citizenry. The question is, however, if all of 
these obligations are really “hard law” obligations, or are they merely “soft law” guidelines, 
as was mentioned previously? 
4 3 1 Sources of corporate obligations to respect human rights 
Traditionally, the settled sources of international law include the “[t]reaties, international 
customary law, general principles of international law, judicial decisions and persuasive soft 
law.”527 Legal framework stand point, namely: corporations’ obligation to uphold human 
rights – it is worth noting that currently there is no treaty, custom or general principles of 
international law that expressly bounds companies to respect human rights. This is 
regrettably so, notwithstanding the jus cogens nature of human rights528 or the fact that 
 
526 E Engle “Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A remedy for Human Rights Violation?” (2006) 20 St 
John’s Legal Comment 287 288. 
527 Art 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ 1945. 
528 The principles of IHRL and IHL falls under jus cogens, as H U Rehman, S R S Gilani & M H Khan “A critical 
assessment of jus cogens nature of international human rights law” (2014) The Dialogue 404 at 406-407 
argues that “human rights are being considered of superior status in the normative hierarchy of international 
law: firstly, article 1(3), 56 and 103 of the UN Charter read together, give the meaning that member states of 
UN are under obligation to contribute to the accomplishment of international cooperation for promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental  freedoms for all. This obligation prevails over any 
other obligation incurred under any other international agreement. Secondly, article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaty invalidates any treaty that which violates a peremptory norm of general 
international law.”; Further see, discussion on jus cogens nature of human rights in literature by, A Bianchi 
“Human rights and the magic of jus cogens” (2008) 19(3) The European Journal of International Law 491-508 
at 492 argues that “certainly, the identification of the content of the normative category of jus cognes has never 
been an easy process. However, human rights rules have been almost invariably designated as part of it. This 
has occurred either by way of general reference to the bulk of contemporary human rights prescriptions without 
any further qualification, or more frequently, by invoking the peremptory character of particular human rights 
obligation such as the prohibition of slavery, torture and genocide.”; P Zenovic  “Human rights enforcement via 
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corporations are capable of committing grave violations of human rights. One must therefore 
conclude that the current source of corporations’ obligation to respect human rights under 
international law is limited to soft law.529 
The question as to whether corporations should have a duty to respect international 
human rights has been a subject of much debate. One of the reasons for this debate is that 
it is assumed that states carry primary duty to respect human rights.530 Further, that placing 
an obligation on corporations to respect international human rights may implicitly confer 
corporations with locus standi rights under international law and subsequently formalising 
corporations as legal subjects of international law531 – which is perceived to be directly 
contrary to traditional international law principles of state centeredness.532 This rationale led 
to diverse opinions on the issue. Some scholars argue for a stratification of duties to respect 
human rights, namely primary and secondary duties.533 
 
peremptory norms- a challenge to state sovereignty” (2012) 6 Riga Graduate School of Law Research 1-65 at 
page 32 observes that “the legal form of multilateral treaties, especially those concerned with human rights, 
has significantly changed. In our contemporary international legal order, the multilateral treaty making process 
is legislative in objective but contractual in method. That is how non-derogable norms emerging from treaties 
almost universally accepted, adopted by a majority of states within either a global or regional treaty regime, 
have become the norms of jus cogens. That would be the case with the prohibition of genocide, torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment as well as the right to self-determination (…) in these cases jus cogens has 
a significant effect on human rights endorsement: it spreads the compelling character of the norm to states 
which are not signatories of a certain regional or universal legal framework.” 
529 Kyriakakis (2008) Criminal Law Forum 144. 
530 B Bilchitz “The necessity for a Business and Human Right Treaty,” (2016) Vol 1(2) Business and Human 
Rights Journal 204-227 at 206 posits is that “if states are required by international law to ensure that third 
parties (including corporations) comply with binding human rights requirements, then this entails that the third 
parties are themselves obligated to comply with such requirements. Further that, the logic of state’s duty to 
protect at international law – entails the notion that non state actors have a binding legal obligations with 
respect to the human rights contained in these treaties.” 
531 See, Gotzmann (2008) QLSR 36 46. 
532 Dugard International Law 1 argues that international law traditionally concerns itself with the conduct of the 
states in relation to each other. Thus, he defines international law as the “body of rules and principles which 
are binding upon states in their relations with one another.” However, it is worth noting that this traditional or 
classical position of international law is not cast in stone, that is, in the 1940s an exception was allowed which 
elevated international institutions such as the UN and its agencies to be subject of international law. 
533 Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 208.  It is argued that States has the primary function to ensure the protection of 
human rights – reasons, among others, including that most binding international instruments are contracted 
by states and require such contracting states to ensure that third parties within the jurisdiction of such 
contracting states comply with binding human rights instruments – arguably, these third parties includes 
transnational corporations. 
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The classification entail that states are the primary protector of human rights (as of a 
duty) in contrast to corporations’ oblique duty. Ruggie critique the stratification model and 
argues that “[i]t places emphasise on the wrong side of the equation in the sense that it 
concerns itself with a limited list of rights linked to imprecise and expensive responsibilities, 
rather than defining the specific responsibilities of companies with regard to all rights”.534 
Which brings one to the question of whether there is support for the notion that corporations 
should have broad obligations akin to the obligations that states carry under international 
law.  
A starting point was the efforts to bind corporations to respect human rights that date 
back to the early 1970s, namely the proposals on a “business and human rights treaty.”535 
By 1982, the UN in its reaction to complaints of corporations’ human rights violations, 
through the Economic and Social Council, passed Resolution 86/1982, which mandated the 
Intergovernmental Working Group to draft the “Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations.” The object of the Code of Conduct was to provide for voluntary business 
responsibilities related to respect for human rights. However, this draft code of conduct was 
not adopted. There were several other initiatives that were explored by the UN and other 
international organisations to regulate the activities of transnational corporations in relations 
to human rights abuses. These initiatives included the UN Global Compact principles,536 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises537 and the International Labour Organization 
 
534J Ruggie “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A framework for Business and Human Rights” (7 April 2008), 15 
Document A/HRC/8/5 Available at <http://business-humanrights.org/site/default/file/reports-and-
materials/Ruggie-report-7-April-2008.pdf> (accessed on 2017/01/23). 
535 See, Bilchitz (216) BHRJ 206. 
536 UN Global Impact is a voluntary initiative (policy and practical framework) for companies that was launched 
on 26 July 2000 in New York by the UN Secretary General.  
537 The Declaration and Guidelines were adopted by OECD in 1976, revised in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1991, 2000 
and 2011. 
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Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises.538 All these 
instruments are based on voluntary corporate compliance approaches.539 
There has been much criticism against these voluntary compliance mechanisms, 
including that these voluntary compliance mechanisms are not satisfactory because the 
corporation has latitude to weigh the cost of non-compliance against compliance. If the costs 
for non-compliance are lesser than the cost of compliance, corporations may be tempted to 
opt for non-compliance.540 Lyon underscores this argument and state that “self-regulation 
can be welfare-enhancing, but only if industry can make credible commitments that are 
backed up by rigorous third party monitoring schemes, something that is only likely to 
happen when there is strong regulatory threat.”541 
The dissatisfaction with voluntary compliance initiatives, according to Bilchitz, led in 2003 
to the UN Sub Commission on Human Rights’ to Draft Norms on Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises542 (“UN Draft Norms on 
Corporations”) These norms contemplated to place a binding obligation on companies to 
protect and respect human rights.543 Among the most significant features of these norms, 
 
538 Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204th session in 1977 Geneva, and 
amended at its 279 (November 2000), 295 (March 2006) and 329 (March 2017) Sessions. 
539 OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises (2011) Art I(1) Concepts and Principles expressly provide 
that “the guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multinational enterprises. They 
provide principles and standards of good practice consistent with applicable laws and internationally 
recognized standards. Observance of the guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not legally enforceable. 
(…).” 
540 J T Scholz “Voluntary compliance and regulatory enforcement” (1984) 6(4) Law and Policy 387-404. 
541 T Lyon “The pros and cons of voluntary approaches to environmental regulation” (2013) available at 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholars.org> (accessed on 2018/4/29); D Matisoff “Sources of specification error in 
assessment of voluntary environment programs: Understanding program impacts” (2015) 48(1) Policy 
Sciences 109-126. 
542 Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 206 
543 The Preamble of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, United Nations Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2(2003) para 
4 provides among others that “[t]ransnational corporations and other business enterprises, their officers and 
persons working for them are also obliged to respect generally recognized responsibilities and norms in United 
Nations Treaties and other international instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crime of Genocide, the UNCAT; the Slavery Convention and Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” 
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was their departure from the traditional voluntary compliance to non-voluntary enforcement 
mechanism.544 These norms were a step in the right direction for purposes of requiring 
companies to account for human rights abuses. Miretski and Bachmann opined that “these 
norms were of a far-reaching character that included a duty laid on [transnational 
corporations] to impose human rights obligations upon States, even if States failed to ratify 
the human rights instruments establishing these duties”.545 Scholars argue that these norms 
were not adopted, because they contemplated to develop existing norms rather than actual 
codification thereof. The norms contemplated to recognise corporations as subjects of 
international law. This proposition placed or elevated companies to be on the same scale 
with states under international law.546 This, clearly, is a radical and not universally palatable 
proposition. 
The failure to adopt the UN Draft Norms on Corporations led the UN to develop and 
adopt the “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.” This initiative is, again, based on 
voluntary corporate compliance. This is not satisfactory. Corporations, as noted by Kinley, 
possess power, the machinery and agents of the global economy they wield enormous 
influence, especially in developing states. This fact calls for more than voluntary compliance 
schemes. The answer is to hold firms – criminally account for the human rights 
infringment.547 
4 3 2 The current voluntary compliance framework briefly contextualised 
The soft law sources identified above, despite their voluntary compliance approaches, 
can be viewed as normative pointers towards the eventual concretisation of corporations’ 
 
544 Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 207.   
545 P P Miretski & S D Bachmann “Global Business and Human Rights – The UN Norms on the Responsibility 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights – A Requiem” 
p3 at <http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/6272/1/Miretski_Bachmann_-_Business_and_Human_Rights.pdf.> 
(accessed on 2016/11/22). 
546 Miretski & Bachmann “Global Business and Human Rights” 6. 
547 D Kinley “From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at 
International Law” (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931 933. 
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positive obligations with respect to international human rights. These pointers are briefly 
enumerated below. 
4 3 2 1 Duty to undertake human rights due diligence 
Due diligence refers to sensible and practical actions or procedures undertaken to 
mitigate or avoid human rights infringement, crime or other harmful activities. This duty in 
business context is implicit in the “director’s duty of care and skill” – which requires the 
directors of companies to, at all material times, act with certain appropriate standards of care 
and skill “when acting on behalf of a company.”548 In the context of companies and human 
rights, this duty require corporations to undertake reasonable measures to ensure that 
business activities which are conducted by corporations do not cause to adverse human 
rights impacts. The obligation to undertake human rights due diligence is a relatively new 
initiative in the international sphere and it falls under the broader principle of “corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights.”549It is expressly provided for in Principle 17 which 
provides: 
“In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse human 
rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence. The process 
should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon 
the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.”550 
 
548 R T Langford, I Ramsay & Welsh M “The Origins of Company Directors’ Statutory Duty of Care”, (2015) 37 
Sydney Law Review 489 518 at 499. 
549 Principle 13 of the 2003 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – provides that “the 
responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises: a) avoid causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur; b) 
seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products 
or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impact.” 
550 Similar provision exists in the text of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2011 Edition, Article 
IV(5) which provide that “States have the duty to protect human rights. Enterprises should, within the 
framework of internationally recognized human rights, the international human rights obligations of the 
countries in which they operate as well as relevant domestic laws and regulations: Carry out human rights due 
diligence as appropriate to their size, the nature and context of operations and the severity of the risks of 
adverse human rights impacts.” 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the obvious object of corporations is to make profit – their 
business activities are not immune from contributing or causing adverse human rights 
impacts. Therefore, corporations should strive to integrate human rights due diligence duties 
in their enterprise risk-management system. This entails that corporations must put in place 
mechanisms, including policies that reflect the corporations’ commitment to protect and 
respect human rights. 
Ruggie posits that in the process of executing the due diligence duty, corporations must 
be informed by or take into considerations three factors. These factors include firstly, 
considering the tendency of countries in which corporations conduct their businesses – to 
whether such countries respect human rights. Secondly, is to determine as to what human 
rights impacts the corporations’ own business activities may pose. This consideration have 
attracted legal discourse and most of the scholars are in agreement that “[c]orporations are 
capable of impeding the realization of human rights, directly or indirectly, as a result of their 
own actions.”551 Thirdly, to determine whether the corporations’ relationship with other 
enterprises, connected through business activities, may pose a negative impact on human 
rights.552 Thus, the process of executing a due diligence duty include incorporation and 
integration of human rights statements in corporate policies, conducting human rights impact 
assessments and putting in place performance indicators to ensure a robust enforcement of 
the human rights policies. 
4 3 2 2 Duty to undertake good corporate governance 
The meaning of “corporate governance” is a subject of much debate in business law. 
This concept includes principles such as “corporate citizenship”, “corporate social 
 
551 N Pillay “The Corporate Responsibility to Respect: A Human Rights Milestone” Annual Labour and Social 
Policy Review 4. 
552 J Ruggie Protect, Respect and Remedy: A framework for Business and Human Rights (2008), 17 Document 
A/HRC/8/5 at <http://business-humanrights.org/site/default/file/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-April-
2008.pdf> (accessed on 2017/01/23). 
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responsibility” and “corporate ethics.” The principle of corporate governance places a duty 
on corporations to adopt effective policies that are characterised by values including 
corporate responsibility, accountability, good ethical conduct and respect for human rights. 
In terms of the Code of Governance (“King IV”) to which many South African, Namibian and 
Southern African corporations ascribe to, corporations are required to “consider not only the 
financial performance but also the impact of the company’s operations on society and the 
environment.”553 Further, it encourages companies to be compliant with the laws and 
instruments that prescribe upholding human rights.554 
The other aspect of “corporate governance” from which inference may be derived or that 
may persuasively reflect corporate duties to respect human rights: is corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Traditionally, CSR in a broader sense, “[i]s concerned with ‘what is’ – 
or ‘should be’ – the relationship between global corporations, governments of countries and 
societies in which such corporations resides or operates.”555 Implicitly, this involves the 
altruistic character of corporations in contrast to selfish or utilitarian character. From the 
altruistic characteristic perspective, scholars argue that CSR should not be limited to 
philanthropic means. Rather as Davis argues that corporate social responsibility entails the 
“[c]orporations’ consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical and legal requirements of the firm.”556 In this context, Davis opines that 
corporations are obliged to evaluate their decisions and to determine the effects of such 
decisions on society. Further, that corporate decisions should consider not only the profit or 
 
553 Principle 1 (1.2.1) of King IV Code of Governance (2009) at <http://www.iodsa.co.za/?kingIII> (accessed 
on 2017/01/ 22). 
554 Principle 6 (6.1.4) of King IV Code of Governance provide that “Compliance with applicable laws should be 
understood not only in terms of the obligations that they create, but also for the rights and protection that they 
afford.” 
555 D Crowther & G Aras Corporate Social Responsibility (2008) 10. 
556 K Davis “The case for and against business assumption of social responsibility” (1973) 16 Academy of 
Management Journal 312 312. 
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benefits obtained by the corporation; but such decisions should also include the interest of 
upoholding human rights of the society it operates in. 
However, corporations tend to disregard this noble soft law obligation and consequently 
cause human rights violations in varying degrees. For instance, one can refer to the 
appalling Shell Petroleum Development Corporation’s (SPDC) situation in Nigeria.557 In this 
instance, the ACHPR found that the SPDC oil exploration operations in the Ogoni land 
contributed to the displacement and expulsion of the Ogoni People from their lands. The 
ACHPR held that “[t]he SPDC and the Nigerian government forces has destroyed Ogoni 
houses and villages and then, through its security forces, obstructed, harassed, beaten and, 
in some cases, shot and killed innocent citizens who have attempted to return to rebuild their 
ruined homes. These actions constitute massive violations of human rights.”558 
It should be clear from the ACHPR finding that Shell, a giant multilateral corporation, not 
only violated several soft law good corporate governance rules and guidelines, but also 
contributed to serious and systematic human rights violations. A further case study, 
discussed below, will assist to put these issues in concrete perspective, especially as they 
pertain to serious human rights violations. 
4 4 Corporations and human rights violations – modes of responsibility and a few 
case studies 
Findings and reports on corporate involvement in infringement and abuse of human rights 
like Shell/Nigeria matter referred to above, prompted commentators to construct the notion: 
“corporate responsibility for gross human rights violations” in a more systematic way. I will 
refer to this with reference to a few case studies. Hughes-Jennett, Karmel, Zerk and Powel 
identified four ways modes of potential corporate responsibility for gross human rights 
 
557 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v 
Nigeria (2001) (“Social and Economic Rights”) African Human Rights Law Report 60, Communication 
155/1996, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
558 Social and Economic Rights para 62. 
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violations, namely: (a) as primary perpetrator; (b) as supplier of goods and services that are 
used in an abusive manner; (c) provision of information that exacerbates abuse; and (d) 
through investment or conduct of companies in nations with meagre democracy and human 
rights accounts.559 I will now turn to case studies to illustrate these suggested modes of 
responsibility. 
4 4 1 Unocal and Total (Myanmar) case 
Unocal Company with its parent company, the Union Oil Company, is registered in 
California USA and Total Company is registered in France. Their business interests and 
operations extend beyond the borders of states in which they are registered, and it is safe 
to say that they are both prime examples of multinational companies in the natural resources 
field. These two companies both had, at all relevant times, oil extraction interests in 
Myanmar. Unocal Corporation obtained a concession from Myanmar government for oil 
extraction.560 In order to extract the oil, a pipeline had to be constructed. Unocal was 
responsible for the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline, which traversed through the 
Tenasserim region.561 
The consequences of constructing the gas pipeline included requiring the residents of 
Tenasserim region to move from their villages and fields to make way for the construction 
of the pipeline. The residents were unwilling to move from their villages and fields. Unocal 
and Total subsequently contracted the Myanmar military for purposes of overcoming the 
resistance and to provide security during the construction. The Myanmar military forces were 
hired notwithstanding their previous poor records in terms of human rights. These 
multinational companies provided funding for military operations, transportations and other 
 
559 J Hughes-Jennett, R Karmel, J Zerk & S Powel “Corporate responsibility for international crimes” (2005) 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs at <https://www.chathamhouse.org> (accessed on 2018/04/28). 
560 A J Wilson “Beyond Unocal: Conceptual problems in using international norms to hold transnational 
corporations liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act” in O de Schutter (eds) Transnational corporations and 
human rights (2006) 55. 
561 Wilson “Beyond Unocal” in Transnational Corporations 56. 
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essential materials to enable the military to conduct regular patrols within the concession 
areas. 
During the tenure of service of the military forces in Tenasserim region, several human 
rights abuses were recorded. The claims of human rights infringement made by the 
residents of Tenasserim region included rape of women and children, destruction of farming 
fields and villages, plundering of properties, forced labour, “torture and killing of persons by 
the Myanmar military”562 The companies were aware of the allegations of human rights 
abuse but there were no corrective measures that were taken from the companies’ side to 
avoid the gross human rights violations. 
Unocal and Total Corporations were sued in September 1996 under the USA’s Alien Tort 
Claim Act 1789563 (ATCA) by the Myanmar nationals who were affected. The legal action 
was withdrawn by the plaintiffs, after the companies offered an out of court settlement in 
2009. 
4 4 2 Oriental Timber Company and Royal Timber Company case 
This case study discusses two companies, namely, the Oriental Timber Company (OTC), 
its president been Mr Guus Kouwenhoven, and the Royal Timber Company (RTC), with its 
director also Mr Guus Kouwenhoven. These companies were registered in Liberia. 
Kouwenhoven was a Dutch national. The two companies teamed up with the Global Star 
Group of companies with registration office in Hong Kong. The primary business of these 
companies was logging and processing of timber.564They carried on their business in several 
nations, including Liberia and a number of Asian countries. The timber were extracted from 
 
562 John Roe III; John Roe VII; John Roe VIII; John Roe X v Unocal Corporation; Union Oil Company of 
California (“John Roe”) D.C. No CV-96-06956 RSWL 14187 (395 F.3d 932b (9th Cir 2002). 
563 28 US Code [USC] §1350. 
564 The Perspective “Investigative Report on Oriental Timber Corporation” (2000) available at 
<www.theperpective.org> (accessed on 2018/04/29). 
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Liberia and exported in its raw form to Asia and Europe. The former president of Liberia, Mr 
Charles Taylor, also had interests in these companies. 
During Charles Taylor’s presidency a rebellion was formed against the government and 
civil war erupted in Liberia. In order to stump the rebel group branded as Liberian United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the government required a supply of weapons, 
financial assistance, personnel and several other resources. Kouwenhoven, during 2000 to 
2003 and in his quest to protect his business interests in Liberia, supplied weapons and 
several other materials, to President Charles Taylor and his armed forces that were essential 
to wage war against LURD.565 The supply of weapons and other essential materials to 
Charles Taylor and his armed forces significantly increased Kouwenhoven’s access to 
timber concessions to an extent that he was granted de facto control over a large portion of 
timber land around Buchanan port in South East Liberia.566 Therefore, because of the 
continued support offered by Kouwenhoven in his capacity as president and director of the 
two companies under discussion, the timber business was sustained in Liberia. 
The supply of weapons by OTC and RTC to Liberia was done notwithstanding the UNSC 
Resolution1342 of 2001 as well as 1408 of 2002. These resolutions prohibited and or placed 
a ban on the supply of weapons to Liberia. There were other instruments that prohibited the 
supply of weapons to Liberia, namely the European Union’s Common Position 
2001/357/CFSP567 and the Netherlands’ Sanctions Regulations.568 The relevance of making 
reference to the Dutch regulations is that the OTC and RTC were of Dutch origin since they 
were owned by a Dutch national. 
 
565 Global Witness “Bankrolling Brutality: Why European timber company DLH should be held to account for 
profiting from Liberian conflict timber” (2010) available at <www.globalwitness.org> (accessed on 2018/04/27). 
566 T B Van Solinge “Eco-crime: The tropical timber trade” in D Siegel & H Nelen Organized crime: Culture, 
markets and policies (2008) 97 111. 
567Council Common Position of 7 May 2001 concerning restrictive measures in relation to Liberia 
(2001/357/CFSP). 
568 Netherlands – Liberia Sanctions Order No 137 of 2001 dated 18 July 2001 (Stc. 2001 No. 137). 
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The weapons and essential materials were shipped to Liberia by ships and vessels 
owned by OTC and RTC. These weapons on arrival were stored at the warehouses of OTC 
and RTC prior to the delivery and use by Charles Taylor and armed forces. Regrettably, 
these weapons were used in committing atrocities by the Charles Taylor’s regime against 
civilians. In June 2006, criminal proceedings in the Netherlands were instituted against 
Kouwenhoven.569 The indictment contained, among others, war crimes as well as illegal 
supply of weapons. Kouwenhoven was convicted for violating international humanitarian law 
(war crimes) in 201 and sentenced to nineteen years in prison. A fugitive from justice, he 
was later located in South Africa and the Netherlands subsequently requested his 
extradition.570 
The successful war crimes prosecution against Kouwenhoven has echoes of the post-
Second World War industrialists’ prosecutions (Krupp et al). In terms of corporate complicity 
in the atrocity crimes committed in Liberia, it is clear that the focus on an individual – 
Kouwenhoven – represents only a partial victory for the proponents of corporate criminal 
accountability (the companies OTC and RTC of which Kouwenhoven was the director and 
driving force, were not prosecuted). The case against Kouwenhoven nevertheless 
represents – in the words of James Stewart – “a partial correction” for the curious regression 
in the post-Second World War recognition of corporate complicity in atrocity crimes.571 
4 4 3 Nigeria Shell Petroleum Development Company case 
The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (RDPC) with registration office in the Netherlands 
had a joint venture with Shell Transport and Trading Company (STTC) with registration office 
in UK. The RDPC and STTC had extractive business interests in Nigeria since the 1950s, 
 
569 The Public Prosecutor v Guus Kouwenhoven  (“Kouwenhoven”) Case Number 220043306 (ECLI: NL: 
GHSGR: 2008:BC6068) Court of Appeal decision delivered on 21 April 2017, available at 
<https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:2650> (accessed 2019/02/12). 
570 Reporting available at <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/dutch-arms-dealers-extradition-
papers-arrive-from-the-netherlands-20180525> (accessed 2019/02/12). 
571 JG Stewart “The historical importance of the Kouwenhoven trial”, available at 
<http://jamesgstewart.com/the-historical-importance-of-the-kouwenhoven-trial/> (accessed 2019/02/19).  
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which led to the establishment of a joint subsidiary known as Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDCNL) with registration office in Nigeria. The SPDCNL on 
behalf of its parent companies conducted oil exploration and production in Ongoni land in 
Nigeria.572 
The SPDCNL’s operations in the late 1980s and early 1990s led the residents of Ongoni 
land to commence peaceful demonstrations against SPDCNL. In order to have a 
coordinated movement, the Ongoni people led by Ken Sao-Wiwa formed a group called: 
Movement for the Survival of the Ongoni People (MOSOP). The concerns raised by 
MOSOP, among others, were the environmental effects caused by the extraction and 
production of oil; and the forced relocation of people from their farms and villages to pave 
way for the oil pipeline that was excavated within the Ongoni land.573 
In order to overcome the resistance and thwart the demonstrations, the SPDCNL 
contracted the Nigerian military and the police forces to provide security at production sites. 
These security forces were compensated by SPDCNL for the security services provided. 
SPDCNL further made provisions for sufficient funding, accommodations and meals to 
ensure that the security forces conducted raids effectively. These raids were characterised 
with brutality, rape against women and children, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced removal 
of the Ongoni land residents, looting, plunder and destruction of properties owned by the 
Ongoni people.574 SPDCNL effectively monitored the movements of the Ongoni people and 
that of MOSOP. Further, SPDCNL paid bribes, including promises of job offers to witnesses 
who were involved in the production of fabricated evidence which resulted the conviction 
 
572 Ester Kiobel and Others v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, and Others (“Ester Kiobel and Others”) Case No. 
569 US (2013) Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America delivered on 17 April 2013 at 
page 2. 
573 Ester Kiobel and Others 3. 
574 Ester Kiobel and Others 3. 
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and punishment of the MOSOP leaders and their subsequent executions.575 Some of the 
Ongoni land residents sought political asylum in other countries. 
Legal actions by persons who were affected were brought against SPDCNL together 
with its parent companies in the USA through the instrumentality of the Alien Tort Act of 
1789.576 The legal action was withdrawn in 2010 after an out of court settlement in the 
amount of US$ 11, 000, 000. 00.577 Of interest for present purposes is the clear claims of 
business collaboration in the commission of “widespread” and “systematic” infringement of 
human rights and the commission of atrocities in Nigeria that informed the case before the 
US court. 
4 4 4 Talisman energy Inc case 
Talisman Energy Inc was a company that was incorporated in Canada and its business 
interests included extraction and processing of oil. It had its business operations in several 
countries including in Sudan. In 1998, it concluded a takeover agreement with Arakis 
Company which had oil concessions in Southern Sudan.578 
The area on which Talisman held a concession was occupied by Sudanese natives. In 
order for Talisman Energy Inc to maximise the potential in its extraction of oil, certain villages 
were required to move and relocate elsewhere. This proved difficult because the natives 
were not willing to leave their fields and villages. Talisman Energy Inc enlisted the services 
of the Sudanese Army to provide security. The Sudanese Army were financially supported 
by Talisman Energy Inc, which further constructed an airport runway as well as helicopter 
apron to facilitate military operations within the concession area. 
 
575 Social and Economic Rights at para 5. 
576 Wiwa v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria (“Wiwa”) Case No 08-1803-cv (2009). 
577 See, Order of Court in Ken Wiwa and Others v Shell Petroleum and Others (Ken Wiwa and Others”) Case 
No. 96 Civ 8386 (KMW)(HBP) dated 8 June 2009 by the US District Court of New York. 
578 S J Kobrin “Oil and politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan” (2004) 36 International Law and Politics 426 at 
437. 
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The Sudanese Army committed gross human rights violations against the Sudanese 
civilians, including rape, forced removal and displacement, torture, destruction of homes and 
properties, murder and mass killing of the non-Muslim people who resided in the oil-rich 
fields off Khartoum. It was further alleged that Talisman Energy’s complicity and participation 
human rights infringement (atrocity crimes) served to gain a business advantage or 
concession.579 
The victims of these infringements, together with the Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 
brought an action against Talisman Energy Inc under the ATCA in the USA. The case was 
registered as Talisman Energy. The claims were clear that the company conspired with the 
Sudanese government to commit a series of abuses. The Court of Appeal dismissed the 
legal action against Talisman Energy Inc in 2009 in the USA. The cause for the discharge 
of the case included that the plaintiffs failed on paper to prove that there were sufficient facts 
to support the allegations that Talisman Energy “aided and abetted the commission of 
atrocities in Sudan.”580 
4 4 5 Anvil mining case 
Anvil Mining Limited was registered in Canada. It had business operations and offices in 
Perth, Australia, Montreal, Canada, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the 
DRC it was based in Dikulushi area where it operated a copper and silver mine. In 2004, the 
rebel groups seized and took control of the town of Kilwa which is about 50 kilometres from 
the Dikulushi area. Government forces, in an attempt to gain control over Kilwa, obtained 
assistance from Anvil Mining Company. Anvil Mining provided the Congolese military with 
vehicles, chartering planes, and financing of military operations to enable the military to 
 
579 The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc, (“Talisman Energy”) Docket No. 07-0016- CV 
Judgment of 2 October 2009, 7. 
580 Talisman Energy available at <http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/43/Presbyterian-Church-
Of-Sudan-v-Talisman-Energy/> (accessed 2017/02/12).  
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effectively dismantle the rebellion.581 Some of the vehicles provided by Anvil Mining 
Company were allegedly used to transport apprehended rebels. Some of the facilities of 
Anvil Mining were used as interrogation rooms in which the apprehended rebels were 
subjected to torture and extrajudicial killings at the hands of the military forces. 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the UN Mission to the DRC intervened 
and launched an investigation on behalf of the victims. In 2006, criminal proceedings were 
instituted against the military personnel by Lubumbashi Military High Court. Three 
employees of Anvil mining company were cited as accused persons for their complicity in 
atrocities. In 2007, the charges were dismissed. The dismissal of the charges in the DRC 
led the victims to sue Anvil mining company in Canada.582 A legal action (class suit) was 
brought in Quebec, Canada. The action was dismissed in 2012 because Quebec courts 
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. 
The claim was then brought to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(the Commission).583 The Commission’s decision was delivered in June 2016 in which the 
DRC was found to be answerable for gross human rights infringements that were committed 
in Kilwa. This decision went further to implore the DRC to indict and punish the employees 
of Anvil mining company for their participation in the commission of atrocities. 
Again, we can see the clear corporate link to the atrocity crimes that were committed. In 
law, the focus turned out to be on natural persons as perpetrators and accomplices, but the 
corporate involvement de facto is clear from the reported facts on the ground. 
 
581 A McBeth “Crushed by an Anvil: A case study on responsibility in the extractive sector” (2014) 11(1) Yale 
Human Rights and Development Journal 127 at 131. 
582 Association Canadienne Contre I’impunite v Anvil Mining Limited (“Anvil Mining”) Case No.34733 (Qc)(Civ) 
decision of the Supreme Court delivered on 01 November 2012. 
583 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and Others v Democratic Republic of Congo (“Institute 
for Human Rights”) Communication 393/10 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights decision 
adopted during the 20th Extraordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights held 
from 9-18 June 2016, Banjul, The Gambia. 
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4 5 Conclusion 
The case studies discussed in the preceding section illustrate the de facto; if not de jure, 
responsibility of corporations in alleged and occasionally proven cases of atrocity crimes 
and gross human rights violations. I will now proceed, in the next chapter, to put these case 
studies and reports of business institutions’ engrossment in grave human rights infringement 
in criminal law perspective. In particular, the crucial elements of corporate actus reus and 
mens rea will be discussed with an eye on constructing a framework for corporate criminal 
liability for atrocity crimes. 
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Chapter 5 
Forms of corporate criminal responsibility: attribution of actus reus and mens rea 
for international crimes to corporations 
5 1 Introduction 
This chapter, firstly, critically analyses two important approaches that are relevant for 
purposes of imputing conduct and attributing fault to juristic persons, namely the nominalist 
and realist approaches. The nominalist (derivative) approach encompasses principles such 
as identification, aggregation and vicarious liability as methods through which corporations 
may be held liable. In contradistinction, the realist approach584 which entails that 
corporations may account for atrocities committed based on the principle of corporate 
culture. Secondly, the chapter discusses the element of unlawful conduct from corporate 
perspective and provide an insight into the requirements that must be fulfilled in order to 
construe corporate actus reus. Thirdly, it analyses the concept of mens rea from the 
corporate perspective. This section departs from the orthodox approach of construing 
corporate mens rea and proposes certain requirements that must be satisfied for purposes 
of inferring corporate mens rea. In this manner, the chapter attempts to introduce new forms 
of corporate criminal responsibility, based on corporate culture, for purposes of corporate 
liability for atrocity crimes. Finally, the chapter analyses the models of criminal accountability 
as contemplated by the Rome Statute and how they can potentially relate to corporations. 
 
584 Pop “Criminal Liability of Corporations” (2009) 18 summarises the rationale of Realists Approach on 
Corporate Criminal Responsibility and posits that “[i]nitially, some argued that corporations cannot be held 
criminally liable because, unlike human beings who are true subjects of law, corporations are legal fictions. 
This argument was abandoned because the existence of the corporations is an incontestable reality in social, 
economic, and juridical life of the society. Nowadays, corporations have legal capacity in the majority of areas 
of law, own real property and goods distinct from those of their members and have their own rights and 
obligations. Thus, it would be at least bizarre to accept that a corporation is a reality when it is harmed by 
others, but not when it violates the rights of other persons.” 
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5 2 Corporate conduct 
The conceptual meaning of unlawful conduct, in our criminal law legal framework, is 
understood to be broad enough to include positive conduct and negative conduct. These 
two forms of conduct are discussed below. 
5 2 1 Positive conduct 
Positive conduct refers to the actual performance of an act.585 It is common knowledge 
that criminal law does not necessarily prohibit abstract acts. Rather the prohibited acts are 
limited to acts that are enumerated in the definitional elements of crimes.586 Burchell posits 
that a person can be said to have carried out an act if “there have been some external or 
physical manifestation of the accused’s thoughts.”587 From the descriptions above, positive 
conduct can be said to manifest through, among others, utterances of words or voluntary 
movement of body parts (muscles).588 In this context, it resonates that criminal responsibility 
cannot attach based on mere evil thoughts of a person. Rather, the evil thoughts must be 
manifested through action in order for criminal responsibility to attach.589 There is scholarly 
agreement that this type of conduct is relatively easy to establish and as such does not 
necessarily pose challenges when contrasted with negative conduct.590 The discussion on 
negative conduct is provided below. 
5 2 2 Negative conduct 
Omission literally means to omit something. It is often construed as failure to positively 
do something or failure to act positively.591 Negative conduct invokes imperative norms 
 
585 Kemp et el Criminal Law 44. 
586 Snyman CR Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 52. 
587 J Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure: General principles of Criminal Law (2011) 72. 
588 Snyman Criminal Law 52. 
589 S v Milne and Others 1951 (1) SA 791 (A) at 822 (South Africa). 
590 Burchell Criminal Law 73. 
591 Kemp et al Criminal Law 44. 
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which places a duty on a person to act positively. Therefore, for liability to attach based on 
omission, the legal question that needs to be addressed is to establish if the accused had a 
legal duty to act positively? Prior to unpacking this question, it is important to note that 
different domestic criminal laws treat omissions differently. Some states provide for a 
general rule of liability based on omission, whereas other states do not.592 
Burchell contend that the “[l]egal systems that do not require action to prevent others 
from harm must envisage exceptional circumstances where a legal duty to act may arise.”593 
These exceptional circumstances can be identified with due regard to several factors: 
presence of a statutory duty on accused to render assistance; the accused’s prior positive 
conduct; the accused must have been in a protective relationship with the victim; and control 
of dangerous property.594 The discussion on how liability may attach based on these 
exceptional circumstances (categories of liability for omission) in the context of corporate 
conduct is provided below. 
5 2 2 1 Prior positive conduct 
Prior positive conduct occurs when a person through his or her positive conduct creates 
a condition that is injurious to others.595 Responsibility under this category attaches because 
of the omission per commissionem rule. This rule proffers that the author of an injurious 
condition has responsibility to avert such condition before it actually materialises or before 
it causes harm against another.596 Prior conduct has its origins from civil law. Burchell posits 
that this was “[o]ne of the early situations under which a legal duty could arise.”597 This rule 
 
592 See, Burchell Criminal Law 74 who posits that “in France, the duty to provide assistance to an endangered 
person when such assistance is possible without danger to the persons providing the assistance or others is 
codified. Similarly, the penal codes of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece and Poland make it an offence to fail 
to render reasonable aid in case of danger. However, Anglo-American and Canada contains no general rule 
duty to intervene.” 
593 Burchell Criminal Law 75. 
594 Kemp et al Criminal Law 46-48; Burchell Criminal Law 78-88. 
595 Burchell Criminal Law 78. 
596 Kemp et al Criminal Law 47. 
597 Burchell Criminal Law 78. 
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found its application in criminal matters. In R v Miller598 (“Miller”)the court found Miller 
responsible for failing to extinguish the fire which started as the consequences of his action. 
In this case Miller had a burning cigarette when he went to bed. When he awoke, he noted 
that there was a small fire which was started by his lighted cigarette. He just stood up and 
moved to the next room and slept. The room burned. Miller was prosecuted and the 
prosecution based its case on the fact that Miller had knowledge of the fire which he started 
and that without cause failed to take preventative measures to extinguish it. The court found 
that Miller created a dangerous situation; consequently, he owed a duty after becoming 
aware of the situation to take measures to prevent and put off the fire. Lord Diplock held 
that: 
“(…) I see no rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to criminal liability, 
conduct which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one’s power to counteract a 
danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one’s state of mind is such as 
constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence.”599 
In the context of corporate criminal responsibility, omission per commissionem rule may 
be applied with reference to corporate activities that are related to their normal business 
activities, for instance the extractive industries. A body corporate that extracts oil and then 
detects oil spills but fails to take preventative measures to avoid further oil spills from causing 
harm, will be responsible based on prior positive conduct. The failure on the part of the 
corporation to take measures that are necessary to extinguish the harm it created may lead 
to liability to attach against such a corporation. 
The other example may be situations where a company deals in the production and 
storage of hazardous substances. By virtue of producing and storing the harmful 
substances, the corporation owe a duty to train or give adequate training to its employees 
 
598 [1983] 2 AC 161 decision of the House of the Lords. 
599 Miller at 176. 
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on how to manage hazardous substances and to ensure the availability of suitable storage 
facilities. If the storage facility is of substandard and/ or a small leak is detected, instead of 
desisting from storing in a leaking facility, the corporation continues to use such leaking 
facility without taking corrective measure to prevent further leakage, such corporation may 
be liable. Liability here attaches because the corporation created a situation by the 
production of the hazardous substance and after detecting a small leak, it failed to take 
corrective measures. 
5 2 2 2 Protective relationship 
The responsibility to act positively may come into being, at the instance of a “protective 
relationship”. This may be in form of natural or contractual relationship. Natural relationships 
may bring about a legal duty to protect because of the relationship between family members, 
for example parent and child relationship or other forms of family relationships.600 The other 
form of protective relationship is contractual relationship. It refers to a relationship that 
comes into being through an agreement601. An employer and employee relationship is an 
example of such relationship which is created through an agreement. The employer 
(including corporations) by virtue of the employment agreement has a legal duty to ensure 
that there is a safe and conducive working environment; and that the employees are not 
exposed to detrimental or dangerous situations at the workplace.602 For example an 
employer (corporation) has a duty to provide a safe workplace and that employees are not 
 
600 Kemp et al Criminal Law 48-49. 
601 Burchell Criminal Law 79. 
602 Slager v Commonwealth Edison Co 595 NE 2d 1097 (Ill App Ct 1992) there was a strike at the premises of 
the employer. The deceased employee did not take part in the strike. When he was leaving the workplace, his 
car was struck with a picket sign. The deceased panicked and accelerated, but unfortunately, he collided into 
a truck and he died at workplace site. In this matter the court found that the employer owed “a duty to provide 
a safe working environment to employees” during strike. 
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exposed to harm practices.603 In the event of the corporation’s failure to render relevant 
protection, it may incur liability.604 
5 2 2 3 Control of a potentially dangerous thing 
A person who deals with dangerous things is required to ensure that those dangerous 
things do not cause harm to third parties.605 Dangerous things may include vicious animals, 
chemical weapons, toxic substances, arms and ammunitions, and so forth.606 The legal duty 
arises on the grounds of a person’s control over the dangerous thing. 
5 2 2 4 Statutory duty 
An obligation to act positively in order to avoid harm may arise from the provision(s) of 
legislation, constitutions, statutes, bilateral or multilateral agreements. Kemp et el posits that 
if a duty is imposed by a statute, two consequences may ensue, namely: liability may attach 
though non-compliance with the provision of a given statute; and further that anyone who 
does not to conform with the provisions of a statute may be liable for the harm caused by 
failure to act positively.607 At the domestic level, constitutions and bills of rights may provide 
for legal duties on both legal and natural persons to promote and protect human rights.608 
This legal duty requires persons to prevent human rights violations. Liability may attach 
where persons fail to comply. These liabilities may include criminal sanctions.609 
 
603 D F Burke “When employees are vulnerable: Employers are too” (2000) The National Law Journal available 
at <www.semmes.com> (accessed on 2018/04/02). 
604 S Beaver “Beyond the exclusivity rule: Employer’s liability for workplace violence” (1997) 18 (1) Marquette 
Law Review 103 124. 
605 J E Aversa “Liability of responsible parties for hazardous waste cleanup: CERCLA section 107 liability after 
one decade” (1991) 1(2) Villanova Environmental Law Journal 563-580. 
606 Kemp et al Criminal Law 47. 
607 Kemp et al Criminal Law 46. 
608 Art 5 of the Namibian Constitution. 
609 See, Kemp et el Criminal Law 47 who posits that “statutory frameworks aimed at combating complex 
criminal phenomena, such as money laundering, organised crime, and financing of terrorism, often provide for 
legal duties, coupled with the criminalisation of failure to comply with such duties.” 
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5 2 3 Unlawful conduct 
As was stated above, criminal law does not concern itself with lawful conduct. Rather, it 
deals with conduct that is construed to be unlawful or that violates the criminal code. 
Therefore, under criminal law and for purposes of establishing corporate criminal 
responsibility, the analysis is centred on the unlawful conduct. The unlawful conduct or actus 
reus in Latin is described as the “external or objective element of an offence”610 which 
comprises all the physical elements of a crime and it excludes the mental state of the 
offender.611 The orthodox approach to unlawful conduct – be it for strict liability, formally or 
materially defined crimes – is that there are certain requirements that must be satisfied for 
responsibility to attach. These requirements include that conduct must be (a) proscribed by 
law, (b) authored by a human being (human conduct), and (c) voluntary.612 It is common 
knowledge that criminal responsibility does not attach to involuntary acts which may occur 
as a result of automatism, somnambulism and epilepsy.613 
To stretch a little further and as it was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation, in addition to unlawful conduct requirements stated above, it is settled law 
under international criminal law that criminal responsibility is primarily individual.614 Under 
these circumstances, a number of questions may arise such as how does one establish 
corporate unlawful conduct? Who commits such unlawful conduct? If such unlawful conduct 
 
610 S Oded Corporate Compliance: New Approaches to Regulatory Enforcement (2013) 110. 
611 K Ambos “What does Intent to Destroy in Genocide Mean?” (2009) 91(876) International Review of the Red 
Cross 833 834; D M Greenfield “The Crime of Complicity in Genocide: How the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia Got It Wrong and Why it Matters” (2008) 98(3) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 921 931. 
612 Kemp et al Criminal Law 31; Burchell Criminal Law 68 defines voluntary conduct as “a conduct which is 
controlled by the will or conduct that is controlled by the accused’s conscious will or subject to his or her self-
control. Even an omission, or failure to act, must be voluntary in this sense.” 
613 Burchell Criminal Law and Procedure 69. 
614 Prosecutor v Du [Ko Tadi] IT-94-1-T, Delivered on 7 May 1997 at Para 665 “it is well recognized that the 
principle of individual responsibility and punishment for crimes under international law recognized at 
Nuremberg is the cornerstone of international criminal law. This principle is the enduring legacy of the 
Nuremberg Charter and judgment which gives meaning to the prohibition of crimes under international law by 
ensuring that the individuals who commit such crimes incur responsibility and are liable to punishment.” 
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is committed by another person other than the corporation – how and what are the conditions 
that must be satisfied for such other person’s unlawful conduct to be imputed on the 
corporation? Are there any other models of criminal responsibility that may be resorted to, 
or best applied to construe corporate unlawful conduct without predicate same to a corporate 
agent? Corporations are, of course, abstract persons without soul, mind, hands, or physical 
body parts for them to personally commit any unlawful conduct. I will now turn to two 
theoretical approaches to explain corporate actus reus. 
5 3 Nominalist vs. Realist approaches to corporate actus reus 
The proponents of the nominalist approach argue that a corporation cannot, on its own, 
commit any conduct, except through its human employees. Cavanagh supports this 
proposition and argue that “a company is nothing more than a collection of individuals.”615 
Implicitly, the theoretical basis for the nominalist approach entails that a corporation’s 
conduct cannot be distinguished from the acts of its employees. This approach assumes 
that only natural persons (directors and employees) are capable of acting and their conduct 
may be imputed onto the corporation through the derivative model.616 
The derivative model encompasses but is not limited to agency (vicarious liability), 
aggregation and the identification theory.617 These theories are not identical. For instance, 
for a servant’s unlawful conduct to be imputed on the corporation through vicarious liability, 
there are several requirements that must be satisfied including, proving the relationship 
between the corporation and the employee (employment relationship), the scope of 
employment; and that the employee was furthering the corporation’s interest.618 The 
 
615 Cavanagh (2011) Journal of Criminal Law 414. 
616 Jordaan (2003) Acta Juridica at 48 Explains that derivative model entails that the “state has to prove that 
an agent or servant of the corporate body, acting within the scope of his or her employment or authority or 
while furthering the interests of the corporate body, committed a crime. The unlawful act and culpability of the 
individual servant or agent are then imputed to the corporate body.” 
617 N Cross Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: An Introduction (2010) 73. 
618 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: in re R v Nanabhani (1939) AD 427 at 431. 
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identification theory can be distinguished from vicarious liability, in the sense that the former 
exclude the conduct of employees in non-managerial positions and seek to impute the 
conduct of senior officials “who may be deemed to be the directing mind and will of the 
corporation.619 
The aggregation theory is distinguishable from both vicarious liability and identification 
theory. It assumes a holistic approach, in the sense that it takes into consideration the 
conduct of all possible participants, the circumstances surrounding the conduct and it is 
premised on collective responsibility.620 In contrast, unlike the nominalist approach, the 
realist approach at actus reus level share similar elements as the nominalist approach. In 
fact, the realist approach concedes, with qualification, that “it is required that actus reus of 
an offence must be performed by an employee, agent or officer of a body corporate acting 
within the actual or apparent scope of his employment.”621 This concession is said to be 
qualified because the actus reus of the agent or employee of a corporation is considered 
and deemed as a formal requirement desired by a corporation.622 The actus reus of 
employees may be manifested as the result of the corporate policy. This proposition is 
discussed in detail below. Suffice to state that the lack of equal bargaining power between 
corporations and individual employees is one of the factors that reduces or diminishes the 
autonomy of an individual to nothing more than an instrument at the behest of a 
corporation.623 
 
619 HL Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v Graham and Sons Ltd [1956] 3 All ER 624, CA the court found explained 
that “The person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his 
mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company.” 
620 Jordaan (2003) Acta Juridica 59. 
621 Jordaan (2003) Acta Juridica 64; Nana (2011) 55(1) JAL 103.   
622 Cavanagh (2011) Journal of Criminal Law 414; Nana (2011) JAL 103 argues that “the tendency at present 
should be to seek to hold corporations liable for criminal acts that may be considered acts that are particular 
to the corporation itself, that is acts in breach of criminal law standards that result from the operation of an 
existing policy or the way the corporation’s activities are managed or organized.” 
623 K Li, D Griffin, H Yue & L Zhao “How does culture influence corporate risk-taking?” (2013) 23 Journal of 
Corporate Finance 1 22. 
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Further contradistinction between these approaches lies in mens rea as will shortly be 
demonstrated below when mens rea is discussed. In a nutshell, at actus reus level these 
approaches are in agreement, though with qualification, that a natural person may be 
deemed to constitute a body part of a corporation for purposes of performing the actus reus. 
In H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham and Sons Ltd624  (“Bolton and Graham”) 
the court made an analogy that: 
“A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. (…) Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work (…).”625 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 2 above, at national level, the unlawful conduct of a 
corporation is derived from the conduct of agents or servant of such a corporation. This 
contention is evidenced and supported by several comparative domestic legislation, to name 
a few: the Italian Legislative Decree 231 of 2001 establishes that a corporation can only 
perform the actus reus through a physical person,626the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, 
Act 51 of 1977, requires that for responsibility to attach to a corporation there must be an 
“act performed by a director or servant of such a corporate body.”627 
As for international criminal law, one can note that the practice of agents to act in the 
interest of an organisation or external entity is not foreign to international criminal law. In 
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo628 (“Jean-Pierre Bemba”) the tribunal, in 
establishing the guilt of Bemba, noted that the combatants who were directly involved in the 
 
624 [1957] 1 QB 159. 
625 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v T J Graham and Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 at 172. 
626 Art 7 Legislative Decree of 2001 of Italy; C Cravetto & E Zanelda “Corporate Criminal Liability in Italy: 
Criteria for Ascribing Actus Reus and Unintetional Crimes”, in D Brodowski, M E Monteros de la Parra, K 
Tiedemann & J Vogel (eds) Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability. (2014) 110 posits that “the Decree 
establish two different criteria for the attribution of the actus reus to legal entity depending on the role that the 
agent has in the organisational chart of the company (a) when a physical person is an individual in subordinate 
position the attribution of responsibility is structured on the idea of organisational fault and the burden of proof 
is on the prosecution. (b) when the author of the crime carries a representative, administrative or directive 
duties the responsibility of the company is structured on identification principle with a strict liability mechanism.” 
627 Section 332(1) of Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 (Namibia). 
628 ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute – delivered on 21 March 2016. 
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commission of murders, raping women and children and assaults against victims as well as 
plundering and looting of properties were merely instruments of the Mouvement de libération 
du Congo (MLC) which Bemba had effective control and authority over in his capacity as 
President and Commander-in-Chief of its military wing Armée de libération du Congo (ALC). 
The tribunal started: 
“The Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the attack was committed pursuant 
to or in furtherance of the organisational policy.”629 
This decision demonstrates that because of the MLC’s organisational policies which 
authorized and or encouraged plundering and looting as means of combatants’ self-payment 
the combatants, by their own volition, would not have committed the atrocities in question. 
In support of this contention, the Trial Chamber III in Jean-Pierre Bemba further found that: 
“[I]n light of the above factors, taken together, any suggestion that the crimes were the result of 
an uncoordinated and spontaneous decision of the perpetrators (combatants) acting in isolation 
(and at their own volition), is not a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
evidence.”630Emphasis added in italics. 
It should be noted that Bemba was, at a later stage, acquitted on appeal by ICC.631 The 
acquittal was based, inter alia, on the Appeals Chamber’s assessment that Bemba could 
not account on the premise on command responsibility because the Trial Chamber made a 
serious error when assessing the question whether Bemba took reasonable steps to avert 
crimes at the instance of his subordinates in the MLC.632 This acquittal does not, however, 
nullify the accepted theoretical position on the elements of command responsibility. At the 
 
629 Jean-Pierre Bemba para 687. 
630 Para 685. 
631 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against Trial Chamber III’s “judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, Case No ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 
June 2018).  
632 Paras 189-194.  
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same time, cases like Bemba confirms the position that currently, in terms of the Rome 
Statute, the imputation of unlawful conduct of a natural person onto an abstract entity (be it 
a corporation, or some other form of organisation like the MLC in casu Bemba) is not 
recognized as acceptable modes of responsibility under the Rome Statute. 
The ICC recognizes that unlawful conduct of a natural person may be imputed onto 
another natural person for purposes of establishing criminal liability. And such imputation 
may then be casted in different modes of responsibility, for instance “command 
responsibility”, “joint criminal enterprise” (JCE), and so on. Thus, the imputation of actus 
reus as was demonstrated above may be effected through the instrumentality of a common 
plan,633 JCE,634 or command/ superior responsibility.635 These modes of responsibility 
provide a premise or enable a legal process for imputing one person’s conduct onto another 
person. In Prosecutor v Du [Ko Tadi]636 the ICTY tribunal deemed correct to adopt with 
approval the decision of the Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others637 in which the court 
held that: 
“Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the result of concerted action upon the part 
of a unit or group of men, then evidence given upon any charge relating to that crime against any 
member of such unit or group, may be received as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of 
each member of that unit or group for that crime.”638 
 
633 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidéle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido (“Bemba and Others”) ICC-01/05-01/13 Trial Chamber VII, Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of Rome Statute, Delivered on 19 October 2016 par 62; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, delivered on 27 January 2007, paragraph 
326. 
634 Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-T Judgment delivered on 29 November 2002, para 63. 
635 M E Badar “The mental element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary 
from a comparative criminal law perspective” (2008) 19(3) Criminal Law Forum 473 512. 
636 IT-94-1-T Judgment delivered on 7 May 1997. 
637Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, Vol I Law Reports 35, 43 (1947); Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber 
and 18 Others, Vol II Law Reports, 67 70. 
638 Prosecutor v Du[Ko Tadi] para 685. 
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Moreover, for there to be a reciprocal imputation of actus reus it must be proved, as was 
found by the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidéle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido,639 
(Bemba and Others) that: 
“The accused and at least one other individual worked together in the commission of the offence 
on the basis of an agreement or common plan. It is this common plan that ties the co-perpetrators 
together and justifies reciprocal imputation of their respective acts.”640 
The command responsibility principle641 at actus reus level is much distinct when 
compared to both the common plan modality and JCE. Unlike common plan and JCE, which 
may require both positive and negative conduct and which assumed – at least at first glance 
– a horizontal relationship between the participants, command responsibility require the 
negative conduct (omission)642 to occur in a vertical relationship. The command and or 
superior responsibility principle as prescribed by the Rome Statute of the ICC is the closest 
responsibility principle to that of master-servant principle (the derivative model) in the 
context of corporate criminal liability. 
 
639 ICC-01/05-01/13 Trial Chamber VII, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of Rome Statute, Delivered on 19 
October 2016. 
640 Para 65. 
641 I Bantekas “The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility”, (1999) 93(3) The American Journal of 
International Law 573 573 argue that Superior/ Command responsibility assumes that “a combination of power 
to intervene, knowledge of crimes and subsequent failure to act should render those concerned liable for the 
crimes of their subordinates.”; Art 28 of the Rome Statute of the ICC distinguishes responsibility for both military 
commanders and superiors. The command/superior responsibility include that – the commander/ superior 
“[m]ust have effective control or effective authority and control over the forces (subordinates) who committed 
the crime or about to commit the crime: for commanders, (a) the commander knew or should have known, (b) 
the commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress their commission 
or submit the matter to the competent authority for investigation or prosecution. For superior responsibility 
principle it requires that - superior (a) either knew or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit the offence, (b) the crimes concerned 
activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of superior, and (c) the superior failed to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures to repress or submit the matter to competent authority for investigation 
and punishment.” 
642 Bantekas (1999) AJIL 575. 
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5 4 New perspectives on corporate actus reus 
Derived from the analyses made above and elsewhere in this dissertation, in relation to 
both the nominalist and realist approaches, it is apparent that either of the approaches may 
be applicable, at domestic level, in the process of attributing unlawful conduct to an offending 
corporation. Further, that there are commonalities in the requirements of conduct, such as 
conduct must be authored by a natural person; there must be a law that prohibit a given 
conduct, and that the conduct must be voluntary. 
Despite these similarities, a series of questions may arise: Is it feasible for the principles 
of actus reus – more specifically, corporate actus reus, as practiced at domestic level to be 
supplanted and applied at international law level? Are the rules underpinning corporate 
actus reus, as practiced at domestic level, compatible with the tenets of ICL? If not, what 
type of modifications, if any, may be required for such rules to be compatible with the ICL? 
Before unpacking these questions, it is important to first acknowledge that it is common 
knowledge that some of the international forums may apply domestic rules, as the 
circumstances may require, in settling international doctrinal debates.643 The essence of this 
acknowledgment is to gainsay, as it is demonstrated below, that even though domestic 
principles form part of the sources of general international law – these domestic rules may 
not be adequate to supplant corporate actus reus as practiced at domestic level to an 
international forum. 
There are distinct observations to be made regarding the element of actus reus as applied 
at domestic level, which may be capable of creating a disjoint between international and 
domestic criminal law. Firstly, corporate actus reus as a distinct element is recognized in 
some (arguably, most) domestic legal systems, however it is at present not recognized at 
international law level and certainly not at the ICC. Secondly, at international level, and 
 
643 See, Art 38(1)(C) of the Statute of the ICJ. 
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certainly at the ICC, unlawful conduct by one natural person can only be imputed on another 
natural person to the exclusion of corporations. In contrast, at domestic level, the unlawful 
conduct of a natural person may be imputed on another natural person and/or a legal person. 
Thirdly, at international level, and certainly at the ICC, the command / superior responsibility 
mode of responsibility is still premised on the conduct (often negative conduct) of natural 
persons and not the conduct of abstract entities. 
These observations underscore the incompatibility of the current form of corporate actus 
reus under domestic criminal law with guidelines of actus reus at international criminal law 
level, and certainly as these are applied at the ICC. What remains to be analysed are the 
proposed rules that must be followed to ensure that the unlawful conduct which are allegedly 
committed by corporations are appropriately and effectively attributed on such corporations 
at the international level. 
5 4 1 Proposed corporate actus reus requirements 
The analysis in the preceding section highlighted the incompatibility of domestic rules on 
corporate actus reus vis-à-vis their application at international level. The rules proposed and 
discussed below are construed to be applicable at international criminal law and do not 
purport to be all encompassing. However, they are essential when viewed from the distinct 
international criminal law object of “putting an end to impunity” for perpetration of atrocity 
crimes. These proposed rules on actus reus pertaining to corporations are: (a) the conduct 
must be proscribed by law; (b) the conduct must be of a natural person; and (c) the conduct 
must be compliant with organisational policy. These proposed rules are not just discussed 
in abstract, but a hypothetical case study is also provided to demonstrate how these rules 
may be applied at the international level. 
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5 4 1 1 The conduct must be proscribed by law 
Conventionally, before conduct can be construed to be unlawful, there must be a law that 
proscribe or prohibits that specific conduct. This is one of the pillars underpinning the legality 
principle. Kemp et el posits that legality entails “that no person should be subjected to 
punishment by the state, except for conduct that is clearly defined as a crime according to 
a valid and applicable law.”644 Therefore, it is illegal to punish a person for conduct that was 
not defined as a crime prior to its commission. Equally, even courts are not allowed to create 
new crimes in order to punish a person – rather the courts must interpret and apply the law 
that existed at the material time when the conduct was committed.645 
International criminal law, the legality principle can be established through the availability 
of a custom or treaty which proscribes such conduct. In Vasilijevic,646 the ICTY held that the 
“[r]equirements which must be met before a Trial Chamber may convict an accused for 
committing an offence under customary international law or treaty law, includes that the 
conduct in question is regarded as criminal under that body of law.”647 In essence, it is 
 
644 Kemp et al Criminal Law 17. On the origin and background on the principle of legality and he posits that the 
“first formal statement of the principle of legality may be found in Article 8 of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man (1791), which held that no one may be punished except by virtue of a law established and 
promulgated before the crime and legally applied. This principle was further developed and introduced into 
Bavarian Penal Code of 1813 by the German jurist, Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach, who first coined 
the now well-known legal maxim Nulla poena sine lege, nulla poena sine crimine, nullum crimen sine poena 
legali – which means No punishment without law, no punishment without crime, no crime without lawful 
punishment.” 
645 CR Snyman Criminal Law Fifth Edition (2008) 36 posits that one of the pillars of the of legality is “nullum 
crimen sine lege” which means “no crime without law.” For this reason, he states that “an accused may not be 
found guilty of a crime and sentenced unless the type of conduct with which he is charged: (a) has been 
recognized by the law as a crime, (b) in clear terms, (c) before the conduct took place, (d) without the court 
having to stretch the meaning of the words and concepts in the definition to bring the particular conduct of the 
accused within the compass of the definition, and (e) after conviction the imposition of punishment also 
complies with the four principles sets out immediately above.”; Vasilijevic para 196 Trial Chamber held that 
“the principle of nullum crimen sine lege does not prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements 
of a particular crime. Nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the courts. But under no 
circumstances may the court create new criminal offence after the act charged against accused either by giving 
a definition to a crime which had none so far, thereby rendering it prosecutable and punishable, or criminalizing 
an act which had not until the present time been regarded as criminal.” 
646 IT-98-32-T, Judgment delivered on 29 November 2002. 
647 Para 193. 
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imperative that there must be, in the first place, a clearly articulated law in existence that 
criminalise the conduct in question before such conduct may be deemed unlawful.648 In 
respect of treaty law, to establish if such law existed prior to the conduct in question the 
courts need to be satisfied that, firstly the state was a party to such a treaty prior to the 
conduct.649 Secondly, that such a treaty provides that a violation thereof triggers criminal 
responsibility.650 
The Rome Statute embodies the tenets of the principle of legality and makes provision 
that an alleged offender cannot be prosecuted, unless at the time when the conduct in 
question was committed, such conduct was proscribed by the Rome Statute and was clearly 
defined as a crime.651 It further expressly prohibits retroactivity or application of the Statute 
to acts which were performed before it came into force.652 
5 4 1 2 The conduct must be of a natural person 
A human act refers to any conscious deed executed by a human being or “the manner in 
which a person behaves”653. The requirement that conduct must be authored by a human 
being excludes from criminal accountability any conduct that may be authored by non-
 
648 See, Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T Delivered on 02 September 1998, para 605 “(…) the 
Chamber believes, an essential question which should be addressed at this stage is whether Article 4 of the 
Statute includes norms which did not, at the time the crimes alleged in the indictment were committed, form 
part of existing international customary law. Moreover, the Chamber recalls the establishment of the ICTR 
during which the UN Secretary General asserted that in application of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
the International Tribunal should apply rules of International Humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt of 
customary law.” 
649 See, Prosecutor v Clement Kayishima and Obed Ruzindana ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment delivered on 21 May 
1999 the Trial Chamber noted that “the Trial Chamber is cognizant of the ongoing discussions, in other forums, 
about whether the above mentioned instruments should be considered customary international law that 
imposes criminal liability for serious breaches. In the present case, such an analysis seems superfluous 
because the situation is rather clear. Rwanda became a party to the Conventions of 1949 on 5 May 1964 and 
to Protocol II on 19 November 1984. These instruments, therefore, were in force in the territory of Rwanda at 
the time when the tragic events took place within its borders.” 
650Vasilijevic para 193. 
651 Art 22 and 23 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
652 Art 24. 
653 English Oxford Living Dictionary available at <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defintion/conduct> 
(accessed on 2018/05/11). 
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human beings, for example, animals, machines (for instance fully automated systems) and 
natural occurrences, for instance natural disasters (so-called “acts of God”). Of course, 
insofar as animals, forces of nature of machines are manipulated by humans to cause 
certain events, that will still qualify as human conduct.654 
Human conduct is indispensable to the successful prosecution of a corporation. This 
dissertation recognizes that a human being’s conduct is indispensable for the construction 
of corporate conduct, since corporations do not have the physical and intellectual 
capabilities to perform acts.655 The bewildering possibilities presented by Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) falls beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it is acknowledged that AI 
may, in future, disrupt our present understanding of the limitations of corporate conduct and 
our current assumption that human conduct is an indispensable prerequisite for the 
construction of corporate actus reus and mens rea. It may very well be that in future 
corporations will be able to conduct their business on the basis of non-human decision-
making, such as algorithmic or fully automated decision-making, leading to robotic conduct 
with real-world consequences. The ethical and legal implications of this will be immense and 
is already identified as such.656 This will of course also impact the element of mens rea, and 
not only the conduct element. 
In terms of our current reality, however, it is still realistic to construct corporate actus reus 
around the activities of humans, where humans are not mere pawns or robots, but humans 
in service or in charge of the corporation in question. In order for corporate activities to be 
carried out – it recruits and hire human beings who actually perform tasks and functions on 
behalf of the corporation.657 Several contributions can be deduced from the SA’s Criminal 
 
654 Burchell Criminal Law 45. 
655 R v Bennett & Co (Pty) Ltd 1941 TPD 194. 
656 On the ethics of AI and related debates, see T Hagendorff at 
<https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1903/1903.03425.pdf> (accessed 2019/03/20). 
657 H L Bolton (Engineering) 172 
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Procedure Act 51 of 1977 section 332(1) that contemplates to impute conduct performed by 
human beings onto a corporation for purposes of establishing a corporate charge: 
 “(1) For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any offence, whether 
under any law or at common law– 
(a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or with permission, 
express or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; and  
(b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have been but was 
not performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of that corporate body,  
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant, or 
in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed to 
have been performed (and with the same intent, if any) by the corporate body, or, as the case 
may be, to have been an omission (and with the same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate 
body.”658 
The link to the corporation is important because in order for a natural person’s conduct to 
be imputed on the body corporate, there must be a relationship between such natural person 
and the corporation. This relationship can either be as a result of agency or employment as 
is demonstrated below. 
5 4 1 3 Existence of agency/ employment relationship 
The process of establishing employment relations may be determined by the definition of 
who is an employee and employer; and secondly by analysing the contract of employment. 
National laws will be useful tools in this regard, and the Namibian Labour Act659, for instance, 
defines “employee” in the following terms: 
 
658 Sect 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 (Republic of South Africa). 
659 Sect 1 of the Namibian Labour Act 11 of 2007. 
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“An individual, other than an independent contractor, who: (a) works for another person and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration for that work; or (b) in any manner assists in 
carrying on or conducting the business of an employer.”660 
An employer is defined in the following terms: 
“Any person, including the state who: (a) employs or provides work for, an individual and who 
remunerates or expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate that individual; or (b) permits an 
individual to assist that person in any manner in the carrying or, conducting that person’s 
business.”661 
Derived from these definitions, it is apparent that the employer must be vested with 
authority to direct, instruct, supervise and ability to control the employee662and the employee 
ought to have been integrated in the employer’s organisation.663 From the contract 
perspective, conventionally, an employment contract may reveal whether a person is 
categorised as an employee or not. The other aspect that may be determined from the 
contract is whether the terms of the contract refer to the contract for services (independent 
contractor) or contract of service (employee). In a nutshell, the indicators that may help to 
identify an employee are multifaceted.664 To this end the definition of employment 
relationship is contentious, and this dissertation does not discuss it in detail. Suffice to note 
the relevance of domestic legal sources, notably established labour laws and other relevant 
commercial transaction laws that may help to identify the existence of a more than incidental 
relationship between a natural and a corporate person. 
 
660 Sect 1. 
661 Sect 1 of the Namibian Labour Act 11 of 2007. 
662 See, Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk 1998 3 SA 17 (SCA). 
663 See, Smit v Workmans Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 207 (A). 
664 See, SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 20 ILJ 1936 (LAC) which laid down several factors 
that may be applied in establishing who an employee is. Some of these factors include: “if the contract purports 
to render personal service or for specific task, is the service rendered personally or through others, is the 
employee in a subordinate relation to the employer, etcetera.”  
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This dissertation adopts the definition of employment relationship as propounded by 
Lewis et al who defines it with reference to “an economic, legal, social, psychological and 
political relationship in which employees devote their time and expertise to the interests of 
their employers in return for a range of personal financial and non-financial rewards.”665 The 
effect and relevance of identifying an employee or servant of a corporation is that it assists 
in the process of linking and imputing the wrongful conduct of an employee onto the 
corporation. Without this relationship, the conduct of a human being (servant) may not be 
imputed onto a body corporate. 
Apart from employment relationship, the other method that may be applied to determine 
the principal’s conduct is through the agency theory. The agency relationship is distinct from 
employment relationship. The former is premised on scope of authority and the latter is 
premised on scope of employment.666 The classical form of agency “relates to situations in 
which one individual (called agent667) is engaged by another individual (called the principal) 
to act on his/her behalf based upon a designated fee schedule.”668 The agency and or 
employment relationship creates a buffer between a corporation and any other person who 
do not qualify as agents or employees of a corporation. 
The effect of the buffer created by these relationships is to exclude the conduct of non-
agents or non-employees from been imputed on the corporation. This means that the only 
conduct that may be imputed onto the corporation, are those conduct which are authored 
by agents or employees of the corporation. It is worth noting that the classical agency theory 
has progressed to a degree that it is no more limited to natural persons – rather it includes 
 
665 P Lewis, A Thornhill & M Saunders Employment Relations: Understanding the employment relationship 
(2003) 6. 
666 D Neild “Vicarious liability and the employment rationale” (2013) 44 VUWLR 707 709. 
667 P Dalley “A theory of agency law” (2011) 72 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 495 500 defines an agent 
as “a person who has agreed to act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control. The agent 
must hold the power to affect the principal’s affairs in some ways.” 
668 M Nomazi “Role of the agency theory in implementing management’s control” (2013) 5(2) Journal of 
Accounting and Taxation 38 40. 
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that a legal person (agent corporation) can conclude an agency agreement with another 
legal person (principal corporation).669 
Kultys posits that the agency theory may be invoked when discussing corporate liability 
because it is a “device that restricts agents’ own interests and make them pursue the 
principals’ interests.”670 In this context the agent’s action has an effect on the relationship 
between the principal (corporation) and any other third party, for example a victim of a 
crime.671 Scholars argue that a human being can act on the behalf of a company if there is 
an express or implied672 or apparent673 term authorising such natural person to perform 
functions on the behalf of a body corporate.674 The express authority to perform the said 
functions – can be derived from an existing contract (written or oral) between a natural 
person and the company, for example a contract of employment.675 The implied authority 
arises as a natural consequence of an agent or employee’s job position, whereas, apparent 
authority can be inferred from the principal’s conduct that tend to create an impression to 
the third party that the agent was authorised to perform the act for the principal (body 
corporate).676 
The preceding paragraphs analysed the element of conduct must be authored by a 
human being as well as what constitute an “employee or agent” of the company. What 
remains to be discussed is the requirement of in the course of employment and or furthering 
the employer’s interests. The paragraphs below address this requirement. 
 
669 See, Dalley (2011) U Pitt Law Rev 547 
670 J Kultys “Controversies about agency theory as theoretical basis for corporate governance” (2016) 7(4) 
Oeconomia Copernicana 613 615. 
671 Dalley (2011) U Pitt Law Rev 547 
672 This is an authority that arises or can be inferred from the nature of work (position) of an agent or employee. 
Activities that may reasonably expected to be performed by an agent notwithstanding the absence of express 
term. 
673 Apparent authority may arise when the principal by conduct causes the third party to believe that the agent 
has authority to act on his or her behalf. The third party may rely on estoppel toward off the principal’s claim 
that an agent had not authority to act. 
674 Dalley (2011) U Pitt Law Rev547; J Kultys “Controversies about agency theory as theoretical basis for 
corporate governance” (2016) 7(4) Oeconomia Copernicana 613-63. 
675 R C Wyse “A framework of analysis for the law of agency” (1979) 40(1) Montana Law Review 31 33. 
676 B Studniberg “Revisiting the self-authorizing agent” (2013) 44(2) Ottawa Law Review 311 314. 
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5 4 1 4 In course and scope of employment 
One of the requirements that must be satisfied for human conduct to be successfully 
imputed onto a corporation is that at the material time when the conduct was committed 
(performance or omit to perform an act), the agent or servant was performing his or her 
designated duties. What exactly constitute in the course and scope of employment is 
contentious as is demonstrated below. Scholars describe in the course and scope of 
employment with reference to “acts of employees that are carried out in the execution or 
fulfilment of such employees’ duties as prescribed in terms of the employment contract.”677 
This description has attracted criticism on the basis that it limits liability to acts which are 
expressly authorised. 
The implication being that acts which are incidental (implied) to the terms of the 
employment contract may not be covered. Further that acts which were not authorised by 
contract, but which can further the employer’s interests may be excluded. These criticisms 
led to the requirement in question to be extended to cover unauthorised acts on condition 
that such acts were connected to the authorised acts. Salmond, in advancing this 
requirement, opined that: 
“a master is liable even for acts which he has not authorised, provided they are so connected with 
acts he has authorised that they may be regarded as modes – although improper modes – of 
doing them.”678 
Salmond’s formulation contemplates to include incidents where the employee, (even 
though he/ she acted contrary to express instructions) was furthering the interests of the 
employer. In Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall the court found that “scope of employment” is not 
limited to tasks which are expressly issued and performed by the servant, this is because: 
 
677 S Murray “The extent of an employer’s vicarious liability when an employee act within the scope of 
employment” (2012) LLM Dissertation: North-West University. 
678 J W Salmond The Law of Tort (1969) 83 
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“Instructions vary in character, some may define the work to be done by the servant, others may 
prescribe the manner in which it is to be accomplished, and some may indicate the end to be 
attained and others the means by which it is attained. Provided the servant is doing his master’s 
work or pursuing his master’s ends he is acting within the scope of his employment (…).”679 
There are two approaches that may be applied in determining whether an employee’s act 
can be imputed on a company under the in the course and scope of employment 
requirement, namely: the standard approach and the deviation approach. The standard 
approach contemplates that an employee acted as was directed or as prescribed by the 
employer (either expressly or implicitly). This proposition suggests that the servant ought to 
have been under the master’s control. Further that the acts of the servant, even though they 
were unauthorised, if performed for the benefits of the master – then such master may be 
liable. Liability that is sought through the standard approach does not pose challenges when 
compared to the deviation approach. This is because the deviation approach attempts to 
hold the employer liable for employees’ conduct which may, in certain circumstances, 
appear to be intentional or where the employee may be on a frolic of his own. On this score, 
Burchell argues that the criminal responsibility contemplated in section 332(1) of the South 
African Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 transcends the limits of vicarious liability. The 
reason for this averment is that the provision includes acts of the employees or agents which 
may fall beyond their powers and duties – with a qualifier that such acts were performed in 
the progression of “furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation.”680 
In Mashudu Fhedzisani v Unitrans Ltd T/A Greyhound and Another681(“Mashudu”) the 
plaintiff with his brother approached a bus which was idling whilst its operator who was 
dressed in uniform standing outside the bus. The bus operator insulted and assaulted the 
plaintiff. The employer’s code of conduct expressly forbids the conduct exhibited by the bus 
 
679 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 (AD) 733 at 741. 
680 Burchell Criminal Law 476. 
681 Case Number 18952/10 Decision of the Gauteng Local Division High Court delivered on 15 August 2014. 
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operator. A disciplinary hearing was instituted against the bus operator and he was 
subsequently discharged. On merit, the employer denied liability for the conduct of the 
employee (bus operator) on the basis that there were clear instructions that prohibited 
employees from misconduct. 
The employer further averred that the employee was on a frolic of his own. One of the 
questions that the court had to address was whether the presence of a “prohibition of certain 
conduct was sufficient for an employer to claim that it is not vicariously liable for the actions 
of an employee?”682The court found that the driver of the bus was on duty at the time when 
the insult and assault occasioned. Further, that he was not on a frolic of his own. The 
presence of a code that prohibits certain conduct is not a decisive factor when determining 
an employer’s vicarious liability. The court held that: 
“The bus driver, in my view, by furthering the employer’s business and while dealing with 
passengers is very much exercising his duties when he apparently lost his temper and the 
incident ensued. He was objectively speaking, continuing with his duties and his employer’s 
affairs. (…) although not authorised, the actions of the bus driver were so closely connected with 
the acts which he was authorised to do that they can be regarded as an improper manner of 
executing his duties.”683 
In deviation cases, courts tend to apply the close connection test to determine if the 
employee’s conduct can be imputed on the employer. The connection must exist between 
the unlawful acts of the member of staff (personal interests) and the proprietor’s business. 
In K v Minister of Safety and Security684 the officers who were dressed in uniform offered K 
a lift home. She accepted the lift, and, in the process, she was raped by the three police 
officers. To determine the employer’s vicarious liability, there were several pointers which 
 
682 Mashudu para 6. 
683 Paras 11-12. 
684 2005 6 SA 419 (CC).  
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were considered that evidenced the close connectedness of the officers’ acts with the police 
functions. This include the fact that the police officers were dressed in uniforms. The victim 
thus placed her trust in the police officers which trust was short lived, as it was apparent that 
it was subsequently abused by the police officers. In this case, the fact that the police officers 
had duty to protect vulnerable persons was the catalyst for them to have an opportunity to 
rape the victim. The court stated that: 
“The opportunity to commit crime would not have arisen but for the trust the applicant placed in 
them because they were policeman.”685 
The court found that the “in the course and scope of employment” requirement was 
fulfilled when the police officers acted and as a result the court imputed the unlawful conduct 
of the three police officers onto the employer (the government), which was vicariously liable. 
In modern democratic societies with justiciable bills of rights, corporations are anticipated to 
guard human rights and the inability to do so may attract liability. Globler v Naspers Bpk686 
concerned a case of sexual harassment between employees which was perpetrated on 
several occasions at the residence of the victim employee. The victim reported the matter 
to the supervisor and the supervisor, whilst seized with the report, did not reasonable 
procedures to prevent the continuation of the said harassment. As a result, the victim 
suffered an emotional breakdown. The court reasoned that liability in this case was not to 
be found on risk that was created by the employer; rather, liability ought to be constructed 
based on protected constitutional values. The employer was legally obliged to protect 
employees and prevent sexual harassment at the workplace. 
 
685 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) at 57. 
686 2004 4 SA 220 (C). 
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5 4 1 5 Conduct must be compliant with organisational policy 
It was demonstrated above that traditionally, criminal law – at national level – recognizes 
that only human conduct may be imputed onto a corporate entity. This proposition appears 
to have been accepted, although with qualification, by the proponents of the realist 
approach. Of course, this qualified acceptance is premised on the assumption that corporate 
policies and culture wields much influence on how servants or agents will perform their 
duties. The influence of corporate culture or organisational policies on corporate servants or 
agents, as suggested by the realist approach, seems to be significant. Before unpacking the 
organisational policy requirement, it is worth noting that the element of compliant with 
organisational policy can be distinguished from in the course or scope of employment as 
was discussed above. 
The distinction is that the former includes intentional acts and methods of operations. It 
contemplates to hold not only employers but also superiors and commanders derivatively 
liable for the unlawful conduct of agents, senior workers and subordinates respectively. The 
effort of the group or members of an organisation is to achieve a prescribed goal. The goal 
may either be lawful or unlawful. In this context the compliance with organisational policy 
requirement’s reach extends beyond employers and may include organised groups such as 
rebel groups which may not qualify (in the strict sense of the definition of employment 
relationship) as employers. The focus in this subsection is on compliance with unlawful 
organisational policy. 
To illustrate this, we can draw the attention at the SCSL decision in Prosecutor v Charles 
Ghankay Taylor.687 As a reminder: During the late 1980s till early 2000s there were armed 
conflicts in Sierra Leone. The conflict was between the government and the RUF (rebel 
group) which had an alliance with the AFRC. Saybana Sankoh headed the rebel group, 
whilst Taylor being the president of neighbouring Liberia. The RUF leader assisted Charles 
 
687 SCSL-03-01-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment delivered on 26 September 2013. 
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Taylor during the armed conflict that ensued in Liberia during the late 1980s. To return the 
favour, Charles Tayler provided training, financial support and weapons to the RUF rebel 
group. 
The rebel group used the support to enhance their perpetration of international crimes 
(war crimes and crimes against humanity). The SCSL Appeals Chamber established the link 
between the unlawful conduct performed by the RUF/AFRC’s members and the 
RUF/AFRC’s organisational policies and strategies to be determinative – the court stated: 
“the RUF/AFRC’s operational strategy was characterized by a campaign of crimes against the 
Sierra Leonean population, including the crimes charged in all 11 Counts of the Indictment, which 
were inextricably linked to the strategy of the military operations themselves.”688 
In this matter it is apparent that the RUF/ AFRC as organised group had policies and 
strategies that encouraged its members to commit crimes. Thus, the unlawful conduct of the 
individual members of the group may be imputed on the leader of the group and on the 
group or organisation itself. It is important to state that it is settled law that imputing an 
individual member’s unlawful conduct on the leader (superior/ commander) or organisation 
does absolve such individual member (actor) from criminal responsibility. Indeed, as we 
have seen, the realist approach recognizes the imputation of the conduct of an individual on 
an organised group or corporate entity. 
The realist approach argues that the conduct of a servant or agent of an organisation or 
corporation should be equivalent to involuntary acts in relation to such servant but voluntary 
in relation to the corporation. Further, that ignorance on the part of the employees who are 
 
688 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor at para 266, the Appeals Chamber found that “RUF/AFRC promoted 
sexual violence and slavery by promulgating ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ where the fighters were encouraged to 
take anything they wanted from the civilians (…).” 
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not or less educated may contribute to their diminished capacity of choice, including choice 
to resist policy directives.689 
At the national level, the principle that comes close to the realist approach above is that 
of relative force. A natural person may retain, although with diminished will, “[t]he ability of 
subjecting his bodily movements to his will or intellect, however, he may be confronted with 
the prospect of suffering some harm if he chooses not to comply.”690 An example is when 
an employee faces the prospect of been subject to discharge in the event of non-compliance 
with corporate policies.691 Equally, if the investigation reveals that the unlawful conduct in 
question was (a) committed outside the scope of employment; or (b) was committed contrary 
to corporate policies; or (c) the unlawful conduct was committed for other purposes other 
than furthering corporate interests – then individual criminal responsibility may be applied. 
The realists’ approach that a natural person’s conduct must be construed involuntary to 
the individual and voluntary to the corporation raise distinct questions and appear not to fully 
appreciate the broader spectrum of corporate responsibility. There are circumstances in 
which corporations may be used by its owners or employees to commit crimes. It is not 
uncommon that employees and owners of corporations may commit crimes and use the 
corporate veil to shield themselves from being held responsible. Skinner cites 
Commerzbank, a German Bank with affiliated branches in New York, USA to be an example 
of a recently discovered bank that was used for money laundering by the bank’s executives. 
Commerzbank was alleged “to have improperly facilitated business for Iran, Sudan, Cuba 
 
689 See, J Clough “Bridging the theoretical gap: The search for a realist model of corporate criminal liability” 
(2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 267-300; R Mays “Towards Corporate Fault as the basis of criminal liability of 
corporations” (1998) Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies 31-67; W Wilkinson “Corporate criminal liability – 
The move towards recognizing genuine corporate fault” (2003) 5(9) Canter Law Review 142-170. 
690 Snyman Criminal Law 5 ed 55. 
691 M D Shear, M Landler, M Apuzzo & E Lichtblau “Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him” 
(30.01.2017) The New York Times, at <https//www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-
ban-memo.html?_r=0> (accessed on 2017/02/18). The article stated that “President Trump fired his acting 
attorney general on Monday night, removing her as the nation’s top law enforcement officer after she defiantly 
refused to defend his executive order closing the nation’s borders to refugees and people from predominantly 
Muslim countries.” 
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and Myanmar, and abetted a multimillion-dollar securities fraud for Japanese company.”692 
Scholars further cite Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in Pakistan to be 
one of the banks that was suspected sponsoring terror and of the unlawful activities of 
Afghan rebel groups.693 In their statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the USA 
on BCCI’s affairs, (then) Senator John Kerry (who later became US Secretary of State) and 
Hank Brown stated that: 
“BCCI’s criminality included fraud, money laundering in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas, 
bribery, support for terrorism, arms trafficking, and sale of nuclear technologies, and tax 
evasion.”694 
These cited situations underscore the fact that individuals (employees, agents and 
owners of businesses) may use their corporations as instruments (fronts) to commit crimes. 
This negates against the realist (narrow) approach that individual conduct ought to be 
construed as involuntary in respect to such individuals and voluntary in relations to 
corporations. In the context of ending impunity for gross human rights violations and to 
reconcile these two positions, it is submitted that they should not be construed in the manner 
that one overrides another, or to be mutually exclusive. Rather, their application ought be 
depending on the facts of each situation. The submission on the two approaches above 
effectuates the realisation of the full scale of tender of corporate charge. In contrast, to 
discredit any of the approaches may result in failure to cover a variety of situations – which 
failure may acerbate impunity for gross human rights violations. 
 
692 C P Skinner “Executive liability for anti-money laundering controls” (2016) 116 Columbia Law Review 
Sidebar 1 1. 
693 S A Rizvi “The Illegal business of financial transactions” (2001) Gulf Pakistan Economist; M S Moodley 
“Money laundering and countermeasures: A comparative security analysis of selected case studies with 
specific reference to South Africa” (2008) Master thesis, University of Pretoria. Available at 
<http://repository.up.ac.za> (accessed on 2018/05/14). 
694 J Kerry & H Brown “The BCCI affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate” 
(1992) 102d Congress 2d Session Senate Print 102-140. Available at <https://info.publicintelligence.net/The-
BCCI-Affair.pdf> (accessed on 2018/05/14). 
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Under circumstances where a corporation is suspected to have been used by individuals 
to commit crimes (exceptional situations)695 the veil of incorporation696 may be pierced to 
hold the members liable. This legal innovation has been commonly practiced by various 
states. There are common law and statutory factors that ought to be fulfilled in order to 
trigger the piercing of the veil of incorporation, including where a company was established 
for fraudulent purposes,697 a sham, a façade, a stratagem, a cloak,698 or an unconscionable 
injustice.699 
The nominalist and realist approaches as distinguished above, are both devices that 
advances social control and as such they should not be situated in a competitive spectrum, 
in opposition to each other, but to rather to complement each other. There are indicators 
that may be relevant in establishing to whether a servant or agent performed an unlawful 
conduct in pursuit of corporate policies or culture, which include the examination of such 
servant or agent’s, (a) express or implied job descriptions (terms of reference); (b) the 
express or implied inclusion of clauses in corporate policies that encourages or promote 
servants or agents to commit unlawful acts, including tolerating or condoning unlawful 
conduct; and (c) the corporation’s failure to put in place positive mechanism that discourages 
its servants from performing unlawful conduct.700 
The discussion above analysed in detail the concept of corporate actus reus and its 
requirements. Arguments on whether it is feasible to supplant corporate actus reus, as 
practiced at national level, and apply it at the international level was ventilated and 
challenges were pointed out. The identified challenges were among the factors that 
 
695 See, Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W) at 52A – “the general rule is that courts has no general 
discretion simply to disregard a company’s separate legal personality”; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1991] 1 
All ER 929 “the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances 
exist indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.” 
696 Piercing corporate veil was described in Dadoo at 550 with reference to “disregarding a company’s separate 
personality in order to fix liability elsewhere for what are ostensibly acts of the company.” 
697 See, Adams at 1022. 
698 See, Cape Pacific at 792. 
699 See, Botha at 525. 
700 Strydom (2008) TSAR 512. 
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necessitated the suggestion for new rules on corporate actus reus at the international level. 
The succeeding discussion, in the section below, will focus on the principle of corporate fault 
(mens rea). 
5 5 Corporate mens rea 
It was stated in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation that, in theory, the concept of 
corporate criminal responsibility can attach via two models. First, is the derivative (indirect) 
mode through which an employee or agent’s conduct and mens rea are construed to be the 
conduct and mens rea of the body corporate. This imputation resonate from the generally 
common account that a juristic person is an abstract entity without hands to act and brains 
to think. Second is the corporate culture (direct) mode where mens rea of the company is 
deduced from the relevant corporate policies. Given these theoretical underpinnings, it 
follows that a body corporate’s mens rea can be proved by the application of both the 
derivative and direct modes. 
5 6 The concept of mens rea 
Scholars describe the concept of mens rea with reference to terms such as the malevolent 
mind, wicked mind,701 and guilty mind.702 The concept focusses on a person’s state of mind 
and or the thoughts of a person that existed (or assumed to) at the material time when the 
unlawful conduct was authored. Ahadi describes mens rea as “the culpable state of mind, 
which the prosecuting authority needs to prove, the accused had while committing an 
offence.”703 Robinson argues that mens rea may be described broadly and also in a 
narrower manner. In its broader description, mens rea is construed to be: 
 
701 Kemp et el Criminal Law 182. 
702 Burchell Criminal Law 54. 
703 F Ahadi “A study on the concept of mens rea elaborating on socially bound principles provided under statute 
law” (2017) 3(5) International Journal of Management and Applied Science 66 67. 
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“Synonymous with a person’s blameworthiness or more precisely, those conditions that make a 
person’s violation sufficiently blameworthy to merit the condemnation of criminal conviction. (..) It 
includes all criminal law principles of blameworthiness, mental requirement of offence as well as 
excuses such as insanity, immaturity and duress, to mention a few.”704 
In contradistinction, the narrower sense of mens rea refers: 
“to the state of mind or inattention that, together with its accompanying conduct, criminal law 
defines as an offence. (…) but does not include excuses, defences or other principles outside 
the definition of the offence.”705 
Derived from these descriptions, it is apparent that mens rea may be referred to as the 
mental (subjective) element of a crime in contrast to physical or external elements of the 
crime.706 It is a concept that finds its roots in the criminal law maxim “actus non facit reum 
nisi mens sit rea.”707 The maxim means: the author of an unlawful act cannot be punished 
without a malevolent mind. The essence of this maxim is that it affords a distinction between 
intended and unintended unlawful acts.708 Literally stating, the maxim contemplates to 
punish unlawful acts that were intended in contrast to unintended unlawful acts. This 
proposition is not absolute. Some scholars observed that there are unlawful acts that may 
attract criminal punishment without the presence of a malevolent mind – these include 
statutory offences which are based on strict liability.709 
The strict liability offences fall outside the scope of mens rea – for this reason their 
intricacies is not discussed under this section. However, reference to the strict liability 
offences in this section, was made with specific purpose, namely, to recognise and 
 
704 P Robinson “Mens Rea” (1999) Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper 35 available at 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/35> (accessed on 2018/05/19). 
705 Robinson (1999) Scholarship Penn Law 3. 
706 F B Sayre “Mens rea” (1932) 45(6) Harvard Law Review 974 974; Badar (2008) Criminal Law Forum 473 
518. 
707 Chesney (1939) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 627. 
708 Sayre (1932) Harvard Law Review 990. 
709 Burchell Criminal Law 54. 
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acknowledge that there is an exception to the maxim stated above. Not all unlawful acts may 
require mens rea for responsibility to attach. 
5 7 Forms of mens rea 
Mens rea is composed of two basic forms, namely intention and negligence. These two 
forms are discussed in detail below. However, it is important to state that negligence is 
neither intention-in-disguise nor a lesser form of fault, but rather an independent form of 
fault.710Thus, in this section reference to mens rea (fault) encapsulates intention or 
negligence respectively. 
5 7 1 Intention 
The word dolus even though not directly translated to mean intention is often used 
interchangeably with the word intention/intent. Intention means that a person performs an 
act willingly or deliberately, which causes the consequence.711 Cassese defines intention as 
“the will to bring about a certain result.”712 Literally stating, intention can manifest in the first 
place in situations “where a person wants something to happen as a result of his or her 
conduct.”713 Cook defines intention with reference to the “attitude of mind in which the doer 
of an act adverts to a consequence of the act and desires it to follow.”714 Therefore, criminal 
intention means the accused meant to commit an unlawful conduct or deliberately caused 
 
710 Burchell Criminal Law 406 argue that “the failure to ensure that conduct does conform to the standard is 
reprehensible and thus negligence is regarded as a form of fault.” See, contrast view by G P Fletcher “The 
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis,” (1971) 119(3) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 401 402 in particular where he argues that “[n]egligence appears indeed to be an inferior, almost 
aberrant ground for criminal liability. Every interest protected by the criminal law is protected against intentional 
violations; but only a few – life, bodily integrity, and sometimes property – are secured against negligent risks.”  
711 Snyman Criminal Law 182 defines intention “the will to commit the act or cause the result set out in the 
definitional elements of the crime, in the knowledge of the circumstances rendering such act or result unlawful.” 
712 A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 162. 
713 S Parsons “Intention in criminal law: Why is it so difficult to find?” (2000) Mountbatten Journal of Legal 
Studies 5-6. 
714 W H Cook “Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law” (1917) 26(8) Yale Law Journal 645-663 at 654. 
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the proscribed consequences. From the Rome Statute’s perspective, intention is defined as 
follows: 
“For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) in relation to conduct, that person 
means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause 
that consequence or is aware that it will occur in ordinary course of events.”715 
Derived from these definitions, it is apparent that intention may be limited to situations 
where the actor achieved what he or she desired through his or her acts. However, there is 
a plethora of legal literature which suggests that intention is not just limited to the desired 
outcomes or consequences as defined above – rather, it extend and include, as Burchell 
puts it, “not just to deliberate but also foreseen conduct.”716 In this context, intention appears 
to cover a wide range of situations. A note here is required: intention can be contrasted with 
motive. Motive underscores the purpose or reason of doing something.717 
At domestic level, there are several forms of intention, notably, “dolus directus”, “dolus 
indirectus”, “dolus eventualis”, and “dolus indeterminatus.” In contrast, from the international 
criminal law perspective, precisely from the Rome Statute – it recognizes two forms of 
intention, namely direct and indirect intention. On this score, Van der Vyver argues is of the 
opinion that the definition of intention provided for in the Rome Statute recognise “dolus 
directus” and “dolus indirectus” to the exclusion of “dolus eventualis.” The exclusion of dolus 
eventualis is assumed “by the provision requiring intent and knowledge.”718These forms of 
intention are analysed in the framework of corporate criminal scheme below. 
 
715 Art 30(2) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
716 Burchell Criminal Law 360. 
717 Kemp et el Criminal Law 184 explains that “motive means the underlying reason for the accused’s unlawful 
conduct. (…) the motive with which a particular accused acted may affect his moral blameworthiness and may 
thus act as mitigating or aggravating factor in relation to sentencing.” 
718 J D Van der Vyver “The International Criminal Court and the concept of mens rea in International Criminal 
Law” (2004) 12 U of Miami Inter’ Law and Comparative Law Rev 57 
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5 7 1 1 Dolus directus 
Dolus directus literally means direct intention. It entails that an accused person meant to 
commit a proscribed conduct or deliberately caused the proscribed outcome and or 
consequence. Burchell argues that “this type of intention will be present where the accused’s 
aim and object was to perpetrate the unlawful conduct or cause the consequence.”719 In the 
context of corporate responsibility, corporate direct intention means that the corporation’s 
aim and object were to deliberately cause the consequence. There are several ways through 
which corporate direct intention may manifest, for instance where there is a corporate policy 
that encourages the commission of certain conduct; and where the employees of the 
corporation, in the course of their employment, deliberately cause the proscribed 
consequences. 
Among the instructive cases on corporate direct intention is the Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa and Others v Democratic Republic of Congo720(“Institute 
for Human Rights”). This case was analyzed in chapter 4 above. However, for purposes of 
the discussion on corporate direct intention, it is important to restate the salient facts. Anvil 
Mining Limited operated a mine field Dikulushi area, DRC. 2004 marked the heat-year for 
the subsisting internal armed conflict in the DRC between the rebel groups and government 
forces in Kilwa area, about 50 kilometres from Dikulushi. Because of the proximity of Kilwa 
to Dikulushi, Anvil Mining Limited thought its interests were threatened by the conflict. Anvil 
Mining Limited’s wanted to protect its interests and as result provided the Congolese military 
with vehicles, chartering planes, and financing for military operations to enable the military 
to effectively dismantle the rebellion.721 
 
719 Burchell Criminal Law 362. 
720 Communication 393/10 decision adopted during the 20th Extraordinary Session of the African Commission 
on Human and People’s Rights held from 9-18 June 2016, Banjul, The Gambia. 
721 McBeth (2014) Yale Human Rights and Deve’ Journal 131. 
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It was alleged that Anvil Mining Limited participated in committing atrocities, and that 
employees of Anvil Mining Limited were deployed, armed with weapons and directly 
participated at the battlefields together with the Congolese military officers. Conduct 
included torture and extrajudicial killings of the rebels. When the matter was brought before 
the African Commission. The Commission found the DRC to be accountable for atrocities 
committed.722 This decision went further to require DRC to prosecute and punish the 
employees of Anvil mining company for their deliberate commission of atrocities. It appears 
from this case that Anvil Mining Limited’s motive was to protect its interests. Beyond motive, 
because the company willingly deployed its armed employees at the battlefield with the 
knowledge and intended plan to protect its interests at all costs, one can also construct a 
case of corporate direct intention. 
5 7 1 2 Dolus indirectus 
Burchell posits that indirect intention “exists where, although the unlawful conduct or 
consequence was not the accused’s aim and object, he or she foresaw the unlawful conduct 
or consequence as certain.”723 Let’s take a hypothetical example:  Corporation Y is a 
registered company with its main office in Namibia and its business interest is primarily the 
extraction of oil. It obtains a lucrative extractive concession from the Namibian government 
to extract oil from the Erongo region. The said Erongo region is inhabited by the native 
population who survive on crop farming. The population are requested to move from their 
homes and farms to clear the land for construction of the extraction plant. 
The population refuse to move out of their villages and farms. The refusal prompts 
corporation Y to request government forces to assist in forceful removal of the native 
population. To effectuate the forced removal, corporation Y provide the government forces 
with essential services such as the provision of accommodation, transport as well as funding 
 
722 Institute for Human Rights paras 5-7. 
723 Burchell Criminal Law 363. 
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for operations conducted within the earmarked concession area. Amidst these operations, 
government forces commit rapes, murder, forced removal and damage to properties. 
It could be inferred that corporation Y’s aim and objective was to lawfully extract oil – as 
per the concession awarded to it. However, in order to achieve this, it is necessary to clear 
the land in order to construct the extraction plant. By necessity, the clearing of the land 
required the native population to be moved from the oil concession area. Because of the 
civilian population’s resistance to move, corporation Y went ahead and requested 
government forces to intervene. 
The forced removal and atrocities committed by the government forces were not 
corporation Y’s aim and object – however, corporation Y could not achieve its object without 
first clearing and constructing the oil plant. If corporation Y is charged for the atrocities 
committed, it cannot claim that it only intended to extract oil and not to cause forced removal 
or atrocities suffered by the native population. The volition is satisfied in the sense that 
corporation Y directed its will at the extraction of oil, with full knowledge that the native 
population would be forcefully removed from their villages and farms to make way for the 
construction of the oil plant which was necessary in achieving corporation Y’s ultimate goal. 
5 7 1 3 Dolus eventualis 
Burchell states that this form of intention “exists where the accused foresaw the 
possibility that the prohibited consequence might occur and the accused accept this 
possibility into the bargain.”724 Cassese used the concept of dolus eventualis 
interchangeably with recklessness and defined them with reference to the “state of mind 
where a person foresees that his/ her action is likely to produce a prohibited consequence, 
and nevertheless takes the risk of so acting.”725 Under this form of intention, the accused 
must have foreseen that his/her act may possibly bring about a proscribed result or 
 
724 Burchell Criminal Law 55. 
725 Cassese International Criminal Law 168. 
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consequence (secondary) other than the results which the accused primarily desired – with 
this foresight the accused went on and acted. 
One could look at the hypothetical example of Company Y in Namibia (above) and 
construct a possible case of dolus eventualis on the same set of facts, if one would argue 
that Company Y had knowledge of the risk of government security forces’ overreach and 
nevertheless persisted with its decision to involve the security forces. Viewed through the 
prism of dolus eventualis one can then argue that Company Y was aware of a risk, and 
recklessly pursued the course of action regardless of the risk. One should just be careful not 
to frame Corporation Y’s mens rea in “ought to have done” terms – i.e. the test for 
negligence. If, on the scenario that Company Y was aware of the risk of government forces’ 
propensity for overreach or worse, one would proceed to say that Corporation Y “ought to 
have cancelled the involvement of government forces, but nevertheless persisted”, the 
framing is no longer one of dolus eventualis, but rather that of negligence. This fine line, 
between the tests for negligence and dolus eventualis or recklessness can cause problems 
if the facts are murky, or if there is a prosecutorial or judicial misapprehension of the test for 
negligence (objective) as opposed to dolus eventualis or recklessness (subjective). To solve 
this doctrinal problem some jurisdictions have created a category between negligence and 
intent, known as “conscious negligence” or luxuria. This is where a person foresaw a 
particular result, but unreasonably came to the conclusion that it would not materialise. A 
note here is needed – to explain that luxuria is forms part of negligence but not for 
intention.726 
At the standpoint of international criminal law, one should note that there is a debate 
between scholars as to whether dolus eventualis or recklessness would be enough to satisfy 
 
726 P Carstens “Revisiting the relationship between dolus eventualis and luxuria in context of vehicular 
collisions causing the death of fellow passengers and/or pedestrians: S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA)” 
(2013) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 67 68; See, also, W Bertelsmann “What happened to luxuria? 
Some observations on criminal negligence, recklessness and dolus eventualis” (1975) South African Law 
Journal 59 74.  
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the mens rea element of criminal liability for atrocity crimes. There seems to be a general 
proposition that customary international law may apply mens rea in the form of dolus 
eventualis. Here an argument could be made for the inclusion of dolus eventualis or 
recklessness for atrocity crimes. This is probably correct, no doubt because of the 
widespread recognition of dolus eventualis as an acceptable species of intent in national 
legal schemes,727 and because of the principles of criminal liability as set out by the 
Nuremberg IMT.728 Considering the Rome Statute, however, the issue appears to be more 
contentious. Commentators have pointed out that Article 30 of the Rome Statute is 
“considerably stricter than the one generally required in customary international law and 
domestic legal orders.”729 
The reason here, is because intention and knowledge in relation to the result of the 
specified conduct are required. This leaves no room for liability based on reckless behaviour 
or based on dolus eventualis. The only scope for dolus eventualis or recklessness as an 
acceptable form of mens rea under the Rome Statute would be to find it in the “otherwise 
provided” provision in article 30 (1) of the Rome Statute. The language of the rest of Article 
30 of the Rome Statute also seems to exclude dolus eventualis/ recklessness as generally 
acceptable forms of mens rea for purposes of the atrocity crimes. Indeed, Articles 30(2)(b) 
and (3) suggests that the alleged perpetrator must not be more than just aware of the risk 
or “[p]ossibility that his or her conduct would cause the consequence in question.”730 The 
language, “will occur”, as opposed to, “may occur”, supports this interpretation.731 
Although some of the earlier decisions by the ICC seem to have supported a broader 
view of dolus under Article 30, to include dolus eventualis,732 later decisions have rejected 
 
727 See, for instance, F Mantovani “The general principles of international criminal law: The viewpoint of a 
national criminal lawyer” (2013) Journal of International Criminal Justice 26 32.  
728 HH Jescheck “The general principles of international criminal law set out in Nuremberg, as mirrored in the 
ICC Statute” (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 38 45.  
729 Werle & Jessberger International Criminal Law 191.  
730 Art 30(2)(b) of Rome Statute. 
731 Werle & Jessberger 180.  
732 Thomas Lubanga at paras 349-352.  
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such a broad reading and opted for a more restrictive reading, in line with the plain language 
of Article 30.733  
Although I am sympathetic to the broader understanding of dolus (to include dolus 
eventulais/recklessness), especially in the context of corporate criminal charge and given 
the risks created by corporate behaviour, such a broader reading would stretch the meaning 
of dolus under Article 30 of the Rome Statute beyond the plain meaning of the text. For dolus 
eventualis/recklessness to be included as forms of mens rea, Article 30 will have to be 
amended, or will have to be textually linked to a suitable “otherwise provided” provision, 
specifically related to criminal responsibility of corporations. This will have to be the subject 
of law reform and an amended Rome Statute. More on this in Chapter 7, below. 
5 7 2 Negligence (and the inapplicability to atrocity crimes) 
Scholars define negligence with reference to “omission to do something which a 
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of 
human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would 
not do.”734 Negligence (culpa) arises when there is failure to measure up to certain standards 
on the part of the accused. Cassese argue that a person act negligently, if such person “acts 
in disregard of certain elementary standards with which any reasonable man should comply 
and in addition, such a person is aware of the risk of harm but takes it believing that the risk 
will not materialise owing to the steps he has taken or will take.”735 It follows that the test to 
determine negligence is objective – that is, the reasonable person’s test. A reasonable 
person is defined as “a hypothetical person within a society who exercises average care, 
 
733 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, (Confirmation of charges) decision of 15 June 2009, paras 357.  
734 J G Tinus “Reasonable person in criminal law” (2017) LLM Thesis Queen’s University (Canada), 1 at 
<https://qspace.library.queensu.ca> (accessed on 2018/05/19); H Kristin “Applying the reasonable person 
standard to psychosis: How tort law unfairly burdens adults with mental illness” (2007) 68(6) Ohio State Law 
Journal 1733 1738 defines negligence as “not exercising reasonable care under all the circumstances.” 
735 Cassese International Criminal Law 171. 
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skill, and judgment in conduct and who serves as a comparative standard for determining 
liability.”736 
Since the focus of this dissertation is the atrocity offences of “genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes”, mens rea in the form of negligence is not relevant. These most 
grave offences at international law all involve mens rea in the form of intent. Indeed, for the 
crime of genocide, a specific form of intent is required, namely: special intent (dolus 
specialis).737 As for corporate criminal accountability, the required mens rea for the atrocity 
crimes should also be in the form of intent. This is also reflected in the proposed 
amendments to the Rome Statute in Chapter 7, below. 
5 8 Nominalist vs. realist approaches to corporate mens rea 
At corporate mens rea, the nominalist (derivative) approach posits that a body corporate 
may be charged criminally. However, the criminal responsibility of a juristic person must be 
predicated by a guilty finding against the servant or agent (natural persons) of such a juristic 
person. The servant of a company who performed the unlawful conduct should first be found 
criminally responsible, thereafter; such guilty finding may be imputed on the corporation. 738 
The assumption is that a natural person who is an employee, servant of the corporation is 
considered to embody such corporation’s will and mind. Therefore, the established fault on 
the part of the servant or agent is construed to be the fault of the corporation.739 
 
736 J G Tinus “Reasonable person in criminal law” (2017) LLM Thesis Queen’s University 1. 
737 D Aydin “The interpretation of genocidal intent under the Genocide Convention and the jurisprudence of 
international courts” (2014) The Journal of Criminal Law 423 425.  
738 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 1977 -FCPA Amendment Act 1988 (known as Trade Act 1988), and 
FCPA Amendment Act 1998, section 78dd-1 &2 altered the focus to include the prohibition of corporate 
corruption within and beyond the borders of the United States; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, section 301; 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention 173 of 1999 article 3 “liability of a legal person (…) shall not 
exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators of, or accessories to, 
the criminal offences (…).” 
739 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 337; See, Zinnecker (1985) Brigham Young 
University Law Review, 317 320 – who refers to the judgment in Goddard v Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 223 
(1869), in which the court held that “a corporation is an imaginary being. It has no mind but mind of its servants 
(…) All its schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds 
and executed by human hands; and these minds and hands are its servants’ minds and hands.” 
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In contrast, the proponents of the realist approach argue that the derivative model 
deliberately turns a blind eye to the reality that corporations can pursue their own desires. 
In that, nominalists predicate a guilty finding of a natural person, only then can such guilty 
finding be imputed on corporation. This is challenged by realists, who assume that the 
organisational culture when analysed correctly, may demonstrate that corporations’ mens 
rea may be independent of a natural person’s will and mind. French contends that the desire 
of the corporation can be distinguished from those of its servants or agents, if it can be 
demonstrated that “corporations and not just the people who work in them have reasons for 
doing what they do.”740 In order for a corporation to effectively conduct its business, it may, 
among others, be required to formulate policies, set goals, develop corporate structures and 
hierarchy and put in place processes for decision making. Thus, the actuality of these 
characteristics coupled with the reasons for corporations to conduct business lies at the 
heart of French’s argument as to why a body corporate’s fault must be gathered from its 
culture and policies. 
Without losing sight of French’s contention above – a note here is necessary: when a 
company is registered (time of incorporation), it is often required that a corporation must 
state its nature of business.741 The reason for this requirement is to ensure that the object 
of the corporation is not unlawful in nature. By virtue of this requirement, at first glance, it 
may be inferred that corporations are created for reasons related to lawful business 
endeavours – and there is reason for them to carry out such businesses. It is argued that 
the fact that a corporation was created for lawful business, does not exclude the possibility 
of such a corporation to develop further policies or adopt a new corporate culture that may 
tend to encourage or tolerate the commission of crimes in the future whilst pursuing its 
business interest. To buttress this argument, the discussion that follows, attempts to identify 
 
740 P A French “The Corporation as a moral person,” (1979) 16(3) American Philosophical Quarterly 207 213. 
741 Namibian Companies Act 28 of 2004, section 59(1). 
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how a corporation, even though it was registered to conduct lawful business, may use its 
corporate culture and policies to tolerate or encourage the commission of crimes. 
5 8 1 Corporate culture: what is it? 
The realist approach advocates for corporate mens rea that is constructed from corporate 
culture. The corporate culture model as Cavanagh posits, attempts to hold “[c]orporations 
directly liable for their own acts and omissions,”742 and he describes corporate culture as: 
“[A] doctrine that examines body corporates’ organizational processes, structure, goals and 
hierarchies. This doctrine combines these variables to determine whether there is culture that 
sanctions or encourages the commission of crime. If it can be shown that a corporate culture of 
non-compliance with the law existed, it becomes possible to infer corporate mens rea by the 
corporation itself.”743 
In this context, corporate culture entails how the corporation conduct its affairs, how it 
executes its functions and decision-making processes.744 The characteristics of corporate 
culture embody the corporation’s values, mission, assumptions and artefacts. Corporate 
culture thus reflects how the corporation expresses or represents itself to the public at large. 
Most often, the object of corporate culture is to positively impress the public (consumers) 
and those associated with such a corporation. Shimasaki argue that “every company is 
unique in its culture and the manner in which it conducts its business.”745 It follows that 
corporate culture reflects the personality of a body corporate. These personality traits are 
“tangible to an extent that outsiders and customers can sense a real difference”746 and be 
able to distinguish between body corporates, just like distinguishing between individual 
 
742 Cavanagh (2011) Journal of Criminal Law 429. 
743 Cavanagh (2011) Journal of Criminal Law 432. 
744 J J Dahlgaard & S M Dahlgraad-Park “Lean production, six sigma quality, TQM and company culture”, 
(2006) 18(3) The TQM Magazine 263 273. 
745 C Shimasaki Biotechnology Entrepreneurship: Starting, Managing and Leading Biotech Companies (2014) 
394. 
746 Shimasaki Biotechnology Entrepreneurship 395. 
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natural persons. Therefore, corporate culture identifies a body corporate to an extent that in 
the eyes of the society, as Shimasaki puts it, “[o]ne can say that each company has a 
personality of its own.”747 
The effect of corporate culture on the corporation, servants or agents cannot be 
overstated. Li et al748 conducted a study on how corporate culture can influence a corporate 
decision. The study revealed that corporate culture has strong influence on how the 
corporation functions and further that it may induce or encourage or “influence corporate 
risk-taking both through its effects on managerial decision-making and even through its 
effect on a country’s formal institutions.”749 The study conducted by Li et al further 
established that when a body corporate’s corporate culture is strong and effective it renders 
the concept of individualism weaker and ineffective. In this manner, corporate culture 
prescribes or commands collectivism – which renders it difficult to distinguish an individual’s 
fault – that is, an individual’s mens rea is rendered insignificant because it is usurped by the 
collective will and intellect (corporate mens rea). 
Corporate culture as was demonstrated above, have the effect of not only to influence 
the corporation to take the non-risky decisions but that it may pose a negative effect on 
corporate decision by increasing the “[f]irm’s appetite for risk and consequently the 
perilousness of their decisions.”750 It is on these theoretical bases, among others, that the 
proponents of the realist approach advocates for corporate mens rea that is construed from 
corporate culture. This is because under these circumstances the nominalist (derivative) 
model fails to reflect these stated realities of corporate culture. 
The practice of construing corporate mens rea that is based on corporate culture is 
relatively new in the sphere of national criminal law. However, countries such as Australia 
 
747 Shimasaki Biotechnology Entrepreneurship 394. 
748 Li et al (2013) Journal of Corporate Finance 22  
749 Li et al (2013) Journal of Corporate Finance 19. 
750 Li et al (2013) Journal of Corporate Finance 9. 
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has put in place legislation that hold corporations criminally responsible for crimes 
committed based on corporate mens rea. In this regard, the instructive instrument is the 
Australian Criminal Code.751 The code provides for corporate criminal responsibility in its 
strict sense and it contemplates to construe corporate mens rea derived from corporate 
culture.752 Corporate mens rea based on corporate culture may be attributed to a body 
corporate where it is established that such a corporation “expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorized or permitted the commission of the crime.”753 
In the Australian Criminal Code, the concept of “corporate culture” is defined to mean 
“attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate 
generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes place.”754 
It follows that, to determine if a body corporate authorized a certain conduct – unlawful 
conduct in particular – regard given to the Australian Criminal Code. The code lays down 
two criteria. Firstly, it requires proving that within the body corporate there existed a 
corporate culture at the material time when the unlawful conduct was performed. The 
existence of corporate culture alone is not enough for purposes of attributing mens rea – 
rather the existence thereof must have “directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-
compliance”755 with the law. Secondly, it is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate 
that, at the time when the unlawful conduct was committed, the corporation “failed to create 
and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance”756 with the law.757 The concept 
of corporate culture can be distinguished from corporate policy for purposes of corporate 
responsibility. The discussion below analyses the concept of corporate policy. 
 
751 Act 12 of 1995 as amended by the Amendment Act 55 of 2001. 
752 Clause 12.3(1) provides that “if intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to a 
physical element of an offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body corporate that expressly, tacitly 
or impliedly authorized or permitted the commission of the offence.” 
753 Clause 12.3(1). 
754 Clause 12.3 (6) para 2. 
755 Clause 12.3(2)(c). 
756 Clause 12.3(2)(d). 
757 Clause 12.3 (6) para 2. 
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5 8 2 Corporate policy: what is it? 
For present purposes a policy refers to a set of ideas or a plan or course of action that is 
proposed or adopted by an institution – corporations are not an exception. A corporate policy 
is a subcomponent of corporate culture – that is, because a culture includes a policy.758 A 
corporate policy reflects the aspirations, ideas or course of action that is adopted or 
implemented by a corporation. In a nutshell, policies or strategies dictate in a systematic 
manner as to what should be done, and it provides the object for performing such action. A 
good policy can be an effective tool for a corporation’s success; however, a bad policy can 
negatively impact a corporation – including paving way for a corporation to commit crimes. 
To establish mens rea of an individual person based on an entity’s policies is criticized by 
the realist approach on the basis that it is prejudicial to an individual. For instance, it 
dispenses with the principle of cost-benefit of punishment. When a servant or agent of a 
juristic person commits an unlawful act whilst on duty and in furtherance of such juristic 
person’s interest – there may be no benefits that accrue to such agent or servant. Rather, 
at that material time, the benefits may accrue to the corporation. In addition, the unlawful 
conduct committed by the servant or agent of a body corporate while pursuant to corporate 
policies are devoid of such servant or agent’s independent volition. Therefore, the prejudice 
here lies in subjecting an individual to punishment for unlawful conduct from which he or she 
did not derive pleasure or benefit and from the absence of such agent or servant’s volition 
to commit the unlawful conduct. 
In sum, the discussion above described the concept of corporate culture and that of 
corporate policy and demonstrated how corporations may use its corporate culture and 
policies to encourage or tolerate the commission of crimes. The discussion that follows, 
 
758 See, Clause 12.3(6) para 2 definition of culture. 
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attempts to identify and suggest new rules that may be applied in construing corporate mens 
rea. 
5 9 The new method of attributing mens rea to a corporation 
In the sections above, it was identified that mens rea refers to the guilty mind. A guilty 
mind may be manifested in different ways. The orthodox criminal law recognizes two forms 
of mens rea, namely: intention, and negligence. This was stated in the discussed above. 
These forms of mens rea are recognized at domestic level and may be applied to establish 
individual and corporate criminal responsibility as was demonstrated in Chapter 2. As we 
know, the concept of corporate criminal responsibility is not currently applied at international 
criminal law level, and ICC.is not an exception. This dissertation proposes that corporate 
criminal responsibility should be recognized as a mode of responsibility for atrocity crimes. 
A key requisite will be to recognise and construct the element of corporate intention for the 
commission of atrocity crimes. 
Corporate intention can manifest in different ways. Firstly, in situations where a natural 
person who is an employee of the corporation with guilty mind, whilst in course or scope of 
his/her employment, meant to commit an unlawful conduct or deliberately brought about a 
proscribed consequence (dolus directus). Secondly, in situations where a natural person 
who is an employee or agent of the corporation, “in the course or scope of his/her 
employment”, does not deliberately cause the prohibited consequences – however, such 
employee or agent realises that to accomplish the corporation’s goal, by necessity the 
prohibited conduct or consequence may occur (dolus indirectus). 
Thirdly, the situation where an operative of a company, whilst “in the course or scope of 
his/her employment”, have foreseen that his/her act may possibly bring about a proscribed 
result or consequence, other than the results which the accused employee or agent primarily 
desired. With this foresight, the accused employee or agent went on and acted. It is required 
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under this situation, that (a), the offending corporation foresaw that there existed a possibility 
that unintended consequences (proscribed acts) might be committed by its operative, and 
(b) the company, despite the foresight of the secondary consequences went on and took 
the risk (dolus eventualis). Finally, apart from the three situations above, corporate intention 
may exist in situations where there is a corporate policy or strategy that condones or 
encourages the employees or agents to deliberately cause the prohibited conduct or 
consequence. 
In light of these situations above, through which corporate intention may be construed, to 
successfully prosecute an offending corporation, the prosecution is required to show that at 
the material time when the unlawful conduct was committed the offender (i) had knowledge 
of the act, (ii) knowledge of the elements of the crime, (iii) the unlawfulness of such conduct, 
and (iv) directed his/her (its) will towards the commission of the unlawful conduct.759 
Intention (dolus) be it for co-perpetrator or accomplice760 and actors in terms of JCE, 
therefore consists in various forms, namely direct, indirect, dolus eventualis/recklessness, 
and dolus generalis (indeterminatus). 
The Social and Economic Rights case referenced in chapter 4 may be instructive 
regarding corporate intention to commit atrocities. In this case the organisation’s operational 
policy called for “ruthless military actions against demonstrators”761 with specific intent to 
displace the indigenous people from their villages. 
 
759 Snyman Criminal Law 182 define intention “as the will to commit the act or cause the results set out in the 
definitional elements of the crime, in the knowledge of the circumstances rendering such act or result 
unlawful.”; Prosecutor v Du [Ko Tadi] para 657 citing with approval the decision in R v Finta [1994] 1 RCS 701 
in which the court found that “the mental element required to be proven to constitute a crime against humanity 
is that the accused was aware of or willfully blind to facts or circumstances which would bring his or acts within 
crimes against humanity. However, it would not be necessary to establish that the accused knew that his action 
were inhumane.” 
760 Juvenal Kajelijeli at para 768 it was found that “for purposes of accomplice liability, the mens rea 
requirement will be fulfilled where an individual acts with the knowledge that his or her acts assists in the 
commission of the crime by the actual perpetrator. The accused need not to know the precise offence being 
committed by the actual perpetrator, the accused must be aware of the essential elements of the crime, and 
must be seen to have acted with awareness that he or she thereby supported the commission of the crime.” 
761 Social and Economic Rights at para 8. 
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5 10 A note on the relationship between corporate intention and knowledge 
Knowledge refers to awareness of something; the cognitive element. In criminal law, 
knowledge refers to “[t]he offender’s awareness of the unlawful conduct, existence of 
circumstance or consequences.”762 It can either be actual or constructive knowledge. 
Knowledge is not a form of intention. It can, depending on the law, be required as an element 
of mens rea. Knowledge encompasses both the knowledge of the circumstance and that of 
the consequence. This may be established if it is proven that the accused corporation is 
“[a]ware that a certain circumstance or consequence exists or will exist in the ordinary course 
of events.”763 This requirement is both reactive and proactive in terms of combating 
corporate criminality. It encourages corporations to observe the due diligence duty – which 
in turn helps in the foresight in relation to the likelihood of a consequence or circumstance 
to occur. In this manner the corporation stands in a good position to reprimand or punish its 
agent or servant who may commit atrocities contrary to corporate policies. 
As demonstrated in chapter 4 above, a corporation has the responsibility to avert the 
commission of unlawful conduct (atrocities) by its agents or servants. This corporate duty 
may arise when the corporation is seized with the knowledge or has belief to suspect that 
an unlawful conduct is commensurate or is approximately to be committed. Under these 
circumstances, it is incumbent on the corporation to “take reasonable measures” to punish 
or refer the breach to a competent body for investigation or to have the servant or agent 
punished accordingly.764 
 
762 Badar (2008) Criminal Law Forum 495. 
763 Art 30(3) Rome Statute of the ICC defines knowledge as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of event.” 
764 See, A Eser & F Retttenmaier “Criminality of organisations: lessons from domestic law – a comparative 
perspective” in A Nollkaemper & H Van de Wilt (eds) System criminality in international law (2009) 222 233. 
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The concept “knowledge” may be divided into actual765 and constructive knowledge.766 
Bantekas767 argues that the standard which is based on ‘the reason to know test’768 as was 
applied in ICTR769 and ICTY770 is higher than knew test. In effect these tests “mean that a 
person who is in possession of sufficient information about criminality may not escape 
liability by ignorance.”771 If this standard were to be applied on the Talisman Energy Inc772 
case, that company would not have escaped responsibility for the atrocities that were 
committed in Sudan. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, there was clear evidence which 
showed that senior representatives of Talisman Energy Inc knew about the oppressive rule 
which the military exerted on the people who lived in the oil rich regions. Despite this 
awareness Talisman Energy Inc continued to hire the military as its security agency. It 
financed the military operations and upgraded roads and airstrips which made it easier for 
the military to continue with the commission of atrocities. Indicators that may be applied to 
establish corporate knowledge, among others, include: the type and nature of atrocities 
committed, the frequencies of occurrence of crimes – for instance widespread or systematic, 
repetition thereof, locality of the crime, and the logistical support deployed. 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute provides that for criminal responsibility, a person must 
commit the unlawful conduct with intent and knowledge. Both mental elements are thus 
required; not the one or the other.773 Currently, of course, this standard applies to natural 
 
765 Prosecutor v Sefer Halilovic IT-01-48-T, Judgment delivered on 16 November 2005, para 65 the Tribunal 
held that “the knowledge cannot be presumed but must be established based on the circumstantial evidence.” 
766 Art 28(a)(i) Rome Statute of the ICC state that “the person either knew or owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.” 
767 Bantekas (1999) AJIL 595. 
768 Badar (2008) CrimLF 473 512. 
769 Art 6(3) Statute of the ICTR. 
770 Art 7(3) Statute of the ICTY. 
771 Bantekas (1999) AJIL 590; Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić IT-95-9-A, Judgment delivered on 28 November 
2006 at para 135 the tribunal in determining the guilty of the accused who pleaded ignorance held that “the 
accused must have known of the mistreatment of the non-Serb detainees, including the confinement under 
inhumane condition because Bosanski Samic is a small town – the moans and cries of prisoners could be 
heard outside the detention centre.” 
772 Talisman Energy para 7. 
773 Art 30(1) Rome Statute of the ICC. See, also, Werle & Jessberger International Criminal Law 179.  
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persons only. Suggestions as to whether the interpretation of Article 30 – on the mental 
element – should be retained for the proposed ICC jurisdiction over corporate entities 
accused of atrocity crimes will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
5 11 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the competing approaches and theories on unlawful conduct and 
fault in the context of corporate criminal responsibility. These approaches were identified as 
nominalist (derivative) and realist. It was also identified that the notion of corporate mens 
rea is implicitly excluded from the text of the Rome Statute. In contrast, the Rome Statute 
recognizes the concept of individual mens rea774 of persons who are eighteen (18) years old 
and above.775 This exclusion entrenches the values and assumptions associated with the 
nominalist approach – including that a body corporate cannot form the actual or constructive 
malevolent mind of its own. The consequence of this exclusion was identified to have 
exacerbated, among others, the disjoint between national and international criminal law. 
With the object of reducing the identified disjoint as well as “putting an end to impunity” 
for corporations which are responsible for the commission of atrocities, this chapter 
proposed new rules for corporate unlawful conduct and fault. These new rules were 
analysed in details and explanations were presented stating the contours of the proposed 
requirements. The centrality of the chapter was to showcase the appropriate model that may 
best be applied in the quest of holding corporations criminally responsible for atrocities. In 
this manner this chapter, in particular on fault, it departed from the orthodox approach which 
was restricted to predicating a guilty find of a servant or agent prior to attributing such finding 
on the corporation – and proposed a combination of factor rule. In this vein, it was 
 
774 Art 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
775 Art 26 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, provides that “the court shall have no jurisdiction over any person 
who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.” 
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demonstrated that corporate culture is much responsive and it captures the modern complex 
nature of corporate activities than construing fault based on derivative models. 
Further it was demonstrated that the physical and mental element requirement may be 
established or deduced from a myriad of factors. These factors include but not limited to the 
methods used, the number of victims involved and their status.776In essence, in the 
jurisprudence of the ICC it is clear that to establish mens rea of an individual, depending on 
the nature of crime, requires proving that such individual acted with intention to commit the 
unlawful conduct and further that he or she had necessary knowledge or was aware that the 
conduct was unlawful.777 
The succeeding chapter, unlike the present chapter, analyses the concept of corporate 
punishment. It juxtaposes on the available forms of corporate punishment, the rational of 
punishment and explores several options that may be adopted – which may be best suited 
for corporate punishment. Corporate punishment, as is discussed in the said succeeding 
chapter, encompasses punishment imposed on the servant or agent of the corporation as 
well as that which is imposed on the corporation itself. 
  
 
776 Prosecutor v Juvenal Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment delivered on 01 December 2003, para 806 the 
Trial Chamber II held that “some indicia of intent may be evidence such as the physical targeting of the group 
or their property, the use of derogatory language towards members of the targeted groups, the weapons 
employed and the extent of body injuries, methodical way of planning and the systematic way of killing.”; 
Katanga at para 807. 
777 Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana ICTR-00-60-T, Judgement delivered on 13 April 2006, para 57 the Trial 
Chamber held that “accused must have acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack and 
knowledge that his act formed part of the attack on the civilian population.”; Badar (2008) CrimLF 475. 
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Chapter 6 
Punishment: exploring how corporations may be criminally sanctioned for 
atrocity crimes: An amended jurisdiction of the international criminal court 
6 1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 showcased that corporations are capable of participating in the commission of 
atrocities, and in chapter 5 it was shown how unlawful conduct may be imputed on the 
corporation as well as how corporate fault may be construed. This chapter underscores that 
subjecting corporations to criminal sanctions for crimes under international criminal law 
(atrocity crimes) should be pursued as a necessary imperative. In this context, this chapter 
focuses on the form of sanctions that may be imposed on the offending company. In so 
doing, the chapter firstly elucidates the concept and purpose of punishment. 
Secondly, the chapter provides an analysis on reasons that contemplate to justify 
corporate punishment. Thirdly, the chapter analyses the theories such as absolute, relative 
and combined theories. These theories are analysed in the light of the sanctions that may 
be imposed on body corporates. Finally, the Chapter analyses the nature of punishment that 
may be appropriate for corporations, including imprisonment (for corporate 
employees/servants); criminal fines; suspension of corporate trade licence; deregistration 
and declaring corporations as criminal organisations; and adverse publication. 
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6 2 Concept of punishment 
The concept of punishment is generally defined with reference to any measure that may 
be deemed to be painful or that renders some form of discomfort on the person been 
punished.778 Terblanche defines punishment with reference to: 
“the experience of unpleasantness or the deprivation of goods or an adverse sanction which 
leaves the offender in a position less advantageous than that in which he found himself before 
the imposition of the punishment.”779 
In Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re R v Berger the court established that punishment 
includes “everything that adversely affects the accused in his person, his occupation or his 
property as part and parcel of the punishment inflicted upon him.”780 The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines punishment as “a penalty inflicted on an offender through a judicial 
process.”781 This involves, among others, imprisonment, forfeiture of properties, death, 
payment of fine, suspension of licence (trade and/or driver’s) and compensation. 
Garland describes punishment as “the legal process whereby violators of criminal law are 
condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specified legal categories and procedure.”782 
Bean argues that: in criminal law – punishment consists of certain characteristics and 
identifies same, among others, as follows: 
 
778 M Dan-Cohen “Sanctioning corporations” (2010) 19 Journal of Law and Policy 15 at 18 describes criminal 
punishment as “a form of centralized social control that employs coercion, is initiated by the state, is rule-
bound, and is judicially administered.”; L A Lefton Psychology (1991) defines punishment as “a process of 
presenting a consequence, delivered after a behavior, which serves to reduce the frequency or intensity with 
which the behavior occurs.” 
779 S S Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa 2 ed (2007) 3. 
780 1936 AD 334 at 339. 
781 Merriam-Webster Dictionary at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punishment> (accessed on 
2018/06/11). 
782 D Garland Punishment and Modern Society (1990) 17; G Newman The Punishment Response (1978) 6-7 
describes punishment with reference to the “pain or other unpleasant consequence that results from an offence 
against a rule and that is administered by others, who represent legal authority, to the offender who broke the 
rule.” 
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“(i) it must be unpleasant to the offender; (ii) it must be for an offence; (iii) it must be meted 
against an offender; (iv) it must be the work of personal agencies – thus, it must not be the natural 
consequence of an action; and (v) it must be imposed by a competent body or authority.”783 
Ginneken defines punishment with reference to “state’s imposition of any type of sanction 
on a person for an act that has violated criminal law.”784 Derived from these definitions it is 
apparent that the concept of punishment is multifaceted. From the retributive perspective, 
punishment may be considered as one of the purposes of sentencing. In this manner, 
Ginneken elucidates that “punishment is not only considered an end in itself, but also a 
means to an end.”785 
In the context of corporate criminal responsibility, punishment refers to any pain or 
suffering imposed against the employee or agent of the offending corporation or the 
corporation itself by the state or any competent body. This definition envisages the effect 
that both the servant (employee) and the corporation itself may be subjected to punishment 
– together or to alternate between servant and corporation. The analysis on corporate 
punishment is shaped by various approaches that may influence how punishment may be 
perceived. These include philosophical,786 sociological,787 nominalist and realist 
approaches. The nominalist approach prefers to punish individuals for crimes committed by 
corporations on one end, and on the other end the realist approach advocates for 
punishment to be imposed on the corporation itself for crimes committed by the corporation. 
The discussion that follows analyses how an individual servant (employee) of the 
 
783 P Bean Punishment: A philosophical and criminological Inquiry (1988) 5. 
784 E F J C Van Ginneken “The pain and purpose of punishment: A subjective perspective” (2016) Howard 
League What is Justice? Working Papers 22/2016 at <https://howardleague.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/HLWP-22-2016> (accessed on 2018/06/11).  
785 Van Ginneken “The pain and purpose of punishment: A subjective perspective” 8. 
786 Under this perspective the debate on punishment is centred on three theories of punishment, namely 
absolute, relative and combined theory. The main idea is to establish an acceptable basis for punishment. This 
is an acknowledgment that there is no single accurate theory of punishment or all-embracing theory. 
787 The main argument is that punishment is a product of societal structure. Thus, this perspective perceives 
punishment as social phenomenon which is centred and influenced by social thinking. 
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corporation and or corporation itself may be subjected to punishment under corporate 
criminal responsibility. 
6 2 1 Individual punishment in the context of corporate criminal responsibility 
It was demonstrated in various chapters of this dissertation that nominalists argue that 
corporations cannot commit crimes; corporate crimes can only be committed by individual 
employees attached to the corporation. For this reason, the nominalist approach does not 
envisage punishment against a corporation itself, rather it advocates for imposing 
punishment against individual employees of the corporation. The basis for this advocacy, 
hinges on the assumption that individuals has a soul to damn and a physical body that can 
suffer harm. In contrast, a corporation lack these human characteristics. In this manner, the 
nominalist approach contemplates to punish the employee or servant of the corporation who 
committed the crime or who failed to act positively to avoid the commission of a crime – 
provided the derivative liability requirements are satisfied.788 
The derivative liability requirements distinguishes the individual punishment 
contemplated in light of corporate criminal accountability from the general or ordinary 
individual criminal responsibility which may attach to individuals other than employees or 
servants of the corporation (any person who is not linked to the corporation – to justify the 
application of corporate criminal responsibility principle). The forms of penalty that may be 
imposed on a servant of a company under corporate criminal responsibility are similar to the 
general forms of penalty that may attach under the individual criminal responsibility. 
Imposition of punishment onto a servant or employee of a corporation under corporate 
criminal responsibility has a history. There are several assumptions that underpin imposing 
penalty on the servant of the corporation for corporate crime. These assumptions include 
 
788 Derivative liability requirement as was identified in chapters of this dissertation above includes “(a) conduct 
of an employee of the corporation; (b) in the course or scope of employment or furthering the employer’s 
interest, etcetera.” 
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that imposing punishment on the corporation to the exclusion of the corporate’s servant “fails 
to sufficiently provide incentive for directors to implement adequate strategies to ensure that 
their corporations avoid breaching the law.”789 
There are certain circumstances where the corporation may be used as a front by its 
servants and shareholders. Under these circumstances, imposing punishment on the 
corporation itself may not be the appropriate deterrent strategy. It resonates that for 
corporate criminality to be effectively deterred, there is a need for a holistic approach. Cowan 
argues that “one of the ways to deter corporations without incurring the undesirable 
externalities associated with fines is to prosecute the culpable individuals within the 
organisation.”790 Punishment against individuals may, among others, include imprisonment, 
fines and warnings. Detailed discussions on the type of sanctions that may be imposed on 
individual offenders in the context of corporate punishment are discussed in the section that 
discusses sanctions below. 
6 2 2 Punishment of a corporation in the context of corporate criminal responsibility 
Contrary to the nominalist approach discussed in the section above, the realist approach 
recognizes the need to punish both the servant (employee) and the corporation itself as 
elucidated in previous chapters. However, its primary goal is to inflict punishment on the 
corporation itself. Under the realist approach the form of punishment may include 
deregistration of the corporation, adverse publication, criminal fines, and suspension of 
corporate trading licence. These forms of punishment are explored in the sanctions section 
discussed below. 
 
789 M Welsh & H Anderson “Directors’ personal liability for corporate fault: An alternative model” (2005) 26 
Adelaide Law Review 299 301. 
790 A Cowan “Scarlet letters for corporations? Punishment by publicity under the New Sentencing Guidelines” 
(1992) 65 Southern California Law Review 2387 2393. 
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6 3 Justification of corporate punishment 
This section explores as to why corporations may be subjected to criminal sanctions. 
Some of the reasons that seek to advance corporate punishment were stated in Chapter 1 
and elsewhere in this dissertation. However, it is important to identify and discuss some of 
the reasons that justify corporate punishment in detail. The discussion on corporate 
punishment is divided in two schools of thoughts. First, the nominalists who argue that 
companies are abstract entities or mere fictions – thus, they should not to be subjected to – 
alternatively they should be exempted from criminal punishment. Rather, individual servants 
or employees ought to be punished.791 The nominalists suppose that corporations do not 
have a physical body to suffer punishment. The second, is the realists “who affirm the 
existence of collective entities over and above their individual members.”792 The assumption 
been that companies can commit crimes, hence, the corollary ought to be that they could 
also suffer criminal punishment. 
There are several reasons that are advanced by both the nominalists and realists on the 
question of whether corporations must be subjected to criminal punishment or not. Before 
unpacking these reasons, it is important to elucidate the presumption of criminal 
punishment. The presumption of punishment helps to place the discussion in its proper 
context. Generally, it is presumed that crime must be punished. This presumption is not 
limited to punishment of individuals, rather, the scope of punishment may include subjecting 
corporations and even states to “punishment”, as the circumstances may require.793 Of 
course, this presumption entails that “punishment occurs as a natural response to 
 
791 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 18 posits that reductionist (nominalist) “maintain that to talk 
about collective entities is to use a shorthand or indulge in a fiction, and in either case is to designate nothing 
but the multitude of individual agents and their interactions.” 
792 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 18. 
793 S Rich “Corporate criminals and punishment theory” (2016) XXIX (1) Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 97-118. 
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wrongdoing instead of a conventional creation.”794 The essence here is that, as Lorca 
argues, offenders are punished not because the punisher intends to punish them, rather 
because “punishment is a natural consequence of crime – therefore, it is the criminals who 
have brought punishment upon themselves.”795 
The factors that underpin the discussion on whether to criminally punish corporations or 
not may be broadly identified as follows: First, the moral blameworthy person and practical 
personality argument. Blameworthiness here refers to having done something wrong and 
taking responsibility for such wrong.796 Goudkamp argues that blameworthiness is the 
bedrock or “foundation of liability.”797 The assumption been that blame798 “on the part of the 
offender justifies allocating punishment for a crime committed by such offender.”799 Some 
scholars argue that blameworthiness is influenced by a number of propositions, including 
that: 
“(a) to be blameworthy, one must have made a choice to engage in conduct which causes an 
undesirable outcome; (b) the relevant choice only exists if the individual could have conducted 
themselves so as to avoid the undesirable outcome; and (c) an undesirable outcome can only 
be avoided by way of a choice if the individual foresaw that outcome.”800 
 
794 R Lorca “The presumption of punishment: A critical review of its early modern origins” (2016) XXIX (2) 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 385 385. 
795 Lorca (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud at 385; Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 44. 
796 G Watson “Two faces of responsibility” in G Watson Agency and answerability (2004) 289 describe 
blameworthiness to involve the idea of liability to sanctions or certain adverse or unwelcome treatment; see, 
A B Carlsson “Blameworthiness as deserved guilt” (2017) 21 Journal of Ethics 89115.who posits that “agents 
are only blameworthy for that over which they have either direct or indirect control.” 
797 J Goudkamp “The spurious relationship between moral blameworthiness and liability for negligence” (2004) 
28 Melbourne University Law Review 342-373 at 342; D Owen “The fault pit” (1992) 26 Georgia Law Review 
703. 
798 Carlsson (2017) Journal of Ethics 92 defines blame as to be understood as a negative attitudes: indignation, 
resentment and guilt – he explains that “we feel resentment when the wrongdoing is directed towards 
ourselves, and indignation when the wrongdoing is directed to others. (…) these reactive attitudes have a 
rebuking character, which set them apart from contempt and shame.” 
799 Goudkamp (2004) Melb Univ Law Rev 342. 
800 Goudkamp (2004) Melb Univ Law Rev 347; S Perry “Risk, harm and responsibility” in D Owen (ed) 
Philosophical foundations of tort law (1995) 341. 
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In this context moral blameworthiness is construed to be concerned with the person’s 
state of mind and not necessarily the conduct which may be committed without the requisite 
mens rea.801 Inbar et al argues that “[a] blameworthy action is one where an agent causes 
harm to another and does so intentionally or where the harm was caused accidentally – 
these acts may include acts which are performed with intention to harms another even if 
such acts fails.”802 The concept of moral blameworthiness underscores that an individual 
can be blamed for the committing a crime (to have caused the harm) if such individual 
possessed the requisite mens rea to do so.803 The question as to whether a corporation may 
qualify as a moral blameworthy person is contentious. The nominalist school of thought 
argues that corporations should not be construed as moral blameworthy persons because 
they do not possess full faculties of their own – equivalent to faculties possessed by natural 
persons. By explication, this entails that corporations are akin to objects and do not have an 
independent state of mind. Corporations are not moral agents; moral agency is an intrinsic 
human characteristic. Corporations thus rely on the state of mind of their servants. 
Corporations ought not to be subject to the same constraints that are applicable to natural 
persons. In this context, the nominalists posit that “punishing corporations requires forcing 
them, conceptually as well as normatively, into a pre-existing procrustean bed designed to 
accommodate a different type of inhabitant.”804 
The essence of the nominalist argument is to demonstrate that the criminal law principles 
which are founded on individual criminal responsibility should not be applied in the same 
fashion to corporations as they are applied to individuals. The assumption is that if 
corporations ought to be criminally punished – such punishment should be conceptually and 
 
801 Carlsson (2017) Journal of Ethics 115; D A Pizarro, D Tannenbaum & E Uhlmann “Mindless, harmless and 
blameworthy” (2012) 23 Psychological Inquiry 1 4. 
802 Y Inbar, D A Pizarro & F Cushman “Benefiting from misfortune: When harmless actions are judged to be 
morally blameworthy” (2011) XX(X) Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1-11 available at 
<http://pspb.sagepub.com> (accessed on 2018/06/26). 
803 K G Shaver The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility and blameworthiness (1985) 70. 
804 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 17. 
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normatively distinct from those which are applicable to individuals. The underlying rationale 
for this assumption is that individuals are moral agents; corporations are not.805 
These nominalist assumptions are challenged by the realists who argue that corporations 
can be construed as rational agents. The rational agent status is, from the realist 
perspective, construed as a necessary condition to confer on corporations moral agency.806 
The argument is that if it is conceivable that corporations are rational agents, then, moral 
responsibility ought to attach. Rich posits that the concept of rational agency in the light of 
corporate punishment refers to the following: 
“A corporation is more than a simple object, and that imbuing it with attitudes and judgements is 
not the same as imbuing a machine with the same. It means that the agent responds to reasons, 
but it is more than that. It also means that the agent has some self-awareness, and that it takes 
responsibility for its attitudes and actions over time. While corporations’ actions are constituted 
of the decisions of multiple people, the group becomes distinct from the individuals that constitute 
it, with decisions that can sometimes diverge from the decision of a majority of group members 
if they decide alone for a corporation.”807 
These rationality attributes demonstrate the autonomous nature of corporations. It 
follows that body corporates can take or make decisions that are distinct from the personal 
decisions of its servants. This aligns with the “controlling mind” theory and the concomitant 
notion that the corporate entity can only have one intention, not the multiple intentions of the 
individual employees, but the intention formed by the “controlling mind” of the single juristic 
entity.808 Thus, when the servants of the corporations make decisions for the company, such 
 
805 For thoughts by exponents of the nominalist school, see H van Eeden, K Hopkins & C Adendorff “Criminal 
liability of moral blameless corporations” (Sept 2011) De Rebus 27 at 29.  
806 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 103 who argues “[t]hat corporate moral agency requires rational 
agency in order to exist and further that corporations are kind of entities that can properly be brought within 
the ambit of retributive punishment framework.” 
807 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 104. 
808 For an application of this theory, see Burg Trailers SA (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd 2004 (1) SA 284 (SCA) 
at para 7.  
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decisions are attributed to the company. The object here, being to ultimately reflect and align 
such decision with the single corporate intent. Pettit809 identifies the autonomy of corporate 
intention with reference to the application of what he terms the discursive dilemma. 
Through the concept of discursive dilemma Pettit gives an example of three directors 
who must adopt by means of votes several decisions that will in turn inform the course of 
corporate actions. The first director tenders a proposal (A) for the purchase of a new fishing 
boat. The second director proposes two things, (B) that some safety provisions to be 
installed in the boat – which turns out to be expensive, and (C) the boat to be docked near 
a popular bay, which is inked for lucrative fishing. The first director votes for proposal A and 
against B and C. The second director votes for proposal C but against A and B. The third 
director votes for proposals A, B and C. The outcome of the votes, which is in turn is called 
“corporate decision”, is to purchase a new fishing boat without installing security measures 
and to fish adjacent a popular bay. 
The discursive dilemma demonstrates that none of the directors (individually) wanted 
this type of conclusion to be reached. As Rich posits, “each director may depart with 
understanding that the corporate position is not really a reflection of his or her own views.”810 
It therefore follows that the corporate decision may not be traced to any specific individual 
director. Rather the decision reflects the corporate intention.811 In the event that the fishing 
boat causes injuries to someone on account that such a boat lacked the necessary safety 
provisions, it becomes difficult let alone unfair to hold the directors in their individual 
capacities responsible. Thus, the corporation itself ought to be responsible for the harm 
caused. 
 
809 P Pettit “Responsibility Incorporated” (2007) 117 Journal of Ethics 171 at 181. 
810 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 104. 
811 See, Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 25 who argues that “[i]nformation related functions are 
generally imputed to the organization, rather than to specific individuals, because the total information that 
leads to a certain decision, action, or product is not normally possessed by any single individual, nor is it just 
the combined knowledge possessed by a number of identifiable individuals. Instead, it depends on the 
organizational structure.” 
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Recognition of corporate decisions to be distinct from the individual members’ decisions 
(autonomy of corporations) taken together with the legal personality of corporations812 inform 
the argument in favour of practical personality.813 Practical personality is a “notion which is 
designed to answer the question of whether applying sanctions to an entity makes sense, in 
that it spells out the preconditions for using coercive power as a measure of control with 
respect to corporations.”814 Simply put, is it practical to attribute blame on corporations? If 
so, what are the conditions that must be satisfied for such blame to be attributed? Partly, 
these questions are addressed by the preceding discussion on corporate decision making 
process. The other way of addressing these questions is through the lens of legal personality 
of corporations. 
A detailed discussion on the legal nature and effect of corporate legal personality were 
discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation. However, suffice to state here 
that the essence of corporate legal personality is to confer corporations with rights, privileges 
and corresponding obligations as well as recognising corporations as persons. These rights 
and obligations serve as preconditions that effectuates or affords corporations to perform 
practical activities, such as taking and implementing corporate decisions, recruiting 
corporate servants, signing of corporate documents, sue and be sued. 
The second argument relates to the punishment of innocent persons. There are 
competing propositions on the question of whether corporate punishment should be 
abandoned on account that it unjustly subjects innocent persons to punishment. Innocent 
persons referred to under this argument, from the nominalist perspective; include 
 
812 See detailed discussion on corporate legal personality in chapters above. 
813 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy at 25 argues that practical personality requires that “we be 
able to ascribe to the corporation causal efficacy which includes some form of instrumental rationality 
manifested as much in the harnessing of the corporation’s causal power to the pursuit of some goals as in 
responsiveness to norms and threats that back them up. This involves, among others, representations of 
actions designed to thwart in one way or another corporation’s pursuit of its guiding goals and interests.” 
814 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy  26. 
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employees, creditors, consumers and shareholders of the corporations.815 In contrast, the 
realist in a counterclaim discards the nominalist argument with an analogue of the 
unintended effects of punishment imposed on individuals. From the context of punishment 
against individuals, the realist describes innocent persons with reference to the dependants 
of the individual on whom the sanctions are imposed. 
The nominalist argues that corporate punishment should be discarded on grounds that 
the corporations cannot truly suffer harm. Rather, corporate punishment may lead, as Dan-
Cohen puts it, to “punishing the innocent, even in the service of some desirable goals, 
amounts to treating an individual as a means rather than as an end, in violation of human 
dignity.”816 The underlying assumption that influences the nominalist’s line of thought is the 
infamous statement that a body corporate lacks the soul to damn but the soul of its servants 
and no body to kick but the body of its servant. In this context, punishment is understood to 
be “inflicted on human beings whose guilt remains unproven.”817 
Nominalists identified several ways through which innocent persons may suffer as a 
result of corporate responsibility. These include: a) loss of employment and fringe benefits 
by employees; b) shareholders may lose their investments and profits; and, c) in order to 
alleviate the burden of punishment (fines) the corporation may increase the product price to 
raise funds for purposes of using the profits to douse the fine. In this manner, the product 
price raising technique has the potential to indirectly cause the consumers to pay the fines. 
These nominalist arguments are challenged by realists, who firstly elucidate the effect of 
sanctions on the dependants of a punished individual. The argument is that it is inevitable 
for the effect of punishment to extend beyond the offender (individual or corporation) and to 
negatively impact on third parties (dependants, employees, and so on). This is the 
 
815 A W Alschuler “Two ways to think about the punishment of corporations” (2009) 46 American Criminal Law 
Review 1359 1367. 
816 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 22. 
817 Alschuler (2009) Am Crim Law Rev 1367. 
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unintended consequences of punishment. Therefore, it follows that it is unnecessary to 
advance the argument related to the impact of punishment on innocent third parties in an 
attempt to use such argument to discredit corporate punishment on one hand, and on the 
other hand fails to use the same argument against individual punishment. The basis for this 
averment is that the approach is selective and unfairly distinguishes the effect of punishment 
between third parties in corporate cases and those of individual cases.818 On this score, 
Beale posits that “[c]orporate punishment falls on the entity, though the effect is felt by the 
shareholders.”819 Similarly, in the case of individuals, the effect of punishment extends 
beyond the punished individuals to include family members and dependants of such a 
punished individual. 
The third argument relates to the efficacy of criminal punishment. The concept of efficacy 
entails the ability to yield a desired outcome.820 The question to whether corporate criminal 
punishment is effective to dissuade corporate criminality continues to be at the centre of the 
debate among scholars.821 The sceptics problematize the notion of “corporate crime” by 
questioning whether corporate crime is truly wrongful and in turn advocates for regulatory 
enforcement as the appropriate scheme of handling breaches committed by corporations. 
In contradistinction, the proponents of corporate criminal punishment affirm that 
corporations are capable of committing grave violations. 
The argument here is that the utilisation of regulatory enforcement is not effective enough 
to dissuade corporate crimes. The argument is grounded on the proposition that 
 
818 See, S S Beale “A response to the critics of corporate criminal liability” (2009) 46 American Criminal Law 
Review 1481 1485 who argues that “it is not possible to distinguish in a meaningful way the innocent third 
parties in corporate cases from the innocent third parties who are typically affected by prosecution of individual 
defendants.” 
819 Beale (2009) Am Crim Law Rev 1486 state that “when individual defendants are ordered to pay criminal 
fines, or imprisoned and unable to earn income, the purpose is to punish the defendant, though the effect 
extends to those who are dependent, directly or indirectly upon the dependent.” 
820 L Dunford & A Ridley “No soul to be damned, no body to be kicked: Responsibility, Blame and Corporate 
Punishment” (1996) 24 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 1 19. 
821 D M Nagy “Criminalization of corporate law: The impact of criminal sanctions on corporate misconduct” 
(2007) 2(1) Journal of Business and Technology Law 111 114. 
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corporations can easily calculate the cost of compliance against those of damages. Thus, if 
corporations are exempted from criminal sanctions, the chances of dissuading them with 
administrative or civil and regulatory enforcement mechanisms may prove futile.822 In 
contrast, the stigma associated with the imposition of criminal sanctions has the potential to 
deter corporate crimes. Dan-Cohen, in defence of corporate punishment, recognizes the 
value of civil and administrative penalties. However, he found that these civil and 
administrative penalties are not effective to deter corporate criminality. For this reason, he 
posits that “without criminally sanctioning the corporations, we face therefore an 
accountability and enforcement deficit.”823 The effectiveness of criminal sanctions imposed 
on corporations is discussed in more detail, below, in the section that deals with specific 
forms of sanctions. 
The fourth argument relates to “putting an end to impunity.” The argument for disrupting 
impunity for core crimes is a normative and policy imperative linked to the broader human 
rights and international criminal justice movements. These aspirational norms are also 
reflected in the Preamble of the Rome Statute. The relevant part of the Preamble provides 
that the international community are determined “to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” 824Of course, as things 
currently stand, the strategies to end impunity for the atrocity crimes may, at the domestic 
level, include the prosecution of human beings (individual) and also body corporates, but it 
certainly excludes the prosecution and punishment of corporations at the ICC itself, as we 
 
822 See, J E Fisch “Criminalization of corporate law: The impact on shareholders and Other Constituents”(2007) 
2 (1) Journal of Business and Technology law 91-95 at 91 who posits that “the reason for prosecuting 
corporations is that there have not been adequate civil or enforcement alternatives to ensure adequate legal 
compliance.”;  Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 98. 
823 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 28. 
824 See, Para 5 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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now know. It is precisely because of this “impunity gap” vis-à-vis corporations that the writing 
of this dissertation was undertaken in the first place. 
It was demonstrated in chapter 4 of this dissertation that companies can commit crimes. 
Further, that at domestic level, corporations may be prosecuted and criminally punished. In 
contrast, at international level, there are no enforcement mechanisms that are designed to 
hold corporations criminally liable. The lack of enforcement machinery, notably at the ICC, 
has a potential to shield corporations from been subjected to scrutiny and as a result 
corporation may enjoy impunity for international crimes. Dan-Cohen argues that “the failure 
to punish corporations is to exempt some powerful agents, capable of great social harm, 
from a significant instrument of social control.”825 This noted exemption (condoning impunity) 
can be avoided by extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to cover offences committed by 
companies. 
The fifth argument is concerned with rights and obligations of corporations as the catalyst 
for corporate punishment. Literature suggest, as was demonstrated in chapter 4 of this 
dissertation, that corporations have rights under domestic and international law.826 These 
rights, inter alia, include: the right to sue and be sued, acquire property, conduct business, 
and so forth. Corporations are recognized as legal persons with capacity to act. Some of the 
corporate acts, undeniably, may be construed as wrongful or unlawful acts that violate 
criminal law norms. Derived from this reality, the proponents of corporate punishment argue 
that since corporations possess rights both at domestic and international levels, it makes 
sense that there must be corresponding obligations. Breaches of such obligations should 
also be subject to criminal sanctions, where appropriate. This argument invokes balancing 
two competing factors, namely the rights of corporations on one hand, and on the other hand 
the corresponding obligations. This argument challenges the prevailing international law 
 
825 Dan-Cohen (2010) Journal of Law and Policy 17. 
826 See, R J Rafalko “Corporate punishment: A proposal” (1989) 8(12) Journal of Business Ethics 917-928. 
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approach (orthodox approach) which confers rights on corporations without providing 
corresponding consequences for breaches committed by corporations (in the course) when 
such corporations exercise their rights. 
6 4 What purpose does corporate punishment serve? 
The theoretical objectives for criminal punishment include deterring and preventing the 
commission of crimes, to rehabilitate and reform the offender, to restore the breached 
balance, and retribution.827 These theories of punishment are discussed below in the context 
of corporate punishment with special emphasis on the potential application of these theories 
by the ICC with respect to guilty corporations. The theories underpinning criminal 
punishment may be classified in three categories, namely: absolute, relative, and 
combination theory. In the discussion that follows, these theories are analysed in the context 
of corporate punishment. These theories are not limited to national level – rather they may 
be applied at international criminal law level. 
The theories of punishment are included in various articles contained in the text of the 
Rome Statute and has been interpreted and applied by the ICC, of course in the context of 
individual criminal responsibility.828 In Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the tribunal held that 
“accordingly, the Chamber considers that the preamble establishes retribution and 
deterrence as the primary objective of punishment at the ICC.”829 It follows that the ICC does 
not favour one single theory as the only correct theory – rather it advocates for a combination 
of various theories of punishment. 
 
827 On the traditional ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ theories of punishment, see C Roxin, “Prevention, censure and 
responsibility: The recent debate on the purposes of punishment” in AP Simester, A Du bois-Pedain & U 
Neumann (eds) Liberal Criminal Theory – Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (2014) 23 42.  
828 In Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08, Trial Chamber III, Decision on Sentence 
Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute delivered on 21 June 2016, para 8 provides that the “applicable law when 
issuing punishment include the Preamble, art 23, 76, 77 and 79 of the Rome Statute of the ICC as well as 
Rules 143, 144, 145 and 147 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rome Statute of the ICC.” 
829  Para 10. 
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The lack of a clear sentencing philosophy in the Rome Statute and the concomitant 
possibilities regarding the application of multiple theories (in combination), should not 
distract from the overarching aim of the ICC stated in the Rome Statute Preamble paragraph 
4, namely to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the crimes” within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, thus contributing to combating the offences. This may suggest a stronger 
emphasis on the deterrence theory; however, commentators have pointed out that even 
paragraph 4 of the Preamble should not be taken to mean that deterrence “will serve as the 
primary factor in sentencing offenders.”830 
6 4 1 Absolute theory 
The absolute theory, according to Kemp et al, underscores the restoration of the “balance 
that was disrupted”831 by an offender’s unlawful conduct. Thus, it may take the form of 
retributive or restorative measures which is distinguishable from vengeance.832 Based on an 
offender’s free will, the consequences or results of his or her conduct may attach personal 
responsibility or such offender may be held personally responsible for disrupting the legal 
balance.833 Suffice to state that the focus of retribution is not necessarily futuristic in nature, 
rather it is based on the past. 
In this manner, punishment is perceived to be justifiable because it is “just an end in 
itself.”834 Rich posits that punishment under the retributive approach is issued against the 
offender, “because the offender deserves the punishment in direct proportion to her or his 
 
830 A Hole “The sentencing provisions of the International Criminal Court” (2005) International Journal of 
Punishment & Sentencing 37 54.  
831 Kemp et al Criminal Law 20. 
832 See, Snyman Criminal Law 12 where he distinguishes between retributive and vengeance and posits that 
vengeance refers to the idea of ‘eye for an eye’ which he explains that it is the primitive premise of the absolute 
theory. This ancient perceived meaning of absolute theory is rejected by modern writers who contend that 
retributive theory’s premise is to “restore the legal balance which was disrupted by the commission of the 
crime.” 
833 Kemp et al Criminal Law 21. 
834 Snyman Criminal Law 11. 
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blameworthiness in committing the offence.”835 This theory is not foreign to the jurisprudence 
of the ICC. In Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo the tribunal described retribution and contrasted 
it with vengeance: 
“Retribution is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge, but as an expression of the 
international community’s condemnation of the crimes. In this way, a proportionate sentence also 
acknowledges the harm to the victims and promotes the restoration of peace and 
reconciliation.”836 
Currently, as it was stated in other Chapters of this dissertation, the Rome Statute of the 
ICC does not recognise corporate punishment. Therefore, the absolute theory which is 
contemplated by the text of the Rome Statute is aimed at punishing an individual. In the 
context of corporate punishment, the absolute theory does not appear to pose 
insurmountable challenges when applied to corporations. For instance, it was demonstrated 
in Chapter 5 that corporate will and intention may be derived from its culture and policies – 
in this respect it is sufficient to reiterate that corporations may contemplate in its policies the 
cost of committing a crime against the benefit thereof. A classic example, in the context of 
product liability, is that of Ford Motor Company, where it was noted that the “company 
created an internal report that calculated that paying out civil costs to burn victims would be 
less expensive than recalling and fixing all fault vehicles which were sold out.”837 
It follows that to effectively punish this type of corporate conduct may require, among 
others, the application of retributive theory. The issue as to whether a company lacks a 
 
835 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 100. 
836 ICC-01/05-01/08 Trial Chamber III, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute delivered on 
21 June 2016, para 11. 
837 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 99 he provides salient facts of Ford Motors Company that “employess 
of the Ford Motor Company were under pressure to produce an inexpensive and compact vehicle. In order to 
do this, they put the car’s fuel tank in the rear. They became aware that the car’s design, including its fuel tank 
placement, meant that some number of car passenger would likely suffer extreme burns or death. The so the 
car was left unsafe, and more deaths resulted – it was apparent that the problem with the vehicles could be 
fixed with an inexpensive improvement which required placing a piece of rubber around the gas tank which 
could cost US$5.00.” 
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physical body to be subjected to suffering – as required by the precepts of the absolute 
theory – should not limit the inquiry. It is rather suggested that suffering should not be limited 
to the physical nature of the offender but may take other forms including, as Rich puts it, the 
imposition of fines that reflects the “higher upper limits”838or which are proportionate to the 
harm caused. This proposition on sentencing policy is supplemented and discussed in detail 
below. Under the retributive theory the rationale for prosecuting a corporation, ought to be 
construed as the condemnation of the atrocities committed and its desire of working towards 
impunity free society. 
6 4 2 Relative theory 
The relative theory, unlike the absolute theory, is futuristic and it discards the concept of 
free will. It presupposes, as Snyman puts it, that “man does not have a freedom of choice 
but is the victim of outside forces.”839 Important to note that the relative theory encompasses 
three approaches: First, the preventive approach, that is the underlying rationale for 
punishment is to prevent the repetition of crime. The object is to incapacitate the corporate 
entity or render such entity incapable to commit an offence for the second or subsequent 
time.840 At early stages of civilisation irrational and drastic punishment measures which 
lacked proportionality to crimes committed were applied. For instance, if an offender 
committed a crime, such an offender could be subjected to maiming or death (the ultimate 
prevention). 
Under this approach, it follows that to effectively prevent the repetition of corporate 
criminality, it may require utilisation of mechanisms such as suspension of licence to do 
business and compulsory winding up.841 Primarily, the object of punishment is to disable the 
 
838 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 99. 
839 Snyman Criminal Law 14. 
840 Kemp et al Criminal Law 21. 
841 The terms “winding-up” and “liquidation” are sometimes used interchangeably. Both terms refer to the 
dissolution of a corporate entity, the selling off of the asserts owned by the corporation and the distribution of 
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offender. In the context of corporate punishment, even though body corporate cannot 
physically be incarcerated, “[i]t may be harmed, among others, by means of forfeiture of its 
assets and suspension of its licence to trade or conduct business.”842 In this manner, a 
corporate entity may suffer because, for instance suspending a trade licence of a corporation 
negatively affects such corporation’s goals, including frustrating its profit margins. In the 
same manner, forfeiture of a corporation’s assets makes it relatively difficult for such a 
corporation to reconstruct itself. This prevents the corporation from disguising itself under a 
new name or where such corporation contemplated relocation – thus, rendering the 
preventative theory effective and suitable to be applied on offending corporations. 
Secondly, the deterrence approach is also understood to be derived from the perception 
that “people choose to violate or obey the law after calculating the gains and consequences 
of their actions.”843 That is, offenders calculate the cost and benefit of committing a crime – 
if the benefits exceed the cost, then an offender may be motivated to commit an offence. 
The underlying assumption is that the offender is rational and capable to take decisions. 
In the context of corporate punishment, it was demonstrated in chapter 5 that a corporate 
entity is capable to set its goals, take decisions and implement such decisions. Under these 
circumstances, for the deterrence theory to be effective, punishment (cost) must be relatively 
higher than the pleasure (benefits) obtained by the offender from the crime in question. 
Deterrence may take the form of either general844 or specific forms.845 In Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo the tribunal held that “with regard to deterrence, a sentence should be adequate to 
discourage a convicted person from recidivism (specific deterrence) as well as to ensure 
that those who would consider committing similar crimes will be dissuaded from doing so 
 
the proceeds to legitimate creditors and other interested parties. See, in general, D Davis (ed) Companies and 
other business structures in South Africa 2ed (2010) 226-228. 
842 Rich (2016) Can J Law and Jurisprud 110. 
843 S G Shaham, O Beck & M Kett International Handbook of Penology and Criminal Justice (2008) 349. 
844 General deterrence seeks to deter would be offenders other than the offender who is punished from 
commission of crimes in the future. 
845 Specific deterrence aims to deter the offender in question from committing (repetition) offences in the future. 
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(general deterrence).”846 The assumption, unlike for retribution, is that punishment is inflicted 
to dissuade the actual or would-be offender from committing crime in the future. The 
emphasis is on the lesson taught to the offender and would-be offenders. 
Third, is the reformative approach, which entails that the purpose of inflicting punishment 
is to reinforce the character of the offender or to enable such an offender to overcome or 
resist the temptation of committing crime in the future. In this manner, punishment is 
perceived to reform or correct the offender. Thus, reformative punishment is thought to re-
educate the offender for such offender to become a responsible and useful member of the 
community.847 Henning argues that “criminal sanctions are appropriate for a corporation – 
when the goal of the criminal prosecution is rehabilitation of the organisation to change its 
corporate culture so that it can more effectively prevent future violations.”848 In effect, the 
reformative theory contemplates to induce corporations to put in place effective compliance 
programs and monitoring mechanisms that may in turn not only prevent corporate criminality 
but also improve corporate governance.849 
6 4 3 Combination theory 
The combination theory refers to the combination of absolute and relative theories of 
punishment. Absolute and relative theories should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. 
When applied in isolation they do not yield appropriate results. On this score, the proponents 
of the combination theory believes that when these two theories are combined they may 
produce better results.850 At national level, for example in SA, the combination theory was 
 
846 ICC-01/05-01/08 Trial Chamber III, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute delivered on 
21 June 2016, para 11. 
847 Kemp et al Criminal Law 21. 
848  P J Henning “Should the perception of corporate punishment matter?” (2010) 19 Journal of Law and Policy 
83 87. 
849 On compliance as a key aspect of good corporate governance, see 
<https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/08/principles-of-corporate-governance/> (accessed 2019/03/22).  
850 Snyman Criminal Law 19 states that “the courts do not reject any one of the theories, but on the other hand, 
they do not accept any single theory as being the only correct one to the exclusion of all the others.” 
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applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Zinn851 in which the court laid down a 
combination of attributes that should be considered when punishing an offender. These 
factors include the crime, the offender852 and the interests of society.853 The philosophy of 
punishment under the combined theory is similar to the philosophies elucidated under the 
absolute and relative theory. 
6 5 Sanctions 
Although international criminal law generally, and the ICC in particular, do not provide for 
specific sentencing options for corporations, it is essential to consider a few options in light 
of this dissertation’s proposed framework for corporate criminal liability under the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. 
6 5 1 Imprisonment 
Imprisonment refers to a judicial process of placing or incarcerating a convicted offender 
into a correctional facility or any place designated for the purpose of admitting the convicted 
offender to serve his or her sentence.854 Imprisonment is a generally recognized form of 
punishment and its application dates back to time immemorial. The practice of incarcerating 
convicted offenders continues to be relevant in the present era. Coyle et al argue that 
 
851 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540. 
852 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 Trial Chamber I, Judgment delivered on 10 July 2012 
the court is required to take the circumstances of the offender into account at sentencing stage. 
853 Snyman Criminal Law 19 describes these factors in relation to the theories of punishment and states that 
“[b]y ‘crime’ is meant especially the consideration that the degree of harm or seriousness of the violation must 
be taken into account – this implicitly refers to retributive theory; the factor of ‘criminal’ is understood to entail 
the personal circumstances of the offender, including the personal  reasons which drove him or her to commit 
the crime on one hand and on the other the prospects of such offender of becoming a law abiding member of 
society – when this factor is construed in this manner it may invoke reformative theory; and ‘interest of society’ 
factor firstly may refer to the need to protect society from harm – which may fall under preventive theory, and 
secondly to situation which contemplate to deter community from commission of crime – which implicitly 
involves general deterrence theory.” 
854 A Mickunas “Philosophical issues related to prison reform” in J Murphy & J Dison (eds) Are prisons any 
better? Twenty years of correctional reform (1990) 77-93; A Howe Punishment and Critique: Towards a 
feminist analysis of penalty 67. 
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“imprisonment is used as a tool of criminal justice policy in every country of the modern 
world.”855 From the philosophical standpoint, the absolutist (retributive) method requires the 
sentence of imprisonment imposed on the offender to be comparable to the crime 
committed. That is, the more severe the crime that was committed, the stiffer the term of 
imprisonment. In contrast, the relative theory’s point of view, is that “imprisonment should 
be inflicted with object to serve some greater good”856 which, among others, include to deter 
and or rehabilitate the offenders. 
In the context of corporate punishment, imprisonment as a form of punishment is 
obviously not applicable directly on the corporation itself. However, it is important to state 
that imprisonment as a form of punishment may be an effective tool that can be used to 
punish corporate servants or directors who are found liable for corporate crimes.857 It is not 
uncommon for directors or servants of corporations to be subjected to punishment by means 
of imprisonment. 
In Guus Kouwenhoven’s case discussed in chapter 5 of this dissertation, the accused 
(as director of body corporate) was charged for war crimes and arms smuggling. The 
accused was found guilty and sentenced to 19 years imprisonment.858 This case is relevant 
to the discussion on corporate criminal responsibility, particularly the responsibility of the 
directors of corporations. It sends an unambiguous message to all directors that conducting 
business with full knowledge that such business aids or abets the commission of atrocities 
attracts criminal punishment. From the deterrence perspective, the punishment of Guus 
Kouwenhoven serves two purposes, namely, to specifically deter the offender by 
 
855 A Coyle, C Heard & H Fair “Current trends and practices in the use of imprisonment” (2016) 98(3) 
International Review of the Red Cross 761 762. 
856 J M Pollock (eds) Prison today and tomorrow (1997) 9. 
857 See, S N Durlauf & D S Nagin “Imprisonment and crime: Can both be reduced?” (2011) 10(1) Criminology 
and Public Policy 30; C Murray Does Prison Work? (1997) 13, who posits that incarceration, reduces the 
incidence of crime committed. 
858  See, A Harrison “Dutch court makes legal history by sentencing timber baron Guus Kouwenhoven to 19 
years for war crimes and arm smuggling during Liberian civil war” (21 April 2017) Global witness, at 
<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-release> (accessed on 2018/06/29). 
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incarcerating him and to generally deter other directors and entities from committing crimes 
through the instrumentality of corporations. 
6 5 2 Criminal fines 
In criminal law, a fine refers to the sum of money that a court may impose as form of 
sentence on a convicted offender, including corporate entities for the crime committed.859 A 
fine is a competent sentence for a crime committed.860 For instance, the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act861 identifies a fine as a sentence that may be imposed upon a convicted 
offender, including corporate entities.862 A fine as a sentence for a crime committed can be 
distinguished from administrative fines, because “[u]nder pure system of administrative 
sanctions, regulatory agencies levies monetary penalties and the courts are often not 
involved, except in rare cases of judicial review of agency actions.”863 
Second, administrative fines’ main object is to seek or induce the corporation to conform 
or to comply with the legal standards or requirements. This is contrasted with the object of 
punishment contemplated under criminal prosecution, which may include, as we know, the 
element of retribution.  
Third, criminal fines, unlike administrative fines, are perceived to carry a high degree of 
stigma which may lead to the loss of corporate personhood and prestige.864 This distinction, 
to some extent, elevates criminal fines to be an appropriate form of sanction that is available 
 
859 Terblanche Sentencing 268. 
860 S v Angula (CR84/2012) [2012] NAHCXD 19, Judgment delivered on 10 October 2012. 
861 Section 276(1)(f) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (Namibia). 
862 Section 11(2) United Kingdom’s Bribery Act of 2010 state “[a]ny other person guilty of an offence, (a) on 
summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”; 
in addition see art 19(2) of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption which state that 
“each party shall ensure that legal persons (…) shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.” 
863 R M Brown “Administrative and criminal penalties in the enforcement of occupational health and safety 
legislations” (1992) 30(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 691 692. 
864 Brown (1992) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 718 elucidates that “[a] fine imposed on a corporation by a criminal 
court may be perceived by most people as indicating greater wrongdoing that an administrative penalty. This 
perception may exist because judicial pronouncements are seen as more authoritative than administrative 
rulings, or because the judiciary is associated with more serious crimes than administrative agencies.” 
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against offending corporations. Further, some scholars argue that since corporations, for 
lack of physical body, cannot be incarcerated or committed to prison, criminal fines are 
appropriate for purposes of sanctioning offending corporations.865 
It is argued that, in the context of the retributive theory, for a fine to be an effective tool 
of corporate punishment or to be justified as a morally appropriate response to a crime 
committed, it should be proportionate to the degree of the offence committed. However, in 
the context of the deterrence theory, in particular general deterrence, higher criminal fines 
may be required to effectively deter would-be corporate offenders. The theory is free from 
critiques, specifically, in light of the challenges which may arise in relation to heightened 
fines. For instance, large corporations may easily pay such higher fines; in contrast, small 
and medium size corporations may not afford to pay. The inability to pay the fine may tend 
to frustrate the object of punishment. The other issue is that the sentenced corporation may 
tend to increase commodity prices in order to make higher profits and thereafter pay such 
fines from the generated profits.866 In this manner, innocent customers may be subjected to 
heighted commodity prices. 
It is worth noting that in social control there is no theory that is absolute or without 
weakness. This is demonstrated by the existence of a myriad of theories that are available 
for purposes of justifying their applicability towards social control. Equally so, there is no all-
embracing or single perfect form of sentence. Thus, the imposition of fines as a competent 
form of sentence is not an exception. However, some of the challenges associated with a 
fine noted above, may be avoided. To avoid these challenges, recovery measures must be 
adopted. That is, where a convicted corporation fails to satisfy the fine, the court may issue 
 
865  P J Henning “Should the perception of corporate punishment matter?” (2010) 19 Journal of Law and Policy 
83 86 considers the “[r]eal punishment available against a corporation is a fine, which can be much more easily 
calibrated to redress any harm.” 
866 J A Corlett “French on corporate punishment: Some problems” (1988) 7(3) Journal of Business Ethics 205 
posits that fining a corporation is inadequate because the cost of the fines can be easily absorbed by raising 
consumer prices.” 
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a warrant authorizing the sheriff to levy the amount of fine by attachment and sale of such 
corporate assets.867 This measure may effectuate the enforcement of payment of fine. The 
issue of raising consumer price by corporations may be frustrated by government 
intervention through strategies on commodity price control.868 
6 5 3 Suspension of corporate trade license 
The preventative measures that may be adopted to prevent a body corporate from 
committing atrocities during its business operation, may include suspending its trading 
license. Suspension of trading license is a type of restraint that renders the convicted 
corporation unable to trade for a specified period of time. The rationale is that during the 
period of suspension, the convicted corporation may not be able to commit crimes. The 
effect of suspension, apart from been a preventative measure, may be reformative in nature. 
For instance, a suspension order may be issued against a convicted corporation to enable 
such a corporation to take remedial action, including compliance with the law.869Implicitly, 
this may induce corporations to alter or improve their corporate culture and put in place 
measures that dissuade employees from engaging in criminal activities, as well as for 
corporations to undertake human rights due diligence when conducting business. 
6 5 4 Deregistration of corporation 
Deregistration of a corporation may refer to the cancellation of the corporate entity’s 
trading license or the termination of its juristic status.870 Deregistration may be necessary 
where a corporate entity has failed to comply with specific legal provisions or where such a 
 
867 Section 288 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (Namibia). 
868 H Polikoff “Commodity price and the Supreme Court” (1940) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 934 
935. 
869 Botswana Trade Act 5 of 2004 which entered into force on 1 April 2008, Section 19 provides that “a 
suspension shall be for such period as the licensing committee may determine to enable the licensee to take 
remedial action so as to comply with such requirements of his license.” 
870 Nulandis (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance and Others 2013(5) SA 294 (KZP) para 9. 
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corporation has breached the law, including the commission of crimes871 during the 
subsistence of its trading license. The purpose is to persuade corporations to conduct their 
business within the perimeters of the law or encourage corporate compliance with the law. 
The effect is to restrain a convicted corporation from trading which may subsequently 
prevent such a convicted corporation from reoffending. 
If a corporation is deregistered, it continues to “[e]xist as an association of members who 
remain personally liable for its debts, while its assets become vested in the state.”872 In a 
nutshell, deregistration, just like fine and suspension of trading licence and criminal 
declaration, may be an effective method of corporate punishment. The reason being that it 
does not affect the innocent shareholder irreparably873 but rather it encourages compliance 
with laws. After deregistration, innocent or interested parties have an option to rectify or to 
influence the corporation to comply with the law in order to have such a corporation re-
registered.874 
6 5 5 Declaration as criminal entity and adverse publication 
The practice of declaring offending organisations or entities as criminal, is not foreign to 
international criminal law. The history of this practice is accredited to the Nuremberg legacy, 
as we have seen in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The impugned organisations were declared 
as criminal organisations because of their complicity in the commission of atrocities. It is 
worth noting that the effect of the declaration was not to punish the offending organisations 
 
871 Botswana Trade Act 5 of 2004 Section 20(1)(c) provides a license may be revoked where “the licensee has 
been convicted of an offence.” 
872 Nulandis (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance and Others 2013(5) SA 294 (KZP) para 9. 
873 See, Corlett (1988) Journal of Business Ethics 205 who argues that revocation may negatively affect 
innocent shareholder. To this effect, deregistration may be a much effective method of corporate punishment 
when compared to revocation which contemplates forced windup. For instance, in Botswana in terms of Trade 
Act 5 of 2004, section 20(3) it provides that a “licensee shall be given three months to windup a business 
where the license has been revoked.” 
874 Nulandis (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance and Others 2013(5) SA 294 (KZP) para 39 the court emphasized 
that “compliance with re-registration requirements is not a mere procedural formality but a substantive 
necessity for efficient management of the companies register.” 
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per se, rather it was to facilitate or afford the Allied Powers to prosecute and punish 
individuals for membership in organisations that were declared criminal. In as much as the 
declaration was not a form of punishment, the organisations that were declared ceased to 
conduct their operations. 
At national level, for example in South Australia, the Serious and Organised Crime Act of 
2008 vests the power to issue a criminal declaration against an offending organisation on 
the Attorney-General. For the declaration to be made, there must be information which 
depicts a link between the organisation and the atrocities committed.875 Thus, there must be 
evidence which indicates that: 
“The member of the organization associates for purposes of organizing, planning, facilitating, 
supporting or engaging in serious criminal activities,876 and the organization represents a risk to 
public safety and order.”877 
The effect of the declaration, as was found in South Australia v Totani,878 includes that 
the declaration carries no legal consequence for the declared organisation. That is, even if 
an organisation is declared criminal, it may continue with its existence and conducting 
business.879 However, it attempts to identify persons on whom a control order may be issued 
and whom others may not associate with. In essence, it criminalises association with an 
organisation that is declared as criminal.880 It is required by the Australian law that if an 
organisation is declared criminal, such declaration must be published in a government 
 
875 South Australia v Totani (2010) 243 CLR 1 at par 451. 
876 Sect 11(1)(a) South Australian Serious and Organized Crime (Control) Act of 2008. 
877 Sect 11(1)(b). 
878 (2010) 243 CLR 1 par 452 the Court held that “by itself the Attorney-General’s declaration carries no legal 
consequences for either the organization or its members. The Act does not proscribe an organization the 
subject of a declaration, nor its membership of such an organization made an offence. The declaration serves 
the purpose of identifying persons to whom other provisions of the Act will apply. It identifies persons who may 
be the subject of an application for a control order under section 14(1), on the basis of their membership. It 
identifies persons with whom others may not associate, on account of their membership of a declared 
organization, if the membership is proved.” 
879 Paras 167 and 397. 
880 Sect 35(1)(a) South Australian Serious and Organized Crime (Control) Act. 
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gazette.881Adverse publicity equally may have a negative effect on the corporation because 
it has the effect of exposing the body corporate to public scrutiny and shame. 
Dunford and Ridley opine that the object of adverse publicity must not simply inflict 
financial loss, but that it must be done in a manner that seeks to negatively affect the 
standing, image or prestige of the convicted corporation.882 In this manner, adverse publicity 
as a form of sanction must attract society’s condemnation against the convicted corporation 
so that it may effectively deter the convicted corporation and would-be corporate offenders. 
It is submitted that the effect of declaring a corporation as a criminal organisation must to 
some extent depart from the Nuremburg legacy, that is, the effect must not be limited to 
punishing the individual or to criminalise association thereof as contemplated under the 
Australian law. It should rather include that if an entity is declared as a criminal organisation, 
such entity should, in a compulsory manner, be caused to wind up or compelled to liquidate. 
On this score, suffice to state that declaring offending corporations as criminal 
organisations coupled with adverse publicity may be an effective sanction on corporations. 
This statement is premised on the theoretical assumption that for a corporation to thrive, it 
requires interaction or association with customers and other corporations. Thus, if this 
association cord is severed or cut by fear of criminal sanction against those who intend to 
associate with the declared corporation, surely the declared corporation’s prestige and 
status in the society in which it operates may decline or be negatively affected. 
Fombrun argues that organisational prestige, image and status are vital and “[o]f prime 
importance for many firms because their performance and survival depend in large part on 
their reputation.”883 For this reason, corporations may tend to, with all necessary measures, 
 
881 Sect 12. 
882 Dunford & Ridley (1996) International Journal of Sociology of Law 1 14. 
883 C J Fombrun Reputation: Realizing value from corporate image (1996) 10; On corporate reputation, see, B 
M Whetten & A Mackey “A social actor conception of organizational identity and its implications for the study 
of organizational reputation” (2002) 41 Business and Society 393 414. 
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strictly guard and protect their reputations, including avoidance of any conduct that may 
attract declaration as criminal organisation or which may lead to adverse publication. 
6 6 Conclusion 
The chapter recognized that corporate punishment is not provided for under the 
jurisprudence of international criminal law and in particular in that of the ICC. It was 
demonstrated that corporations at national level may be sanctioned for the commission of 
crimes. However, there seems to be no consistency in the application of corporate 
sanctions. Jurisdictions such as South Australia allows declaration of organisations as 
criminal entities as well as to effectively publish such findings in the government gazette 
whereas other jurisdictions such as Namibia and South Africa appear to provide for payment 
of criminal fines, rather than declaration of corporations as criminal entities. Despite these 
differences, this Chapter identified potential methods of punishment that may be available 
for sentencing a convicted corporation. These methods include criminal fines, suspension 
of corporate trade license, deregistration of convicted corporations, and declaration of such 
convicted corporations as criminal entities as well as adverse publication thereof. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion, lessons and submissions 
7 1 Introduction 
This Chapter constitutes the conclusion; the summary of lessons that may be derived 
from the preceding analysis and the main submissions. The lesson aspect of this Chapter 
includes lessons that culminate from the legacy of Nuremberg (both IMT and NMTs) – as to 
how the Nuremberg trials dealt with corporate criminal responsibility. It is important to reflect 
on the legacy of the Nuremberg trials. The Nuremberg trials served as the first international 
forum that dealt with international crimes. Further lessons on corporate liability for atrocity 
crimes are derived from the debates at the Rome Conference, and subsequent to that 
leading up to and including the Kampala Review Conference. 
This Chapter also reflects on the lessons that may be derived from domestic practices. 
These lessons are used to sharpen and buttress the main submissions on the disconnect 
between domestic and international practices; the effect of non-recognition of corporate 
liability; the governance gap; admissibility issues (complementarity rule); and the proposal 
for the amendment of the Rome Statute with the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the 
ICC to cover corporate criminal responsibility. 
7 2 Lessons on corporate criminal responsibility 
Corporations can commit crimes. Therefore, they ought to be criminally sanctioned. This 
principle, at domestic level, is recognized in several jurisdictions. However, research 
indicates that this principle is not universally recognized nor applied uniformly at domestic 
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level.884 Its recognition cannot, however, be overstated because even states that in the past 
did not recognise corporate criminal responsibility, have opted to recognise it, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 above.885 In contrast, it remains unrecognized at international 
level as a competent form of criminal responsibility.886 
The lack of universal recognition of the corporate criminal charge, at domestic and 
international levels, poses a number of negative effects including, a) retarded development 
of this principle; b) the failure by the international community to effectively govern the 
activities of corporations887; and c) counterproductive or disjointed jurisprudence between 
the ICC and domestic courts, particularly with reference to the aim of “[e]ffecting an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of international crimes.”888 In this regard, corporations are left 
at their own devices.889 This status quo has up to date successfully resisted change despite 
countless calls and proposals for reform from scholars and other international 
organisations.890 
Considering the above, this dissertation makes several submissions and proposes 
amending the Rome Statute. The contemplated amendment advocates for extending or 
widening the jurisdiction of the ICC to accommodate a corporate criminal charge. The 
benefits of incorporating corporate criminal accountability in the jurisdiction of the ICC were 
analysed in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 above. 
 
884 See, Chapter 5 of this dissertation above; R C Syle “Corporations, veils, and International Criminal Liability” 
(2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 955 974; S R Ratner “Corporations and Human Rights: A 
Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111(3) The Yale Law Journal 443-545. 
885 See, Stessens (1994) Int Comp Law Q 520; Corlett (1988) Journal of Business Ethics 205-210. 
886 J A Bush “The Prehistory of corporations and conspiracy in international criminal law: What Nuremberg 
really said” (2009) 109 Colombia Law Review 1094 1145. 
887 Bilchitz “(2016) BHJR 206. 
888 Kremnitzer (2010) J Int Crim J 916. 
889 Gotzmann (2008)  QLSR 36 at 46 emphasizes the need to close the governance gap and attempt to regulate 
corporate activities under international law and she argues that “the broader category of human rights law is 
continually evolving in response to the heightened awareness that limiting human rights liability to individuals 
and states is inadequate as this fails to regulate powerful non-state-actors.” 
890 Haigh (2008) Australian Journal of Human Rights 199. 
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7 2 1 Lessons from the Nuremberg trials 
The trials that were held in Nuremberg, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, were classified into two categories, namely, (a) the proceedings against the 
high ranking German officials held before the IMT, and (b) proceedings held in the 
demarcated zones before the NMTs.891 The distinction between these proceedings is 
relevant because these tribunals were constituted by distinguishable instruments. Although 
they were for the most part focussed on the criminal liability of natural persons, the 
declaration of certain organisations as criminal is noteworthy for this dissertation. 
The IMT was constituted in terms of the 1945 Charter of London and it dealt with the 
proceedings against the high-ranking Nazis, whereas the NMTs conducted its business as 
per the Control Council Law 10 and it dealt with the lower ranking members. In the context 
of corporate liability, the Charter of the IMT provided for the declaration of organisations as 
criminal organisations.892 The effect of the declaration was to hold individuals (natural 
persons) liable for membership in those organisations that were declared as criminal.893 If 
the proceedings for an offence of membership, as envisaged in Control Council Law 10, 
were brought against a natural person who has membership in an organisation which was 
declared as criminal, such declaration was acceptable proof of the criminal nature of the 
organisation in question. It follows that the corporate scheme from the IMT perspective was 
limited to the declaration of organisations as criminal. It became clear from the IMT trials 
that criminal responsibility for international crimes was individual.894 
Control Council Law 10 did not provide for organisational responsibility. Rather, it created 
an offence of membership in the organisation that was declared criminal. It is important to 
 
891 See, Chap 3 of this Dissertation above. 
892 See, para 1 of Art 9 of the Charter of the IMT. 
893 See, Chap 3 of this Dissertation above. 
894 See, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, (Göring and Others) 1946, 
IMT Vol XXII, Judgment and sentencing of the Afternoon Session of the Two Hundred and Seventeenth Day, 
Monday 30 September 1946. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
254 
 
point out, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3 above; that there was evidence that suggested 
that corporations participated in the commission of atrocities in various ways. These 
included, among others, the supply of essential war materials such as arms and 
ammunitions that were used in wars; production of zyklon B gas that was used in 
extermination camps; plunder, as well as the administration of slave programmes that 
benefited corporations and the Nazi regime.895 Despite these contributions, corporations as 
such were not brought before the Nuremberg tribunals. 
7 2 2 Lessons from the Rome and Kampala Review Conference 
The idea of establishing a permanent court that is designed to adjudicate over 
international crimes dates back to the immediate post-WWII era, but gained momentum 
during the Balkan wars of the early 1990’s.896 After a series of events and meetings, the 
idea became a reality that was effectuated by the Rome Conference of 1998 which led to 
the creation of the ICC in 2002. At the Rome Conference, corporate liability proposals and 
discussions were made, as was demonstrated in chapter 3 above, however, these proposals 
were not adopted. 
The international community (as represented at Rome) reiterated the IMT’s finding that 
responsibility for international crimes was individual – and for this reason, they did not adopt 
corporate criminal responsibility.897 There was scepticism among the members at the Rome 
Conference who held the view that the making provision for corporate criminal responsibility 
would negatively affect certain state parties’ primacy rights.898 This standpoint was 
 
895 See, Bush (2009) Colombia Law Review 1105 who avers that “during the war, the role of business in 
German war effort and criminality was known to be huge, as information streamed out of Europe about the 
extent of forcible population transfers for slave labour. Private employer ranged from small farms using forced 
labourers to bring the crops to facilities… corporate size was not always the equivalent of moral gravity: A 
small chemical firm was entrusted with distribution of Zyklon B to the SS at Auschwitz.” 
896 See, Cassese “From Nuremberg to Rome” in Rome Statute 4-5. 
897 See, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, “Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole” (1998) UN 
Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2, 133-136. 
898 See, Schabas (1998) 6(4) European Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 84 95. 
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challenged in chapter 3 of this dissertation. It was pointed out that the logic of the 
complementarity principle may cause dissonance between those states that, in theory 
(because of domestic criminal law principles) should be able to exercise jurisdiction over 
corporations but decline to do that. Normally, based on the complementarity principle, the 
ICC would then be able to step in, but because of the jurisdictional limitation in terms of 
natural persons only, the ICC will not be available either.899 The other factor that was inked 
to have contributed to non-adoption of corporate scheme during the Rome Conference was 
the lack of time. 
It was apparent that more time was required by the Rome Conference in order to ventilate 
the issues that were raised by corporate criminal responsibility. To this effect, the 
anticipation was that the issue of corporate liability would be afforded enough time during 
the Kampala Review Conference. This anticipation did not come to fruition because 
corporate liability was not included on the agenda of the Kampala Review Conference.900 
Thus, for corporate criminal responsibility to return to the discussion table, there should be 
a demand from state parties.901 
7 2 3 Lessons from domestic practices 
It was demonstrated in chapter 2 above that the principle of corporate criminal 
responsibility has evolved, and it is recognized, at domestic level, in certain jurisdictions and 
discounted in others. From the doctrinal development perspective, it is appears that the 
principle of corporate criminal responsibility continues to evolve.902 This averment is 
supported by the reality that some states which previously discounted this principle have 
opted to recognise it and include same in their legislations.903 However, there are disparities 
 
899 Kyriakakis (2008) Criminal Law Forum 125. 
900 See, Chapter 3 of this Dissertation above. 
901 See, art 121 of the Rome Statute of the ICC on the procedure that must be complied with when proposing 
an amendment – an analysis of this provision was made in chapter 3 of this Dissertation. 
902 See, Bernard (1984) Criminology 5. 
903 See, Chap 2 of this Dissertation above. 
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in relation to how this principle is applied in various jurisdictions in which it is recognized – 
the disparities depict the lack of uniformity. From the comparative study made in chapter 2 
of this dissertation above, it is revealed that the Namibian,904 Italian905 and South African’s 
corporate scheme is based on vicarious liability; UK is based on a fusion of identification 
and corporate culture theory,906 and; the USA been based on the fusion of vicarious liability 
and aggregation theory.907 
The disparity raises a number of concerns, among others, it creates jurisprudential 
disjoint at domestic level. Further, it may create a situation where corporations may be forced 
to relocate to states that have less stringent laws and enforcement mechanisms – in order 
to avoid strict scrutiny. To alleviate these consequences, it is submitted below that an 
international forum which recognizes the principle of corporate criminal responsibility is 
required to harness the domestic practices and to foster a homogenous approach of putting 
an end to impunity for corporate offences. 
7 3 Submission on the jurisprudential disconnect between the ICC and domestic 
courts 
This section consists of the submission on the jurisprudential disconnect between the ICC 
and domestic courts which was identified in this dissertation. The jurisprudential disconnect 
is at two levels. The first disconnect level is related to domestic courts themselves. In chapter 
2 of this dissertation it was demonstrated that domestic courts are divided in respect with 
how the principle of corporate criminal responsibility is applied. In essence, some states 
recognise corporate criminal responsibility on one end, and on the other end, some states 
adhere to the principle of societas delinqere non potest.908 Needless to say that in countries 
 
904 See, sect 332 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (Namibia). 
905 Italian legislative Decree 231/2001 issued on 8 June 2001. 
906 See, Chap 19 of the UK Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
907 See, Park & Song “Corporate criminal liability” (2013) 50 Am Crim Law Rev 764. 
908 See, generally Chap 2 of this Dissertation above. 
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where corporate criminal accountability is recognized – the practice lacks uniformity. The 
lack of uniformity is manifested in twofold: (a) lack of uniformity in the conceptual meaning 
and object of corporate criminal accountability principle, and (b) the lack of uniformity in the 
practice of sanction. 
It is worth to explain here that from the conceptual perspective; corporate criminal liability 
refers in its strict sense to a modality that seeks to hold corporations criminally accountable 
for the crimes committed. Thus, the primary object of corporate criminal liability 
contemplates to sanction the corporations themselves and not necessarily the directors or 
persons representing the corporations. The other object, which is relative, of the principle 
deems the corporation as a mere juristic person who cannot suffer pain for purposes of 
sanctions – for this reason – states use the principle of corporate criminal liability to sanction 
directors or others persons, as the circumstances may require, liable for crimes 
committed.909 
In the context of sanction, the lack of uniformity lies in the choice of theories which states 
adopt to effectuate and implement the principle of corporate criminal liability. On 
comparison, South Africa sanction corporations based on vicarious liability principle,910 UK 
sanction corporations based on identification principle,911 USA sanction corporations 
premised on multiple theories, namely: (a) vicarious liability, and (b) aggregation theory. 
Wherefore, Australia sanction corporations based on corporate culture and structural 
negligence.912 
The second jurisprudential disconnect is related to the ICC and national courts – in 
precise: courts that recognize the theory of corporate criminal liability. Here, the disjoint 
appears that the ICC recognizes individual criminal liability to the exclusion of corporate 
 
909 See, Welsh & Anderson (2005) Adelaide Law Review 301. 
910 See, Sect 332 Criminal Procedure Act (South Africa). 
911 Zinnecker (1985) Brigham Young University Law Review 326. 
912 The Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995. 
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criminal liability. In sharp contrast – some domestic courts recognize both individual and 
corporate criminal accountability. The disparity in recognized modes of criminal liability 
between the ICC and domestic courts has the potential to create and effectuate legal 
uncertainty in respect to, among others, the defences which may be available to the accused 
corporations.913 
This legal uncertainty may be experienced, for example, the corporation may 
successfully plea lack of jurisdiction when arraigned before the ICC for any core crime. In 
contrast, the corporation may not succeed with the plea of lack of jurisdiction when arraigned 
for core crimes under national courts. By implication, these differentiated approaches to 
corporate criminal responsibility can be circumvented by amending the Rome Statute to 
encompass the corporate criminal liability principle. 
7 4 Submission on non-recognition of corporate criminal liability under international 
sphere 
The main impediment against the recognition of corporate criminal responsibility principle 
at international law, as was demonstrated and challenged in chapter 3 of this dissertation 
above, among others, is the theoretical assumption underlying the societas delinqere non 
potest principle.914 Further, the other concern which appears to be at the core of non-
recognition of corporate criminal responsibility is non-existence of political determination 
from the international community. Bilchitz argue that the main challenge relating to a call for 
a treaty or reform on corporate criminal responsibility in international sphere is the lack of 
 
913 Haigh (2008) Australian Journal of Human Rights 208. 
914 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 334 notes that “the comparative law problem of 
diverse national positions in relation to both the principle and form of corporate criminal liability has been a live 
issue in the debates around corporate criminal liability under international law. In some states, for example, 
the principle of societas delinquere non potest still prevails.” 
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consensus915 and political will from international community to recognize a company as a 
subject of international law for purposes of criminal liability.916 
Gotzmann argues that “the extension of legal subject-hood under international law has 
been motivated by both utility and ideology.”917 She proffers that the recognition and 
inclusion of international organization such as the UN as legal subject of international law 
was based on practical reality. That is, this perspective dispenses away with the traditional 
theories of international law that deemed legal personality as an exclusive club of states 
only. From this perspective, it is suggested that legal personality under international law or 
to be a legal subject under international law is not engraved in a stone. Rather the concept 
is dynamic and fluid in nature. It is a concept that is subject of change based on needs. In 
this context, to discount corporation from the scrutiny of international law is to discredit the 
efforts of “[h]uman rights theories that rejects limiting duty holders to states or to those 
carrying state policies.”918Therefore, the theoretical basis for recognizing corporations as 
legal subject of international law ought to hinge, among others, on the practical reality that 
corporations are (a) conferred with international rights and protections, (b) capable to bring 
litigation, enforce and defend themselves under international law, and (c) are capable to 
bear international duties.919 
7 5 Submission on closing governance gap 
It is common knowledge that corporations are juristic persons with rights.920 These rights, 
among others, include the right to associate, transact or conduct business with other 
persons at domestic and or international level (for transnational corporations).921 These 
 
915 Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 224. 
916 Dugard International Law 3. 
917 Gotzmann (2008) Queensland Law Student Review, 36 46.  
918 Ratner (2001) Yale Law Journal 452. 
919 E Duruigbo “Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes 
and Recurring Challenges,” (2008) 6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 238 to 239. 
920 Davies Company Law 153; Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
921 Ratner (2001) Yale Law Journal 461. 
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attributes signifies that corporations are global actors, and as Slye observes, corporations 
enjoys full protection under “international law as they are construed as proper objects of 
international law.”922 It was demonstrated in chapter 4 of this dissertation that through the 
interactions or in pursuit of the commercial activities, corporations may commit acts that may 
be construed as criminal. These criminal acts, without doubt, may assume serious 
dimensions to qualify as atrocity offences.923 
In order to subdue or alleviate these consequences, a series of instruments both at 
domestic and international levels respectively as was demonstrated in chapter 3 and 4 of 
this dissertation above have been adopted. However, the responses to these consequences 
raises concerns in relations to (a) the varying approaches adopted, and (b) the effectiveness 
of such approaches to deter corporate criminal acts. In relations to variations in approaches 
– at domestic level – (i) some states may subject corporations to criminal prosecution, and 
(ii) some states construe corporations as mere fictions and as such deem them to be 
incapable of committing crimes.924 Consequently, the latter category of states finds no 
justifications to subject corporations to criminal prosecutions. This latter approach 
underscores, among others, that companies may be held to account through administrative 
sanctions or civil sanctions.925 
The variation on approaches to corporate responsibility has created governance gap. In 
this context, the concept of governance gap denotes a state of affairs where a corporate 
behaviour is criminally punished in certain jurisdictions and at the same time, such similar 
behaviour is not punishable in other jurisdictions.926 This situation subsists as it is noted with 
 
922 Slye (2008) Brook Journal of International Law 956. 
923 Ratner (2001) Yale Law Journal 457. The international community has for a long time recognized the power 
which corporations possess both at domestic and international sphere with its concomitant consequences, 
including commission of crimes. 
924 See, Chap 2 of this dissertation above. 
925 See, Weigend (2008) JICJ 929. 
926 See, D Bilchitz “Human rights accountability in domestic courts: Does Kiobel increase the global governance 
gap?” (2013) 130(4) South African Law Journal 805. 
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the current practices at national level as was demonstrated in chapter 2 of this dissertation 
above. 
In essence the fact that states such as UK, South Africa, France, just to mention a few, 
recognise corporate criminal conduct and sanction such conduct with criminal sanctions on 
one end, and on the other end, a same corporate criminal conduct is not recognized by other 
states such as Germany nor is it criminally sanctioned may be construed to constitute 
governance gap. The issues related to governance gap has been raised by other scholars 
who argue that the failure to close such loopholes may lead to corporations continuously 
enjoy impunity for crimes committed. Bilchitz in this regard posits that: 
“There is problem of weak governance zones: there are parts of the world in which laws are not 
properly enforced, human rights standards are weak and courts lack independence. How can 
one ensure that individuals can gain access to a remedy against corporations that violate 
fundamental rights in these contexts? Corporations could exploit the weakness in these countries 
to maximise their profits without any fear of legal consequences.”927 
The anxiety caused by governance gap is not just limited at domestic level; rather it 
extends into the international sphere. At international level, all the forms of corporate 
responsibility are not recognized (be it criminal, civil or administrative) and as such the 
current approach to corporate responsibility is based on corporate voluntary compliance 
schemes.928 Under voluntary compliance scheme, in contrast to corporate criminal 
responsibility, corporations are left at their own devices or to regulate themselves. 
 
927 Bilchitz (2016) BHRJ 217; Kremnitzer (2010) JICJ 916 who opines that “the problem is that states alone 
cannot be trusted to enforce the law within their jurisdiction when international crimes are committed. The main 
problem is that states may prefer the investments and the economic activity of culprit-corporation over the 
need to protect their citizens from such corporations.” 
928 The concerted effort of the international community is demonstrated by the adoption of several noncriminal 
norms (self-regulation by corporations). See, UN Global Compact principles; OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises; International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises. 
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Literature suggests that these voluntary compliance schemes have been ineffective.929 
Of course, the obvious rational for this suggestion lies in the non-binding legal nature of 
voluntary compliance schemes.930Apart from these ineffective international voluntary 
compliance schemes, currently: it appears that there is no institution or forum at international 
level that has jurisdiction to adjudicate over international crimes committed by corporations. 
The lack of international forum has the potential to increase the governance gap.931This 
averment resonates from the reality that “corporations no longer operate within one 
jurisdiction and have capacity to cause harm in a range of jurisdictions.”932 
The fact that corporations are capable of operating or conduct business in two or more 
jurisdictions at the same time renders it difficult for their conduct to be effectively regulated 
at domestic level. This is exacerbated by the domestic approaches to corporate criminal 
responsibility, namely, some states do not recognise corporate criminal responsibility. The 
consequences here, among others, been that the non –recognition thereof, has potential to 
afford offending corporations an opportunity to seek safe havens in such jurisdictions – and 
in turn, it effectuates the governance gap. 
It is therefore, this dissertation’s submission that in order to effectively reduce the present 
governance gap, there must be an international forum that is vested with competent 
jurisdiction to adjudicate over corporations for international crimes. This submission does 
not necessarily call for the creation of another international court besides the ICC. Rather 
the call is to amend the Rome Statute and to vest the ICC with the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
over core crimes committed by corporations, as is submitted below. 
Here, the proposal is that: the inclusion of corporate charge under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC has potential to reduce the governance gap effectively in the sense that under the 
 
929 Kyriakakis (2009) Netherlands International Law Review 352. 
930 Scholz (1984) Law and Policy 404; Matisoff (2015) Policy Sciences 126. 
931 Bilchitz (2013) SALJ 805. 
932 Bilchitz (2013) SALJ 794. 
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circumstances where states seized with the a corporate charge are unable or unwilling to 
investigate the corporations, then the ICC may activity the complementarity scheme and 
assume jurisdiction.933 The submission is constructed on the contention that the ICC is the 
most appropriate forum that can reduce the governance gap because it has a number of 
attributes which may not be found at domestic level. These attributes, among others, 
includes a) the ICC is not limited to a specific geographical location of a state (territory) – it 
has a universal reach advantage, in contrast, states may lack the requisite extraterritoriality. 
For instance, if a corporation commits grave human rights violations in state A and relocate 
to state B the chances of state A to successfully prosecute such a corporation, 
notwithstanding the bilateral extradition treaties, are reduced significantly. This challenge 
may be surpassed by the ICC with fewer technicalities involved. b) The ICC is an 
international institution that has jurisdiction to adjudicate over atrocity crimes; in contrast, 
domestic courts may lack the jurisdiction over atrocity crimes. Finally, it helps in the process 
of legitimising corporate domestic prosecution. 
7 6 Submission on extending the ICC jurisdiction to include corporate criminal 
responsibility 
There are compelling factors that support the request aimed at extending the jurisdiction 
of the ICC to cover the core crimes committed by juristic persons. On this score, among 
others, Gotzmann argue that “[c]orporations have increased in mobility and power which 
affords them the ability to evade national laws and enforcement mechanisms.”934 
 
933 See, Haigh (2008) Australian Journal of Human Rights 200 noted that “Many host states, which are often 
developing states where TNCs locate their production capabilities, may be unwilling or unable to effectively 
regulate the human rights conduct of TNCs within their jurisdiction. A host state may not have the financial or 
legal resources to regulate a powerful TNC. The host state may be concerned that the TNC will relocate, taking 
its foreign direct investment with it, if made to account for its human rights conduct. The problem is 
compounded if the host state has committed human rights violations in which the TNC has been complicit. A 
home state, the country in which the TNC’s parent company is incorporated, and often a developed state, 
generally does not act to fill this regulatory gap.” 
934 Gotzmann (2008) Queensland Law Student Review 41. 
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Corporations’ mobility and conduct of business is not limited to national borders, rather, they 
may operate in several countries. Corporate mobility makes it easy for corporations to evade 
national laws and their enforcement – simply by, after committing atrocities such corporation 
may relocate to other countries. 
Scholars are in agreement that modern corporations wield much economic power and 
influence.935 This economic power can be used to exert pressure on governments – 
especially, in developing states – to ignore the atrocities committed by corporations. Further, 
as it was demonstrated in detail in chapter 4 of this dissertation, it cannot be denied that 
corporations are capable of committing atrocities. Therefore, it is submitted that to effectively 
put an end to impunity enjoyed by corporations or efforts to sanction corporations for 
atrocities committed must be at an international level – in this regard, through the ICC.936 
Extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to cover crimes committed by corporations has a 
potential, among others, to: (a) lay the foundation for developing the principle of corporate 
criminal responsibility – which it deserves; (b) it contribute to the efforts for respecting, 
upholding, and protection of human rights – which is much desired, and (c) it contributes to 
bringing an end to impunity for atrocity transgressions committed by corporations.937 Against 
this backdrop, it is proposed that the Rome Statute ought to be modified or an amendment 
to be effected to make provision for the principle of corporate criminal liability. 
The proposed amendment, among others, include, first – to amend article 11 of the Rome 
Statute to afford the ICC with the “jurisdiction ratione temporis” over core crimes committed 
by corporations “after the entry into force of” the amendment that provide for corporate 
criminal responsibility. The essence of the jurisdiction ratione temporis amendment provision 
(over corporate crimes) is to guard against retrospective punishment938 and to uphold the 
 
935 Van Solinge “The tropical timber trade” in Organized crime 111 
936 Gotzmann (2008) Queensland Law Student Review 41. 
937 Para 5 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
938 See, art 24 of the Rome Statute of the ICC which provided that “no person shall be criminally responsible 
under this statute for conduct prior to entry into force of the statute.” 
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“nullum crimen sine lege principle.”939 The essence of “nullum crimen sine lege” is to limit 
the ICC’s jurisdiction to a criminal conduct that was recognized as crime when it was 
committed. Further, the recognized crime must be a crime that falls within the purview of the 
ICC. 
Second – to amend article 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC by means of incorporating 
article 25 bis. The proposed article 25 bis contemplates to provide for corporate criminal 
responsibility in the following terms: 
Article 25 bis  
Corporate criminal responsibility 
1) The court shall, except for states, have jurisdiction over corporations (“juristic 
persons”). 
2) A corporation shall be found accountable and liable for a penalty for an offence under 
this statute, if such corporation: 
a) Individually or jointly with other corporation(s) or natural person(s) commit an 
offence, or 
b) Aids, abets or assists in the commission or attempted commission of an offence, 
or 
c) Furthers the commission or attempted commission of an offence. 
3) Corporate conduct that constitute an offence, under this statute, shall be proved by 
establishing that: 
a) The conduct was committed by a servant or agent of the corporation. 
b) The corporate servant or agent’s unlawful conduct shall be imputed on the 
corporation, if it is proved that such unlawful conduct was committed whilst such 
servant or agent was: 
 
939 See, art 22 of the Rome Statute of the ICC which provides that “a person shall not be criminally responsible 
under this statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the court.” 
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i) in course and/ or scope of employment or agency, or 
ii) in furtherance of the interests of the corporation, or 
iii) in compliance with the juristic person’s organisational policy, or 
iv) existed a prope nexum between the unlawful conduct committed by servant 
or agent of the corporation and the corporation or organisation’s business. 
4) Corporate mens rea shall be proved by establishing that: 
a) The servant or agent of the corporation authorized (expressly or impliedly) the 
commission of an act that constituted the offence, or 
b) There exist a corporate policy or culture that authorised or condoned (expressly 
or impliedly) the commission of an act that constituted the offence. 
5) A corporation’s accountability for an offence, shall not be construed to exclude the 
individual criminal responsibility of the servant or agent of the corporation who is the 
perpetrator or accomplice of the offence. 
Third – to amend article 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC by effecting the incorporation 
of article 30 bis after sub-article (3) of article 30. The proposed amendment is to provide for 
the presumptions on mental element of the corporation. 
Article 30 bis 
Corporate mental element 
1. A corporation shall be found accountable and liable for a penalty for an offence under 
this statute, if the elements of an offence are committed with intention. A corporation 
shall be presumed to have intention where:  
a) in relation to conduct, that a corporation through its servant or agent or 
corporate policy or corporate culture intended to engage in the unlawful 
conduct. 
 b) in relation to the unlawful consequence, 
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i) a corporation, through its servant or agent intended to cause that 
unlawful consequence, or 
ii) a corporation is aware that in the ordinary course of event the unlawful 
consequence will occur, or 
iii) a corporate policy or culture means to cause that unlawful consequence 
or condones that unlawful consequence. 
Fourth – to amend article 63 of the Rome Statute by means of inserting sub-article (3) to 
provide for a proprietor (employee, or servant, or agent) to represent a corporation during 
trial. 
Fifth – to amend article 77 of the Rome Statute by means of incorporating article 77 bis 
to provide for penalties applicable to juristic persons in the following terms: 
Article 77 bis 
Penalties applicable to corporations 
1. In respect to a convicted corporate offender, the Court may impose one of the 
following penalties for an offence referred to in article 5(1)(a),(b) and(c) of this 
statute: 
a) Criminal fine for a specified amount of money, or 
b) Suspension of the corporate trade licence for a specified period of time, or 
c) Deregistration of corporation, or 
d) Declaration of corporation as criminal entity, or 
e) Adverse publication of corporation. 
2. The Court may impose a combination of any of the penalties referred to in (a), (b), 
(c), (d) and (e) of sub-article (1) of this article. 
3. In addition to penalties referred to sub-article (1) and (2) of this article, the Court may 
order: 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
268 
 
a) The seizure or confiscation of any proceeds or assets or property gained from 
the offence. 
b) The forfeiture of any proceeds or assets or property gained from the offence. 
An analysis as to how these proposed amendments would work is provided in details in 
chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation. For this reason, there is no need for repetition here; 
however, it is important to state that corporate punishment is advantageous in many 
respects. For instance, the Rome Statute of the ICC contains remedies such as reparation, 
compensation and restitution. These remedies mainly involve monetary values. The 
probability is high for a corporation, unlike a natural person, to honour a reparation, 
compensation and restitution order of the court. This is because, corporations commands 
much economic power and influence than a natural person. The discussion that follows 
focusses on the submission on issues related to challenges that may ensue in the event that 
a corporate charge is recognized under the Rome Statute – mainly the admissibility of a 
corporate case before the ICC. 
7 7 Submission on issues of admissibility of a corporate case 
The inroads made by and as provided for in domestic legislations and international 
instruments discussed above demonstrate an appropriate step in the right direction. 
However, these inroads are in themselves inadequate to solve the comparative law 
challenge that emerged throughout or at the time of crafting the Rome Statute. The 
challenges, inter alia, included an argument that – to include a corporate charge, some 
states (that do not recognize a corporate charge) would be rendered “unwilling and unable 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”940 The finding of unwilling and inability to 
investigate or prosecute is a vital factor that triggers the ICC to invoke its complementarity 
jurisdiction over the international crime. 
 
940 Art 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
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The issue of admissibility of the international crime before the ICC was determined in 
Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein 
Ali.941 The court determined that for a matter to be inadmissible before the ICC – domestic 
investigation must demonstrate that ‘it covered the same individual and the same act’. 
Further that, mere preparation or undertaking to investigate in future is not sufficient for a 
successful claim of inadmissibility before the ICC. In the context of Germany and Italy, chief 
to this enquiry is the domestic law that exclude corporate criminal liability. Therefore, 
partially, the comparative law challenge may be resolved by answering the legal question to 
whether – if the envisaged corporate scheme was to be included in the Rome Statute could 
a defence or plea of defective national law be sustained under circumstances where a state 
fails in its obligation to implement the Rome Statute of the ICC? Conversely, can a state 
raise a “defect in national law” as defence for failing to cooperate with the ICC? 
It is worth to note that article 1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides for 
complementarity rule. This rule entails that domestic courts assumes primacy “[i}n the 
investigation and prosecution of core crimes”942 and not otherwise. Further, article 88 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC obliges states to render the necessary cooperation with the ICC. 
Considered holistically, the gist of these provisions is to ensure that the state parties 
positively implement the Rome Statute of the ICC by putting in place mechanisms which are 
required in order to achieve the state’s responsibilities. It then follows that, firstly in event 
where a domestic rule conflict with an international customary rule, in most jurisdictions, the 
international customary rule prevails.943 Secondly, the “jus cogens” nature of core crimes 
dictates their direct application to domestic jurisdictions. The consequences here include 
that states, by virtue of jus cogens, may be required to cooperate, ie by means of 
 
941 ICC-01/09-02/11 O A, para 36 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judgment 30 May 2011. 
942 See, art 1 Rome Statute. 
943 Art 144 of the Namibian Constitution; Sect 39(1)(b) of 1996 South African Constitution. 
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implementing the Rome Statute – which, by extension counters the defect in domestic law 
argument. 
The legal question on defect in national law was adjudicated on in Prosecutor v Tihofil 
Blaskic944 in which the court found “(…) there exists in international law, a universally 
recognized principle whereby a gap or deficiency in municipal law or any lack of the 
necessary national legislation, does not relieve states and other international subjects 
(juristic persons) from their international obligation”.945 Furthermore, the solution to the 
comparative law challenge is not necessarily limited in introducing administrative or civil 
sanctions in the text of the Rome Statute, rather the solution may be sought from a swarm 
of contributing factors, for example: policy considerations. 
The policy consideration factors include, firstly: it is submitted that, as a matter of policy 
consideration, prosecuting and punishing corporations for international crimes have an 
effect of enhancing the deterrence theory contemplated by the Rome Statute. Further, 
prosecuting corporations is one of the available effective and systematic methods of bringing 
an “end to impunity” for the perpetration on international crimes. By extension, the failure to 
cause corporations to account criminally, has the potential to incentivise the commission of 
core crimes by corporations.946 The second policy factor lies in the “separate legal 
personality of corporations.”947 That is, a duly incorporated corporation is a real subject of 
law with full capacity,948the right to conduct business from which the corporation derives its 
benefits. It is therefore submitted that the assumption should be that if a person has rights, 
equally so, such a person must be imposed with duties that correspond with the rights. For 
instance, corporations has the right to conduct business for its benefits or profit, regrettably 
 
944 IT-95-14-T Judgment of 3 April 1996 Decision on the motion of the defence filed pursuant to Rule 64 of the 
rules of procedure and evidence. 
945 Prosecutor v Tihofil Blaskic IT-95-14-T Judgment of 3 April 1996 para 7. 
946 Amann (2001) HICLR 331. 
947 See, Salmon case for further reading on legal personality. 
948 Goulding Company Law 40 argues that “[o]nce registered in a manner required by law, a company forms a 
new legal entity separate from the shareholders, even where there is only a bare compliance with the 
provisions of the Act and where the overwhelming majority of the issued shares are held by one person.” 
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these corporations in pursuit of maximising their benefits are not immunised against abuse 
of their powers, including commission or participation in the commission of crimes. 
Therefore, these unlimited powers without correctional measures enjoyed by corporations 
must be challenged.949 
Thirdly, it is undeniable that corporations of nowadays are institutions that are much 
organised when compared to ancient corporations.950 For instance, ancient corporations 
could not act nor make a decision. Currently, the position is that corporations are capable of 
formulating policies, taking rational decisions951 and implement these decisions (policies) in 
the interests of the corporation, contrast to direct interest of the employees of such 
corporations. As a result, punishing an employee for the conduct from which he or she did 
not derive pleasure or benefit952 is unfair and prejudicial. Thus, it is submitted that to correct 
this ill-conceived legal position and prejudice ascribed on the employee – the assumption 
should be that punishment must be made against the persons who benefited or obtained 
pleasure from the criminal conduct, in this regard, the corporation itself. 
7 8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter contains the summary of this dissertation, reflecting on the lessons that may 
be derived from the IMT, NMTs, the Rome Conference and the Kampala Review Conference 
as well as the practices from domestic courts on criminal responsibility of body corporates. 
It further provided a number of submissions, ranging from jurisprudential disconnect that 
exists between the domestic courts and the ICC; submission on why it is crucial to recognize 
juristic persons as subjects at international level and for purposes of corporate responsibility; 
 
949 Davies Company Law 153 posits that the concept of capacity when applied in the context of companies 
can be traced back to the 19th century when the concept of a ‘company’s legal capacity’ was developed by the 
courts; more specifically, the company’s capacity to act was limited by its objects. The practice was that a 
company was required by legislation to include a statement of its objects in its memorandum of association; 
hence, companies were not allowed to act outside their objects. 
950 See, Chap1 of this dissertation above. 
951 Fisse & Braithwaite Corporations 102. 
952 Cavanaugh (2011) JCL 415. 
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submission on the need to close the corporate governance gap through the instrumentality 
of international criminal law – with special emphasis on the object “to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of international crimes”953 with focus on corporations. 
It is without doubt that modern corporations are at law recognized as juristic persons with 
capacity to act and their acts may extend beyond the territory of a single country. They may 
be economically powerful to an extent that they can influence government policies, including 
bringing wealthy through foreign direct investment and improve people’s lives. However, 
some of the corporate conduct may constitute serious violations (international crimes), 
therefore, to effectively deter corporations from committing crimes, this dissertation made a 
submission on amending the Rome Statute. The contemplated amendment, inter alia, 
include provisions related to temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, incorporation of article 25 bis 
that deals with corporate criminal responsibility and incorporation of article 77 bis to provide 
for penalties applicable to corporations. 
In sum, it is was noted that the principle of corporate criminal responsibility appears to 
progressively develop at domestic level954 contrary to international criminal law level. This 
lack of development at international level depicts, among others, the lack of political will by 
the international community. This dissertation has demonstrated that the adoption of 
corporate criminal responsibility by the ICC, is a realistic opportunity that may effectively 
thwart impunity for atrocity crimes committed by corporations. To buttress this submission 
and as it was elucidated in the preceding chapters, Stewart argues that the significance of 
corporate criminal liability include its expressive function – here, corporate criminal liability 
is construed as an effective “vehicle for communicating moral blame for corporate 
participation in atrocities.”955This expressive function renders corporate criminal liability to 
be a preferable model of liability in contrast to civil liability. 
 
953 See, preamble of the Rome Statute. 
954 Haigh (2008) Australian Journal of Human Rights 205. 
955 Stewart “Towards synergies in forms of corporate accountability for international crimes” 3. 
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The expressive (punitive) nature of corporate criminal liability, as was extensively 
discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6 above, includes the stigma that it presents on convicted 
corporations. Further, as was demonstrated above, the pro-corporate criminal liability 
scholars are in agreement that the imposition of criminal sanctions does not openly allow 
corporations to engross the cost by passing same to innocent consumers through 
commodity or service elevated prices.956 Finally, this dissertation demonstrated that both 
corporate criminal liability, individual criminal responsibility and civil liability can co-exist in 
pursuit of an effective solution to corporate accountability for international crimes. 
  
 
956 Stewart “Towards synergies in forms of corporate accountability for international crimes” 4. 
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S v Williams en ‘n ander 1980(1) SA 60 (A) 
S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) 
SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 20 ILJ 1936 (LAC) 
Smit v Workmans Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 207 (A) 
Twalo v The Minister of Safety and Security [2009] 2 All SA 491 (E) 
South Australia 
South Australia v Totani (2010) 243 CLR 1 
United Kingdom 
Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 
Case of the Lord of the Manor of Hampstead (1704) 91 English Report 195 (KB) 
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd v Lewellin [1957] 1 WLR 464 
Foss v Harbottel (1843) 67 ER 189 
HL Bolton (Engineering) Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 
Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 713 
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Limpus v London General Omnibus Company (1862) 158 All ER 993 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 
Queen v Great North of England Railway (1846) 114 Eng Rap 492 
R v Miller[1983] 2 AC 161 (HL) 
Reedie v London and North West Railways (1849) 4 Exch 244 
Rex v Huggins (1730) 92 Eng. Rep. 518 KBD 
Salamon v Salamon and Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 
Smith v Hancock [1894] 2 Ch 377 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (UKHL) 
Vane v Yiannopoullos [1964] 3 All ER 820 (HL) [(1965) AC 486] 
United States of America 
Ester Kiobel and Others v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, and Others Case No. 569 US (2013) 
Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America delivered on 17 April 2013 
Goddard v Grand Trunk Ry 57 Me. 202, 223 (1869) 
John Roe III; John Roe VII; John Roe VIII; John Roe X v Unocal Corporation; Union Oil 
Company of California D.C. No CV-96-06956 RSWL 14187 (395 F.3d 932b (9th Cir 2002) 
Nedco Ltd v Clark (1973) 43 DLR (3d) 714 
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v U.S. 212 U.S. 481 (1909) 
Ken Wiwa and Others v Shell Petroleum and Others Case No. 96 Civ 8386 (KMW)(HBP) 
Order of Court dated 8 June 2009 by the US District Court of New York 
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The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc, Case No. 07-0016-CV, (2nd 
Circuit 2009) Judgment 2 October 2009 
Slager v Commonwealth Edison Co 595 NE 2d 1097 (Ill App Ct 1992) 
State v Morris and Essex Railroad Co. 23 NJL 360 (1852) 
Wiwa v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Case No 08-1803-cv (2009) 
Regional cases 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and Others v Democratic Republic of 
Congo Communication 393/10 ACHPR decision adopted during the 20th Extraordinary 
Session 9-18 June 2016, Banjul, Gambia 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) v Nigeria (2001) African Human Rights Law Report 60, Communication 
155/1996, ACHPR 30th Ordinary Session 13-27 October 2001, Banjul, Gambia 
International cases 
International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana Case No ICC-01/04-01/10 Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on Confirmation of Charges delivered on 16 December 2011 
Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali 
ICC-01/09-02/11 O A, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judgment 30 May 2011 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga Case No ICC-01/04-01/07 Judgment of Trial Chamber II, 
dated 7 March 2014 
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Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ICC-01/04-01/07 Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Decision on Confirmation of Charges delivered on 30 September 2008 
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Case No ICC-01/05-01/08 Judgment of Trial 
Chamber II dated 21 March 2016 
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08, Trial Chamber III, Decision on 
Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute delivered on 21 June 2016 
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo, Fidéle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido Case No ICC-01/05-01/13 Trial 
Chamber VII, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of Rome Statute, Delivered on 19 October 
2016 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, delivered on 27 January 2007 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case No ICC-01/04-01/06 Judgment of 14 March 2012 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 Trial Chamber I, Judgment delivered 
on 10 July 2012 
International Court of Justice 
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Report No. 
91, Judgment of 26 February 2007 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) ICJ Report No. 14, Judgment dated 21 June 1986 
Croatia v Serbia ICJ Judgement delivered on 3 February 2015 on the application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
307 
 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996 
The Case regarding Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) ICJ 
Reports 2005 delivered on 19 December 2005 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija IT-95-17/1 Decision of the Appeals Chamber delivered on 21 
July 2000 
Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić IT-95-9-A, Judgment delivered on 28 November 2006 
Prosecutor v Delalic IT-96-21-T Decision of ICTY Trial Chamber delivered on 16 November 
1998 
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic IT-96-23 IT-96-23/1A 
Decision of ICTY Appeals Chamber delivered on 12 June 2002 
Prosecutor v Dražen Erdemović IT-96-22-T Judgment of Trial Chamber I delivered on 29 
November 1996 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić and Goran Borovnica IT-94-1-T Appeals Chamber Decision on 
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction dated 2 October 1995 
Prosecutor v DuskoTadić and Goran Borovnica IT-94-1-T Opinion and Judgment Trial 
Chamber II by Judges McDonald, Stephen and Vohrah dated 7 May 1997 
Prosecutor v Du [Ko Tadi] a/k/a/ Dule IT-94-1-T, Delivered on 7 May 1997 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić and Goran Borovnica IT-94-1-T Decision of the Trial Chamber II 
on Sentencing dated 14 July 1997 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić Case No IT-94-1-A Judgment of the Appeals Chamber dated 15 
July 1999 
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Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac IT-97-25-T, Decision of Trial Chamber delivered on 15 March 
2002 
Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvo^ka, Milojica Kos, Mla\o Radi, Zoran Žigi and Dragoljub Prca IT-
98-30/1-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber delivered on 2 November 2001 
Prosecutor v Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martino Vic, IT-98-34-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber 
delivered on 31 March 2003 
Prosecutor v Sefer Halilovic IT-01-48-T, Judgment delivered on 16 November 2005 
Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A Appeals Judgment delivered on 15 July 1999 
Prosecutor v Tihofil Blaskic IT-95-14-T Judgment of 3 April 1996 
Prosecutor v Vasiljević IT-98-32-T Judgment delivered on 29 November 2002 
Prosecutor v Željko Ražnatović IT-97-27 Initial Indictment of 23 September 1997 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T Delivered on 02 September 1998 
Prosecutor v Clement Kayishima and Obed Ruzindana ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment delivered 
on 21 May 1999 
Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze Case No 
ICTR-99-52-T Judgment and Sentence of Trial Chamber I on 3 December 2003 
Prosecutor v Ignace Bagilishema ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment delivered on 3 July 2002 
Prosecutor v Juvenal Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber II delivered on 
23 May 2003 
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Prosecutor v Juvěnal Kajelijeli Case No ICTR-98-44A-T Judgment and Sentence of 1 
December 2003 
Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana ICTR-00-60-T, Judgement delivered on 13 April 2006 
International Military Tribunal 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, (Goring and 
Others) 1946, IMT Volume XXII, Judgment and Sentencing of the Afternoon Session of the 
Two Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Monday 30 September 1946 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Volume XXII, 
(1948) 466 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal  
Military Tribunal Nuremberg, (United States of America v Carl Krauch et al.) Judgment of 30 
July 1948, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Vol. VIII 
Military Tribunal Nuremberg (United States of America v Flick et al), judgment of 22 
December 1947, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Vol. VI 
Trial of ALfreid Felix Alwyn Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others (Krupp Trial), 
United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 17 November 1947 to 30 June 1948, Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals (UNWCC), Vol X, 84 
Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B Case), British Military Court, Hamburg, 1 -8 
March 1946, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (UNWCC), Vol. I (His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1946) 
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Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, Vol I Law Reports 35, 43 (1947); Gustav Becker, 
Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, Vol II Law Reports, 67 British Military Court  for the Trial of 
War Criminals, Held at Almelo, Holland delivery on 24-26 November 1945 
Special Court of Sierra Leone 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor Case No, SCSL-2003-01-I delivered on 3 March 2003 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Tylor Case No SCSL-03-1-T Judgment Summary of 26 April 
2011 
Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL-03-01-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment delivered 
on 26 September 2013 
Special Panel for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste 
Prosecutor v Lino Beno Case No 4 b/2004, Judgment of the District Court of Dili (Special 
Panels for Serious Crimes) delivered on 16 November 2004  
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Index of statute/legislations 
Domestic legislations 
Australia 
Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995 as amended by the Amendment Act 55 of 2001 
Australian Serious and Organized Crime (Control) Act of 2008 
Belgium 
Belgian Penal Code as amended by the Belgium Law of May 4, 1999 
Botswana  
Trade Act 5 of 2004 which entered into force on 1 April 2008 
France 
French Criminal Code of 1994 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 
French Grande Ordonnance Criminelle of 1670 
French Penal Code of 1992 
Germany 
German Criminal Code promulgated on 13 November 1998 published in the Federal Law 
Gazette I p. 3322 as Amended by Art 1 of the Law of 24 September 2013 published in the 
Federal Law Gazette I p. 3671 and as Amended by Art 6(18) of the Law of 10 October 2013 
published in the Federal Law Gazette I p. 3799 
German Code of Administrative Offences Act 
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Italy 
The Italian Constitution 
Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001 issued on 8 June 2001 
Namibia 
Administration of Justice Proclamation 21 of 1919 
Close Corporation Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984) 
Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973 
Companies Act 28 of 2004 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Labour Act 11 2007 
Namibian Constitution 
Netherlands 
Dutch Penal Code 
Liberia Sanctions Order No 137 of 2001 dated 18 July 2001 (Stc. 2001 No. 137) 
Sierra Leone 
Companies Act, 1924 
Constitution of Sierra Leone Act 6 of 1991 
Criminal Procedure Act No. 32 of 1965 assented to in Her Majesty’s name on the 6th day of 
October 1965 and interred into force being an Act to Consolidate and Amend the Law 
Relating to Criminal Procedure on 7th October 1965 
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South Africa 
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 
Executive Powers (Justice) Transfer Proclamation AG 33 of 1979 dated 12 November 1979 
King III Code of Governance (2009) 
The 1996 South African Constitution 
Sweden 
Swedish Companies Act 2005 
Swedish Code of Statutes of 2014 
Swedish Penal Code of 1962 
Russia 
Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation 195-FZ of December 2001 
adopted on 21 December 2001 and endorsed by the Council of Federation on 26 December 
2001 
United Kingdom 
Bribery Act of 2010 signed on 10 April 2010 
Bubble Act of 1720 
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Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Chapter 19, Royal assent 26 
July 2007 (entry into force 6 April 2008) 
Magna Carta in 1215 
United States of America 
Alien Tort Claim Act (1789) 28 US Code [USC] 
Declaration of Independence 1776 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 Publication No 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
Elkins Act 1903 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977 
Model Penal Code (1985) 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Publication No 107-204, §§ 802 -807, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
Security Exchange Act 1934 Title 15 U.S.C 
Trade Act 1988 Title V, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). 
Regional instruments 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights Adopted on 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5.21I.L.M. 58 (1982) entered into force 21 October 1986 
African Union Convention on Protecting and Combating Corruption, adopted on 1 July 2003 
(entry into force 5 August 2006) 
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa of 1991, adopted on 30 
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January 1991 and opened for signature 30 January 1991 to 31 July 1991 (entered into force 
22 April 1998) 
Organization of African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
adopted on 14 July 1999 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, adopted by the 23 Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the African Union on 27 June 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea 
Continental Europe 
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law 
of 1998 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999 (European Treaty Series 
No. 173) done at Strasbourg on the 27th January 1999 came into force 1 July 2002 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (European 
Treaty Series No. 37) done at Warsaw on 16 May 2005, was previously published as 
Miscellaneous No 7 (2008) Cm 7465, it entered into force in the UK on 1 April 2009 
Council of Europe on the Prevention of Terrorism (European Treaty Series No 196) done at 
Warsaw on the 16th May 2005 
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law 
(European Treaty Series No. 172) done at Strasbourg on the 4th November 1998 
Council of European Union Common Position of 7 May 2001 concerning restrictive 
measures in relation to Liberia (2001/357/CFSP) 
Statute of the Council of Europe (European Treaty Series No 1) conclude at London on 5 th 
May 1949 
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International instruments 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis of 8 December 1945 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internally Wrongful Acts of 12 December 2001 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 
Control Council Law No. 09 Seizure of property owned by I.G. Farbanindustrie and the 
control thereof of 30 November 1945 
Control Council Law No. 10 Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity of 20 December 1945, Official Gazette Control Council for 
Germany 50-55 (1946)  
Geneva Convention (I) of 12 August 1949: Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
Geneva Convention (II) of 12 August 1949: Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
Geneva Convention (III) of 12 August 1949: Relative Treatment of Prisoners of War 
Geneva Convention (IV) of 12 August 1949: Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999, entered 
into force 10 April 2002 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(ICSPCA) of 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII), 28 UN GOAR Supp. (No.30) 
at 75 U.N. Document A/9030 of 1974, 1015 U.N.T.S 243 entered into force on 18 July 1976 
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International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office 
at its 204th session in 1977 Geneva, and amended at its 279 (November 2000), 295 (March 
2006) and 329 (March 2017) Sessions 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Special Proclamation by the Supreme 
Commander tor the Allied Powers at Tokyo, entered into force on 19 January 1946 and as 
Amended on 26 April 1946 
Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 pertaining to the Prosecution and Punishment of 
German War Criminals in the countries 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which was 
opened for signature on 16 December 1996 and came into force on 23 March 1976 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949: Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflict of 8 June 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949: Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict of 8 June 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949: Relating to the Adoption 
of Additional Distinctive Emblem of 8 December 2005 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, the text of the Rome Statute was 
circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by procès-verbaux of 
10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 
16 January 2002; the Rome Statute came into force on 1 July 2002 
Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adopted on 25 May 1993 
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 827 as Amended on 13 May 
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1998 by UNSC Resolution 1166 and Amended on 30 November 2000 by UNSC Resolution 
1329 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as amended), adopted by the 
United Nation Security Council on 8 November 1994 in terms of Resolution 955 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone concluded on 16 January 2002 and come into 
force on 12 April 2002 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of 
Versailles) of 18 June 1919 
Treaty of Versailles and the South West Africa Mandate, Act 49 of 1919 which was signed 
on 28 June 1919, reprinted in Government Notice 72 of June 1921 
United Nations Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice adopted 14 August 
1941 signed 26 June 1945 and came effective on 24 October 1945 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, entered into force 14 December 2005 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
adopted by General Assembly on 9 December 1948 in terms of Resolution 260 and entered 
into force 12 January 1951 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes, passed by the United 
Nations General Assembly in terms of Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, and it 
entered into force 29 September 2003 
United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
adopted by United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992 
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United Nations International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 2006 
and it came into force on 23 December 2010 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1966 
United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1965 and came into 
force in 1969 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature by General Assembly 
Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 and entered into force on 26 June 1987 
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 
and came into force on 25 December 2003 
United Nations Global Compact Principles launched on 26 July 2000 in New York by the UN 
Secretary General 
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, United Nations Document 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2(2003) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty adopted 23 May 1969 and became effective on 27 
January 1980 
Resolutions / reports/ conferences 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone dated 16 January 2002 
Economic and Social Council Decision 223 (1994) UN Document A/49/508-S/19941157 
Letter from the President of Sierra Leone to UNSC President dated 12 June 2000 UN 
Document S/2000/786 
Special Rapporteur Report on Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of Rwanda 
transmitted to the United Nation Commission on Human Rights (Res S-3/1) 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 of 1993 UN Document S/RES/780 on the 
establishment of a Commission of Expert on the atrocities committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia 
United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1970 on atrocities in Libya. 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, Summary of Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the 
Whole (1998) UN Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 2 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court (1998) UN Document A/CONF.183/13 Vol 3 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court’s Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law Working 
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Paper on Article 23, Paragraph 5 and 6: Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 
(1998) UN Document A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2 
United Nations Security Council, Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established 
in terms of UNSC Resolution 780 of 1992 UN Document S/25274 
United Nations Security Commission, Final Report of the Commission of Experts established 
in terms of UNSC Resolution 780 UN Document S/1994/674 
United Nations Security Council Resolution1342 of 2001 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 of 2000 UN Document S/RES/1315 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) establishing the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 827 (1993) UN Document 
S/RES/827 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) UN Document S/RES/935 
empowering the Commission of Experts to conduct investigation in the Former Yugoslavia 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 1994 dated 8 November 1994 on the 
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
United Nations Document S/25266, French Proposal (from the Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations) letter dated 10 February 1993 
Other instruments 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on 
Combating of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction 1997 
entered into force on 15 February 1999 
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Organization for Economic Co-operations and Development Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions adopted by 
Negotiating Conference on 21 November 1997 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises adopted by OECD in 1976, revised in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1991, 2000 and 2011 
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